comparing 6c4762985506fe00b28eaa758f53af7e7da622c0 and feat/dpop-token-binding on bretton.dev/coves

+148 -6

internal/api/middleware/auth.go

···

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"

     

       5
       5
        
       	"context"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"fmt"

     

       6
       7
        
       	"log"

     

       7
       8
        
       	"net/http"

     

       8
       9
        
       	"strings"

     
···

       15
       16
        
       	UserDIDKey      contextKey = "user_did"

     

       16
       17
        
       	JWTClaimsKey    contextKey = "jwt_claims"

     

       17
       18
        
       	UserAccessToken contextKey = "user_access_token"

     

       19
       19
       +
       	DPoPProofKey    contextKey = "dpop_proof"

     

       18
       20
        
       )

     

       19
       21
        
       

     

       20
       22
        
       // AtProtoAuthMiddleware enforces atProto OAuth authentication for protected routes

     

       21
       23
        
       // Validates JWT Bearer tokens from the Authorization header

     

       24
       24
       +
       // Supports DPoP (RFC 9449) for token binding verification

     

       22
       25
        
       type AtProtoAuthMiddleware struct {

     

       23
       23
       -
       	jwksFetcher auth.JWKSFetcher

     

       24
       24
       -
       	skipVerify  bool // For Phase 1 testing only

     

       26
       26
       +
       	jwksFetcher  auth.JWKSFetcher

     

       27
       27
       +
       	dpopVerifier *auth.DPoPVerifier

     

       28
       28
       +
       	skipVerify   bool // For Phase 1 testing only

     

       25
       29
        
       }

     

       26
       30
        
       

     

       27
       31
        
       // NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware creates a new atProto auth middleware

     

       28
       32
        
       // skipVerify: if true, only parses JWT without signature verification (Phase 1)

     

       29
       33
        
       //

     

       30
       34
        
       //	if false, performs full signature verification (Phase 2)

     

       35
       35
       +
       //

     

       36
       36
       +
       // IMPORTANT: Call Stop() when shutting down to clean up background goroutines.

     

       31
       37
        
       func NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher auth.JWKSFetcher, skipVerify bool) *AtProtoAuthMiddleware {

     

       32
       38
        
       	return &AtProtoAuthMiddleware{

     

       33
       33
       -
       		jwksFetcher: jwksFetcher,

     

       34
       34
       -
       		skipVerify:  skipVerify,

     

       39
       39
       +
       		jwksFetcher:  jwksFetcher,

     

       40
       40
       +
       		dpopVerifier: auth.NewDPoPVerifier(),

     

       41
       41
       +
       		skipVerify:   skipVerify,

     

       42
       42
       +
       	}

     

       43
       43
       +
       }

     

       44
       44
       +
       

     

       45
       45
       +
       // Stop stops background goroutines. Call this when shutting down the server.

     

       46
       46
       +
       // This prevents goroutine leaks from the DPoP verifier's replay protection cache.

     

       47
       47
       +
       func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) Stop() {

     

       48
       48
       +
       	if m.dpopVerifier != nil {

     

       49
       49
       +
       		m.dpopVerifier.Stop()

     

       35
       50
        
       	}

     

       36
       51
        
       }

     

       37
       52
        
       

     
···

       70
       85
        
       			}

     

       71
       86
        
       		} else {

     

       72
       87
        
       			// Phase 2: Full verification with signature check

     

       88
       88
       +
       			//

     

       89
       89
       +
       			// SECURITY: The access token MUST be verified before trusting any claims.

     

       90
       90
       +
       			// DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, not a replacement for signature verification.

     

       73
       91
        
       			claims, err = auth.VerifyJWT(r.Context(), token, m.jwksFetcher)

     

       74
       92
        
       			if err != nil {

     

       75
       75
       -
       				// Try to extract issuer for better logging

     

       93
       93
       +
       				// Token verification failed - REJECT

     

       94
       94
       +
       				// DO NOT fall back to DPoP-only verification, as that would trust unverified claims

     

       76
       95
        
       				issuer := "unknown"

     

       77
       96
        
       				if parsedClaims, parseErr := auth.ParseJWT(token); parseErr == nil {

     

       78
       97
        
       					issuer = parsedClaims.Issuer

     
···

       82
       101
        
       				writeAuthError(w, "Invalid or expired token")

     

       83
       102
        
       				return

     

       84
       103
        
       			}

     

       104
       104
       +
       

     

       105
       105
       +
       			// Token signature verified - now check if DPoP binding is required

     

       106
       106
       +
       			// If the token has a cnf.jkt claim, DPoP proof is REQUIRED

     

       107
       107
       +
       			dpopHeader := r.Header.Get("DPoP")

     

       108
       108
       +
       			hasCnfJkt := claims.Confirmation != nil && claims.Confirmation["jkt"] != nil

     

       109
       109
       +
       

     

       110
       110
       +
       			if hasCnfJkt {

     

       111
       111
       +
       				// Token has DPoP binding - REQUIRE valid DPoP proof

     

       112
       112
       +
       				if dpopHeader == "" {

     

       113
       113
       +
       					log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=missing_dpop ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header",

     

       114
       114
       +
       						r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path)

     

       115
       115
       +
       					writeAuthError(w, "DPoP proof required")

     

       116
       116
       +
       					return

     

       117
       117
       +
       				}

     

       118
       118
       +
       

     

       119
       119
       +
       				proof, err := m.verifyDPoPBinding(r, claims, dpopHeader)

     

       120
       120
       +
       				if err != nil {

     

       121
       121
       +
       					log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=dpop_verification_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",

     

       122
       122
       +
       						r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)

     

       123
       123
       +
       					writeAuthError(w, "Invalid DPoP proof")

     

       124
       124
       +
       					return

     

       125
       125
       +
       				}

     

       126
       126
       +
       

     

       127
       127
       +
       				// Store verified DPoP proof in context

     

       128
       128
       +
       				ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), DPoPProofKey, proof)

     

       129
       129
       +
       				r = r.WithContext(ctx)

     

       130
       130
       +
       			} else if dpopHeader != "" {

     

       131
       131
       +
       				// DPoP header present but token doesn't have cnf.jkt - this is suspicious

     

       132
       132
       +
       				// Log warning but don't reject (could be a misconfigured client)

     

       133
       133
       +
       				log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] type=unexpected_dpop ip=%s method=%s path=%s warning=DPoP header present but token has no cnf.jkt",

     

       134
       134
       +
       					r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path)

     

       135
       135
       +
       			}

     

       85
       136
        
       		}

     

       86
       137
        
       

     

       87
       138
        
       		// Extract user DID from 'sub' claim

     
···

       124
       175
        
       			claims, err = auth.ParseJWT(token)

     

       125
       176
        
       		} else {

     

       126
       177
        
       			// Phase 2: Full verification

     

       178
       178
       +
       			// SECURITY: Token MUST be verified before trusting claims

     

       127
       179
        
       			claims, err = auth.VerifyJWT(r.Context(), token, m.jwksFetcher)

     

       128
       180
        
       		}

     

       129
       181
        
       

     
···

       134
       186
        
       			return

     

       135
       187
        
       		}

     

       136
       188
        
       

     

       137
       137
       -
       		// Inject user info and access token into context

     

       189
       189
       +
       		// Check DPoP binding if token has cnf.jkt (after successful verification)

     

       190
       190
       +
       		// SECURITY: If token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header, we cannot trust it

     

       191
       191
       +
       		// (could be a stolen token). Continue as unauthenticated.

     

       192
       192
       +
       		if !m.skipVerify {

     

       193
       193
       +
       			dpopHeader := r.Header.Get("DPoP")

     

       194
       194
       +
       			hasCnfJkt := claims.Confirmation != nil && claims.Confirmation["jkt"] != nil

     

       195
       195
       +
       

     

       196
       196
       +
       			if hasCnfJkt {

     

       197
       197
       +
       				if dpopHeader == "" {

     

       198
       198
       +
       					// Token requires DPoP binding but no proof provided

     

       199
       199
       +
       					// Cannot trust this token - continue without auth

     

       200
       200
       +
       					log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header - treating as unauthenticated (potential token theft)")

     

       201
       201
       +
       					next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       202
       202
       +
       					return

     

       203
       203
       +
       				}

     

       204
       204
       +
       

     

       205
       205
       +
       				proof, err := m.verifyDPoPBinding(r, claims, dpopHeader)

     

       206
       206
       +
       				if err != nil {

     

       207
       207
       +
       					// DPoP verification failed - cannot trust this token

     

       208
       208
       +
       					log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: DPoP verification failed - treating as unauthenticated: %v", err)

     

       209
       209
       +
       					next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       210
       210
       +
       					return

     

       211
       211
       +
       				}

     

       212
       212
       +
       

     

       213
       213
       +
       				// DPoP verified - inject proof into context

     

       214
       214
       +
       				ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, claims.Subject)

     

       215
       215
       +
       				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)

     

       216
       216
       +
       				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)

     

       217
       217
       +
       				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, DPoPProofKey, proof)

     

       218
       218
       +
       				next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))

     

       219
       219
       +
       				return

     

       220
       220
       +
       			}

     

       221
       221
       +
       		}

     

       222
       222
       +
       

     

       223
       223
       +
       		// No DPoP binding required - inject user info and access token into context

     

       138
       224
        
       		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, claims.Subject)

     

       139
       225
        
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)

     

       140
       226
        
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)

     
···

       179
       265
        
       	return token

     

       180
       266
        
       }

     

       181
       267
        
       

     

       268
       268
       +
       // GetDPoPProof extracts the DPoP proof from the request context

     

       269
       269
       +
       // Returns nil if no DPoP proof was verified

     

       270
       270
       +
       func GetDPoPProof(r *http.Request) *auth.DPoPProof {

     

       271
       271
       +
       	proof, _ := r.Context().Value(DPoPProofKey).(*auth.DPoPProof)

     

       272
       272
       +
       	return proof

     

       273
       273
       +
       }

     

       274
       274
       +
       

     

       275
       275
       +
       // verifyDPoPBinding verifies DPoP proof binding for an ALREADY VERIFIED token.

     

       276
       276
       +
       //

     

       277
       277
       +
       // SECURITY: This function ONLY verifies the DPoP proof and its binding to the token.

     

       278
       278
       +
       // The access token MUST be signature-verified BEFORE calling this function.

     

       279
       279
       +
       // DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, not a replacement for signature verification.

     

       280
       280
       +
       //

     

       281
       281
       +
       // This prevents token theft attacks by proving the client possesses the private key

     

       282
       282
       +
       // corresponding to the public key thumbprint in the token's cnf.jkt claim.

     

       283
       283
       +
       func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) verifyDPoPBinding(r *http.Request, claims *auth.Claims, dpopProofHeader string) (*auth.DPoPProof, error) {

     

       284
       284
       +
       	// Extract the cnf.jkt claim from the already-verified token

     

       285
       285
       +
       	jkt, err := auth.ExtractCnfJkt(claims)

     

       286
       286
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       287
       287
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token requires DPoP but missing cnf.jkt: %w", err)

     

       288
       288
       +
       	}

     

       289
       289
       +
       

     

       290
       290
       +
       	// Build the HTTP URI for DPoP verification

     

       291
       291
       +
       	// Use the full URL including scheme and host

     

       292
       292
       +
       	scheme := strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Scheme)

     

       293
       293
       +
       	if forwardedProto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); forwardedProto != "" {

     

       294
       294
       +
       		// Forwarded proto may contain a comma-separated list; use the first entry

     

       295
       295
       +
       		parts := strings.Split(forwardedProto, ",")

     

       296
       296
       +
       		if len(parts) > 0 && strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) != "" {

     

       297
       297
       +
       			scheme = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]))

     

       298
       298
       +
       		}

     

       299
       299
       +
       	}

     

       300
       300
       +
       	if scheme == "" {

     

       301
       301
       +
       		if r.TLS != nil {

     

       302
       302
       +
       			scheme = "https"

     

       303
       303
       +
       		} else {

     

       304
       304
       +
       			scheme = "http"

     

       305
       305
       +
       		}

     

       306
       306
       +
       	}

     

       307
       307
       +
       	scheme = strings.ToLower(scheme)

     

       308
       308
       +
       	httpURI := scheme + "://" + r.Host + r.URL.Path

     

       309
       309
       +
       

     

       310
       310
       +
       	// Verify the DPoP proof

     

       311
       311
       +
       	proof, err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyDPoPProof(dpopProofHeader, r.Method, httpURI)

     

       312
       312
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       313
       313
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof verification failed: %w", err)

     

       314
       314
       +
       	}

     

       315
       315
       +
       

     

       316
       316
       +
       	// Verify the binding between the proof and the token

     

       317
       317
       +
       	if err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyTokenBinding(proof, jkt); err != nil {

     

       318
       318
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP binding verification failed: %w", err)

     

       319
       319
       +
       	}

     

       320
       320
       +
       

     

       321
       321
       +
       	return proof, nil

     

       322
       322
       +
       }

     

       323
       323
       +
       

     

       182
       324
        
       // writeAuthError writes a JSON error response for authentication failures

     

       183
       325
        
       func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {

     

       184
       326
        
       	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

+416

internal/api/middleware/auth_test.go

···

       1
       1
        
       package middleware

     

       2
       2
        
       

     

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"

     

       4
       5
        
       	"context"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"crypto/ecdsa"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"crypto/elliptic"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"crypto/rand"

     

       9
       9
       +
       	"encoding/base64"

     

       5
       10
        
       	"fmt"

     

       6
       11
        
       	"net/http"

     

       7
       12
        
       	"net/http/httptest"

     
···

       9
       14
        
       	"time"

     

       10
       15
        
       

     

       11
       16
        
       	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"

     

       17
       17
       +
       	"github.com/google/uuid"

     

       12
       18
        
       )

     

       13
       19
        
       

     

       14
       20
        
       // mockJWKSFetcher is a test double for JWKSFetcher

     
···

       326
       332
        
       		t.Errorf("expected nil claims, got %+v", claims)

     

       327
       333
        
       	}

     

       328
       334
        
       }

     

       335
       335
       +
       

     

       336
       336
       +
       // TestGetDPoPProof_NotAuthenticated tests that GetDPoPProof returns nil when no DPoP was verified

     

       337
       337
       +
       func TestGetDPoPProof_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {

     

       338
       338
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       339
       339
       +
       	proof := GetDPoPProof(req)

     

       340
       340
       +
       

     

       341
       341
       +
       	if proof != nil {

     

       342
       342
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected nil proof, got %+v", proof)

     

       343
       343
       +
       	}

     

       344
       344
       +
       }

     

       345
       345
       +
       

     

       346
       346
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_WithDPoP_SecurityModel tests the correct DPoP security model:

     

       347
       347
       +
       // Token MUST be verified first, then DPoP is checked as an additional layer.

     

       348
       348
       +
       // DPoP is NOT a fallback for failed token verification.

     

       349
       349
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_WithDPoP_SecurityModel(t *testing.T) {

     

       350
       350
       +
       	// Generate an ECDSA key pair for DPoP

     

       351
       351
       +
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       352
       352
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       353
       353
       +
       		t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)

     

       354
       354
       +
       	}

     

       355
       355
       +
       

     

       356
       356
       +
       	// Calculate JWK thumbprint for cnf.jkt

     

       357
       357
       +
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       358
       358
       +
       	thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       359
       359
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       360
       360
       +
       		t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)

     

       361
       361
       +
       	}

     

       362
       362
       +
       

     

       363
       363
       +
       	t.Run("DPoP_is_NOT_fallback_for_failed_verification", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       364
       364
       +
       		// SECURITY TEST: When token verification fails, DPoP should NOT be used as fallback

     

       365
       365
       +
       		// This prevents an attacker from forging a token with their own cnf.jkt

     

       366
       366
       +
       

     

       367
       367
       +
       		// Create a DPoP-bound access token (unsigned - will fail verification)

     

       368
       368
       +
       		claims := auth.Claims{

     

       369
       369
       +
       			RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       370
       370
       +
       				Subject:   "did:plc:attacker",

     

       371
       371
       +
       				Issuer:    "https://external.pds.local",

     

       372
       372
       +
       				ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       373
       373
       +
       				IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       374
       374
       +
       			},

     

       375
       375
       +
       			Scope: "atproto",

     

       376
       376
       +
       			Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       377
       377
       +
       				"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       378
       378
       +
       			},

     

       379
       379
       +
       		}

     

       380
       380
       +
       

     

       381
       381
       +
       		token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       382
       382
       +
       		tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       383
       383
       +
       

     

       384
       384
       +
       		// Create valid DPoP proof (attacker has the private key)

     

       385
       385
       +
       		dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint")

     

       386
       386
       +
       

     

       387
       387
       +
       		// Mock fetcher that fails (simulating external PDS without JWKS)

     

       388
       388
       +
       		fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}

     

       389
       389
       +
       		middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false) // skipVerify=false

     

       390
       390
       +
       

     

       391
       391
       +
       		handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       392
       392
       +
       			t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: handler was called despite token verification failure")

     

       393
       393
       +
       		}))

     

       394
       394
       +
       

     

       395
       395
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint", nil)

     

       396
       396
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tokenString)

     

       397
       397
       +
       		req.Header.Set("DPoP", dpopProof)

     

       398
       398
       +
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       399
       399
       +
       

     

       400
       400
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       401
       401
       +
       

     

       402
       402
       +
       		// MUST reject - token verification failed, DPoP cannot substitute for signature verification

     

       403
       403
       +
       		if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       404
       404
       +
       			t.Errorf("SECURITY: expected 401 for unverified token, got %d", w.Code)

     

       405
       405
       +
       		}

     

       406
       406
       +
       	})

     

       407
       407
       +
       

     

       408
       408
       +
       	t.Run("DPoP_required_when_cnf_jkt_present_in_verified_token", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       409
       409
       +
       		// When token has cnf.jkt, DPoP header MUST be present

     

       410
       410
       +
       		// This test uses skipVerify=true to simulate a verified token

     

       411
       411
       +
       

     

       412
       412
       +
       		claims := auth.Claims{

     

       413
       413
       +
       			RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       414
       414
       +
       				Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       415
       415
       +
       				Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       416
       416
       +
       				ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       417
       417
       +
       				IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       418
       418
       +
       			},

     

       419
       419
       +
       			Scope: "atproto",

     

       420
       420
       +
       			Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       421
       421
       +
       				"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       422
       422
       +
       			},

     

       423
       423
       +
       		}

     

       424
       424
       +
       

     

       425
       425
       +
       		token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       426
       426
       +
       		tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       427
       427
       +
       

     

       428
       428
       +
       		// NO DPoP header - should fail when skipVerify is false

     

       429
       429
       +
       		// Note: with skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked

     

       430
       430
       +
       		fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       431
       431
       +
       		middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true) // skipVerify=true for parsing

     

       432
       432
       +
       

     

       433
       433
       +
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       434
       434
       +
       		handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       435
       435
       +
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       436
       436
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       437
       437
       +
       		}))

     

       438
       438
       +
       

     

       439
       439
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint", nil)

     

       440
       440
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tokenString)

     

       441
       441
       +
       		// No DPoP header

     

       442
       442
       +
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       443
       443
       +
       

     

       444
       444
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       445
       445
       +
       

     

       446
       446
       +
       		// With skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked, so this should succeed

     

       447
       447
       +
       		if !handlerCalled {

     

       448
       448
       +
       			t.Error("handler should be called when skipVerify=true")

     

       449
       449
       +
       		}

     

       450
       450
       +
       	})

     

       451
       451
       +
       }

     

       452
       452
       +
       

     

       453
       453
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_TokenVerificationFails_DPoPNotUsedAsFallback is the key security test.

     

       454
       454
       +
       // It ensures that DPoP cannot be used as a fallback when token signature verification fails.

     

       455
       455
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_TokenVerificationFails_DPoPNotUsedAsFallback(t *testing.T) {

     

       456
       456
       +
       	// Generate a key pair (attacker's key)

     

       457
       457
       +
       	attackerKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       458
       458
       +
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&attackerKey.PublicKey)

     

       459
       459
       +
       	thumbprint, _ := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       460
       460
       +
       

     

       461
       461
       +
       	// Create a FORGED token claiming to be the victim

     

       462
       462
       +
       	claims := auth.Claims{

     

       463
       463
       +
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       464
       464
       +
       			Subject:   "did:plc:victim_user", // Attacker claims to be victim

     

       465
       465
       +
       			Issuer:    "https://untrusted.pds",

     

       466
       466
       +
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       467
       467
       +
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       468
       468
       +
       		},

     

       469
       469
       +
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       470
       470
       +
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       471
       471
       +
       			"jkt": thumbprint, // Attacker uses their own key

     

       472
       472
       +
       		},

     

       473
       473
       +
       	}

     

       474
       474
       +
       

     

       475
       475
       +
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       476
       476
       +
       	tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       477
       477
       +
       

     

       478
       478
       +
       	// Attacker creates a valid DPoP proof with their key

     

       479
       479
       +
       	dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, attackerKey, "POST", "https://api.example.com/protected")

     

       480
       480
       +
       

     

       481
       481
       +
       	// Fetcher fails (external PDS without JWKS)

     

       482
       482
       +
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}

     

       483
       483
       +
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false) // skipVerify=false - REAL verification

     

       484
       484
       +
       

     

       485
       485
       +
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       486
       486
       +
       		t.Fatalf("CRITICAL SECURITY FAILURE: Request authenticated as %s despite forged token!",

     

       487
       487
       +
       			GetUserDID(r))

     

       488
       488
       +
       	}))

     

       489
       489
       +
       

     

       490
       490
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://api.example.com/protected", nil)

     

       491
       491
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tokenString)

     

       492
       492
       +
       	req.Header.Set("DPoP", dpopProof)

     

       493
       493
       +
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       494
       494
       +
       

     

       495
       495
       +
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       496
       496
       +
       

     

       497
       497
       +
       	// MUST reject - the token signature was never verified

     

       498
       498
       +
       	if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       499
       499
       +
       		t.Errorf("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: Expected 401, got %d. Token was not properly verified!", w.Code)

     

       500
       500
       +
       	}

     

       501
       501
       +
       }

     

       502
       502
       +
       

     

       503
       503
       +
       // TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedProto ensures we honor the external HTTPS

     

       504
       504
       +
       // scheme when TLS is terminated upstream and X-Forwarded-Proto is present.

     

       505
       505
       +
       func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedProto(t *testing.T) {

     

       506
       506
       +
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       507
       507
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       508
       508
       +
       		t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)

     

       509
       509
       +
       	}

     

       510
       510
       +
       

     

       511
       511
       +
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       512
       512
       +
       	thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       513
       513
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       514
       514
       +
       		t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)

     

       515
       515
       +
       	}

     

       516
       516
       +
       

     

       517
       517
       +
       	claims := &auth.Claims{

     

       518
       518
       +
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       519
       519
       +
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       520
       520
       +
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       521
       521
       +
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       522
       522
       +
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       523
       523
       +
       		},

     

       524
       524
       +
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       525
       525
       +
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       526
       526
       +
       			"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       527
       527
       +
       		},

     

       528
       528
       +
       	}

     

       529
       529
       +
       

     

       530
       530
       +
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)

     

       531
       531
       +
       	defer middleware.Stop()

     

       532
       532
       +
       

     

       533
       533
       +
       	externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"

     

       534
       534
       +
       	dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)

     

       535
       535
       +
       

     

       536
       536
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)

     

       537
       537
       +
       	req.Host = "api.example.com"

     

       538
       538
       +
       	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")

     

       539
       539
       +
       

     

       540
       540
       +
       	proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof)

     

       541
       541
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       542
       542
       +
       		t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with forwarded proto, got %v", err)

     

       543
       543
       +
       	}

     

       544
       544
       +
       

     

       545
       545
       +
       	if proof == nil || proof.Claims == nil {

     

       546
       546
       +
       		t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")

     

       547
       547
       +
       	}

     

       548
       548
       +
       }

     

       549
       549
       +
       

     

       550
       550
       +
       // TestMiddlewareStop tests that the middleware can be stopped properly

     

       551
       551
       +
       func TestMiddlewareStop(t *testing.T) {

     

       552
       552
       +
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       553
       553
       +
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false)

     

       554
       554
       +
       

     

       555
       555
       +
       	// Stop should not panic and should clean up resources

     

       556
       556
       +
       	middleware.Stop()

     

       557
       557
       +
       

     

       558
       558
       +
       	// Calling Stop again should also be safe (idempotent-ish)

     

       559
       559
       +
       	// Note: The underlying DPoPVerifier.Stop() closes a channel, so this might panic

     

       560
       560
       +
       	// if not handled properly. We test that at least one Stop works.

     

       561
       561
       +
       }

     

       562
       562
       +
       

     

       563
       563
       +
       // TestOptionalAuth_DPoPBoundToken_NoDPoPHeader tests that OptionalAuth treats

     

       564
       564
       +
       // tokens with cnf.jkt but no DPoP header as unauthenticated (potential token theft)

     

       565
       565
       +
       func TestOptionalAuth_DPoPBoundToken_NoDPoPHeader(t *testing.T) {

     

       566
       566
       +
       	// Generate a key pair for DPoP binding

     

       567
       567
       +
       	privateKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       568
       568
       +
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       569
       569
       +
       	thumbprint, _ := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       570
       570
       +
       

     

       571
       571
       +
       	// Create a DPoP-bound token (has cnf.jkt)

     

       572
       572
       +
       	claims := auth.Claims{

     

       573
       573
       +
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       574
       574
       +
       			Subject:   "did:plc:user123",

     

       575
       575
       +
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       576
       576
       +
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       577
       577
       +
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       578
       578
       +
       		},

     

       579
       579
       +
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       580
       580
       +
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       581
       581
       +
       			"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       582
       582
       +
       		},

     

       583
       583
       +
       	}

     

       584
       584
       +
       

     

       585
       585
       +
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       586
       586
       +
       	tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       587
       587
       +
       

     

       588
       588
       +
       	// Use skipVerify=true to simulate a verified token

     

       589
       589
       +
       	// (In production, skipVerify would be false and VerifyJWT would be called)

     

       590
       590
       +
       	// However, for this test we need skipVerify=false to trigger DPoP checking

     

       591
       591
       +
       	// But the fetcher will fail, so let's use skipVerify=true and verify the logic

     

       592
       592
       +
       	// Actually, the DPoP check only happens when skipVerify=false

     

       593
       593
       +
       

     

       594
       594
       +
       	t.Run("with_skipVerify_false", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       595
       595
       +
       		// This will fail at JWT verification level, but that's expected

     

       596
       596
       +
       		// The important thing is the code path for DPoP checking

     

       597
       597
       +
       		fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}

     

       598
       598
       +
       		middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false)

     

       599
       599
       +
       		defer middleware.Stop()

     

       600
       600
       +
       

     

       601
       601
       +
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       602
       602
       +
       		var capturedDID string

     

       603
       603
       +
       		handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       604
       604
       +
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       605
       605
       +
       			capturedDID = GetUserDID(r)

     

       606
       606
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       607
       607
       +
       		}))

     

       608
       608
       +
       

     

       609
       609
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       610
       610
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tokenString)

     

       611
       611
       +
       		// Deliberately NOT setting DPoP header

     

       612
       612
       +
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       613
       613
       +
       

     

       614
       614
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       615
       615
       +
       

     

       616
       616
       +
       		// Handler should be called (optional auth doesn't block)

     

       617
       617
       +
       		if !handlerCalled {

     

       618
       618
       +
       			t.Error("handler should be called")

     

       619
       619
       +
       		}

     

       620
       620
       +
       

     

       621
       621
       +
       		// But since JWT verification fails, user should not be authenticated

     

       622
       622
       +
       		if capturedDID != "" {

     

       623
       623
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected empty DID when verification fails, got %s", capturedDID)

     

       624
       624
       +
       		}

     

       625
       625
       +
       	})

     

       626
       626
       +
       

     

       627
       627
       +
       	t.Run("with_skipVerify_true_dpop_not_checked", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       628
       628
       +
       		// When skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked (Phase 1 mode)

     

       629
       629
       +
       		fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       630
       630
       +
       		middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       631
       631
       +
       		defer middleware.Stop()

     

       632
       632
       +
       

     

       633
       633
       +
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       634
       634
       +
       		var capturedDID string

     

       635
       635
       +
       		handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       636
       636
       +
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       637
       637
       +
       			capturedDID = GetUserDID(r)

     

       638
       638
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       639
       639
       +
       		}))

     

       640
       640
       +
       

     

       641
       641
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       642
       642
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tokenString)

     

       643
       643
       +
       		// No DPoP header

     

       644
       644
       +
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       645
       645
       +
       

     

       646
       646
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       647
       647
       +
       

     

       648
       648
       +
       		if !handlerCalled {

     

       649
       649
       +
       			t.Error("handler should be called")

     

       650
       650
       +
       		}

     

       651
       651
       +
       

     

       652
       652
       +
       		// With skipVerify=true, DPoP check is bypassed - token is trusted

     

       653
       653
       +
       		if capturedDID != "did:plc:user123" {

     

       654
       654
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected DID when skipVerify=true, got %s", capturedDID)

     

       655
       655
       +
       		}

     

       656
       656
       +
       	})

     

       657
       657
       +
       }

     

       658
       658
       +
       

     

       659
       659
       +
       // TestDPoPReplayProtection tests that the same DPoP proof cannot be used twice

     

       660
       660
       +
       func TestDPoPReplayProtection(t *testing.T) {

     

       661
       661
       +
       	// This tests the NonceCache functionality

     

       662
       662
       +
       	cache := auth.NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute)

     

       663
       663
       +
       	defer cache.Stop()

     

       664
       664
       +
       

     

       665
       665
       +
       	jti := "unique-proof-id-123"

     

       666
       666
       +
       

     

       667
       667
       +
       	// First use should succeed

     

       668
       668
       +
       	if !cache.CheckAndStore(jti) {

     

       669
       669
       +
       		t.Error("First use of jti should succeed")

     

       670
       670
       +
       	}

     

       671
       671
       +
       

     

       672
       672
       +
       	// Second use should fail (replay detected)

     

       673
       673
       +
       	if cache.CheckAndStore(jti) {

     

       674
       674
       +
       		t.Error("SECURITY: Replay attack not detected - same jti accepted twice")

     

       675
       675
       +
       	}

     

       676
       676
       +
       

     

       677
       677
       +
       	// Different jti should succeed

     

       678
       678
       +
       	if !cache.CheckAndStore("different-jti-456") {

     

       679
       679
       +
       		t.Error("Different jti should succeed")

     

       680
       680
       +
       	}

     

       681
       681
       +
       }

     

       682
       682
       +
       

     

       683
       683
       +
       // Helper: createDPoPProof creates a DPoP proof JWT for testing

     

       684
       684
       +
       func createDPoPProof(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, method, uri string) string {

     

       685
       685
       +
       	// Create JWK from public key

     

       686
       686
       +
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       687
       687
       +
       

     

       688
       688
       +
       	// Create DPoP claims with UUID for jti to ensure uniqueness across tests

     

       689
       689
       +
       	claims := auth.DPoPClaims{

     

       690
       690
       +
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       691
       691
       +
       			IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       692
       692
       +
       			ID:       uuid.New().String(),

     

       693
       693
       +
       		},

     

       694
       694
       +
       		HTTPMethod: method,

     

       695
       695
       +
       		HTTPURI:    uri,

     

       696
       696
       +
       	}

     

       697
       697
       +
       

     

       698
       698
       +
       	// Create token with custom header

     

       699
       699
       +
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)

     

       700
       700
       +
       	token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"

     

       701
       701
       +
       	token.Header["jwk"] = jwk

     

       702
       702
       +
       

     

       703
       703
       +
       	// Sign with private key

     

       704
       704
       +
       	signedToken, err := token.SignedString(privateKey)

     

       705
       705
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       706
       706
       +
       		t.Fatalf("failed to sign DPoP proof: %v", err)

     

       707
       707
       +
       	}

     

       708
       708
       +
       

     

       709
       709
       +
       	return signedToken

     

       710
       710
       +
       }

     

       711
       711
       +
       

     

       712
       712
       +
       // Helper: ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK converts an ECDSA public key to JWK map

     

       713
       713
       +
       func ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(pubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) map[string]interface{} {

     

       714
       714
       +
       	// Get curve name

     

       715
       715
       +
       	var crv string

     

       716
       716
       +
       	switch pubKey.Curve {

     

       717
       717
       +
       	case elliptic.P256():

     

       718
       718
       +
       		crv = "P-256"

     

       719
       719
       +
       	case elliptic.P384():

     

       720
       720
       +
       		crv = "P-384"

     

       721
       721
       +
       	case elliptic.P521():

     

       722
       722
       +
       		crv = "P-521"

     

       723
       723
       +
       	default:

     

       724
       724
       +
       		panic("unsupported curve")

     

       725
       725
       +
       	}

     

       726
       726
       +
       

     

       727
       727
       +
       	// Encode coordinates

     

       728
       728
       +
       	xBytes := pubKey.X.Bytes()

     

       729
       729
       +
       	yBytes := pubKey.Y.Bytes()

     

       730
       730
       +
       

     

       731
       731
       +
       	// Ensure proper byte length (pad if needed)

     

       732
       732
       +
       	keySize := (pubKey.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8

     

       733
       733
       +
       	xPadded := make([]byte, keySize)

     

       734
       734
       +
       	yPadded := make([]byte, keySize)

     

       735
       735
       +
       	copy(xPadded[keySize-len(xBytes):], xBytes)

     

       736
       736
       +
       	copy(yPadded[keySize-len(yBytes):], yBytes)

     

       737
       737
       +
       

     

       738
       738
       +
       	return map[string]interface{}{

     

       739
       739
       +
       		"kty": "EC",

     

       740
       740
       +
       		"crv": crv,

     

       741
       741
       +
       		"x":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(xPadded),

     

       742
       742
       +
       		"y":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(yPadded),

     

       743
       743
       +
       	}

     

       744
       744
       +
       }

+4 -1

internal/atproto/auth/jwt.go

···

       87
       87
        
       // Claims represents the standard JWT claims we care about

     

       88
       88
        
       type Claims struct {

     

       89
       89
        
       	jwt.RegisteredClaims

     

       90
       90
       -
       	Scope string `json:"scope,omitempty"`

     

       90
       90
       +
       	// Confirmation claim for DPoP token binding (RFC 9449)

     

       91
       91
       +
       	// Contains "jkt" (JWK thumbprint) when token is bound to a DPoP key

     

       92
       92
       +
       	Confirmation map[string]interface{} `json:"cnf,omitempty"`

     

       93
       93
       +
       	Scope        string                 `json:"scope,omitempty"`

     

       91
       94
        
       }

     

       92
       95
        
       

     

       93
       96
        
       // stripBearerPrefix removes the "Bearer " prefix from a token string

+32 -73

internal/atproto/auth/jwt_test.go

···

       2
       2
        
       

     

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
        
       	"context"

     

       5
       5
       -
       	"os"

     

       6
       5
        
       	"testing"

     

       7
       6
        
       	"time"

     

       8
       7
        
       

     
···

       208
       207
        
       	issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"

     

       209
       208
        
       

     

       210
       209
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       211
       211
       -
       	os.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", secret)

     

       212
       212
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       213
       213
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       214
       214
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET")

     

       215
       215
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       216
       216
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       217
       217
       -
       	}()

     

       210
       210
       +
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", secret)

     

       211
       211
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       212
       212
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       218
       213
        
       

     

       219
       214
        
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, secret, 1*time.Hour)

     

       220
       215
        
       

     
···

       237
       232
        
       	issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"

     

       238
       233
        
       

     

       239
       234
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       240
       240
       -
       	os.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "correct-secret")

     

       241
       241
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       242
       242
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       243
       243
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET")

     

       244
       244
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       245
       245
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       246
       246
       -
       	}()

     

       235
       235
       +
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "correct-secret")

     

       236
       236
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       237
       237
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       247
       238
        
       

     

       248
       239
        
       	// Create token with wrong secret

     

       249
       240
        
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, "wrong-secret", 1*time.Hour)

     
···

       260
       251
        
       	issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"

     

       261
       252
        
       

     

       262
       253
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       263
       263
       -
       	os.Unsetenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET") // Ensure secret is not set

     

       264
       264
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       265
       265
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       266
       266
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       267
       267
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       268
       268
       -
       	}()

     

       254
       254
       +
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "") // Ensure secret is not set (empty = not configured)

     

       255
       255
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       256
       256
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       269
       257
        
       

     

       270
       258
        
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, "any-secret", 1*time.Hour)

     

       271
       259
        
       

     
···

       286
       274
        
       	// An attacker tries to use HS256 with an issuer that should use RS256/ES256

     

       287
       275
        
       

     

       288
       276
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       289
       289
       -
       	os.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")

     

       290
       290
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://trusted.example.com") // Different from token issuer

     

       291
       291
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       292
       292
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET")

     

       293
       293
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       294
       294
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       295
       295
       -
       	}()

     

       277
       277
       +
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")

     

       278
       278
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://trusted.example.com") // Different from token issuer

     

       279
       279
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       296
       280
        
       

     

       297
       281
        
       	// Create HS256 token with non-whitelisted issuer (simulating attack)

     

       298
       282
        
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:attacker", "https://victim-pds.example.com", "some-secret", 1*time.Hour)

     
···

       311
       295
        
       	// SECURITY TEST: When no issuers are whitelisted for HS256, all HS256 tokens should be rejected

     

       312
       296
        
       

     

       313
       297
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       314
       314
       -
       	os.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")

     

       315
       315
       -
       	os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS") // Empty whitelist

     

       316
       316
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       317
       317
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET")

     

       318
       318
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       319
       319
       -
       	}()

     

       298
       298
       +
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")

     

       299
       299
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "") // Empty whitelist

     

       300
       300
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       320
       301
        
       

     

       321
       302
        
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://any-pds.example.com", "some-secret", 1*time.Hour)

     

       322
       303
        
       

     
···

       332
       313
        
       	issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"

     

       333
       314
        
       

     

       334
       315
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       335
       335
       -
       	os.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "test-secret")

     

       336
       336
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       337
       337
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       338
       338
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET")

     

       339
       339
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       340
       340
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       341
       341
       -
       	}()

     

       316
       316
       +
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "test-secret")

     

       317
       317
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       318
       318
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       342
       319
        
       

     

       343
       320
        
       	// Create RS256-signed token (can't actually sign without RSA key, but we can test the header check)

     

       344
       321
        
       	claims := &Claims{

     
···

       414
       391
        
       

     

       415
       392
        
       func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_Whitelisted(t *testing.T) {

     

       416
       393
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       417
       417
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com,https://pds2.example.com")

     

       418
       418
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       419
       419
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       420
       420
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       421
       421
       -
       	}()

     

       394
       394
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com,https://pds2.example.com")

     

       395
       395
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       422
       396
        
       

     

       423
       397
        
       	if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds1.example.com") {

     

       424
       398
        
       		t.Error("Expected pds1 to be whitelisted")

     
···

       430
       404
        
       

     

       431
       405
        
       func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_NotWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {

     

       432
       406
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       433
       433
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com")

     

       434
       434
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       435
       435
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       436
       436
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       437
       437
       -
       	}()

     

       407
       407
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com")

     

       408
       408
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       438
       409
        
       

     

       439
       410
        
       	if isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://attacker.example.com") {

     

       440
       411
        
       		t.Error("Expected non-whitelisted issuer to return false")

     
···

       443
       414
        
       

     

       444
       415
        
       func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_EmptyWhitelist(t *testing.T) {

     

       445
       416
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       446
       446
       -
       	os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       447
       447
       -
       	defer ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       417
       417
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "") // Empty whitelist

     

       418
       418
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       448
       419
        
       

     

       449
       420
        
       	if isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://any.example.com") {

     

       450
       421
        
       		t.Error("Expected false when whitelist is empty (safe default)")

     
···

       453
       424
        
       

     

       454
       425
        
       func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_WhitespaceHandling(t *testing.T) {

     

       455
       426
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       456
       456
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "  https://pds1.example.com  ,  https://pds2.example.com  ")

     

       457
       457
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       458
       458
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       459
       459
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       460
       460
       -
       	}()

     

       427
       427
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "  https://pds1.example.com  ,  https://pds2.example.com  ")

     

       428
       428
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       461
       429
        
       

     

       462
       430
        
       	if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds1.example.com") {

     

       463
       431
        
       		t.Error("Expected whitespace-trimmed issuer to be whitelisted")

     
···

       469
       437
        
       func TestShouldUseHS256_WithKid_AlwaysFalse(t *testing.T) {

     

       470
       438
        
       	// Tokens with kid should NEVER use HS256, regardless of issuer whitelist

     

       471
       439
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       472
       472
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://whitelisted.example.com")

     

       473
       473
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       474
       474
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       475
       475
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       476
       476
       -
       	}()

     

       440
       440
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://whitelisted.example.com")

     

       441
       441
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       477
       442
        
       

     

       478
       443
        
       	header := &JWTHeader{

     

       479
       444
        
       		Alg: AlgorithmHS256,

     
···

       488
       453
        
       

     

       489
       454
        
       func TestShouldUseHS256_WithoutKid_WhitelistedIssuer(t *testing.T) {

     

       490
       455
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       491
       491
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")

     

       492
       492
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       493
       493
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       494
       494
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       495
       495
       -
       	}()

     

       456
       456
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")

     

       457
       457
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       496
       458
        
       

     

       497
       459
        
       	header := &JWTHeader{

     

       498
       460
        
       		Alg: AlgorithmHS256,

     
···

       506
       468
        
       

     

       507
       469
        
       func TestShouldUseHS256_WithoutKid_NotWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {

     

       508
       470
        
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       509
       509
       -
       	os.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")

     

       510
       510
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       511
       511
       -
       		os.Unsetenv("HS256_ISSUERS")

     

       512
       512
       -
       		ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       513
       513
       -
       	}()

     

       471
       471
       +
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")

     

       472
       472
       +
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       514
       473
        
       

     

       515
       474
        
       	header := &JWTHeader{

     

       516
       475
        
       		Alg: AlgorithmHS256,

+134 -2

internal/atproto/auth/README.md

···

       110
       110
        
       5. Find matching key by `kid` from JWT header

     

       111
       111
        
       6. Cache the JWKS for 1 hour

     

       112
       112
        
       

     

       113
       113
       +
       ## DPoP Token Binding

     

       114
       114
       +
       

     

       115
       115
       +
       DPoP (Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession) binds access tokens to client-controlled cryptographic keys, preventing token theft and replay attacks.

     

       116
       116
       +
       

     

       117
       117
       +
       ### What is DPoP?

     

       118
       118
       +
       

     

       119
       119
       +
       DPoP is an OAuth extension (RFC 9449) that adds proof-of-possession semantics to bearer tokens. When a PDS issues a DPoP-bound access token:

     

       120
       120
       +
       

     

       121
       121
       +
       1. Access token contains `cnf.jkt` claim (JWK thumbprint of client's public key)

     

       122
       122
       +
       2. Client creates a DPoP proof JWT signed with their private key

     

       123
       123
       +
       3. Server verifies the proof signature and checks it matches the token's `cnf.jkt`

     

       124
       124
       +
       

     

       125
       125
       +
       ### CRITICAL: DPoP Security Model

     

       126
       126
       +
       

     

       127
       127
       +
       > ⚠️ **DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, NOT a replacement for token signature verification.**

     

       128
       128
       +
       

     

       129
       129
       +
       The correct verification order is:

     

       130
       130
       +
       1. **ALWAYS verify the access token signature first** (via JWKS, HS256 shared secret, or DID resolution)

     

       131
       131
       +
       2. **If the verified token has `cnf.jkt`, REQUIRE valid DPoP proof**

     

       132
       132
       +
       3. **NEVER use DPoP as a fallback when signature verification fails**

     

       133
       133
       +
       

     

       134
       134
       +
       **Why This Matters**: An attacker could create a fake token with `sub: "did:plc:victim"` and their own `cnf.jkt`, then present a valid DPoP proof signed with their key. If we accept DPoP as a fallback, the attacker can impersonate any user.

     

       135
       135
       +
       

     

       136
       136
       +
       ### How DPoP Works

     

       137
       137
       +
       

     

       138
       138
       +
       ```

     

       139
       139
       +
       ┌─────────────┐                          ┌─────────────┐

     

       140
       140
       +
       │   Client    │                          │   Server    │

     

       141
       141
       +
       │             │                          │  (Coves)    │

     

       142
       142
       +
       └─────────────┘                          └─────────────┘

     

       143
       143
       +
              │                                        │

     

       144
       144
       +
              │ 1. Authorization: Bearer <token>       │

     

       145
       145
       +
              │    DPoP: <proof-jwt>                  │

     

       146
       146
       +
              │───────────────────────────────────────>│

     

       147
       147
       +
              │                                        │

     

       148
       148
       +
              │                                        │ 2. VERIFY token signature

     

       149
       149
       +
              │                                        │    (REQUIRED - no fallback!)

     

       150
       150
       +
              │                                        │

     

       151
       151
       +
              │                                        │ 3. If token has cnf.jkt:

     

       152
       152
       +
              │                                        │    - Verify DPoP proof

     

       153
       153
       +
              │                                        │    - Check thumbprint match

     

       154
       154
       +
              │                                        │

     

       155
       155
       +
              │                              200 OK    │

     

       156
       156
       +
              │<───────────────────────────────────────│

     

       157
       157
       +
       ```

     

       158
       158
       +
       

     

       159
       159
       +
       ### When DPoP is Required

     

       160
       160
       +
       

     

       161
       161
       +
       DPoP verification is **REQUIRED** when:

     

       162
       162
       +
       - Access token signature has been verified AND

     

       163
       163
       +
       - Access token contains `cnf.jkt` claim (DPoP-bound)

     

       164
       164
       +
       

     

       165
       165
       +
       If the token has `cnf.jkt` but no DPoP header is present, the request is **REJECTED**.

     

       166
       166
       +
       

     

       167
       167
       +
       ### Replay Protection

     

       168
       168
       +
       

     

       169
       169
       +
       DPoP proofs include a unique `jti` (JWT ID) claim. The server tracks seen `jti` values to prevent replay attacks:

     

       170
       170
       +
       

     

       171
       171
       +
       ```go

     

       172
       172
       +
       // Create a verifier with replay protection (default)

     

       173
       173
       +
       verifier := auth.NewDPoPVerifier()

     

       174
       174
       +
       defer verifier.Stop() // Stop cleanup goroutine on shutdown

     

       175
       175
       +
       

     

       176
       176
       +
       // The verifier automatically rejects reused jti values within the proof validity window (5 minutes)

     

       177
       177
       +
       ```

     

       178
       178
       +
       

     

       179
       179
       +
       ### DPoP Implementation

     

       180
       180
       +
       

     

       181
       181
       +
       The `dpop.go` module provides:

     

       182
       182
       +
       

     

       183
       183
       +
       ```go

     

       184
       184
       +
       // Create a verifier with replay protection

     

       185
       185
       +
       verifier := auth.NewDPoPVerifier()

     

       186
       186
       +
       defer verifier.Stop()

     

       187
       187
       +
       

     

       188
       188
       +
       // Verify the DPoP proof

     

       189
       189
       +
       proof, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(dpopHeader, "POST", "https://coves.social/xrpc/...")

     

       190
       190
       +
       if err != nil {

     

       191
       191
       +
           // Invalid proof (includes replay detection)

     

       192
       192
       +
       }

     

       193
       193
       +
       

     

       194
       194
       +
       // Verify it binds to the VERIFIED access token

     

       195
       195
       +
       expectedThumbprint, err := auth.ExtractCnfJkt(claims)

     

       196
       196
       +
       if err != nil {

     

       197
       197
       +
           // Token not DPoP-bound

     

       198
       198
       +
       }

     

       199
       199
       +
       

     

       200
       200
       +
       if err := verifier.VerifyTokenBinding(proof, expectedThumbprint); err != nil {

     

       201
       201
       +
           // Proof doesn't match token

     

       202
       202
       +
       }

     

       203
       203
       +
       ```

     

       204
       204
       +
       

     

       205
       205
       +
       ### DPoP Proof Format

     

       206
       206
       +
       

     

       207
       207
       +
       The DPoP header contains a JWT with:

     

       208
       208
       +
       

     

       209
       209
       +
       **Header**:

     

       210
       210
       +
       - `typ`: `"dpop+jwt"` (required)

     

       211
       211
       +
       - `alg`: `"ES256"` (or other supported algorithm)

     

       212
       212
       +
       - `jwk`: Client's public key (JWK format)

     

       213
       213
       +
       

     

       214
       214
       +
       **Claims**:

     

       215
       215
       +
       - `jti`: Unique proof identifier (tracked for replay protection)

     

       216
       216
       +
       - `htm`: HTTP method (e.g., `"POST"`)

     

       217
       217
       +
       - `htu`: HTTP URI (without query/fragment)

     

       218
       218
       +
       - `iat`: Timestamp (must be recent, within 5 minutes)

     

       219
       219
       +
       

     

       220
       220
       +
       **Example**:

     

       221
       221
       +
       ```json

     

       222
       222
       +
       {

     

       223
       223
       +
         "typ": "dpop+jwt",

     

       224
       224
       +
         "alg": "ES256",

     

       225
       225
       +
         "jwk": {

     

       226
       226
       +
           "kty": "EC",

     

       227
       227
       +
           "crv": "P-256",

     

       228
       228
       +
           "x": "...",

     

       229
       229
       +
           "y": "..."

     

       230
       230
       +
         }

     

       231
       231
       +
       }

     

       232
       232
       +
       {

     

       233
       233
       +
         "jti": "unique-id-123",

     

       234
       234
       +
         "htm": "POST",

     

       235
       235
       +
         "htu": "https://coves.social/xrpc/social.coves.community.create",

     

       236
       236
       +
         "iat": 1700000000

     

       237
       237
       +
       }

     

       238
       238
       +
       ```

     

       239
       239
       +
       

     

       113
       240
        
       ## Security Considerations

     

       114
       241
        
       

     

       115
       242
        
       ### ✅ Implemented

     
···

       120
       247
        
       - Required claims validation (sub, iss)

     

       121
       248
        
       - Key caching with TTL

     

       122
       249
        
       - Secure error messages (no internal details leaked)

     

       250
       250
       +
       - **DPoP proof verification** (proof-of-possession for token binding)

     

       251
       251
       +
       - **DPoP thumbprint validation** (prevents token theft attacks)

     

       252
       252
       +
       - **DPoP freshness checks** (5-minute proof validity window)

     

       253
       253
       +
       - **DPoP replay protection** (jti tracking with in-memory cache)

     

       254
       254
       +
       - **Secure DPoP model** (DPoP required AFTER signature verification, never as fallback)

     

       123
       255
        
       

     

       124
       256
        
       ### ⚠️ Not Yet Implemented

     

       125
       257
        
       

     

       126
       126
       -
       - DPoP validation (for replay attack prevention)

     

       258
       258
       +
       - Server-issued DPoP nonces (additional replay protection)

     

       127
       259
        
       - Scope validation (checking `scope` claim)

     

       128
       260
        
       - Audience validation (checking `aud` claim)

     

       129
       261
        
       - Rate limiting per DID

     
···

       186
       318
        
       

     

       187
       319
        
       ## Future Enhancements

     

       188
       320
        
       

     

       189
       189
       -
       - [ ] DPoP proof validation

     

       321
       321
       +
       - [ ] DPoP nonce validation (server-managed nonce for additional replay protection)

     

       190
       322
        
       - [ ] Scope-based authorization

     

       191
       323
        
       - [ ] Audience claim validation

     

       192
       324
        
       - [ ] Token revocation support

+4 -1

.gitignore

···

       47
       47
        
       

     

       48
       48
        
       # Build artifacts

     

       49
       49
        
       /validate-lexicon

     

       50
       50
       -
       /bin/
     

       50
       50
       +
       /bin/

     

       51
       51
       +
       

     

       52
       52
       +
       # Go build cache

     

       53
       53
       +
       .cache/

+5 -6

go.mod

···

       1
       1
        
       module Coves

     

       2
       2
        
       

     

       3
       3
       -
       go 1.24.0

     

       3
       3
       +
       go 1.25

     

       4
       4
        
       

     

       5
       5
        
       require (

     

       6
       6
       -
       	github.com/bluesky-social/indigo v0.0.0-20251009212240-20524de167fe

     

       6
       6
       +
       	github.com/bluesky-social/indigo v0.0.0-20251127021457-6f2658724b36

     

       7
       7
        
       	github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.1

     

       8
       8
        
       	github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0

     

       9
       9
        
       	github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.3

     
···

       11
       11
        
       	github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2 v2.0.12

     

       12
       12
        
       	github.com/lib/pq v1.10.9

     

       13
       13
        
       	github.com/pressly/goose/v3 v3.22.1

     

       14
       14
       -
       	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.9.0

     

       14
       14
       +
       	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0

     

       15
       15
       +
       	github.com/xeipuuv/gojsonschema v1.2.0

     

       15
       16
        
       	golang.org/x/net v0.46.0

     

       16
       17
        
       	golang.org/x/time v0.3.0

     

       17
       18
        
       )

     

       18
       19
        
       

     

       19
       20
        
       require (

     

       20
       21
        
       	github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect

     

       21
       21
       -
       	github.com/carlmjohnson/versioninfo v0.22.5 // indirect

     

       22
       22
        
       	github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.2.0 // indirect

     

       23
       23
        
       	github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect

     

       24
       24
        
       	github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v4 v4.2.0 // indirect

     

       25
       25
       +
       	github.com/earthboundkid/versioninfo/v2 v2.24.1 // indirect

     

       25
       26
        
       	github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4 // indirect

     

       26
       27
        
       	github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.1 // indirect

     

       27
       28
        
       	github.com/go-logr/stdr v1.2.2 // indirect

     
···

       71
       72
        
       	github.com/segmentio/asm v1.2.0 // indirect

     

       72
       73
        
       	github.com/sethvargo/go-retry v0.3.0 // indirect

     

       73
       74
        
       	github.com/spaolacci/murmur3 v1.1.0 // indirect

     

       74
       74
       -
       	github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2 // indirect

     

       75
       75
        
       	github.com/whyrusleeping/cbor-gen v0.2.1-0.20241030202151-b7a6831be65e // indirect

     

       76
       76
        
       	github.com/xeipuuv/gojsonpointer v0.0.0-20180127040702-4e3ac2762d5f // indirect

     

       77
       77
        
       	github.com/xeipuuv/gojsonreference v0.0.0-20180127040603-bd5ef7bd5415 // indirect

     

       78
       78
       -
       	github.com/xeipuuv/gojsonschema v1.2.0 // indirect

     

       79
       78
        
       	gitlab.com/yawning/secp256k1-voi v0.0.0-20230925100816-f2616030848b // indirect

     

       80
       79
        
       	gitlab.com/yawning/tuplehash v0.0.0-20230713102510-df83abbf9a02 // indirect

     

       81
       80
        
       	go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp v0.46.1 // indirect

+6 -8

go.sum

···

       2
       2
        
       github.com/benbjohnson/clock v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J11/hYXuz8f4ySSvYwY0FKfm+ezbsZBKZxNJlLklBHA=

     

       3
       3
        
       github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 h1:VlbKKnNfV8bJzeqoa4cOKqO6bYr3WgKZxO8Z16+hsOM=

     

       4
       4
        
       github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6rlkpw=

     

       5
       5
       -
       github.com/bluesky-social/indigo v0.0.0-20251009212240-20524de167fe h1:VBhaqE5ewQgXbY5SfSWFZC/AwHFo7cHxZKFYi2ce9Yo=

     

       6
       6
       -
       github.com/bluesky-social/indigo v0.0.0-20251009212240-20524de167fe/go.mod h1:RuQVrCGm42QNsgumKaR6se+XkFKfCPNwdCiTvqKRUck=

     

       7
       7
       -
       github.com/carlmjohnson/versioninfo v0.22.5 h1:O00sjOLUAFxYQjlN/bzYTuZiS0y6fWDQjMRvwtKgwwc=

     

       8
       8
       -
       github.com/carlmjohnson/versioninfo v0.22.5/go.mod h1:QT9mph3wcVfISUKd0i9sZfVrPviHuSF+cUtLjm2WSf8=

     

       5
       5
       +
       github.com/bluesky-social/indigo v0.0.0-20251127021457-6f2658724b36 h1:Vc+l4sltxQfBT8qC3dm87PRYInmxlGyF1dmpjaW0WkU=

     

       6
       6
       +
       github.com/bluesky-social/indigo v0.0.0-20251127021457-6f2658724b36/go.mod h1:Pm2I1+iDXn/hLbF7XCg/DsZi6uDCiOo7hZGWprSM7k0=

     

       9
       7
        
       github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.2.0 h1:DC2CZ1Ep5Y4k3ZQ899DldepgrayRUGE6BBZ/cd9Cj44=

     

       10
       8
        
       github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.2.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=

     

       11
       9
        
       github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.0-20190314233015-f79a8a8ca69d/go.mod h1:maD7wRr/U5Z6m/iR4s+kqSMx2CaBsrgA7czyZG/E6dU=

     
···

       17
       15
        
       github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v4 v4.2.0/go.mod h1:v57UDF4pDQJcEfFUCRop3lJL149eHGSe9Jvczhzjo/0=

     

       18
       16
        
       github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 h1:GzkhY7T5VNhEkwH0PVJgjz+fX1rhBrR7pRT3mDkpeCY=

     

       19
       17
        
       github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1/go.mod h1:Mu1zIs6XwVuF/gI1OepvI0qD18qycQx+mFykh5fBlto=

     

       18
       18
       +
       github.com/earthboundkid/versioninfo/v2 v2.24.1 h1:SJTMHaoUx3GzjjnUO1QzP3ZXK6Ee/nbWyCm58eY3oUg=

     

       19
       19
       +
       github.com/earthboundkid/versioninfo/v2 v2.24.1/go.mod h1:VcWEooDEuyUJnMfbdTh0uFN4cfEIg+kHMuWB2CDCLjw=

     

       20
       20
        
       github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4 h1:NFTV2Zj1bL4mc9sqWACXbQFVBBg2W3GPvqp8/ESS2Wg=

     

       21
       21
        
       github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4/go.mod h1:m8KPJKqk1gH5J9DgRY2ASl2lWCfGKXixSwevea8zH2U=

     

       22
       22
        
       github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.1 h1:KOIHODQj58PmL80G2Eak4WdvUzjSJSm0vG72crDCqb8=

     
···

       172
       172
        
       github.com/stretchr/objx v0.1.0/go.mod h1:HFkY916IF+rwdDfMAkV7OtwuqBVzrE8GR6GFx+wExME=

     

       173
       173
        
       github.com/stretchr/objx v0.4.0/go.mod h1:YvHI0jy2hoMjB+UWwv71VJQ9isScKT/TqJzVSSt89Yw=

     

       174
       174
        
       github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.0/go.mod h1:Yh+to48EsGEfYuaHDzXPcE3xhTkx73EhmCGUpEOglKo=

     

       175
       175
       -
       github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2 h1:xuMeJ0Sdp5ZMRXx/aWO6RZxdr3beISkG5/G/aIRr3pY=

     

       176
       176
       -
       github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.2/go.mod h1:FRsXN1f5AsAjCGJKqEizvkpNtU+EGNCLh3NxZ/8L+MA=

     

       177
       175
        
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.2.2/go.mod h1:a8OnRcib4nhh0OaRAV+Yts87kKdq0PP7pXfy6kDkUVs=

     

       178
       176
        
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=

     

       179
       177
        
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.4.0/go.mod h1:j7eGeouHqKxXV5pUuKE4zz7dFj8WfuZ+81PSLYec5m4=

     
···

       182
       180
        
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.1/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=

     

       183
       181
        
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0/go.mod h1:yNjHg4UonilssWZ8iaSj1OCr/vHnekPRkoO+kdMU+MU=

     

       184
       182
        
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4/go.mod h1:sz/lmYIOXD/1dqDmKjjqLyZ2RngseejIcXlSw2iwfAo=

     

       185
       185
       -
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.9.0 h1:HtqpIVDClZ4nwg75+f6Lvsy/wHu+3BoSGCbBAcpTsTg=

     

       186
       186
       -
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.9.0/go.mod h1:r2ic/lqez/lEtzL7wO/rwa5dbSLXVDPFyf8C91i36aY=

     

       183
       183
       +
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0 h1:Xv5erBjTwe/5IxqUQTdXv5kgmIvbHo3QQyRwhJsOfJA=

     

       184
       184
       +
       github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0/go.mod h1:r2ic/lqez/lEtzL7wO/rwa5dbSLXVDPFyf8C91i36aY=

     

       187
       185
        
       github.com/urfave/cli v1.22.10/go.mod h1:Gos4lmkARVdJ6EkW0WaNv/tZAAMe9V7XWyB60NtXRu0=

     

       188
       186
        
       github.com/warpfork/go-wish v0.0.0-20220906213052-39a1cc7a02d0 h1:GDDkbFiaK8jsSDJfjId/PEGEShv6ugrt4kYsC5UIDaQ=

     

       189
       187
        
       github.com/warpfork/go-wish v0.0.0-20220906213052-39a1cc7a02d0/go.mod h1:x6AKhvSSexNrVSrViXSHUEbICjmGXhtgABaHIySUSGw=

Compare changes