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.beads
aggregators
cmd
genjwks
server
docs
internal
scripts
static
tests
+5
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/community/post/get.json
···
"type": "string",
"format": "did"
},
+
"handle": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "handle",
+
"description": "Current handle resolved from DID"
+
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
+200
internal/core/unfurl/circuit_breaker.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import (
+
"fmt"
+
"log"
+
"sync"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
// circuitState represents the state of a circuit breaker
+
type circuitState int
+
+
const (
+
stateClosed circuitState = iota // Normal operation
+
stateOpen // Circuit is open (provider failing)
+
stateHalfOpen // Testing if provider recovered
+
)
+
+
// circuitBreaker tracks failures per provider and stops trying failing providers
+
type circuitBreaker struct {
+
failures map[string]int
+
lastFailure map[string]time.Time
+
state map[string]circuitState
+
lastStateLog map[string]time.Time
+
failureThreshold int
+
openDuration time.Duration
+
mu sync.RWMutex
+
}
+
+
// newCircuitBreaker creates a circuit breaker with default settings
+
func newCircuitBreaker() *circuitBreaker {
+
return &circuitBreaker{
+
failureThreshold: 3, // Open after 3 consecutive failures
+
openDuration: 5 * time.Minute, // Keep open for 5 minutes
+
failures: make(map[string]int),
+
lastFailure: make(map[string]time.Time),
+
state: make(map[string]circuitState),
+
lastStateLog: make(map[string]time.Time),
+
}
+
}
+
+
// canAttempt checks if we should attempt to call this provider
+
// Returns true if circuit is closed or half-open (ready to retry)
+
func (cb *circuitBreaker) canAttempt(provider string) (bool, error) {
+
cb.mu.RLock()
+
defer cb.mu.RUnlock()
+
+
state := cb.getState(provider)
+
+
switch state {
+
case stateClosed:
+
return true, nil
+
case stateOpen:
+
// Check if we should transition to half-open
+
lastFail := cb.lastFailure[provider]
+
if time.Since(lastFail) > cb.openDuration {
+
// Transition to half-open (allow one retry)
+
cb.mu.RUnlock()
+
cb.mu.Lock()
+
cb.state[provider] = stateHalfOpen
+
cb.logStateChange(provider, stateHalfOpen)
+
cb.mu.Unlock()
+
cb.mu.RLock()
+
return true, nil
+
}
+
// Still in open period
+
failCount := cb.failures[provider]
+
nextRetry := lastFail.Add(cb.openDuration)
+
return false, fmt.Errorf(
+
"circuit breaker open for provider '%s' (failures: %d, next retry: %s)",
+
provider,
+
failCount,
+
nextRetry.Format("15:04:05"),
+
)
+
case stateHalfOpen:
+
return true, nil
+
default:
+
return true, nil
+
}
+
}
+
+
// recordSuccess records a successful unfurl, resetting failure count
+
func (cb *circuitBreaker) recordSuccess(provider string) {
+
cb.mu.Lock()
+
defer cb.mu.Unlock()
+
+
oldState := cb.getState(provider)
+
+
// Reset failure tracking
+
delete(cb.failures, provider)
+
delete(cb.lastFailure, provider)
+
cb.state[provider] = stateClosed
+
+
// Log recovery if we were in a failure state
+
if oldState != stateClosed {
+
cb.logStateChange(provider, stateClosed)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// recordFailure records a failed unfurl attempt
+
func (cb *circuitBreaker) recordFailure(provider string, err error) {
+
cb.mu.Lock()
+
defer cb.mu.Unlock()
+
+
// Increment failure count
+
cb.failures[provider]++
+
cb.lastFailure[provider] = time.Now()
+
+
failCount := cb.failures[provider]
+
+
// Check if we should open the circuit
+
if failCount >= cb.failureThreshold {
+
oldState := cb.getState(provider)
+
cb.state[provider] = stateOpen
+
if oldState != stateOpen {
+
log.Printf(
+
"[UNFURL-CIRCUIT] Opening circuit for provider '%s' after %d consecutive failures. Last error: %v",
+
provider,
+
failCount,
+
err,
+
)
+
cb.lastStateLog[provider] = time.Now()
+
}
+
} else {
+
log.Printf(
+
"[UNFURL-CIRCUIT] Failure %d/%d for provider '%s': %v",
+
failCount,
+
cb.failureThreshold,
+
provider,
+
err,
+
)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// getState returns the current state (must be called with lock held)
+
func (cb *circuitBreaker) getState(provider string) circuitState {
+
if state, exists := cb.state[provider]; exists {
+
return state
+
}
+
return stateClosed
+
}
+
+
// logStateChange logs state transitions (must be called with lock held)
+
// Debounced to avoid log spam (max once per minute per provider)
+
func (cb *circuitBreaker) logStateChange(provider string, newState circuitState) {
+
lastLog, exists := cb.lastStateLog[provider]
+
if exists && time.Since(lastLog) < time.Minute {
+
return // Don't spam logs
+
}
+
+
var stateStr string
+
switch newState {
+
case stateClosed:
+
stateStr = "CLOSED (recovered)"
+
case stateOpen:
+
stateStr = "OPEN (failing)"
+
case stateHalfOpen:
+
stateStr = "HALF-OPEN (testing)"
+
}
+
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL-CIRCUIT] Circuit for provider '%s' is now %s", provider, stateStr)
+
cb.lastStateLog[provider] = time.Now()
+
}
+
+
// getStats returns current circuit breaker stats (for debugging/monitoring)
+
func (cb *circuitBreaker) getStats() map[string]interface{} {
+
cb.mu.RLock()
+
defer cb.mu.RUnlock()
+
+
stats := make(map[string]interface{})
+
+
// Collect all providers with any activity (state, failures, or both)
+
providers := make(map[string]bool)
+
for provider := range cb.state {
+
providers[provider] = true
+
}
+
for provider := range cb.failures {
+
providers[provider] = true
+
}
+
+
for provider := range providers {
+
state := cb.getState(provider)
+
var stateStr string
+
switch state {
+
case stateClosed:
+
stateStr = "closed"
+
case stateOpen:
+
stateStr = "open"
+
case stateHalfOpen:
+
stateStr = "half-open"
+
}
+
+
stats[provider] = map[string]interface{}{
+
"state": stateStr,
+
"failures": cb.failures[provider],
+
"last_failure": cb.lastFailure[provider],
+
}
+
}
+
return stats
+
}
+175
internal/core/unfurl/circuit_breaker_test.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import (
+
"fmt"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
func TestCircuitBreaker_Basic(t *testing.T) {
+
cb := newCircuitBreaker()
+
+
provider := "test-provider"
+
+
// Should start closed (allow attempts)
+
canAttempt, err := cb.canAttempt(provider)
+
if !canAttempt {
+
t.Errorf("Expected circuit to be closed initially, but got error: %v", err)
+
}
+
+
// Record success
+
cb.recordSuccess(provider)
+
canAttempt, _ = cb.canAttempt(provider)
+
if !canAttempt {
+
t.Error("Expected circuit to remain closed after success")
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestCircuitBreaker_OpensAfterFailures(t *testing.T) {
+
cb := newCircuitBreaker()
+
provider := "failing-provider"
+
+
// Record failures up to threshold
+
for i := 0; i < cb.failureThreshold; i++ {
+
cb.recordFailure(provider, fmt.Errorf("test error %d", i))
+
}
+
+
// Circuit should now be open
+
canAttempt, err := cb.canAttempt(provider)
+
if canAttempt {
+
t.Error("Expected circuit to be open after threshold failures")
+
}
+
if err == nil {
+
t.Error("Expected error when circuit is open")
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestCircuitBreaker_RecoveryAfterSuccess(t *testing.T) {
+
cb := newCircuitBreaker()
+
provider := "recovery-provider"
+
+
// Record some failures
+
cb.recordFailure(provider, fmt.Errorf("error 1"))
+
cb.recordFailure(provider, fmt.Errorf("error 2"))
+
+
// Record success - should reset failure count
+
cb.recordSuccess(provider)
+
+
// Should be able to attempt again
+
canAttempt, err := cb.canAttempt(provider)
+
if !canAttempt {
+
t.Errorf("Expected circuit to be closed after success, but got error: %v", err)
+
}
+
+
// Failure count should be reset
+
if count := cb.failures[provider]; count != 0 {
+
t.Errorf("Expected failure count to be reset to 0, got %d", count)
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestCircuitBreaker_HalfOpenTransition(t *testing.T) {
+
cb := newCircuitBreaker()
+
cb.openDuration = 100 * time.Millisecond // Short duration for testing
+
provider := "half-open-provider"
+
+
// Open the circuit
+
for i := 0; i < cb.failureThreshold; i++ {
+
cb.recordFailure(provider, fmt.Errorf("error %d", i))
+
}
+
+
// Should be open
+
canAttempt, _ := cb.canAttempt(provider)
+
if canAttempt {
+
t.Error("Expected circuit to be open")
+
}
+
+
// Wait for open duration
+
time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
+
+
// Should transition to half-open and allow one attempt
+
canAttempt, err := cb.canAttempt(provider)
+
if !canAttempt {
+
t.Errorf("Expected circuit to transition to half-open after duration, but got error: %v", err)
+
}
+
+
// State should be half-open
+
cb.mu.RLock()
+
state := cb.state[provider]
+
cb.mu.RUnlock()
+
+
if state != stateHalfOpen {
+
t.Errorf("Expected state to be half-open, got %v", state)
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestCircuitBreaker_MultipleProviders(t *testing.T) {
+
cb := newCircuitBreaker()
+
+
// Open circuit for provider A
+
for i := 0; i < cb.failureThreshold; i++ {
+
cb.recordFailure("providerA", fmt.Errorf("error"))
+
}
+
+
// Provider A should be blocked
+
canAttemptA, _ := cb.canAttempt("providerA")
+
if canAttemptA {
+
t.Error("Expected providerA circuit to be open")
+
}
+
+
// Provider B should still be open (independent circuits)
+
canAttemptB, err := cb.canAttempt("providerB")
+
if !canAttemptB {
+
t.Errorf("Expected providerB circuit to be closed, but got error: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestCircuitBreaker_GetStats(t *testing.T) {
+
cb := newCircuitBreaker()
+
+
// Record some activity
+
cb.recordFailure("provider1", fmt.Errorf("error 1"))
+
cb.recordFailure("provider1", fmt.Errorf("error 2"))
+
+
stats := cb.getStats()
+
+
// Should have stats for providers with failures
+
if providerStats, ok := stats["provider1"]; !ok {
+
t.Error("Expected stats for provider1")
+
} else {
+
// Check that failure count is tracked
+
statsMap := providerStats.(map[string]interface{})
+
if failures, ok := statsMap["failures"].(int); !ok || failures != 2 {
+
t.Errorf("Expected 2 failures for provider1, got %v", statsMap["failures"])
+
}
+
}
+
+
// Provider that succeeds is cleaned up from state
+
cb.recordSuccess("provider2")
+
_ = cb.getStats()
+
// Provider2 should not be in stats (or have state "closed" with 0 failures)
+
}
+
+
func TestCircuitBreaker_FailureThresholdExact(t *testing.T) {
+
cb := newCircuitBreaker()
+
provider := "exact-threshold-provider"
+
+
// Record failures just below threshold
+
for i := 0; i < cb.failureThreshold-1; i++ {
+
cb.recordFailure(provider, fmt.Errorf("error %d", i))
+
}
+
+
// Should still be closed
+
canAttempt, err := cb.canAttempt(provider)
+
if !canAttempt {
+
t.Errorf("Expected circuit to be closed below threshold, but got error: %v", err)
+
}
+
+
// One more failure should open it
+
cb.recordFailure(provider, fmt.Errorf("final error"))
+
+
// Should now be open
+
canAttempt, _ = cb.canAttempt(provider)
+
if canAttempt {
+
t.Error("Expected circuit to be open at threshold")
+
}
+
}
+202
internal/core/unfurl/kagi_test.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
func TestFetchKagiKite_Success(t *testing.T) {
+
// Mock Kagi HTML response
+
mockHTML := `<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head>
+
<title>FAA orders 10% flight cuts at 40 airports - Kagi News</title>
+
<meta property="og:title" content="FAA orders 10% flight cuts" />
+
<meta property="og:description" content="Flight restrictions announced" />
+
</head>
+
<body>
+
<img src="https://kagiproxy.com/img/DHdCvN_NqVDWU3UyoNZSv86b" alt="Airport runway" />
+
</body>
+
</html>`
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(mockHTML))
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
result, err := fetchKagiKite(ctx, server.URL, 5*time.Second, "TestBot/1.0")
+
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, "article", result.Type)
+
assert.Equal(t, "FAA orders 10% flight cuts", result.Title)
+
assert.Equal(t, "Flight restrictions announced", result.Description)
+
assert.Contains(t, result.ThumbnailURL, "kagiproxy.com")
+
assert.Equal(t, "kagi", result.Provider)
+
assert.Equal(t, "kite.kagi.com", result.Domain)
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchKagiKite_NoImage(t *testing.T) {
+
mockHTML := `<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head><title>Test Story</title></head>
+
<body><p>No images here</p></body>
+
</html>`
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(mockHTML))
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
result, err := fetchKagiKite(ctx, server.URL, 5*time.Second, "TestBot/1.0")
+
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, result)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "no image found")
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchKagiKite_FallbackToTitle(t *testing.T) {
+
mockHTML := `<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head><title>Fallback Title</title></head>
+
<body>
+
<img src="https://kagiproxy.com/img/test123" />
+
</body>
+
</html>`
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(mockHTML))
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
result, err := fetchKagiKite(ctx, server.URL, 5*time.Second, "TestBot/1.0")
+
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, "Fallback Title", result.Title)
+
assert.Contains(t, result.ThumbnailURL, "kagiproxy.com")
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchKagiKite_ImageWithAltText(t *testing.T) {
+
mockHTML := `<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head><title>News Story</title></head>
+
<body>
+
<img src="https://kagiproxy.com/img/xyz789" alt="This is the alt text description" />
+
</body>
+
</html>`
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(mockHTML))
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
result, err := fetchKagiKite(ctx, server.URL, 5*time.Second, "TestBot/1.0")
+
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, "News Story", result.Title)
+
assert.Equal(t, "This is the alt text description", result.Description)
+
assert.Contains(t, result.ThumbnailURL, "kagiproxy.com")
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchKagiKite_HTTPError(t *testing.T) {
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
result, err := fetchKagiKite(ctx, server.URL, 5*time.Second, "TestBot/1.0")
+
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, result)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "HTTP 404")
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchKagiKite_Timeout(t *testing.T) {
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
result, err := fetchKagiKite(ctx, server.URL, 100*time.Millisecond, "TestBot/1.0")
+
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, result)
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchKagiKite_MultipleImages_PicksSecond(t *testing.T) {
+
mockHTML := `<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head><title>Story with multiple images</title></head>
+
<body>
+
<img src="https://kagiproxy.com/img/first123" alt="First image (header/logo)" />
+
<img src="https://kagiproxy.com/img/second456" alt="Second image" />
+
</body>
+
</html>`
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(mockHTML))
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
result, err := fetchKagiKite(ctx, server.URL, 5*time.Second, "TestBot/1.0")
+
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
// We skip the first image (often a header/logo) and use the second
+
assert.Contains(t, result.ThumbnailURL, "second456")
+
assert.Equal(t, "Second image", result.Description)
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchKagiKite_OnlyNonKagiImages_NoMatch(t *testing.T) {
+
mockHTML := `<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head><title>Story with non-Kagi images</title></head>
+
<body>
+
<img src="https://example.com/img/test.jpg" alt="External image" />
+
</body>
+
</html>`
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(mockHTML))
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
result, err := fetchKagiKite(ctx, server.URL, 5*time.Second, "TestBot/1.0")
+
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, result)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "no image found")
+
}
+269
internal/core/unfurl/opengraph_test.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
func TestParseOpenGraph_ValidTags(t *testing.T) {
+
html := `
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head>
+
<meta property="og:title" content="Test Article Title" />
+
<meta property="og:description" content="This is a test description" />
+
<meta property="og:image" content="https://example.com/image.jpg" />
+
<meta property="og:url" content="https://example.com/canonical" />
+
</head>
+
<body>
+
<p>Some content</p>
+
</body>
+
</html>
+
`
+
+
og, err := parseOpenGraph(html)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "Test Article Title", og.Title)
+
assert.Equal(t, "This is a test description", og.Description)
+
assert.Equal(t, "https://example.com/image.jpg", og.Image)
+
assert.Equal(t, "https://example.com/canonical", og.URL)
+
}
+
+
func TestParseOpenGraph_MissingImage(t *testing.T) {
+
html := `
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head>
+
<meta property="og:title" content="Article Without Image" />
+
<meta property="og:description" content="No image tag" />
+
</head>
+
<body></body>
+
</html>
+
`
+
+
og, err := parseOpenGraph(html)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "Article Without Image", og.Title)
+
assert.Equal(t, "No image tag", og.Description)
+
assert.Empty(t, og.Image, "Image should be empty when not provided")
+
}
+
+
func TestParseOpenGraph_FallbackToTitle(t *testing.T) {
+
html := `
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head>
+
<title>Page Title Fallback</title>
+
<meta name="description" content="Meta description fallback" />
+
</head>
+
<body></body>
+
</html>
+
`
+
+
og, err := parseOpenGraph(html)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "Page Title Fallback", og.Title, "Should fall back to <title>")
+
assert.Equal(t, "Meta description fallback", og.Description, "Should fall back to meta description")
+
}
+
+
func TestParseOpenGraph_PreferOpenGraphOverFallback(t *testing.T) {
+
html := `
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head>
+
<title>Page Title</title>
+
<meta name="description" content="Meta description" />
+
<meta property="og:title" content="OpenGraph Title" />
+
<meta property="og:description" content="OpenGraph Description" />
+
</head>
+
<body></body>
+
</html>
+
`
+
+
og, err := parseOpenGraph(html)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "OpenGraph Title", og.Title, "Should prefer og:title")
+
assert.Equal(t, "OpenGraph Description", og.Description, "Should prefer og:description")
+
}
+
+
func TestParseOpenGraph_MalformedHTML(t *testing.T) {
+
html := `
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head>
+
<meta property="og:title" content="Still Works" />
+
<meta property="og:description" content="Even with broken tags
+
</head>
+
<body>
+
<p>Unclosed paragraph
+
</body>
+
`
+
+
og, err := parseOpenGraph(html)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Best-effort parsing should still extract what it can
+
assert.NotEmpty(t, og.Title, "Should extract title despite malformed HTML")
+
}
+
+
func TestParseOpenGraph_Empty(t *testing.T) {
+
html := `
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head></head>
+
<body></body>
+
</html>
+
`
+
+
og, err := parseOpenGraph(html)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
assert.Empty(t, og.Title)
+
assert.Empty(t, og.Description)
+
assert.Empty(t, og.Image)
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchOpenGraph_Success(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create test server with OpenGraph metadata
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
assert.Contains(t, r.Header.Get("User-Agent"), "CovesBot")
+
+
html := `
+
<!DOCTYPE html>
+
<html>
+
<head>
+
<meta property="og:title" content="Test News Article" />
+
<meta property="og:description" content="Breaking news story" />
+
<meta property="og:image" content="https://example.com/news.jpg" />
+
<meta property="og:url" content="https://example.com/article/123" />
+
</head>
+
<body><p>Article content</p></body>
+
</html>
+
`
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(html))
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
result, err := fetchOpenGraph(ctx, server.URL, 10*time.Second, "CovesBot/1.0")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
require.NotNil(t, result)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "Test News Article", result.Title)
+
assert.Equal(t, "Breaking news story", result.Description)
+
assert.Equal(t, "https://example.com/news.jpg", result.ThumbnailURL)
+
assert.Equal(t, "article", result.Type)
+
assert.Equal(t, "opengraph", result.Provider)
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchOpenGraph_HTTPError(t *testing.T) {
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
result, err := fetchOpenGraph(ctx, server.URL, 10*time.Second, "CovesBot/1.0")
+
require.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, result)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "404")
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchOpenGraph_Timeout(t *testing.T) {
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
result, err := fetchOpenGraph(ctx, server.URL, 100*time.Millisecond, "CovesBot/1.0")
+
require.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, result)
+
}
+
+
func TestFetchOpenGraph_NoMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
html := `<html><head></head><body><p>No metadata</p></body></html>`
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(html))
+
}))
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
result, err := fetchOpenGraph(ctx, server.URL, 10*time.Second, "CovesBot/1.0")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
require.NotNil(t, result)
+
+
// Should still return a result with domain
+
assert.Equal(t, "article", result.Type)
+
assert.Equal(t, "opengraph", result.Provider)
+
assert.NotEmpty(t, result.Domain)
+
}
+
+
func TestIsOEmbedProvider(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
url string
+
expected bool
+
}{
+
{"https://streamable.com/abc123", true},
+
{"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=test", true},
+
{"https://youtu.be/test", true},
+
{"https://reddit.com/r/test/comments/123", true},
+
{"https://www.reddit.com/r/test/comments/123", true},
+
{"https://example.com/article", false},
+
{"https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=123", false},
+
{"https://kite.kagi.com/search?q=test", false},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.url, func(t *testing.T) {
+
result := isOEmbedProvider(tt.url)
+
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result, "URL: %s", tt.url)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestIsSupported(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
url string
+
expected bool
+
}{
+
{"https://example.com", true},
+
{"http://example.com", true},
+
{"https://news.site.com/article", true},
+
{"ftp://example.com", false},
+
{"not-a-url", false},
+
{"", false},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.url, func(t *testing.T) {
+
result := isSupported(tt.url)
+
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result, "URL: %s", tt.url)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestGetAttr(t *testing.T) {
+
html := `<meta property="og:title" content="Test Title" name="test" />`
+
doc, err := parseOpenGraph(html)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// This is a simple test to verify the helper function works
+
// The actual usage is tested in the parseOpenGraph tests
+
assert.NotNil(t, doc)
+
}
+170
internal/core/unfurl/service.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"fmt"
+
"log"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
// Service handles URL unfurling with caching
+
type Service interface {
+
UnfurlURL(ctx context.Context, url string) (*UnfurlResult, error)
+
IsSupported(url string) bool
+
}
+
+
type service struct {
+
repo Repository
+
circuitBreaker *circuitBreaker
+
userAgent string
+
timeout time.Duration
+
cacheTTL time.Duration
+
}
+
+
// NewService creates a new unfurl service
+
func NewService(repo Repository, opts ...ServiceOption) Service {
+
s := &service{
+
repo: repo,
+
timeout: 10 * time.Second,
+
userAgent: "CovesBot/1.0 (+https://coves.social)",
+
cacheTTL: 24 * time.Hour,
+
circuitBreaker: newCircuitBreaker(),
+
}
+
+
for _, opt := range opts {
+
opt(s)
+
}
+
+
return s
+
}
+
+
// ServiceOption configures the service
+
type ServiceOption func(*service)
+
+
// WithTimeout sets the HTTP timeout for oEmbed requests
+
func WithTimeout(timeout time.Duration) ServiceOption {
+
return func(s *service) {
+
s.timeout = timeout
+
}
+
}
+
+
// WithUserAgent sets the User-Agent header for oEmbed requests
+
func WithUserAgent(userAgent string) ServiceOption {
+
return func(s *service) {
+
s.userAgent = userAgent
+
}
+
}
+
+
// WithCacheTTL sets the cache TTL
+
func WithCacheTTL(ttl time.Duration) ServiceOption {
+
return func(s *service) {
+
s.cacheTTL = ttl
+
}
+
}
+
+
// IsSupported returns true if we can unfurl this URL
+
func (s *service) IsSupported(url string) bool {
+
return isSupported(url)
+
}
+
+
// UnfurlURL fetches metadata for a URL (with caching)
+
func (s *service) UnfurlURL(ctx context.Context, urlStr string) (*UnfurlResult, error) {
+
// 1. Check cache first
+
cached, err := s.repo.Get(ctx, urlStr)
+
if err == nil && cached != nil {
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Cache hit for %s (provider: %s)", urlStr, cached.Provider)
+
return cached, nil
+
}
+
+
// 2. Check if we support this URL
+
if !isSupported(urlStr) {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported URL: %s", urlStr)
+
}
+
+
var result *UnfurlResult
+
domain := extractDomain(urlStr)
+
+
// 3. Smart routing: Special handling for Kagi Kite (client-side rendered, no og:image tags)
+
if domain == "kite.kagi.com" {
+
provider := "kagi"
+
+
// Check circuit breaker
+
canAttempt, err := s.circuitBreaker.canAttempt(provider)
+
if !canAttempt {
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Skipping %s due to circuit breaker: %v", urlStr, err)
+
return nil, err
+
}
+
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Cache miss for %s, fetching via Kagi parser...", urlStr)
+
result, err = fetchKagiKite(ctx, urlStr, s.timeout, s.userAgent)
+
if err != nil {
+
s.circuitBreaker.recordFailure(provider, err)
+
return nil, err
+
}
+
+
s.circuitBreaker.recordSuccess(provider)
+
+
// Cache result
+
if cacheErr := s.repo.Set(ctx, urlStr, result, s.cacheTTL); cacheErr != nil {
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Warning: failed to cache result: %v", cacheErr)
+
}
+
return result, nil
+
}
+
+
// 4. Check if this is a known oEmbed provider
+
if isOEmbedProvider(urlStr) {
+
provider := domain // Use domain as provider name (e.g., "streamable.com", "youtube.com")
+
+
// Check circuit breaker
+
canAttempt, err := s.circuitBreaker.canAttempt(provider)
+
if !canAttempt {
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Skipping %s due to circuit breaker: %v", urlStr, err)
+
return nil, err
+
}
+
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Cache miss for %s, fetching from oEmbed...", urlStr)
+
+
// Fetch from oEmbed provider
+
oembed, err := fetchOEmbed(ctx, urlStr, s.timeout, s.userAgent)
+
if err != nil {
+
s.circuitBreaker.recordFailure(provider, err)
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch oEmbed data: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
s.circuitBreaker.recordSuccess(provider)
+
+
// Convert to UnfurlResult
+
result = mapOEmbedToResult(oembed, urlStr)
+
} else {
+
provider := "opengraph"
+
+
// Check circuit breaker
+
canAttempt, err := s.circuitBreaker.canAttempt(provider)
+
if !canAttempt {
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Skipping %s due to circuit breaker: %v", urlStr, err)
+
return nil, err
+
}
+
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Cache miss for %s, fetching via OpenGraph...", urlStr)
+
+
// Fetch via OpenGraph
+
result, err = fetchOpenGraph(ctx, urlStr, s.timeout, s.userAgent)
+
if err != nil {
+
s.circuitBreaker.recordFailure(provider, err)
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch OpenGraph data: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
s.circuitBreaker.recordSuccess(provider)
+
}
+
+
// 5. Store in cache
+
if cacheErr := s.repo.Set(ctx, urlStr, result, s.cacheTTL); cacheErr != nil {
+
// Log but don't fail - cache is best-effort
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Warning: Failed to cache result for %s: %v", urlStr, cacheErr)
+
}
+
+
log.Printf("[UNFURL] Successfully unfurled %s (provider: %s, type: %s)",
+
urlStr, result.Provider, result.Type)
+
+
return result, nil
+
}
+27
internal/core/unfurl/types.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import "time"
+
+
// UnfurlResult represents the result of unfurling a URL
+
type UnfurlResult struct {
+
Type string `json:"type"` // "video", "article", "image", "website"
+
URI string `json:"uri"` // Original URL
+
Title string `json:"title"` // Page/video title
+
Description string `json:"description"` // Page/video description
+
ThumbnailURL string `json:"thumbnailUrl"` // Preview image URL
+
Provider string `json:"provider"` // "streamable", "youtube", "reddit"
+
Domain string `json:"domain"` // Domain of the URL
+
Width int `json:"width"` // Media width (if applicable)
+
Height int `json:"height"` // Media height (if applicable)
+
}
+
+
// CacheEntry represents a cached unfurl result with metadata
+
type CacheEntry struct {
+
FetchedAt time.Time `db:"fetched_at"`
+
ExpiresAt time.Time `db:"expires_at"`
+
CreatedAt time.Time `db:"created_at"`
+
ThumbnailURL *string `db:"thumbnail_url"`
+
URL string `db:"url"`
+
Provider string `db:"provider"`
+
Metadata UnfurlResult `db:"metadata"`
+
}
+14
internal/core/unfurl/errors.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import "errors"
+
+
var (
+
// ErrNotFound is returned when an unfurl cache entry is not found or has expired
+
ErrNotFound = errors.New("unfurl cache entry not found or expired")
+
+
// ErrInvalidURL is returned when the provided URL is invalid
+
ErrInvalidURL = errors.New("invalid URL")
+
+
// ErrInvalidTTL is returned when the provided TTL is invalid (e.g., negative or zero)
+
ErrInvalidTTL = errors.New("invalid TTL: must be positive")
+
)
+19
internal/core/unfurl/interfaces.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
// Repository defines the interface for unfurl cache persistence
+
type Repository interface {
+
// Get retrieves a cached unfurl result for the given URL.
+
// Returns nil, nil if not found or expired (not an error condition).
+
// Returns error only on database failures.
+
Get(ctx context.Context, url string) (*UnfurlResult, error)
+
+
// Set stores an unfurl result in the cache with the specified TTL.
+
// If an entry already exists for the URL, it will be updated.
+
// The expires_at is calculated as NOW() + ttl.
+
Set(ctx context.Context, url string, result *UnfurlResult, ttl time.Duration) error
+
}
+117
internal/core/unfurl/repository.go
···
+
package unfurl
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"database/sql"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"fmt"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
type postgresUnfurlRepo struct {
+
db *sql.DB
+
}
+
+
// NewRepository creates a new PostgreSQL unfurl cache repository
+
func NewRepository(db *sql.DB) Repository {
+
return &postgresUnfurlRepo{db: db}
+
}
+
+
// Get retrieves a cached unfurl result for the given URL.
+
// Returns nil, nil if not found or expired (not an error condition).
+
// Returns error only on database failures.
+
func (r *postgresUnfurlRepo) Get(ctx context.Context, url string) (*UnfurlResult, error) {
+
query := `
+
SELECT metadata, thumbnail_url, provider
+
FROM unfurl_cache
+
WHERE url = $1 AND expires_at > NOW()
+
`
+
+
var metadataJSON []byte
+
var thumbnailURL sql.NullString
+
var provider string
+
+
err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, url).Scan(&metadataJSON, &thumbnailURL, &provider)
+
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+
// Not found or expired is not an error
+
return nil, nil
+
}
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get unfurl cache entry: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Unmarshal metadata JSONB to UnfurlResult
+
var result UnfurlResult
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(metadataJSON, &result); err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal metadata: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Ensure provider and thumbnailURL are set (may not be in metadata JSON)
+
result.Provider = provider
+
if thumbnailURL.Valid {
+
result.ThumbnailURL = thumbnailURL.String
+
}
+
+
return &result, nil
+
}
+
+
// Set stores an unfurl result in the cache with the specified TTL.
+
// If an entry already exists for the URL, it will be updated.
+
// The expires_at is calculated as NOW() + ttl.
+
func (r *postgresUnfurlRepo) Set(ctx context.Context, url string, result *UnfurlResult, ttl time.Duration) error {
+
// Marshal UnfurlResult to JSON for metadata column
+
metadataJSON, err := json.Marshal(result)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal metadata: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Store thumbnail_url separately for potential queries
+
var thumbnailURL sql.NullString
+
if result.ThumbnailURL != "" {
+
thumbnailURL.String = result.ThumbnailURL
+
thumbnailURL.Valid = true
+
}
+
+
// Convert Go duration to PostgreSQL interval string
+
// e.g., "1 hour", "24 hours", "7 days"
+
intervalStr := formatInterval(ttl)
+
+
query := `
+
INSERT INTO unfurl_cache (url, provider, metadata, thumbnail_url, expires_at)
+
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, NOW() + $5::interval)
+
ON CONFLICT (url) DO UPDATE
+
SET provider = EXCLUDED.provider,
+
metadata = EXCLUDED.metadata,
+
thumbnail_url = EXCLUDED.thumbnail_url,
+
expires_at = EXCLUDED.expires_at,
+
fetched_at = NOW()
+
`
+
+
_, err = r.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, url, result.Provider, metadataJSON, thumbnailURL, intervalStr)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to insert/update unfurl cache entry: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// formatInterval converts a Go duration to a PostgreSQL interval string
+
// PostgreSQL accepts intervals like "1 hour", "24 hours", "7 days"
+
func formatInterval(d time.Duration) string {
+
seconds := int64(d.Seconds())
+
+
// Convert to appropriate unit for readability
+
switch {
+
case seconds >= 86400: // >= 1 day
+
days := seconds / 86400
+
return fmt.Sprintf("%d days", days)
+
case seconds >= 3600: // >= 1 hour
+
hours := seconds / 3600
+
return fmt.Sprintf("%d hours", hours)
+
case seconds >= 60: // >= 1 minute
+
minutes := seconds / 60
+
return fmt.Sprintf("%d minutes", minutes)
+
default:
+
return fmt.Sprintf("%d seconds", seconds)
+
}
+
}
+23
internal/db/migrations/017_create_unfurl_cache.sql
···
+
-- +goose Up
+
CREATE TABLE unfurl_cache (
+
url TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
+
metadata JSONB NOT NULL,
+
thumbnail_url TEXT,
+
fetched_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+
expires_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
+
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+
);
+
+
CREATE INDEX idx_unfurl_cache_expires ON unfurl_cache(expires_at);
+
+
COMMENT ON TABLE unfurl_cache IS 'Cache for oEmbed/URL unfurl results to reduce external API calls';
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN unfurl_cache.url IS 'The URL that was unfurled (primary key)';
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN unfurl_cache.provider IS 'Provider name (streamable, youtube, reddit, etc.)';
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN unfurl_cache.metadata IS 'Full unfurl result as JSON (title, description, type, etc.)';
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN unfurl_cache.thumbnail_url IS 'URL of the thumbnail image';
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN unfurl_cache.expires_at IS 'When this cache entry should be refetched (TTL-based)';
+
+
-- +goose Down
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_unfurl_cache_expires;
+
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS unfurl_cache;
+9
internal/core/blobs/types.go
···
+
package blobs
+
+
// BlobRef represents a blob reference for atproto records
+
type BlobRef struct {
+
Type string `json:"$type"`
+
Ref map[string]string `json:"ref"`
+
MimeType string `json:"mimeType"`
+
Size int `json:"size"`
+
}
+7 -1
internal/core/posts/interfaces.go
···
package posts
-
import "context"
+
import (
+
"context"
+
)
+
+
// Service constructor accepts optional blobs.Service and unfurl.Service for embed enhancement.
+
// When unfurlService is provided, external embeds will be automatically enriched with metadata.
+
// When blobService is provided, thumbnails from unfurled URLs will be uploaded as blobs.
// Service defines the business logic interface for posts
// Coordinates between Repository, community service, and PDS
+81
internal/core/posts/blob_transform.go
···
+
package posts
+
+
import (
+
"fmt"
+
)
+
+
// TransformBlobRefsToURLs transforms all blob references in a PostView to PDS URLs
+
// This modifies the Embed field in-place, converting blob refs to direct URLs
+
// The transformation only affects external embeds with thumbnail blobs
+
func TransformBlobRefsToURLs(postView *PostView) {
+
if postView == nil || postView.Embed == nil {
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Get community PDS URL from post view
+
if postView.Community == nil || postView.Community.PDSURL == "" {
+
return // Cannot transform without PDS URL
+
}
+
+
communityDID := postView.Community.DID
+
pdsURL := postView.Community.PDSURL
+
+
// Check if embed is a map (should be for external embeds)
+
embedMap, ok := postView.Embed.(map[string]interface{})
+
if !ok {
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Check embed type
+
embedType, ok := embedMap["$type"].(string)
+
if !ok {
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Only transform external embeds
+
if embedType == "social.coves.embed.external" {
+
if external, ok := embedMap["external"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
+
transformThumbToURL(external, communityDID, pdsURL)
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
+
// transformThumbToURL converts a thumb blob ref to a PDS URL
+
// This modifies the external map in-place
+
func transformThumbToURL(external map[string]interface{}, communityDID, pdsURL string) {
+
// Check if thumb exists
+
thumb, ok := external["thumb"]
+
if !ok {
+
return
+
}
+
+
// If thumb is already a string (URL), don't transform
+
if _, isString := thumb.(string); isString {
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Try to parse as blob ref
+
thumbMap, ok := thumb.(map[string]interface{})
+
if !ok {
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Extract CID from blob ref
+
ref, ok := thumbMap["ref"].(map[string]interface{})
+
if !ok {
+
return
+
}
+
+
cid, ok := ref["$link"].(string)
+
if !ok || cid == "" {
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Transform to PDS blob endpoint URL
+
// Format: {pds_url}/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getBlob?did={community_did}&cid={cid}
+
blobURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getBlob?did=%s&cid=%s",
+
pdsURL, communityDID, cid)
+
+
// Replace blob ref with URL string
+
external["thumb"] = blobURL
+
}
+312
internal/core/posts/blob_transform_test.go
···
+
package posts
+
+
import (
+
"testing"
+
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
func TestTransformBlobRefsToURLs(t *testing.T) {
+
t.Run("transforms external embed thumb from blob to URL", func(t *testing.T) {
+
post := &PostView{
+
Community: &CommunityRef{
+
DID: "did:plc:testcommunity",
+
PDSURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
},
+
Embed: map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
+
"external": map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
"thumb": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "blob",
+
"ref": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$link": "bafyreib6tbnql2ux3whnfysbzabthaj2vvck53nimhbi5g5a7jgvgr5eqm",
+
},
+
"mimeType": "image/jpeg",
+
"size": 52813,
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(post)
+
+
// Verify embed is still a map
+
embedMap, ok := post.Embed.(map[string]interface{})
+
require.True(t, ok, "embed should still be a map")
+
+
// Verify external is still a map
+
external, ok := embedMap["external"].(map[string]interface{})
+
require.True(t, ok, "external should be a map")
+
+
// Verify thumb is now a URL string
+
thumbURL, ok := external["thumb"].(string)
+
require.True(t, ok, "thumb should be a string URL")
+
assert.Equal(t,
+
"http://localhost:3001/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getBlob?did=did:plc:testcommunity&cid=bafyreib6tbnql2ux3whnfysbzabthaj2vvck53nimhbi5g5a7jgvgr5eqm",
+
thumbURL)
+
})
+
+
t.Run("handles missing thumb gracefully", func(t *testing.T) {
+
post := &PostView{
+
Community: &CommunityRef{
+
DID: "did:plc:testcommunity",
+
PDSURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
},
+
Embed: map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
+
"external": map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
// No thumb field
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Should not panic
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(post)
+
+
// Verify external is unchanged
+
embedMap := post.Embed.(map[string]interface{})
+
external := embedMap["external"].(map[string]interface{})
+
_, hasThumb := external["thumb"]
+
assert.False(t, hasThumb, "thumb should not be added")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("handles already-transformed URL thumb", func(t *testing.T) {
+
expectedURL := "http://localhost:3001/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getBlob?did=did:plc:test&cid=bafytest"
+
post := &PostView{
+
Community: &CommunityRef{
+
DID: "did:plc:testcommunity",
+
PDSURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
},
+
Embed: map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
+
"external": map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
"thumb": expectedURL, // Already a URL string
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Should not error or change the URL
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(post)
+
+
// Verify thumb is unchanged
+
embedMap := post.Embed.(map[string]interface{})
+
external := embedMap["external"].(map[string]interface{})
+
thumbURL, ok := external["thumb"].(string)
+
require.True(t, ok, "thumb should still be a string")
+
assert.Equal(t, expectedURL, thumbURL, "thumb URL should be unchanged")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("handles missing embed", func(t *testing.T) {
+
post := &PostView{
+
Community: &CommunityRef{
+
DID: "did:plc:testcommunity",
+
PDSURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
},
+
Embed: nil,
+
}
+
+
// Should not panic
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(post)
+
+
// Verify embed is still nil
+
assert.Nil(t, post.Embed, "embed should remain nil")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("handles nil post", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Should not panic
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(nil)
+
})
+
+
t.Run("handles missing community", func(t *testing.T) {
+
post := &PostView{
+
Community: nil,
+
Embed: map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
+
"external": map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
"thumb": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "blob",
+
"ref": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$link": "bafyreib6tbnql2ux3whnfysbzabthaj2vvck53nimhbi5g5a7jgvgr5eqm",
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Should not panic or transform
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(post)
+
+
// Verify thumb is unchanged (still a blob)
+
embedMap := post.Embed.(map[string]interface{})
+
external := embedMap["external"].(map[string]interface{})
+
thumb, ok := external["thumb"].(map[string]interface{})
+
require.True(t, ok, "thumb should still be a map (blob ref)")
+
assert.Equal(t, "blob", thumb["$type"], "blob type should be unchanged")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("handles missing PDS URL", func(t *testing.T) {
+
post := &PostView{
+
Community: &CommunityRef{
+
DID: "did:plc:testcommunity",
+
PDSURL: "", // Empty PDS URL
+
},
+
Embed: map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
+
"external": map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
"thumb": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "blob",
+
"ref": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$link": "bafyreib6tbnql2ux3whnfysbzabthaj2vvck53nimhbi5g5a7jgvgr5eqm",
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Should not panic or transform
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(post)
+
+
// Verify thumb is unchanged (still a blob)
+
embedMap := post.Embed.(map[string]interface{})
+
external := embedMap["external"].(map[string]interface{})
+
thumb, ok := external["thumb"].(map[string]interface{})
+
require.True(t, ok, "thumb should still be a map (blob ref)")
+
assert.Equal(t, "blob", thumb["$type"], "blob type should be unchanged")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("handles malformed blob ref gracefully", func(t *testing.T) {
+
post := &PostView{
+
Community: &CommunityRef{
+
DID: "did:plc:testcommunity",
+
PDSURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
},
+
Embed: map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
+
"external": map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
"thumb": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "blob",
+
"ref": "invalid-ref-format", // Should be a map with $link
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Should not panic
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(post)
+
+
// Verify thumb is unchanged (malformed blob)
+
embedMap := post.Embed.(map[string]interface{})
+
external := embedMap["external"].(map[string]interface{})
+
thumb, ok := external["thumb"].(map[string]interface{})
+
require.True(t, ok, "thumb should still be a map")
+
assert.Equal(t, "invalid-ref-format", thumb["ref"], "malformed ref should be unchanged")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("ignores non-external embed types", func(t *testing.T) {
+
post := &PostView{
+
Community: &CommunityRef{
+
DID: "did:plc:testcommunity",
+
PDSURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
},
+
Embed: map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.images",
+
"images": []interface{}{
+
map[string]interface{}{
+
"image": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "blob",
+
"ref": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$link": "bafyreib6tbnql2ux3whnfysbzabthaj2vvck53nimhbi5g5a7jgvgr5eqm",
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Should not transform non-external embeds
+
TransformBlobRefsToURLs(post)
+
+
// Verify images embed is unchanged
+
embedMap := post.Embed.(map[string]interface{})
+
images := embedMap["images"].([]interface{})
+
imageObj := images[0].(map[string]interface{})
+
imageBlob := imageObj["image"].(map[string]interface{})
+
assert.Equal(t, "blob", imageBlob["$type"], "image blob should be unchanged")
+
})
+
}
+
+
func TestTransformThumbToURL(t *testing.T) {
+
t.Run("transforms valid blob ref to URL", func(t *testing.T) {
+
external := map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
"thumb": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "blob",
+
"ref": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$link": "bafyreib6tbnql2ux3whnfysbzabthaj2vvck53nimhbi5g5a7jgvgr5eqm",
+
},
+
"mimeType": "image/jpeg",
+
"size": 52813,
+
},
+
}
+
+
transformThumbToURL(external, "did:plc:test", "http://localhost:3001")
+
+
thumbURL, ok := external["thumb"].(string)
+
require.True(t, ok, "thumb should be a string URL")
+
assert.Equal(t,
+
"http://localhost:3001/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getBlob?did=did:plc:test&cid=bafyreib6tbnql2ux3whnfysbzabthaj2vvck53nimhbi5g5a7jgvgr5eqm",
+
thumbURL)
+
})
+
+
t.Run("does not transform if thumb is already string", func(t *testing.T) {
+
expectedURL := "http://localhost:3001/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getBlob?did=did:plc:test&cid=bafytest"
+
external := map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
"thumb": expectedURL,
+
}
+
+
transformThumbToURL(external, "did:plc:test", "http://localhost:3001")
+
+
thumbURL, ok := external["thumb"].(string)
+
require.True(t, ok, "thumb should still be a string")
+
assert.Equal(t, expectedURL, thumbURL, "thumb should be unchanged")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("does not transform if thumb is missing", func(t *testing.T) {
+
external := map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
}
+
+
transformThumbToURL(external, "did:plc:test", "http://localhost:3001")
+
+
_, hasThumb := external["thumb"]
+
assert.False(t, hasThumb, "thumb should not be added")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("does not transform if CID is empty", func(t *testing.T) {
+
external := map[string]interface{}{
+
"uri": "https://example.com",
+
"thumb": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$type": "blob",
+
"ref": map[string]interface{}{
+
"$link": "", // Empty CID
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
transformThumbToURL(external, "did:plc:test", "http://localhost:3001")
+
+
// Verify thumb is unchanged
+
thumb, ok := external["thumb"].(map[string]interface{})
+
require.True(t, ok, "thumb should still be a map")
+
ref := thumb["ref"].(map[string]interface{})
+
assert.Equal(t, "", ref["$link"], "empty CID should be unchanged")
+
})
+
}
+13 -14
aggregators/kagi-news/src/coves_client.py
···
content: str,
facets: List[Dict],
title: Optional[str] = None,
-
embed: Optional[Dict] = None
+
embed: Optional[Dict] = None,
+
thumbnail_url: Optional[str] = None
) -> str:
"""
Create a post in a community.
···
facets: Rich text facets (formatting, links)
title: Optional post title
embed: Optional external embed
+
thumbnail_url: Optional thumbnail URL (for trusted aggregators only)
Returns:
AT Proto URI of created post (e.g., "at://did:plc:.../social.coves.post/...")
···
if embed:
post_data["embed"] = embed
+
# Add thumbnail URL at top level if provided (for trusted aggregators)
+
if thumbnail_url:
+
post_data["thumbnailUrl"] = thumbnail_url
+
# Use Coves-specific endpoint (not direct PDS write)
# This provides validation, authorization, and business logic
logger.info(f"Creating post in community: {community_handle}")
···
self,
uri: str,
title: str,
-
description: str,
-
thumb: Optional[str] = None
+
description: str
) -> Dict:
"""
Create external embed object for hot-linked content.
Args:
-
uri: External URL (story link)
-
title: Story title
-
description: Story description/summary
-
thumb: Optional thumbnail image URL
+
uri: URL of the external content
+
title: Title of the content
+
description: Description/summary
Returns:
-
External embed dictionary
+
Embed dictionary ready for post creation
"""
-
embed = {
+
return {
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
"external": {
"uri": uri,
···
}
}
-
if thumb:
-
embed["external"]["thumb"] = thumb
-
-
return embed
-
def _get_timestamp(self) -> str:
"""
Get current timestamp in ISO 8601 format.
+4 -3
aggregators/kagi-news/src/main.py
···
embed = self.coves_client.create_external_embed(
uri=story.link,
title=story.title,
-
description=story.summary[:200] if len(story.summary) > 200 else story.summary,
-
thumb=story.image_url
+
description=story.summary[:200] if len(story.summary) > 200 else story.summary
)
# Post to community
+
# Pass thumbnail URL from RSS feed at top level for trusted aggregator upload
try:
post_uri = self.coves_client.create_post(
community_handle=feed_config.community_handle,
title=story.title,
content=rich_text["content"],
facets=rich_text["facets"],
-
embed=embed
+
embed=embed,
+
thumbnail_url=story.image_url # From RSS feed - server will validate and upload
)
# Mark as posted (only if successful)
+5 -14
aggregators/kagi-news/tests/test_e2e.py
···
Verifies:
- Embed structure matches social.coves.embed.external
- All required fields are present
-
- Optional thumbnail is included when provided
+
- Thumbnails are handled by server's unfurl service (not included in client)
"""
handle, password = aggregator_credentials
···
password=password
)
-
# Test with thumbnail
+
# Create external embed (server will handle thumbnail extraction)
embed = client.create_external_embed(
uri="https://example.com/story",
title="Test Story",
-
description="Test description",
-
thumb="https://example.com/image.jpg"
+
description="Test description"
)
assert embed["$type"] == "social.coves.embed.external"
assert embed["external"]["uri"] == "https://example.com/story"
assert embed["external"]["title"] == "Test Story"
assert embed["external"]["description"] == "Test description"
-
assert embed["external"]["thumb"] == "https://example.com/image.jpg"
-
-
# Test without thumbnail
-
embed_no_thumb = client.create_external_embed(
-
uri="https://example.com/story2",
-
title="Test Story 2",
-
description="Test description 2"
-
)
-
-
assert "thumb" not in embed_no_thumb["external"]
+
# Thumbnail is not included - server's unfurl service handles it
+
assert "thumb" not in embed["external"]
print("\nโœ… External embed format correct")
+4 -3
aggregators/kagi-news/tests/test_main.py
···
mock_client.create_post.return_value = "at://did:plc:test/social.coves.post/abc123"
# Mock create_external_embed to return proper embed structure
+
# Note: Thumbnails are handled by server's unfurl service, not client
mock_client.create_external_embed.return_value = {
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
"external": {
"uri": sample_story.link,
"title": sample_story.title,
-
"description": sample_story.summary,
-
"thumb": sample_story.image_url
+
"description": sample_story.summary
}
}
···
assert call_kwargs["embed"]["$type"] == "social.coves.embed.external"
assert call_kwargs["embed"]["external"]["uri"] == sample_story.link
assert call_kwargs["embed"]["external"]["title"] == sample_story.title
-
assert call_kwargs["embed"]["external"]["thumb"] == sample_story.image_url
+
# Thumbnail is not included - server's unfurl service handles it
+
assert "thumb" not in call_kwargs["embed"]["external"]
+134
scripts/post_streamable.py
···
+
#!/usr/bin/env python3
+
"""
+
Quick script to post a Streamable video to test-usnews community.
+
Uses the kagi-news CovesClient infrastructure.
+
"""
+
+
import sys
+
import os
+
+
# Add kagi-news src to path to use CovesClient
+
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), '../aggregators/kagi-news'))
+
+
from src.coves_client import CovesClient
+
+
def main():
+
# Configuration
+
COVES_API_URL = "http://localhost:8081"
+
PDS_URL = "http://localhost:3001"
+
+
# Use PDS instance credentials (from .env.dev)
+
HANDLE = "testuser123.local.coves.dev"
+
PASSWORD = "test-password-123"
+
+
# Post details
+
COMMUNITY_HANDLE = "test-usnews.community.coves.social"
+
+
# Post 1: Streamable video
+
STREAMABLE_URL = "https://streamable.com/7kpdft"
+
STREAMABLE_TITLE = "NBACentral - \"Your son don't wanna be here, we know it's your last weekend. Enjoy ..."
+
+
# Post 2: Reddit highlight
+
REDDIT_URL = "https://www.reddit.com/r/nba/comments/1orfsgm/highlight_giannis_antetokounmpo_41_pts_15_reb_9/"
+
REDDIT_TITLE = "[Highlight] Giannis Antetokounmpo (41 PTS, 15 REB, 9 AST) tallies his 56th career regular season game of 40+ points, passing Kareem Abdul-Jabbar for the most such games in franchise history. Milwaukee defeats Chicago 126-110 to win their NBA Cup opener."
+
+
# Initialize client
+
print(f"Initializing Coves client...")
+
print(f" API URL: {COVES_API_URL}")
+
print(f" PDS URL: {PDS_URL}")
+
print(f" Handle: {HANDLE}")
+
+
client = CovesClient(
+
api_url=COVES_API_URL,
+
handle=HANDLE,
+
password=PASSWORD,
+
pds_url=PDS_URL
+
)
+
+
# Authenticate
+
print("\nAuthenticating...")
+
try:
+
client.authenticate()
+
print(f"โœ“ Authenticated as {client.did}")
+
except Exception as e:
+
print(f"โœ— Authentication failed: {e}")
+
return 1
+
+
# Post 1: Streamable video
+
print("\n" + "="*60)
+
print("POST 1: STREAMABLE VIDEO")
+
print("="*60)
+
+
print("\nCreating minimal external embed (URI only)...")
+
streamable_embed = {
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
+
"external": {
+
"uri": STREAMABLE_URL
+
}
+
}
+
print(f"โœ“ Embed created with URI only (unfurl service should enrich)")
+
+
print(f"\nPosting to {COMMUNITY_HANDLE}...")
+
print(f" Title: {STREAMABLE_TITLE}")
+
print(f" Video: {STREAMABLE_URL}")
+
+
try:
+
post_uri = client.create_post(
+
community_handle=COMMUNITY_HANDLE,
+
title=STREAMABLE_TITLE,
+
content="",
+
facets=[],
+
embed=streamable_embed
+
)
+
+
print(f"\nโœ“ Streamable post created successfully!")
+
print(f" URI: {post_uri}")
+
+
except Exception as e:
+
print(f"\nโœ— Streamable post creation failed: {e}")
+
import traceback
+
traceback.print_exc()
+
return 1
+
+
# Post 2: Reddit highlight
+
print("\n" + "="*60)
+
print("POST 2: REDDIT HIGHLIGHT")
+
print("="*60)
+
+
print("\nCreating minimal external embed (URI only)...")
+
reddit_embed = {
+
"$type": "social.coves.embed.external",
+
"external": {
+
"uri": REDDIT_URL
+
}
+
}
+
print(f"โœ“ Embed created with URI only (unfurl service should enrich)")
+
+
print(f"\nPosting to {COMMUNITY_HANDLE}...")
+
print(f" Title: {REDDIT_TITLE}")
+
print(f" URL: {REDDIT_URL}")
+
+
try:
+
post_uri = client.create_post(
+
community_handle=COMMUNITY_HANDLE,
+
title=REDDIT_TITLE,
+
content="",
+
facets=[],
+
embed=reddit_embed
+
)
+
+
print(f"\nโœ“ Reddit post created successfully!")
+
print(f" URI: {post_uri}")
+
print(f"\n" + "="*60)
+
print("Both posts created! Check them out at !test-usnews")
+
print("="*60)
+
return 0
+
+
except Exception as e:
+
print(f"\nโœ— Reddit post creation failed: {e}")
+
import traceback
+
traceback.print_exc()
+
return 1
+
+
if __name__ == "__main__":
+
sys.exit(main())
+6 -3
aggregators/kagi-news/src/html_parser.py
···
Perspective(
actor=p['actor'],
description=p['description'],
-
source_url=p['source_url']
+
source_url=p['source_url'],
+
source_name=p.get('source_name', '')
)
for p in parsed['perspectives']
]
···
actor, rest = full_text.split(':', 1)
actor = actor.strip()
-
# Find the <a> tag for source URL
+
# Find the <a> tag for source URL and name
a_tag = li.find('a')
source_url = a_tag['href'] if a_tag and a_tag.get('href') else ""
+
source_name = a_tag.get_text(strip=True) if a_tag else ""
# Extract description (between colon and source link)
# Remove the source citation part in parentheses
···
return {
'actor': actor,
'description': description,
-
'source_url': source_url
+
'source_url': source_url,
+
'source_name': source_name
}
def _extract_sources(self, soup: BeautifulSoup) -> List[Dict]:
+1
aggregators/kagi-news/src/models.py
···
actor: str
description: str
source_url: str
+
source_name: str = "" # Name of the source (e.g., "The Straits Times")
@dataclass
+11 -7
aggregators/kagi-news/src/richtext_formatter.py
···
builder.add_bold("Highlights:")
builder.add_text("\n")
for highlight in story.highlights:
-
builder.add_text(f"โ€ข {highlight}\n")
+
builder.add_text(f"โ€ข {highlight}\n\n")
builder.add_text("\n")
# Perspectives (if present)
···
# Bold the actor name
actor_with_colon = f"{perspective.actor}:"
builder.add_bold(actor_with_colon)
-
builder.add_text(f" {perspective.description} (")
+
builder.add_text(f" {perspective.description}")
-
# Add link to source
-
source_link_text = "Source"
-
builder.add_link(source_link_text, perspective.source_url)
-
builder.add_text(")\n")
+
# Add link to source if available
+
if perspective.source_url:
+
builder.add_text(" (")
+
source_link_text = perspective.source_name if perspective.source_name else "Source"
+
builder.add_link(source_link_text, perspective.source_url)
+
builder.add_text(")")
+
+
builder.add_text("\n\n")
builder.add_text("\n")
# Quote (if present)
···
for source in story.sources:
builder.add_text("โ€ข ")
builder.add_link(source.title, source.url)
-
builder.add_text(f" - {source.domain}\n")
+
builder.add_text(f" - {source.domain}\n\n")
builder.add_text("\n")
# Kagi News attribution
-2
docker-compose.dev.yml
···
-
version: '3.8'
-
# Coves Local Development Stack
# All-in-one setup: PDS + PostgreSQL + optional Relay
#
+1 -1
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/feed/comment.json internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/community/comment.json
···
{
"lexicon": 1,
-
"id": "social.coves.feed.comment",
+
"id": "social.coves.community.comment",
"defs": {
"main": {
"type": "record",
+1 -1
tests/lexicon-test-data/interaction/comment-invalid-content.json
···
{
-
"$type": "social.coves.feed.comment",
+
"$type": "social.coves.community.comment",
"reply": {
"root": {
"uri": "at://did:plc:test123/social.coves.community.post/3k7a3dmb5bk2c",
+1 -1
tests/lexicon-test-data/interaction/comment-valid-sticker.json
···
{
-
"$type": "social.coves.feed.comment",
+
"$type": "social.coves.community.comment",
"reply": {
"root": {
"uri": "at://did:plc:test123/social.coves.community.post/3k7a3dmb5bk2c",
+1 -1
tests/lexicon-test-data/interaction/comment-valid-text.json
···
{
-
"$type": "social.coves.feed.comment",
+
"$type": "social.coves.community.comment",
"reply": {
"root": {
"uri": "at://did:plc:test123/social.coves.community.post/3k7a3dmb5bk2c",
+34
internal/db/migrations/018_migrate_comment_namespace.sql
···
+
-- +goose Up
+
-- Migration: Update comment URIs from social.coves.feed.comment to social.coves.community.comment
+
-- This updates the namespace for all comment records in the database.
+
-- Since we're pre-production, we're only updating the comments table (not votes).
+
+
-- Update main comment URIs
+
UPDATE comments
+
SET uri = REPLACE(uri, '/social.coves.feed.comment/', '/social.coves.community.comment/')
+
WHERE uri LIKE '%/social.coves.feed.comment/%';
+
+
-- Update root references (when root is a comment, not a post)
+
UPDATE comments
+
SET root_uri = REPLACE(root_uri, '/social.coves.feed.comment/', '/social.coves.community.comment/')
+
WHERE root_uri LIKE '%/social.coves.feed.comment/%';
+
+
-- Update parent references (when parent is a comment)
+
UPDATE comments
+
SET parent_uri = REPLACE(parent_uri, '/social.coves.feed.comment/', '/social.coves.community.comment/')
+
WHERE parent_uri LIKE '%/social.coves.feed.comment/%';
+
+
-- +goose Down
+
-- Rollback: Revert comment URIs from social.coves.community.comment to social.coves.feed.comment
+
+
UPDATE comments
+
SET uri = REPLACE(uri, '/social.coves.community.comment/', '/social.coves.feed.comment/')
+
WHERE uri LIKE '%/social.coves.community.comment/%';
+
+
UPDATE comments
+
SET root_uri = REPLACE(root_uri, '/social.coves.community.comment/', '/social.coves.feed.comment/')
+
WHERE root_uri LIKE '%/social.coves.community.comment/%';
+
+
UPDATE comments
+
SET parent_uri = REPLACE(parent_uri, '/social.coves.community.comment/', '/social.coves.feed.comment/')
+
WHERE parent_uri LIKE '%/social.coves.community.comment/%';
+1 -1
internal/core/comments/comment.go
···
// CommentRecord represents the atProto record structure indexed from Jetstream
// This is the data structure that gets stored in the user's repository
-
// Matches social.coves.feed.comment lexicon
+
// Matches social.coves.community.comment lexicon
type CommentRecord struct {
Embed map[string]interface{} `json:"embed,omitempty"`
Labels *SelfLabels `json:"labels,omitempty"`
+2 -2
internal/core/comments/view_models.go
···
)
// CommentView represents the full view of a comment with all metadata
-
// Matches social.coves.feed.getComments#commentView lexicon
+
// Matches social.coves.community.comment.getComments#commentView lexicon
// Used in thread views and get endpoints
type CommentView struct {
Embed interface{} `json:"embed,omitempty"`
···
}
// ThreadViewComment represents a comment with its nested replies
-
// Matches social.coves.feed.getComments#threadViewComment lexicon
+
// Matches social.coves.community.comment.getComments#threadViewComment lexicon
// Supports recursive threading for comment trees
type ThreadViewComment struct {
Comment *CommentView `json:"comment"`
+1 -1
internal/validation/lexicon.go
···
// ValidateComment validates a comment record
func (v *LexiconValidator) ValidateComment(comment map[string]interface{}) error {
-
return v.ValidateRecord(comment, "social.coves.feed.comment")
+
return v.ValidateRecord(comment, "social.coves.community.comment")
}
// ValidateVote validates a vote record
+3 -2
internal/core/unfurl/providers.go
···
// normalizeURL converts protocol-relative URLs to HTTPS
// Examples:
-
// "//example.com/image.jpg" -> "https://example.com/image.jpg"
-
// "https://example.com/image.jpg" -> "https://example.com/image.jpg" (unchanged)
+
//
+
// "//example.com/image.jpg" -> "https://example.com/image.jpg"
+
// "https://example.com/image.jpg" -> "https://example.com/image.jpg" (unchanged)
func normalizeURL(urlStr string) string {
if strings.HasPrefix(urlStr, "//") {
return "https:" + urlStr
+130 -28
docs/PRD_ALPHA_GO_LIVE.md
···
## ๐ŸŽฏ Major Progress Update
**โœ… ALL E2E TESTS COMPLETE!** (Completed 2025-11-16)
+
**โœ… BIDIRECTIONAL DID VERIFICATION COMPLETE!** (Completed 2025-11-16)
All 6 critical E2E test suites have been implemented and are passing:
- โœ… Full User Journey (signup โ†’ community โ†’ post โ†’ comment โ†’ vote)
···
**Time Saved**: ~7-12 hours through parallel agent implementation
**Test Quality**: Enhanced with comprehensive database record verification to catch race conditions
+
### Production Deployment Requirements
+
+
**Architecture**:
+
- **AppView Domain**: coves.social (instance identity, API, frontend)
+
- **PDS Domain**: coves.me (separate domain required - cannot be same as AppView)
+
- **Community Handles**: Use @coves.social (AppView domain)
+
- **Jetstream**: Connects to Bluesky's production firehose (wss://jetstream2.us-east.bsky.network)
+
+
**Required: .well-known/did.json at coves.social**:
+
```json
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"alsoKnownAs": ["at://coves.social"],
+
"verificationMethod": [
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social#atproto",
+
"type": "Multikey",
+
"controller": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "z..."
+
}
+
],
+
"service": [
+
{
+
"id": "#atproto_pds",
+
"type": "AtprotoPersonalDataServer",
+
"serviceEndpoint": "https://coves.me"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
```
+
+
**Environment Variables**:
+
- AppView:
+
- `INSTANCE_DID=did:web:coves.social`
+
- `INSTANCE_DOMAIN=coves.social`
+
- `PDS_URL=https://coves.me` (separate domain)
+
- `SKIP_DID_WEB_VERIFICATION=false` (production)
+
- `JETSTREAM_URL=wss://jetstream2.us-east.bsky.network/subscribe`
+
+
**Verification**:
+
- `curl https://coves.social/.well-known/did.json` (should return DID document)
+
- `curl https://coves.me/xrpc/_health` (PDS health check)
+
## Overview
This document tracks the remaining work required to launch Coves alpha with real users. Focus is on critical functionality, security, and operational readiness.
···
### 1. Authentication & Security
+
#### Production PDS Deployment
+
**CRITICAL**: PDS must be on separate domain from AppView (coves.me, not coves.social)
+
+
- [ ] Deploy PDS to coves.me domain
+
- [ ] Set up DNS: A record for coves.me โ†’ server IP
+
- [ ] Configure SSL certificate for coves.me
+
- [ ] Deploy PDS container/service on port 2583
+
- [ ] Configure nginx/Caddy reverse proxy for coves.me โ†’ localhost:2583
+
- [ ] Set PDS_HOSTNAME=coves.me in PDS environment
+
- [ ] Mount persistent volume for PDS data (/pds/data)
+
- [ ] Verify PDS connectivity
+
- [ ] Test: `curl https://coves.me/xrpc/_health`
+
- [ ] Create test community account on PDS
+
- [ ] Verify JWKS endpoint: `curl https://coves.me/.well-known/jwks.json`
+
- [ ] Test community account token provisioning
+
- [ ] Configure AppView to use production PDS
+
- [ ] Set `PDS_URL=https://coves.me` in AppView .env
+
- [ ] Test community creation flow (provisions account on coves.me)
+
- [ ] Verify account provisioning works end-to-end
+
+
**Important**: Jetstream connects to Bluesky's production firehose, which automatically includes events from all production PDS instances (including coves.me once it's live)
+
+
**Estimated Effort**: 4-6 hours
+
**Risk**: Medium (infrastructure setup, DNS propagation)
+
#### JWT Signature Verification (Production Mode)
-
- [ ] Test with production PDS at `pds.bretton.dev`
-
- [ ] Create test account on production PDS
-
- [ ] Verify JWKS endpoint is accessible
+
- [ ] Test with production PDS at coves.me
+
- [ ] Verify JWKS endpoint is accessible: `https://coves.me/.well-known/jwks.json`
- [ ] Run `TestJWTSignatureVerification` against production PDS
- [ ] Confirm signature verification succeeds
-
- [ ] Test token refresh flow
+
- [ ] Test token refresh flow for community accounts
- [ ] Set `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false` in production environment
- [ ] Verify all auth middleware tests pass with verification enabled
-
- [ ] Document production PDS requirements for communities
-
-
**Estimated Effort**: 2-3 hours
-
**Risk**: Medium (code implemented, needs validation)
-
-
#### did:web Verification
-
- [ ] Complete did:web domain verification implementation
-
- [ ] Test with real did:web identities
-
- [ ] Add security logging for verification failures
-
- [ ] Set `SKIP_DID_WEB_VERIFICATION=false` for production
**Estimated Effort**: 2-3 hours
-
**Risk**: Medium
+
**Risk**: Low (depends on PDS deployment)
+
+
#### did:web Verification โœ… COMPLETE
+
- [x] Complete did:web domain verification implementation (2025-11-16)
+
- [x] Implement Bluesky-compatible bidirectional verification
+
- [x] Add alsoKnownAs field verification in DID documents
+
- [x] Add security logging for verification failures
+
- [x] Update cache TTL to 24h (matches Bluesky recommendations)
+
- [x] Comprehensive test coverage with mock HTTP servers
+
- [ ] Set `SKIP_DID_WEB_VERIFICATION=false` for production (dev default: true)
+
- [ ] Deploy `.well-known/did.json` to production domain
+
+
**Implementation Details**:
+
- **Location**: [internal/atproto/jetstream/community_consumer.go](../internal/atproto/jetstream/community_consumer.go)
+
- **Verification Flow**: Domain matching + DID document fetch + alsoKnownAs validation
+
- **Security Model**: Matches Bluesky (DNS/HTTPS authority + bidirectional binding)
+
- **Performance**: Bounded LRU cache (1000 entries), rate limiting (10 req/s), 24h TTL
+
- **Impact**: AppView indexing and federation trust (not community creation API)
+
- **Tests**: `tests/integration/community_hostedby_security_test.go`
+
+
**Actual Effort**: 3 hours (implementation + testing)
+
**Risk**: โœ… Low (complete and tested)
### 2. DPoP Token Architecture Fix
···
- [ ] Common issues and fixes
- [ ] Emergency procedures (PDS down, database down, etc.)
- [ ] Create production environment checklist
-
- [ ] All environment variables set
-
- [ ] `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false`
-
- [ ] `SKIP_DID_WEB_VERIFICATION=false`
-
- [ ] Database migrations applied
-
- [ ] PDS connectivity verified
-
- [ ] JWKS caching working
-
- [ ] Jetstream consumers running
+
- [ ] **Domain Setup**
+
- [ ] AppView domain (coves.social) DNS configured
+
- [ ] PDS domain (coves.me) DNS configured - MUST be separate domain
+
- [ ] SSL certificates for both domains
+
- [ ] Nginx/Caddy reverse proxy configured for both domains
+
- [ ] **AppView Environment Variables**
+
- [ ] `INSTANCE_DID=did:web:coves.social`
+
- [ ] `INSTANCE_DOMAIN=coves.social`
+
- [ ] `PDS_URL=https://coves.me` (separate domain)
+
- [ ] `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false`
+
- [ ] `SKIP_DID_WEB_VERIFICATION=false`
+
- [ ] `JETSTREAM_URL=wss://jetstream2.us-east.bsky.network/subscribe`
+
- [ ] **PDS Environment Variables**
+
- [ ] `PDS_HOSTNAME=coves.me`
+
- [ ] `PDS_PORT=2583`
+
- [ ] Persistent storage mounted
+
- [ ] **Deployment Verification**
+
- [ ] Deploy `.well-known/did.json` to coves.social with `serviceEndpoint: https://coves.me`
+
- [ ] Verify: `curl https://coves.social/.well-known/did.json`
+
- [ ] Verify: `curl https://coves.me/xrpc/_health`
+
- [ ] Database migrations applied
+
- [ ] PDS connectivity verified from AppView
+
- [ ] JWKS caching working
+
- [ ] Jetstream consumer connected to Bluesky production firehose
+
- [ ] Test community creation end-to-end
- [ ] Monitoring and alerting active
**Estimated Effort**: 6-8 hours
···
## Timeline Estimate
### Week 1: Critical Blockers (P0)
-
- **Days 1-2**: Authentication (JWT + did:web verification)
+
- ~~**Days 1-2**: Authentication (JWT + did:web verification)~~ โœ… **did:web COMPLETED**
+
- **Day 1**: Production PDS deployment (coves.me domain setup)
+
- **Day 2**: JWT signature verification with production PDS
- **Day 3**: DPoP token architecture fix
- ~~**Day 4**: Handle resolution + comment count reconciliation~~ โœ… **COMPLETED**
- **Day 4-5**: Testing and bug fixes
-
**Total**: 15-20 hours (reduced from 20-25 due to completed items)
+
**Total**: 16-23 hours (added 4-6 hours for PDS deployment, reduced from original due to did:web completion)
### Week 2: Production Infrastructure (P1)
- **Days 6-7**: Monitoring + structured logging
···
**Total**: ~~20-25 hours~~ โ†’ **13 hours actual** (E2E tests) + 7-12 hours remaining (load testing, polish)
-
**Grand Total: ~~65-80 hours~~ โ†’ 50-65 hours remaining (approximately 1.5-2 weeks full-time)**
-
*(Originally 70-85 hours. Reduced by completed items: handle resolution, comment count reconciliation, and ALL E2E tests)*
+
**Grand Total: ~~65-80 hours~~ โ†’ 51-68 hours remaining (approximately 1.5-2 weeks full-time)**
+
*(Originally 70-85 hours. Adjusted for: +4-6 hours PDS deployment, -3 hours did:web completion, -13 hours E2E tests completion, -4 hours handle resolution and comment reconciliation)*
**โœ… Progress Update**: E2E testing section COMPLETE ahead of schedule - saved ~7-12 hours through parallel agent implementation
···
- [ ] All P0 blockers resolved
- โœ… Handle resolution (COMPLETE)
- โœ… Comment count reconciliation (COMPLETE)
+
- โœ… did:web verification (COMPLETE - needs production deployment)
+
- [ ] Production PDS deployed to coves.me (separate domain)
- [ ] JWT signature verification working with production PDS
- [ ] DPoP architecture fix implemented
-
- [ ] did:web verification complete
- [ ] Subscriptions/blocking work via client-write pattern
- [x] **All integration tests passing** โœ…
- [x] **E2E user journey test passing** โœ…
···
11. [ ] Go/no-go decision
12. [ ] Launch! ๐Ÿš€
-
**๐ŸŽ‰ Major Milestone**: All E2E tests complete! Test coverage now includes full user journey, blob uploads, concurrent operations, rate limiting, and error recovery.
+
**๐ŸŽ‰ Major Milestones**:
+
- All E2E tests complete! Test coverage now includes full user journey, blob uploads, concurrent operations, rate limiting, and error recovery.
+
- Bidirectional DID verification complete! Bluesky-compatible security model with alsoKnownAs validation, 24h cache TTL, and comprehensive test coverage.
+19 -16
docs/PRD_BACKLOG.md
···
---
-
### did:web Domain Verification & hostedByDID Auto-Population
-
**Added:** 2025-10-11 | **Updated:** 2025-10-16 | **Effort:** 2-3 days | **Priority:** ALPHA BLOCKER
+
### โœ… did:web Domain Verification & hostedByDID Auto-Population - COMPLETE
+
**Added:** 2025-10-11 | **Updated:** 2025-11-16 | **Completed:** 2025-11-16 | **Status:** โœ… DONE
**Problem:**
1. **Domain Impersonation**: Self-hosters can set `INSTANCE_DID=did:web:nintendo.com` without owning the domain, enabling attacks where communities appear hosted by trusted domains
···
- Federation partners can't verify instance authenticity
- AppView pollution with fake hosting claims
-
**Solution:**
-
1. **Basic Validation (Phase 1)**: Verify `did:web:` domain matches configured `instanceDomain`
-
2. **Cryptographic Verification (Phase 2)**: Fetch `https://domain/.well-known/did.json` and verify:
+
**Solution Implemented (Bluesky-Compatible):**
+
1. โœ… **Domain Matching**: Verify `did:web:` domain matches configured `instanceDomain`
+
2. โœ… **Bidirectional Verification**: Fetch `https://domain/.well-known/did.json` and verify:
- DID document exists and is valid
-
- Domain ownership proven via HTTPS hosting
-
- DID document matches claimed `instanceDID`
-
3. **Auto-populate hostedByDID**: Remove from client API, derive from instance configuration in service layer
+
- DID document ID matches claimed `instanceDID`
+
- DID document claims handle domain in `alsoKnownAs` field (bidirectional binding)
+
- Domain ownership proven via HTTPS hosting (matches Bluesky's trust model)
+
3. โœ… **Auto-populate hostedByDID**: Removed from client API, derived from instance configuration in service layer
**Current Status:**
- โœ… Default changed from `coves.local` โ†’ `coves.social` (fixes `.local` TLD bug)
-
- โœ… TODO comment in [cmd/server/main.go:126-131](../cmd/server/main.go#L126-L131)
- โœ… hostedByDID removed from client requests (2025-10-16)
- โœ… Service layer auto-populates `hostedByDID` from `instanceDID` (2025-10-16)
- โœ… Handler rejects client-provided `hostedByDID` (2025-10-16)
- โœ… Basic validation: Logs warning if `did:web:` domain โ‰  `instanceDomain` (2025-10-16)
-
- โš ๏ธ **REMAINING**: Full DID document verification (cryptographic proof of ownership)
-
-
**Implementation Notes:**
-
- Phase 1 complete: Basic validation catches config errors, logs warnings
-
- Phase 2 needed: Fetch `https://domain/.well-known/did.json` and verify ownership
-
- Add `SKIP_DID_WEB_VERIFICATION=true` for dev mode
-
- Full verification blocks startup if domain ownership cannot be proven
+
- โœ… **MANDATORY bidirectional DID verification** (2025-11-16)
+
- โœ… Cache TTL updated to 24h (matches Bluesky recommendations) (2025-11-16)
+
+
**Implementation Details:**
+
- **Security Model**: Matches Bluesky's approach - relies on DNS/HTTPS authority, not cryptographic proof
+
- **Enforcement**: MANDATORY hard-fail in production (rejects communities with verification failures)
+
- **Dev Mode**: Set `SKIP_DID_WEB_VERIFICATION=true` to bypass verification for local development
+
- **Performance**: Bounded LRU cache (1000 entries), rate limiting (10 req/s), 24h cache TTL
+
- **Bidirectional Check**: Prevents impersonation by requiring DID document to claim the handle
+
- **Location**: [internal/atproto/jetstream/community_consumer.go](../internal/atproto/jetstream/community_consumer.go)
---
+18
internal/api/routes/aggregator.go
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/aggregator"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/core/aggregators"
+
"Coves/internal/core/users"
+
"net/http"
+
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
···
func RegisterAggregatorRoutes(
r chi.Router,
aggregatorService aggregators.Service,
+
userService users.UserService,
+
identityResolver identity.Resolver,
) {
// Create query handlers
getServicesHandler := aggregator.NewGetServicesHandler(aggregatorService)
getAuthorizationsHandler := aggregator.NewGetAuthorizationsHandler(aggregatorService)
listForCommunityHandler := aggregator.NewListForCommunityHandler(aggregatorService)
+
// Create registration handler
+
registerHandler := aggregator.NewRegisterHandler(userService, identityResolver)
+
// Query endpoints (public - no auth required)
// GET /xrpc/social.coves.aggregator.getServices?dids=did:plc:abc,did:plc:def
// Following app.bsky.feed.getFeedGenerators pattern
···
// Lists aggregators authorized by a community
r.Get("/xrpc/social.coves.aggregator.listForCommunity", listForCommunityHandler.HandleListForCommunity)
+
// Registration endpoint (public - no auth required)
+
// Aggregators register themselves after creating their own PDS accounts
+
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.aggregator.register
+
// Rate limited to 10 requests per 10 minutes per IP to prevent abuse
+
registrationRateLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 10*time.Minute)
+
r.Post("/xrpc/social.coves.aggregator.register",
+
registrationRateLimiter.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(registerHandler.HandleRegister)).ServeHTTP)
+
// Write endpoints (Phase 2 - require authentication and moderator permissions)
// TODO: Implement after Jetstream consumer is ready
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.aggregator.enable (requires auth + moderator)
+73
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/aggregator/register.json
···
+
{
+
"lexicon": 1,
+
"id": "social.coves.aggregator.register",
+
"defs": {
+
"main": {
+
"type": "procedure",
+
"description": "Register an existing aggregator DID with this Coves instance. Aggregators must first create their own DID via PLC directory, then call this endpoint to register. Domain ownership is verified via .well-known/atproto-did file.",
+
"input": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["did", "domain"],
+
"properties": {
+
"did": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "did",
+
"description": "DID of the aggregator (did:plc or did:web format)"
+
},
+
"domain": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "uri",
+
"description": "Domain where the aggregator is hosted (e.g., 'rss-bot.example.com'). Must serve .well-known/atproto-did file containing the DID."
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"output": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["did", "handle"],
+
"properties": {
+
"did": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "did",
+
"description": "DID of the registered aggregator"
+
},
+
"handle": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"description": "Handle extracted from DID document"
+
},
+
"message": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"description": "Success message with next steps"
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"errors": [
+
{
+
"name": "InvalidDID",
+
"description": "DID format is invalid or not did:plc or did:web format"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "DomainVerificationFailed",
+
"description": "Could not verify domain ownership via .well-known/atproto-did or DID mismatch"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "AlreadyRegistered",
+
"description": "This aggregator DID is already registered with this instance"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "DIDResolutionFailed",
+
"description": "Could not resolve DID document to extract handle and PDS URL"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "RegistrationFailed",
+
"description": "Internal server error occurred during registration"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
}
+
}
+95
scripts/aggregator-setup/1-create-pds-account.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
+
# Script: 1-create-pds-account.sh
+
# Purpose: Create a PDS account for your aggregator
+
#
+
# This script helps you create an account on a PDS (Personal Data Server).
+
# The PDS will automatically create a DID:PLC for you.
+
+
set -e
+
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "Step 1: Create PDS Account for Your Aggregator"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Get PDS URL
+
read -p "Enter PDS URL (default: https://bsky.social): " PDS_URL
+
PDS_URL=${PDS_URL:-https://bsky.social}
+
+
# Get credentials
+
read -p "Enter desired handle (e.g., mynewsbot.bsky.social): " HANDLE
+
read -p "Enter email: " EMAIL
+
read -sp "Enter password: " PASSWORD
+
echo ""
+
+
# Validate inputs
+
if [ -z "$HANDLE" ] || [ -z "$EMAIL" ] || [ -z "$PASSWORD" ]; then
+
echo "Error: All fields are required"
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "Creating account on $PDS_URL..."
+
+
# Create account via com.atproto.server.createAccount
+
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "$PDS_URL/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount" \
+
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+
-d "{
+
\"handle\": \"$HANDLE\",
+
\"email\": \"$EMAIL\",
+
\"password\": \"$PASSWORD\"
+
}")
+
+
# Check if successful
+
if echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -e '.error' > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
echo "Error creating account:"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
# Extract DID and access token
+
DID=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.did')
+
ACCESS_JWT=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.accessJwt')
+
REFRESH_JWT=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.refreshJwt')
+
+
if [ -z "$DID" ] || [ "$DID" = "null" ]; then
+
echo "Error: Failed to extract DID from response"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "โœ“ Account created successfully!"
+
echo ""
+
echo "=== Save these credentials ===="
+
echo "DID: $DID"
+
echo "Handle: $HANDLE"
+
echo "PDS URL: $PDS_URL"
+
echo "Email: $EMAIL"
+
echo "Password: [hidden]"
+
echo "Access JWT: $ACCESS_JWT"
+
echo "Refresh JWT: $REFRESH_JWT"
+
echo "==============================="
+
echo ""
+
+
# Save to config file
+
CONFIG_FILE="aggregator-config.env"
+
cat > "$CONFIG_FILE" <<EOF
+
# Aggregator Account Configuration
+
# Generated: $(date)
+
+
AGGREGATOR_DID="$DID"
+
AGGREGATOR_HANDLE="$HANDLE"
+
AGGREGATOR_PDS_URL="$PDS_URL"
+
AGGREGATOR_EMAIL="$EMAIL"
+
AGGREGATOR_PASSWORD="$PASSWORD"
+
AGGREGATOR_ACCESS_JWT="$ACCESS_JWT"
+
AGGREGATOR_REFRESH_JWT="$REFRESH_JWT"
+
EOF
+
+
echo "โœ“ Configuration saved to $CONFIG_FILE"
+
echo ""
+
echo "IMPORTANT: Keep this file secure! It contains your credentials."
+
echo ""
+
echo "Next step: Run ./2-setup-wellknown.sh"
+93
scripts/aggregator-setup/2-setup-wellknown.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
+
# Script: 2-setup-wellknown.sh
+
# Purpose: Generate .well-known/atproto-did file for domain verification
+
#
+
# This script creates the .well-known/atproto-did file that proves you own your domain.
+
# You'll need to host this file at https://yourdomain.com/.well-known/atproto-did
+
+
set -e
+
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "Step 2: Setup .well-known/atproto-did"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Load config if available
+
if [ -f "aggregator-config.env" ]; then
+
source aggregator-config.env
+
echo "โœ“ Loaded configuration from aggregator-config.env"
+
echo " DID: $AGGREGATOR_DID"
+
echo ""
+
else
+
echo "Configuration file not found. Please run 1-create-pds-account.sh first."
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
# Get domain
+
read -p "Enter your aggregator's domain (e.g., rss-bot.example.com): " DOMAIN
+
+
if [ -z "$DOMAIN" ]; then
+
echo "Error: Domain is required"
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
# Save domain to config
+
echo "" >> aggregator-config.env
+
echo "AGGREGATOR_DOMAIN=\"$DOMAIN\"" >> aggregator-config.env
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "Creating .well-known directory..."
+
mkdir -p .well-known
+
+
# Create the atproto-did file
+
echo "$AGGREGATOR_DID" > .well-known/atproto-did
+
+
echo "โœ“ Created .well-known/atproto-did with content: $AGGREGATOR_DID"
+
echo ""
+
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "Next Steps:"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
echo "1. Upload the .well-known directory to your web server"
+
echo " The file must be accessible at:"
+
echo " https://$DOMAIN/.well-known/atproto-did"
+
echo ""
+
echo "2. Verify it's working by running:"
+
echo " curl https://$DOMAIN/.well-known/atproto-did"
+
echo " (Should return: $AGGREGATOR_DID)"
+
echo ""
+
echo "3. Once verified, run: ./3-register-with-coves.sh"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Create nginx example
+
cat > nginx-example.conf <<EOF
+
# Example nginx configuration for serving .well-known
+
# Add this to your nginx server block:
+
+
location /.well-known/atproto-did {
+
alias /path/to/your/.well-known/atproto-did;
+
default_type text/plain;
+
add_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin *;
+
}
+
EOF
+
+
echo "โœ“ Created nginx-example.conf for reference"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Create Apache example
+
cat > apache-example.conf <<EOF
+
# Example Apache configuration for serving .well-known
+
# Add this to your Apache virtual host:
+
+
Alias /.well-known /path/to/your/.well-known
+
<Directory /path/to/your/.well-known>
+
Options None
+
AllowOverride None
+
Require all granted
+
Header set Access-Control-Allow-Origin "*"
+
</Directory>
+
EOF
+
+
echo "โœ“ Created apache-example.conf for reference"
+103
scripts/aggregator-setup/3-register-with-coves.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
+
# Script: 3-register-with-coves.sh
+
# Purpose: Register your aggregator with a Coves instance
+
#
+
# This script calls the social.coves.aggregator.register XRPC endpoint
+
# to register your aggregator DID with the Coves instance.
+
+
set -e
+
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "Step 3: Register with Coves Instance"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Load config if available
+
if [ -f "aggregator-config.env" ]; then
+
source aggregator-config.env
+
echo "โœ“ Loaded configuration from aggregator-config.env"
+
echo " DID: $AGGREGATOR_DID"
+
echo " Domain: $AGGREGATOR_DOMAIN"
+
echo ""
+
else
+
echo "Configuration file not found. Please run previous scripts first."
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
# Validate domain is set
+
if [ -z "$AGGREGATOR_DOMAIN" ]; then
+
echo "Error: AGGREGATOR_DOMAIN not set. Please run 2-setup-wellknown.sh first."
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
# Get Coves instance URL
+
read -p "Enter Coves instance URL (default: https://api.coves.social): " COVES_URL
+
COVES_URL=${COVES_URL:-https://api.coves.social}
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "Verifying .well-known/atproto-did is accessible..."
+
+
# Verify .well-known is accessible
+
WELLKNOWN_URL="https://$AGGREGATOR_DOMAIN/.well-known/atproto-did"
+
WELLKNOWN_CONTENT=$(curl -s "$WELLKNOWN_URL" || echo "ERROR")
+
+
if [ "$WELLKNOWN_CONTENT" = "ERROR" ]; then
+
echo "โœ— Error: Could not access $WELLKNOWN_URL"
+
echo " Please ensure the file is uploaded and accessible."
+
exit 1
+
elif [ "$WELLKNOWN_CONTENT" != "$AGGREGATOR_DID" ]; then
+
echo "โœ— Error: .well-known/atproto-did contains wrong DID"
+
echo " Expected: $AGGREGATOR_DID"
+
echo " Got: $WELLKNOWN_CONTENT"
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo "โœ“ .well-known/atproto-did is correctly configured"
+
echo ""
+
+
echo "Registering with $COVES_URL..."
+
+
# Call registration endpoint
+
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "$COVES_URL/xrpc/social.coves.aggregator.register" \
+
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+
-d "{
+
\"did\": \"$AGGREGATOR_DID\",
+
\"domain\": \"$AGGREGATOR_DOMAIN\"
+
}")
+
+
# Check if successful
+
if echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -e '.error' > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
echo "โœ— Registration failed:"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
# Extract response
+
REGISTERED_DID=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.did')
+
REGISTERED_HANDLE=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.handle')
+
MESSAGE=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.message')
+
+
if [ -z "$REGISTERED_DID" ] || [ "$REGISTERED_DID" = "null" ]; then
+
echo "โœ— Error: Unexpected response format"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "โœ“ Registration successful!"
+
echo ""
+
echo "=== Registration Details ===="
+
echo "DID: $REGISTERED_DID"
+
echo "Handle: $REGISTERED_HANDLE"
+
echo "Message: $MESSAGE"
+
echo "============================="
+
echo ""
+
+
# Save Coves URL to config
+
echo "" >> aggregator-config.env
+
echo "COVES_INSTANCE_URL=\"$COVES_URL\"" >> aggregator-config.env
+
+
echo "โœ“ Updated aggregator-config.env with Coves instance URL"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Next step: Run ./4-create-service-declaration.sh"
+125
scripts/aggregator-setup/4-create-service-declaration.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
+
# Script: 4-create-service-declaration.sh
+
# Purpose: Create aggregator service declaration record
+
#
+
# This script writes a social.coves.aggregator.service record to your aggregator's repository.
+
# This record contains metadata about your aggregator (name, description, etc.) and will be
+
# indexed by Coves' Jetstream consumer into the aggregators table.
+
+
set -e
+
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "Step 4: Create Service Declaration"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Load config if available
+
if [ -f "aggregator-config.env" ]; then
+
source aggregator-config.env
+
echo "โœ“ Loaded configuration from aggregator-config.env"
+
echo " DID: $AGGREGATOR_DID"
+
echo " PDS URL: $AGGREGATOR_PDS_URL"
+
echo ""
+
else
+
echo "Configuration file not found. Please run previous scripts first."
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
# Validate required fields
+
if [ -z "$AGGREGATOR_ACCESS_JWT" ]; then
+
echo "Error: AGGREGATOR_ACCESS_JWT not set. Please run 1-create-pds-account.sh first."
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo "Enter aggregator metadata:"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Get metadata from user
+
read -p "Display Name (e.g., 'RSS News Aggregator'): " DISPLAY_NAME
+
read -p "Description: " DESCRIPTION
+
read -p "Source URL (e.g., 'https://github.com/yourname/aggregator'): " SOURCE_URL
+
read -p "Maintainer DID (your personal DID, optional): " MAINTAINER_DID
+
+
if [ -z "$DISPLAY_NAME" ]; then
+
echo "Error: Display name is required"
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "Creating service declaration record..."
+
+
# Build the service record
+
SERVICE_RECORD=$(cat <<EOF
+
{
+
"\$type": "social.coves.aggregator.service",
+
"did": "$AGGREGATOR_DID",
+
"displayName": "$DISPLAY_NAME",
+
"description": "$DESCRIPTION",
+
"sourceUrl": "$SOURCE_URL",
+
"maintainer": "$MAINTAINER_DID",
+
"createdAt": "$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")"
+
}
+
EOF
+
)
+
+
# Call com.atproto.repo.createRecord
+
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "$AGGREGATOR_PDS_URL/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.createRecord" \
+
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGGREGATOR_ACCESS_JWT" \
+
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+
-d "{
+
\"repo\": \"$AGGREGATOR_DID\",
+
\"collection\": \"social.coves.aggregator.service\",
+
\"rkey\": \"self\",
+
\"record\": $SERVICE_RECORD
+
}")
+
+
# Check if successful
+
if echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -e '.error' > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
echo "โœ— Failed to create service declaration:"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
# Extract response
+
RECORD_URI=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.uri')
+
RECORD_CID=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.cid')
+
+
if [ -z "$RECORD_URI" ] || [ "$RECORD_URI" = "null" ]; then
+
echo "โœ— Error: Unexpected response format"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "โœ“ Service declaration created successfully!"
+
echo ""
+
echo "=== Record Details ===="
+
echo "URI: $RECORD_URI"
+
echo "CID: $RECORD_CID"
+
echo "======================="
+
echo ""
+
+
# Save to config
+
echo "" >> aggregator-config.env
+
echo "SERVICE_DECLARATION_URI=\"$RECORD_URI\"" >> aggregator-config.env
+
echo "SERVICE_DECLARATION_CID=\"$RECORD_CID\"" >> aggregator-config.env
+
+
echo "โœ“ Updated aggregator-config.env"
+
echo ""
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "Setup Complete!"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Your aggregator is now registered with Coves!"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Next steps:"
+
echo "1. Wait a few seconds for Jetstream to index your service declaration"
+
echo "2. Verify your aggregator appears in the aggregators list"
+
echo "3. Community moderators can now authorize your aggregator"
+
echo "4. Once authorized, you can start posting to communities"
+
echo ""
+
echo "To test posting, use the Coves XRPC endpoint:"
+
echo " POST $COVES_INSTANCE_URL/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create"
+
echo ""
+
echo "See docs/aggregators/SETUP_GUIDE.md for more information"
+195
aggregators/kagi-news/scripts/setup.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
+
# Script: setup-kagi-aggregator.sh
+
# Purpose: Complete setup script for Kagi News RSS aggregator
+
#
+
# This is a reference implementation showing automated setup for a specific aggregator.
+
# Other aggregator developers can use this as a template.
+
+
set -e
+
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "Kagi News RSS Aggregator - Automated Setup"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Configuration for Kagi aggregator
+
AGGREGATOR_NAME="kagi-news-bot"
+
DISPLAY_NAME="Kagi News RSS"
+
DESCRIPTION="Aggregates tech news from Kagi RSS feeds and posts to relevant communities"
+
SOURCE_URL="https://github.com/coves-social/kagi-aggregator"
+
+
# Check if config already exists
+
if [ -f "kagi-aggregator-config.env" ]; then
+
echo "Configuration file already exists. Loading existing configuration..."
+
source kagi-aggregator-config.env
+
SKIP_ACCOUNT_CREATION=true
+
else
+
SKIP_ACCOUNT_CREATION=false
+
fi
+
+
# Get runtime configuration
+
if [ "$SKIP_ACCOUNT_CREATION" = false ]; then
+
read -p "Enter PDS URL (default: https://bsky.social): " PDS_URL
+
PDS_URL=${PDS_URL:-https://bsky.social}
+
+
read -p "Enter email for bot account: " EMAIL
+
read -sp "Enter password for bot account: " PASSWORD
+
echo ""
+
+
# Generate handle
+
TIMESTAMP=$(date +%s)
+
HANDLE="$AGGREGATOR_NAME-$TIMESTAMP.bsky.social"
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "Creating PDS account..."
+
echo "Handle: $HANDLE"
+
+
# Create account
+
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "$PDS_URL/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount" \
+
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+
-d "{
+
\"handle\": \"$HANDLE\",
+
\"email\": \"$EMAIL\",
+
\"password\": \"$PASSWORD\"
+
}")
+
+
if echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -e '.error' > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
echo "โœ— Error creating account:"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
DID=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.did')
+
ACCESS_JWT=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.accessJwt')
+
REFRESH_JWT=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.refreshJwt')
+
+
echo "โœ“ Account created: $DID"
+
+
# Save configuration
+
cat > kagi-aggregator-config.env <<EOF
+
# Kagi Aggregator Configuration
+
AGGREGATOR_DID="$DID"
+
AGGREGATOR_HANDLE="$HANDLE"
+
AGGREGATOR_PDS_URL="$PDS_URL"
+
AGGREGATOR_EMAIL="$EMAIL"
+
AGGREGATOR_PASSWORD="$PASSWORD"
+
AGGREGATOR_ACCESS_JWT="$ACCESS_JWT"
+
AGGREGATOR_REFRESH_JWT="$REFRESH_JWT"
+
EOF
+
+
echo "โœ“ Configuration saved to kagi-aggregator-config.env"
+
fi
+
+
# Get domain and Coves instance
+
read -p "Enter aggregator domain (e.g., kagi-news.example.com): " DOMAIN
+
read -p "Enter Coves instance URL (default: https://api.coves.social): " COVES_URL
+
COVES_URL=${COVES_URL:-https://api.coves.social}
+
+
# Setup .well-known
+
echo ""
+
echo "Setting up .well-known/atproto-did..."
+
mkdir -p .well-known
+
echo "$DID" > .well-known/atproto-did
+
echo "โœ“ Created .well-known/atproto-did"
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "IMPORTANT: Manual Step Required"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Upload the .well-known directory to your web server at:"
+
echo " https://$DOMAIN/.well-known/atproto-did"
+
echo ""
+
read -p "Press Enter when the file is uploaded and accessible..."
+
+
# Verify .well-known
+
echo ""
+
echo "Verifying .well-known/atproto-did..."
+
WELLKNOWN_CONTENT=$(curl -s "https://$DOMAIN/.well-known/atproto-did" || echo "ERROR")
+
+
if [ "$WELLKNOWN_CONTENT" != "$DID" ]; then
+
echo "โœ— Error: .well-known/atproto-did not accessible or contains wrong DID"
+
echo " Expected: $DID"
+
echo " Got: $WELLKNOWN_CONTENT"
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo "โœ“ .well-known/atproto-did verified"
+
+
# Register with Coves
+
echo ""
+
echo "Registering with Coves instance..."
+
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "$COVES_URL/xrpc/social.coves.aggregator.register" \
+
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+
-d "{
+
\"did\": \"$DID\",
+
\"domain\": \"$DOMAIN\"
+
}")
+
+
if echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -e '.error' > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
echo "โœ— Registration failed:"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo "โœ“ Registered with Coves"
+
+
# Create service declaration
+
echo ""
+
echo "Creating service declaration..."
+
SERVICE_RECORD=$(cat <<EOF
+
{
+
"\$type": "social.coves.aggregator.service",
+
"did": "$DID",
+
"displayName": "$DISPLAY_NAME",
+
"description": "$DESCRIPTION",
+
"sourceUrl": "$SOURCE_URL",
+
"createdAt": "$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")"
+
}
+
EOF
+
)
+
+
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "$PDS_URL/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.createRecord" \
+
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_JWT" \
+
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+
-d "{
+
\"repo\": \"$DID\",
+
\"collection\": \"social.coves.aggregator.service\",
+
\"rkey\": \"self\",
+
\"record\": $SERVICE_RECORD
+
}")
+
+
if echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -e '.error' > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
echo "โœ— Failed to create service declaration:"
+
echo "$RESPONSE" | jq '.'
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
RECORD_URI=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | jq -r '.uri')
+
echo "โœ“ Service declaration created: $RECORD_URI"
+
+
# Save final configuration
+
cat >> kagi-aggregator-config.env <<EOF
+
+
# Setup completed on $(date)
+
AGGREGATOR_DOMAIN="$DOMAIN"
+
COVES_INSTANCE_URL="$COVES_URL"
+
SERVICE_DECLARATION_URI="$RECORD_URI"
+
EOF
+
+
echo ""
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo "โœ“ Kagi Aggregator Setup Complete!"
+
echo "================================================"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Configuration saved to: kagi-aggregator-config.env"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Your aggregator is now registered and ready to use."
+
echo ""
+
echo "Next steps:"
+
echo "1. Start your aggregator bot: npm start (or appropriate command)"
+
echo "2. Community moderators can authorize your aggregator"
+
echo "3. Once authorized, your bot can start posting"
+
echo ""
+
echo "See docs/aggregators/SETUP_GUIDE.md for more information"
+55
aggregators/kagi-news/.dockerignore
···
+
# Git
+
.git
+
.gitignore
+
+
# Python
+
__pycache__
+
*.py[cod]
+
*$py.class
+
*.so
+
.Python
+
venv/
+
*.egg-info
+
dist/
+
build/
+
+
# Testing
+
.pytest_cache/
+
.coverage
+
htmlcov/
+
.tox/
+
.hypothesis/
+
+
# IDE
+
.vscode/
+
.idea/
+
*.swp
+
*.swo
+
*~
+
+
# Environment
+
.env.local
+
.env.*.local
+
+
# Data and logs
+
data/
+
*.log
+
+
# Documentation
+
README.md
+
docs/
+
+
# Docker
+
Dockerfile
+
docker-compose.yml
+
.dockerignore
+
+
# Development
+
tests/
+
pytest.ini
+
mypy.ini
+
.mypy_cache/
+
+
# OS
+
.DS_Store
+
Thumbs.db
+53
aggregators/kagi-news/Dockerfile
···
+
# Kagi News RSS Aggregator
+
# Production-ready Docker image with cron scheduler
+
+
FROM python:3.11-slim
+
+
# Install cron and other utilities
+
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
+
cron \
+
curl \
+
procps \
+
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+
# Set working directory
+
WORKDIR /app
+
+
# Copy requirements first for better caching
+
COPY requirements.txt .
+
+
# Install Python dependencies (exclude dev/test deps in production)
+
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
+
feedparser==6.0.11 \
+
beautifulsoup4==4.12.3 \
+
requests==2.31.0 \
+
atproto==0.0.55 \
+
pyyaml==6.0.1
+
+
# Copy application code
+
COPY src/ ./src/
+
COPY config.yaml ./
+
+
# Copy crontab file
+
COPY crontab /etc/cron.d/kagi-aggregator
+
+
# Give execution rights on the cron job and apply it
+
RUN chmod 0644 /etc/cron.d/kagi-aggregator && \
+
crontab /etc/cron.d/kagi-aggregator
+
+
# Create log file to be able to run tail
+
RUN touch /var/log/cron.log
+
+
# Copy entrypoint script
+
COPY docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/
+
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
+
+
# Health check - verify cron is running
+
HEALTHCHECK --interval=60s --timeout=10s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
+
CMD pgrep cron || exit 1
+
+
# Run the entrypoint script
+
ENTRYPOINT ["docker-entrypoint.sh"]
+
+
# Default command: tail the cron log
+
CMD ["tail", "-f", "/var/log/cron.log"]
+48
aggregators/kagi-news/docker-compose.yml
···
+
services:
+
kagi-aggregator:
+
build:
+
context: .
+
dockerfile: Dockerfile
+
container_name: kagi-news-aggregator
+
restart: unless-stopped
+
+
# Environment variables - override in .env file or here
+
environment:
+
# Required: Aggregator credentials
+
- AGGREGATOR_HANDLE=${AGGREGATOR_HANDLE}
+
- AGGREGATOR_PASSWORD=${AGGREGATOR_PASSWORD}
+
+
# Optional: Override Coves API URL
+
- COVES_API_URL=${COVES_API_URL:-https://api.coves.social}
+
+
# Optional: Run immediately on startup (useful for testing)
+
- RUN_ON_STARTUP=${RUN_ON_STARTUP:-false}
+
+
# Mount config file if you want to modify it without rebuilding
+
volumes:
+
- ./config.yaml:/app/config.yaml:ro
+
- ./data:/app/data # For state persistence (if implemented)
+
+
# Use env_file to load credentials from .env
+
env_file:
+
- .env
+
+
# Logging configuration
+
logging:
+
driver: "json-file"
+
options:
+
max-size: "10m"
+
max-file: "3"
+
+
# Health check
+
healthcheck:
+
test: ["CMD", "pgrep", "cron"]
+
interval: 60s
+
timeout: 10s
+
retries: 3
+
start_period: 10s
+
+
# Optional: Networks for multi-container setups
+
# networks:
+
# coves:
+
# external: true
+41
aggregators/kagi-news/docker-entrypoint.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
set -e
+
+
echo "Starting Kagi News RSS Aggregator..."
+
echo "========================================="
+
+
# Load environment variables if .env file exists
+
if [ -f /app/.env ]; then
+
echo "Loading environment variables from .env"
+
export $(grep -v '^#' /app/.env | xargs)
+
fi
+
+
# Validate required environment variables
+
if [ -z "$AGGREGATOR_HANDLE" ] || [ -z "$AGGREGATOR_PASSWORD" ]; then
+
echo "ERROR: Missing required environment variables!"
+
echo "Please set AGGREGATOR_HANDLE and AGGREGATOR_PASSWORD"
+
exit 1
+
fi
+
+
echo "Aggregator Handle: $AGGREGATOR_HANDLE"
+
echo "Cron schedule loaded from /etc/cron.d/kagi-aggregator"
+
+
# Start cron in the background
+
echo "Starting cron daemon..."
+
cron
+
+
# Optional: Run aggregator immediately on startup (for testing)
+
if [ "$RUN_ON_STARTUP" = "true" ]; then
+
echo "Running aggregator immediately (RUN_ON_STARTUP=true)..."
+
cd /app && python -m src.main
+
fi
+
+
echo "========================================="
+
echo "Kagi News Aggregator is running!"
+
echo "Cron schedule: Daily at 1 PM UTC"
+
echo "Logs will appear below:"
+
echo "========================================="
+
echo ""
+
+
# Execute the command passed to docker run (defaults to tail -f /var/log/cron.log)
+
exec "$@"
+20
.beads/.gitignore
···
+
# SQLite databases
+
*.db
+
*.db-journal
+
*.db-wal
+
*.db-shm
+
+
# Daemon runtime files
+
daemon.lock
+
daemon.log
+
daemon.pid
+
bd.sock
+
+
# Legacy database files
+
db.sqlite
+
bd.db
+
+
# Keep JSONL exports and config (source of truth for git)
+
!*.jsonl
+
!metadata.json
+
!config.json
+56
.beads/config.yaml
···
+
# Beads Configuration File
+
# This file configures default behavior for all bd commands in this repository
+
# All settings can also be set via environment variables (BD_* prefix)
+
# or overridden with command-line flags
+
+
# Issue prefix for this repository (used by bd init)
+
# If not set, bd init will auto-detect from directory name
+
# Example: issue-prefix: "myproject" creates issues like "myproject-1", "myproject-2", etc.
+
# issue-prefix: ""
+
+
# Use no-db mode: load from JSONL, no SQLite, write back after each command
+
# When true, bd will use .beads/issues.jsonl as the source of truth
+
# instead of SQLite database
+
# no-db: false
+
+
# Disable daemon for RPC communication (forces direct database access)
+
# no-daemon: false
+
+
# Disable auto-flush of database to JSONL after mutations
+
# no-auto-flush: false
+
+
# Disable auto-import from JSONL when it's newer than database
+
# no-auto-import: false
+
+
# Enable JSON output by default
+
# json: false
+
+
# Default actor for audit trails (overridden by BD_ACTOR or --actor)
+
# actor: ""
+
+
# Path to database (overridden by BEADS_DB or --db)
+
# db: ""
+
+
# Auto-start daemon if not running (can also use BEADS_AUTO_START_DAEMON)
+
# auto-start-daemon: true
+
+
# Debounce interval for auto-flush (can also use BEADS_FLUSH_DEBOUNCE)
+
# flush-debounce: "5s"
+
+
# Multi-repo configuration (experimental - bd-307)
+
# Allows hydrating from multiple repositories and routing writes to the correct JSONL
+
# repos:
+
# primary: "." # Primary repo (where this database lives)
+
# additional: # Additional repos to hydrate from (read-only)
+
# - ~/beads-planning # Personal planning repo
+
# - ~/work-planning # Work planning repo
+
+
# Integration settings (access with 'bd config get/set')
+
# These are stored in the database, not in this file:
+
# - jira.url
+
# - jira.project
+
# - linear.url
+
# - linear.api-key
+
# - github.org
+
# - github.repo
+
# - sync.branch - Git branch for beads commits (use BEADS_SYNC_BRANCH env var or bd config set)
+4
.beads/metadata.json
···
+
{
+
"database": "beads.db",
+
"jsonl_export": "beads.jsonl"
+
}
+3
.gitattributes
···
+
+
# Use bd merge for beads JSONL files
+
.beads/beads.jsonl merge=beads
+131
AGENTS.md
···
+
# AI Agent Guidelines for Coves
+
+
## Issue Tracking with bd (beads)
+
+
**IMPORTANT**: This project uses **bd (beads)** for ALL issue tracking. Do NOT use markdown TODOs, task lists, or other tracking methods.
+
+
### Why bd?
+
+
- Dependency-aware: Track blockers and relationships between issues
+
- Git-friendly: Auto-syncs to JSONL for version control
+
- Agent-optimized: JSON output, ready work detection, discovered-from links
+
- Prevents duplicate tracking systems and confusion
+
+
### Quick Start
+
+
**Check for ready work:**
+
```bash
+
bd ready --json
+
```
+
+
**Create new issues:**
+
```bash
+
bd create "Issue title" -t bug|feature|task -p 0-4 --json
+
bd create "Issue title" -p 1 --deps discovered-from:bd-123 --json
+
```
+
+
**Claim and update:**
+
```bash
+
bd update bd-42 --status in_progress --json
+
bd update bd-42 --priority 1 --json
+
```
+
+
**Complete work:**
+
```bash
+
bd close bd-42 --reason "Completed" --json
+
```
+
+
### Issue Types
+
+
- `bug` - Something broken
+
- `feature` - New functionality
+
- `task` - Work item (tests, docs, refactoring)
+
- `epic` - Large feature with subtasks
+
- `chore` - Maintenance (dependencies, tooling)
+
+
### Priorities
+
+
- `0` - Critical (security, data loss, broken builds)
+
- `1` - High (major features, important bugs)
+
- `2` - Medium (default, nice-to-have)
+
- `3` - Low (polish, optimization)
+
- `4` - Backlog (future ideas)
+
+
### Workflow for AI Agents
+
+
1. **Check ready work**: `bd ready` shows unblocked issues
+
2. **Claim your task**: `bd update <id> --status in_progress`
+
3. **Work on it**: Implement, test, document
+
4. **Discover new work?** Create linked issue:
+
- `bd create "Found bug" -p 1 --deps discovered-from:<parent-id>`
+
5. **Complete**: `bd close <id> --reason "Done"`
+
6. **Commit together**: Always commit the `.beads/issues.jsonl` file together with the code changes so issue state stays in sync with code state
+
+
### Auto-Sync
+
+
bd automatically syncs with git:
+
- Exports to `.beads/issues.jsonl` after changes (5s debounce)
+
- Imports from JSONL when newer (e.g., after `git pull`)
+
- No manual export/import needed!
+
+
### MCP Server (Recommended)
+
+
If using Claude or MCP-compatible clients, install the beads MCP server:
+
+
```bash
+
pip install beads-mcp
+
```
+
+
Add to MCP config (e.g., `~/.config/claude/config.json`):
+
```json
+
{
+
"beads": {
+
"command": "beads-mcp",
+
"args": []
+
}
+
}
+
```
+
+
Then use `mcp__beads__*` functions instead of CLI commands.
+
+
### Managing AI-Generated Planning Documents
+
+
AI assistants often create planning and design documents during development:
+
- PLAN.md, IMPLEMENTATION.md, ARCHITECTURE.md
+
- DESIGN.md, CODEBASE_SUMMARY.md, INTEGRATION_PLAN.md
+
- TESTING_GUIDE.md, TECHNICAL_DESIGN.md, and similar files
+
+
**Best Practice: Use a dedicated directory for these ephemeral files**
+
+
**Recommended approach:**
+
- Create a `history/` directory in the project root
+
- Store ALL AI-generated planning/design docs in `history/`
+
- Keep the repository root clean and focused on permanent project files
+
- Only access `history/` when explicitly asked to review past planning
+
+
**Example .gitignore entry (optional):**
+
```
+
# AI planning documents (ephemeral)
+
history/
+
```
+
+
**Benefits:**
+
- โœ… Clean repository root
+
- โœ… Clear separation between ephemeral and permanent documentation
+
- โœ… Easy to exclude from version control if desired
+
- โœ… Preserves planning history for archeological research
+
- โœ… Reduces noise when browsing the project
+
+
### Important Rules
+
+
- โœ… Use bd for ALL task tracking
+
- โœ… Always use `--json` flag for programmatic use
+
- โœ… Link discovered work with `discovered-from` dependencies
+
- โœ… Check `bd ready` before asking "what should I work on?"
+
- โœ… Store AI planning docs in `history/` directory
+
- โŒ Do NOT create markdown TODO lists
+
- โŒ Do NOT use external issue trackers
+
- โŒ Do NOT duplicate tracking systems
+
- โŒ Do NOT clutter repo root with planning documents
+
+
For more details, see the [beads repository](https://github.com/steveyegge/beads).
+5
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/community/list.json
···
"type": "string",
"description": "Pagination cursor"
},
+
"visibility": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"knownValues": ["public", "unlisted", "private"],
+
"description": "Filter communities by visibility level"
+
},
"sort": {
"type": "string",
"knownValues": ["popular", "active", "new", "alphabetical"],
+8 -8
internal/core/communities/community.go
···
// ListCommunitiesRequest represents query parameters for listing communities
type ListCommunitiesRequest struct {
-
Visibility string `json:"visibility,omitempty"`
-
HostedBy string `json:"hostedBy,omitempty"`
-
SortBy string `json:"sortBy,omitempty"`
-
SortOrder string `json:"sortOrder,omitempty"`
-
Limit int `json:"limit"`
-
Offset int `json:"offset"`
+
Sort string `json:"sort,omitempty"` // Enum: popular, active, new, alphabetical
+
Visibility string `json:"visibility,omitempty"` // Filter: public, unlisted, private
+
Category string `json:"category,omitempty"` // Optional: filter by category (future)
+
Language string `json:"language,omitempty"` // Optional: filter by language (future)
+
Limit int `json:"limit"` // 1-100, default 50
+
Offset int `json:"offset"` // Pagination offset
}
// SearchCommunitiesRequest represents query parameters for searching communities
···
name := c.Handle[:communityIndex]
// Extract instance domain (everything after ".community.")
-
// len(".community.") = 11
-
instanceDomain := c.Handle[communityIndex+11:]
+
communitySegment := ".community."
+
instanceDomain := c.Handle[communityIndex+len(communitySegment):]
return fmt.Sprintf("!%s@%s", name, instanceDomain)
}
+2 -2
internal/core/communities/interfaces.go
···
UpdateCredentials(ctx context.Context, did, accessToken, refreshToken string) error
// Listing & Search
-
List(ctx context.Context, req ListCommunitiesRequest) ([]*Community, int, error) // Returns communities + total count
+
List(ctx context.Context, req ListCommunitiesRequest) ([]*Community, error)
Search(ctx context.Context, req SearchCommunitiesRequest) ([]*Community, int, error)
// Subscriptions (lightweight feed follows)
···
CreateCommunity(ctx context.Context, req CreateCommunityRequest) (*Community, error)
GetCommunity(ctx context.Context, identifier string) (*Community, error) // identifier can be DID or handle
UpdateCommunity(ctx context.Context, req UpdateCommunityRequest) (*Community, error)
-
ListCommunities(ctx context.Context, req ListCommunitiesRequest) ([]*Community, int, error)
+
ListCommunities(ctx context.Context, req ListCommunitiesRequest) ([]*Community, error)
SearchCommunities(ctx context.Context, req SearchCommunitiesRequest) ([]*Community, int, error)
// Subscription operations (write-forward: creates record in user's PDS)
+57
scripts/backup.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
# Coves Database Backup Script
+
# Usage: ./scripts/backup.sh
+
#
+
# Creates timestamped PostgreSQL backups in ./backups/
+
# Retention: Keeps last 30 days of backups
+
+
set -e
+
+
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+
PROJECT_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")"
+
BACKUP_DIR="$PROJECT_DIR/backups"
+
COMPOSE_FILE="$PROJECT_DIR/docker-compose.prod.yml"
+
+
# Load environment
+
set -a
+
source "$PROJECT_DIR/.env.prod"
+
set +a
+
+
# Colors
+
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
+
NC='\033[0m'
+
+
log() { echo -e "${GREEN}[BACKUP]${NC} $1"; }
+
warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $1"; }
+
+
# Create backup directory
+
mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR"
+
+
# Generate timestamp
+
TIMESTAMP=$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
+
BACKUP_FILE="$BACKUP_DIR/coves_${TIMESTAMP}.sql.gz"
+
+
log "Starting backup..."
+
+
# Run pg_dump inside container
+
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" exec -T postgres \
+
pg_dump -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$POSTGRES_DB" --clean --if-exists \
+
| gzip > "$BACKUP_FILE"
+
+
# Get file size
+
SIZE=$(du -h "$BACKUP_FILE" | cut -f1)
+
+
log "โœ… Backup complete: $BACKUP_FILE ($SIZE)"
+
+
# Cleanup old backups (keep last 30 days)
+
log "Cleaning up backups older than 30 days..."
+
find "$BACKUP_DIR" -name "coves_*.sql.gz" -mtime +30 -delete
+
+
# List recent backups
+
log ""
+
log "Recent backups:"
+
ls -lh "$BACKUP_DIR"/*.sql.gz 2>/dev/null | tail -5
+
+
log ""
+
log "To restore: gunzip -c $BACKUP_FILE | docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml exec -T postgres psql -U $POSTGRES_USER -d $POSTGRES_DB"
+133
scripts/deploy.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
# Coves Deployment Script
+
# Usage: ./scripts/deploy.sh [service]
+
#
+
# Examples:
+
# ./scripts/deploy.sh # Deploy all services
+
# ./scripts/deploy.sh appview # Deploy only AppView
+
# ./scripts/deploy.sh --pull # Pull from git first, then deploy
+
+
set -e
+
+
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+
PROJECT_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")"
+
COMPOSE_FILE="$PROJECT_DIR/docker-compose.prod.yml"
+
+
# Colors for output
+
RED='\033[0;31m'
+
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
+
NC='\033[0m' # No Color
+
+
log() {
+
echo -e "${GREEN}[DEPLOY]${NC} $1"
+
}
+
+
warn() {
+
echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $1"
+
}
+
+
error() {
+
echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $1"
+
exit 1
+
}
+
+
# Parse arguments
+
PULL_GIT=false
+
SERVICE=""
+
+
for arg in "$@"; do
+
case $arg in
+
--pull)
+
PULL_GIT=true
+
;;
+
*)
+
SERVICE="$arg"
+
;;
+
esac
+
done
+
+
cd "$PROJECT_DIR"
+
+
# Load environment variables
+
if [ ! -f ".env.prod" ]; then
+
error ".env.prod not found! Copy from .env.prod.example and configure secrets."
+
fi
+
+
log "Loading environment from .env.prod..."
+
set -a
+
source .env.prod
+
set +a
+
+
# Optional: Pull from git
+
if [ "$PULL_GIT" = true ]; then
+
log "Pulling latest code from git..."
+
git fetch origin
+
git pull origin main
+
fi
+
+
# Check database connectivity before deployment
+
log "Checking database connectivity..."
+
if docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" exec -T postgres pg_isready -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$POSTGRES_DB" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
log "Database is ready"
+
else
+
warn "Database not ready yet - it will start with the deployment"
+
fi
+
+
# Build and deploy
+
if [ -n "$SERVICE" ]; then
+
log "Building $SERVICE..."
+
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" build --no-cache "$SERVICE"
+
+
log "Deploying $SERVICE..."
+
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" up -d "$SERVICE"
+
else
+
log "Building all services..."
+
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" build --no-cache
+
+
log "Deploying all services..."
+
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" up -d
+
fi
+
+
# Health check
+
log "Waiting for services to be healthy..."
+
sleep 10
+
+
# Wait for database to be ready before running migrations
+
log "Waiting for database..."
+
for i in {1..30}; do
+
if docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" exec -T postgres pg_isready -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$POSTGRES_DB" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+
break
+
fi
+
sleep 1
+
done
+
+
# Run database migrations
+
# The AppView runs migrations on startup, but we can also trigger them explicitly
+
log "Running database migrations..."
+
if docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" exec -T appview /app/coves-server migrate 2>/dev/null; then
+
log "โœ… Migrations completed"
+
else
+
warn "โš ๏ธ Migration command not available or failed - AppView will run migrations on startup"
+
fi
+
+
# Check AppView health
+
if docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" exec -T appview wget --spider -q http://localhost:8080/xrpc/_health 2>/dev/null; then
+
log "โœ… AppView is healthy"
+
else
+
warn "โš ๏ธ AppView health check failed - check logs with: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs appview"
+
fi
+
+
# Check PDS health
+
if docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" exec -T pds wget --spider -q http://localhost:3000/xrpc/_health 2>/dev/null; then
+
log "โœ… PDS is healthy"
+
else
+
warn "โš ๏ธ PDS health check failed - check logs with: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs pds"
+
fi
+
+
log "Deployment complete!"
+
log ""
+
log "Useful commands:"
+
log " View logs: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f"
+
log " Check status: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml ps"
+
log " Rollback: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml down && git checkout HEAD~1 && ./scripts/deploy.sh"
+149
scripts/generate-did-keys.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
# Generate cryptographic keys for Coves did:web DID document
+
#
+
# This script generates a secp256k1 (K-256) key pair as required by atproto.
+
# Reference: https://atproto.com/specs/cryptography
+
#
+
# Key format:
+
# - Curve: secp256k1 (K-256) - same as Bitcoin/Ethereum
+
# - Type: Multikey
+
# - Encoding: publicKeyMultibase with base58btc ('z' prefix)
+
# - Multicodec: 0xe7 for secp256k1 compressed public key
+
#
+
# Output:
+
# - Private key (hex) for PDS_PLC_ROTATION_KEY_K256_PRIVATE_KEY_HEX
+
# - Public key (multibase) for did.json publicKeyMultibase field
+
# - Complete did.json file
+
+
set -e
+
+
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+
PROJECT_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")"
+
OUTPUT_DIR="$PROJECT_DIR/static/.well-known"
+
+
# Colors
+
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
+
RED='\033[0;31m'
+
NC='\033[0m'
+
+
log() { echo -e "${GREEN}[KEYGEN]${NC} $1"; }
+
warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $1"; }
+
error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $1"; exit 1; }
+
+
# Check for required tools
+
if ! command -v openssl &> /dev/null; then
+
error "openssl is required but not installed"
+
fi
+
+
if ! command -v python3 &> /dev/null; then
+
error "python3 is required for base58 encoding"
+
fi
+
+
# Check for base58 library
+
if ! python3 -c "import base58" 2>/dev/null; then
+
warn "Installing base58 Python library..."
+
pip3 install base58 || error "Failed to install base58. Run: pip3 install base58"
+
fi
+
+
log "Generating secp256k1 key pair for did:web..."
+
+
# Generate private key
+
PRIVATE_KEY_PEM=$(mktemp)
+
openssl ecparam -name secp256k1 -genkey -noout -out "$PRIVATE_KEY_PEM" 2>/dev/null
+
+
# Extract private key as hex (for PDS config)
+
PRIVATE_KEY_HEX=$(openssl ec -in "$PRIVATE_KEY_PEM" -text -noout 2>/dev/null | \
+
grep -A 3 "priv:" | tail -n 3 | tr -d ' :\n' | tr -d '\r')
+
+
# Extract public key as compressed format
+
# OpenSSL outputs the public key, we need to get the compressed form
+
PUBLIC_KEY_HEX=$(openssl ec -in "$PRIVATE_KEY_PEM" -pubout -conv_form compressed -outform DER 2>/dev/null | \
+
tail -c 33 | xxd -p | tr -d '\n')
+
+
# Clean up temp file
+
rm -f "$PRIVATE_KEY_PEM"
+
+
# Encode public key as multibase with multicodec
+
# Multicodec 0xe7 = secp256k1 compressed public key
+
# Then base58btc encode with 'z' prefix
+
PUBLIC_KEY_MULTIBASE=$(python3 << EOF
+
import base58
+
+
# Compressed public key bytes
+
pub_hex = "$PUBLIC_KEY_HEX"
+
pub_bytes = bytes.fromhex(pub_hex)
+
+
# Prepend multicodec 0xe7 for secp256k1-pub
+
# 0xe7 as varint is just 0xe7 (single byte, < 128)
+
multicodec = bytes([0xe7, 0x01]) # 0xe701 for secp256k1-pub compressed
+
key_with_codec = multicodec + pub_bytes
+
+
# Base58btc encode
+
encoded = base58.b58encode(key_with_codec).decode('ascii')
+
+
# Add 'z' prefix for multibase
+
print('z' + encoded)
+
EOF
+
)
+
+
log "Keys generated successfully!"
+
echo ""
+
echo "============================================"
+
echo " PRIVATE KEY (keep secret!)"
+
echo "============================================"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Add this to your .env.prod file:"
+
echo ""
+
echo "PDS_ROTATION_KEY=$PRIVATE_KEY_HEX"
+
echo ""
+
echo "============================================"
+
echo " PUBLIC KEY (for did.json)"
+
echo "============================================"
+
echo ""
+
echo "publicKeyMultibase: $PUBLIC_KEY_MULTIBASE"
+
echo ""
+
+
# Generate the did.json file
+
log "Generating did.json..."
+
+
mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR"
+
+
cat > "$OUTPUT_DIR/did.json" << EOF
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"alsoKnownAs": ["at://coves.social"],
+
"verificationMethod": [
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social#atproto",
+
"type": "Multikey",
+
"controller": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "$PUBLIC_KEY_MULTIBASE"
+
}
+
],
+
"service": [
+
{
+
"id": "#atproto_pds",
+
"type": "AtprotoPersonalDataServer",
+
"serviceEndpoint": "https://coves.me"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
EOF
+
+
log "Created: $OUTPUT_DIR/did.json"
+
echo ""
+
echo "============================================"
+
echo " NEXT STEPS"
+
echo "============================================"
+
echo ""
+
echo "1. Copy the PDS_ROTATION_KEY value to your .env.prod file"
+
echo ""
+
echo "2. Verify the did.json looks correct:"
+
echo " cat $OUTPUT_DIR/did.json"
+
echo ""
+
echo "3. After deployment, verify it's accessible:"
+
echo " curl https://coves.social/.well-known/did.json"
+
echo ""
+
warn "IMPORTANT: Keep the private key secret! Only share the public key."
+
warn "The did.json file with the public key IS safe to commit to git."
+106
scripts/setup-production.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
# Coves Production Setup Script
+
# Run this once on a fresh server to set up everything
+
#
+
# Prerequisites:
+
# - Docker and docker-compose installed
+
# - Git installed
+
# - .env.prod file configured
+
+
set -e
+
+
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+
PROJECT_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")"
+
+
# Colors
+
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
+
RED='\033[0;31m'
+
NC='\033[0m'
+
+
log() { echo -e "${GREEN}[SETUP]${NC} $1"; }
+
warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $1"; }
+
error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $1"; exit 1; }
+
+
cd "$PROJECT_DIR"
+
+
# Check prerequisites
+
log "Checking prerequisites..."
+
+
if ! command -v docker &> /dev/null; then
+
error "Docker is not installed. Install with: curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh"
+
fi
+
+
if ! docker compose version &> /dev/null; then
+
error "docker compose is not available. Install with: apt install docker-compose-plugin"
+
fi
+
+
# Check for .env.prod
+
if [ ! -f ".env.prod" ]; then
+
error ".env.prod not found! Copy from .env.prod.example and configure secrets."
+
fi
+
+
# Load environment
+
set -a
+
source .env.prod
+
set +a
+
+
# Create required directories
+
log "Creating directories..."
+
mkdir -p backups
+
mkdir -p static/.well-known
+
+
# Check for did.json
+
if [ ! -f "static/.well-known/did.json" ]; then
+
warn "static/.well-known/did.json not found!"
+
warn "Run ./scripts/generate-did-keys.sh to create it."
+
fi
+
+
# Note: Caddy logs are written to Docker volume (caddy-data)
+
# If you need host-accessible logs, uncomment and run as root:
+
# mkdir -p /var/log/caddy && chown 1000:1000 /var/log/caddy
+
+
# Pull Docker images
+
log "Pulling Docker images..."
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull postgres pds caddy
+
+
# Build AppView
+
log "Building AppView..."
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml build appview
+
+
# Start services
+
log "Starting services..."
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
+
+
# Wait for PostgreSQL
+
log "Waiting for PostgreSQL to be ready..."
+
until docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml exec -T postgres pg_isready -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$POSTGRES_DB" > /dev/null 2>&1; do
+
sleep 2
+
done
+
log "PostgreSQL is ready!"
+
+
# Run migrations
+
log "Running database migrations..."
+
# The AppView runs migrations on startup, but you can also run them manually:
+
# docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml exec appview /app/coves-server migrate
+
+
# Final status
+
log ""
+
log "============================================"
+
log " Coves Production Setup Complete!"
+
log "============================================"
+
log ""
+
log "Services running:"
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml ps
+
log ""
+
log "Next steps:"
+
log " 1. Configure DNS for coves.social and coves.me"
+
log " 2. Run ./scripts/generate-did-keys.sh to create DID keys"
+
log " 3. Test health endpoints:"
+
log " curl https://coves.social/xrpc/_health"
+
log " curl https://coves.me/xrpc/_health"
+
log ""
+
log "Useful commands:"
+
log " View logs: docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml logs -f"
+
log " Deploy update: ./scripts/deploy.sh appview"
+
log " Backup DB: ./scripts/backup.sh"
+19
static/.well-known/did.json.template
···
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"alsoKnownAs": ["at://coves.social"],
+
"verificationMethod": [
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social#atproto",
+
"type": "Multikey",
+
"controller": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY"
+
}
+
],
+
"service": [
+
{
+
"id": "#atproto_pds",
+
"type": "AtprotoPersonalDataServer",
+
"serviceEndpoint": "https://coves.me"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+18
static/client-metadata.json
···
+
{
+
"client_id": "https://coves.social/client-metadata.json",
+
"client_name": "Coves",
+
"client_uri": "https://coves.social",
+
"logo_uri": "https://coves.social/logo.png",
+
"tos_uri": "https://coves.social/terms",
+
"policy_uri": "https://coves.social/privacy",
+
"redirect_uris": [
+
"https://coves.social/oauth/callback",
+
"social.coves:/oauth/callback"
+
],
+
"scope": "atproto transition:generic",
+
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
+
"response_types": ["code"],
+
"application_type": "native",
+
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "none",
+
"dpop_bound_access_tokens": true
+
}
+2 -1
Dockerfile
···
COPY --from=builder /build/coves-server /app/coves-server
# Copy migrations (needed for goose)
-
COPY --from=builder /build/internal/db/migrations /app/migrations
+
# Must maintain path structure as app looks for internal/db/migrations
+
COPY --from=builder /build/internal/db/migrations /app/internal/db/migrations
# Set ownership
RUN chown -R coves:coves /app
+187
scripts/derive-did-from-key.sh
···
+
#!/bin/bash
+
# Derive public key from existing PDS_ROTATION_KEY and create did.json
+
#
+
# This script takes your existing private key and derives the public key from it.
+
# Use this if you already have a PDS running with a rotation key but need to
+
# create/fix the did.json file.
+
#
+
# Usage: ./scripts/derive-did-from-key.sh
+
+
set -e
+
+
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+
PROJECT_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")"
+
OUTPUT_DIR="$PROJECT_DIR/static/.well-known"
+
+
# Colors
+
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
+
RED='\033[0;31m'
+
NC='\033[0m'
+
+
log() { echo -e "${GREEN}[DERIVE]${NC} $1"; }
+
warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $1"; }
+
error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $1"; exit 1; }
+
+
# Check for required tools
+
if ! command -v openssl &> /dev/null; then
+
error "openssl is required but not installed"
+
fi
+
+
if ! command -v python3 &> /dev/null; then
+
error "python3 is required for base58 encoding"
+
fi
+
+
# Check for base58 library
+
if ! python3 -c "import base58" 2>/dev/null; then
+
warn "Installing base58 Python library..."
+
pip3 install base58 || error "Failed to install base58. Run: pip3 install base58"
+
fi
+
+
# Load environment to get the existing key
+
if [ -f "$PROJECT_DIR/.env.prod" ]; then
+
source "$PROJECT_DIR/.env.prod"
+
elif [ -f "$PROJECT_DIR/.env" ]; then
+
source "$PROJECT_DIR/.env"
+
else
+
error "No .env.prod or .env file found"
+
fi
+
+
if [ -z "$PDS_ROTATION_KEY" ]; then
+
error "PDS_ROTATION_KEY not found in environment"
+
fi
+
+
# Validate key format (should be 64 hex chars)
+
if [[ ! "$PDS_ROTATION_KEY" =~ ^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$ ]]; then
+
error "PDS_ROTATION_KEY is not a valid 64-character hex string"
+
fi
+
+
log "Deriving public key from existing PDS_ROTATION_KEY..."
+
+
# Create a temporary PEM file from the hex private key
+
TEMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
+
PRIVATE_KEY_HEX="$PDS_ROTATION_KEY"
+
+
# Convert hex private key to PEM format
+
# secp256k1 curve OID: 1.3.132.0.10
+
python3 > "$TEMP_DIR/private.pem" << EOF
+
import binascii
+
+
# Private key in hex
+
priv_hex = "$PRIVATE_KEY_HEX"
+
priv_bytes = binascii.unhexlify(priv_hex)
+
+
# secp256k1 OID
+
oid = bytes([0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x0a])
+
+
# Build the EC private key structure
+
# SEQUENCE { version INTEGER, privateKey OCTET STRING, [0] OID, [1] publicKey }
+
# We'll use a simpler approach: just the private key with curve params
+
+
# EC PARAMETERS for secp256k1
+
ec_params = bytes([
+
0x30, 0x07, # SEQUENCE, 7 bytes
+
0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x0a # OID for secp256k1
+
])
+
+
# EC PRIVATE KEY structure
+
# SEQUENCE { version, privateKey, [0] parameters }
+
inner = bytes([0x02, 0x01, 0x01]) # version = 1
+
inner += bytes([0x04, 0x20]) + priv_bytes # OCTET STRING with 32-byte key
+
inner += bytes([0xa0, 0x07]) + bytes([0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x0a]) # [0] OID
+
+
# Wrap in SEQUENCE
+
key_der = bytes([0x30, len(inner)]) + inner
+
+
# Base64 encode
+
import base64
+
key_b64 = base64.b64encode(key_der).decode('ascii')
+
+
# Format as PEM
+
print("-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----")
+
for i in range(0, len(key_b64), 64):
+
print(key_b64[i:i+64])
+
print("-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----")
+
EOF
+
+
# Extract the compressed public key
+
PUBLIC_KEY_HEX=$(openssl ec -in "$TEMP_DIR/private.pem" -pubout -conv_form compressed -outform DER 2>/dev/null | \
+
tail -c 33 | xxd -p | tr -d '\n')
+
+
# Clean up
+
rm -rf "$TEMP_DIR"
+
+
if [ -z "$PUBLIC_KEY_HEX" ] || [ ${#PUBLIC_KEY_HEX} -ne 66 ]; then
+
error "Failed to derive public key. Got: $PUBLIC_KEY_HEX"
+
fi
+
+
log "Derived public key: ${PUBLIC_KEY_HEX:0:8}...${PUBLIC_KEY_HEX: -8}"
+
+
# Encode public key as multibase with multicodec
+
PUBLIC_KEY_MULTIBASE=$(python3 << EOF
+
import base58
+
+
# Compressed public key bytes
+
pub_hex = "$PUBLIC_KEY_HEX"
+
pub_bytes = bytes.fromhex(pub_hex)
+
+
# Prepend multicodec 0xe7 for secp256k1-pub
+
# 0xe7 as varint is just 0xe7 (single byte, < 128)
+
multicodec = bytes([0xe7, 0x01]) # 0xe701 for secp256k1-pub compressed
+
key_with_codec = multicodec + pub_bytes
+
+
# Base58btc encode
+
encoded = base58.b58encode(key_with_codec).decode('ascii')
+
+
# Add 'z' prefix for multibase
+
print('z' + encoded)
+
EOF
+
)
+
+
log "Public key multibase: $PUBLIC_KEY_MULTIBASE"
+
+
# Generate the did.json file
+
log "Generating did.json..."
+
+
mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR"
+
+
cat > "$OUTPUT_DIR/did.json" << EOF
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"alsoKnownAs": ["at://coves.social"],
+
"verificationMethod": [
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social#atproto",
+
"type": "Multikey",
+
"controller": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "$PUBLIC_KEY_MULTIBASE"
+
}
+
],
+
"service": [
+
{
+
"id": "#atproto_pds",
+
"type": "AtprotoPersonalDataServer",
+
"serviceEndpoint": "https://coves.me"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
EOF
+
+
log "Created: $OUTPUT_DIR/did.json"
+
echo ""
+
echo "============================================"
+
echo " DID Document Generated Successfully!"
+
echo "============================================"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Public key multibase: $PUBLIC_KEY_MULTIBASE"
+
echo ""
+
echo "Next steps:"
+
echo " 1. Copy this file to your production server:"
+
echo " scp $OUTPUT_DIR/did.json user@server:/opt/coves/static/.well-known/"
+
echo ""
+
echo " 2. Or if running on production, restart Caddy:"
+
echo " docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml restart caddy"
+
echo ""
+
echo " 3. Verify it's accessible:"
+
echo " curl https://coves.social/.well-known/did.json"
+
echo ""
+2 -3
internal/api/handlers/community/block.go
···
package community
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
-
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
)
// BlockHandler handles community blocking operations
+1 -2
internal/api/handlers/community/list.go
···
package community
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"strconv"
-
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
)
// ListHandler handles listing communities
+2 -3
internal/api/handlers/communityFeed/get_community.go
···
package communityFeed
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/communityFeeds"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
"strconv"
-
-
"Coves/internal/core/communityFeeds"
-
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
)
// GetCommunityHandler handles community feed retrieval
+2 -3
internal/api/handlers/discover/get_discover.go
···
package discover
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/discover"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
"strconv"
-
-
"Coves/internal/core/discover"
-
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
)
// GetDiscoverHandler handles discover feed retrieval
+2 -3
internal/api/handlers/post/errors.go
···
package post
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/aggregators"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
-
-
"Coves/internal/core/aggregators"
-
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
)
type errorResponse struct {
+3 -4
internal/api/handlers/timeline/get_timeline.go
···
package timeline
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
+
"Coves/internal/core/timeline"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
-
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
-
"Coves/internal/core/timeline"
)
// GetTimelineHandler handles timeline feed retrieval
+2 -3
internal/atproto/jetstream/comment_consumer.go
···
package jetstream
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/utils"
+
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
···
"strings"
"time"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/utils"
-
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
-
"github.com/lib/pq"
)
+3 -4
internal/atproto/jetstream/community_consumer.go
···
package jetstream
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/utils"
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
···
"strings"
"time"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/utils"
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
-
lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
"golang.org/x/net/publicsuffix"
"golang.org/x/time/rate"
+3 -4
internal/atproto/jetstream/post_consumer.go
···
package jetstream
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
+
"Coves/internal/core/users"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
···
"log"
"strings"
"time"
-
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
-
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
-
"Coves/internal/core/users"
)
// PostEventConsumer consumes post-related events from Jetstream
+1 -2
internal/core/blobs/service.go
···
package blobs
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
···
"log"
"net/http"
"time"
-
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
)
// Service defines the interface for blob operations
+5 -6
internal/core/comments/comment_service_test.go
···
package comments
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
+
"Coves/internal/core/users"
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
-
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
-
"Coves/internal/core/users"
-
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
···
return nil
}
-
func (m *mockCommunityRepo) List(ctx context.Context, req communities.ListCommunitiesRequest) ([]*communities.Community, int, error) {
-
return nil, 0, nil
+
func (m *mockCommunityRepo) List(ctx context.Context, req communities.ListCommunitiesRequest) ([]*communities.Community, error) {
+
return nil, nil
}
func (m *mockCommunityRepo) Search(ctx context.Context, req communities.SearchCommunitiesRequest) ([]*communities.Community, int, error) {
+1 -2
internal/core/communities/service.go
···
package communities
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/utils"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
···
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
-
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/utils"
)
// Community handle validation regex (DNS-valid handle: name.community.instance.com)
+5 -6
internal/core/posts/service.go
···
package posts
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/aggregators"
+
"Coves/internal/core/blobs"
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
+
"Coves/internal/core/unfurl"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
···
"net/http"
"os"
"time"
-
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/core/aggregators"
-
"Coves/internal/core/blobs"
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
-
"Coves/internal/core/unfurl"
)
type postService struct {
+1 -2
internal/db/postgres/comment_repo.go
···
package postgres
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
···
"log"
"strings"
-
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
-
"github.com/lib/pq"
)
+2 -4
internal/db/postgres/community_repo.go
···
package postgres
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"log"
"strings"
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
-
"github.com/lib/pq"
)
···
}
// Build sort clause - map sort enum to DB columns
-
sortColumn := "subscriber_count" // default: popular
-
sortOrder := "DESC"
+
var sortColumn, sortOrder string
switch req.Sort {
case "popular":
+7 -8
tests/e2e/error_recovery_test.go
···
package e2e
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
+
"Coves/internal/core/users"
+
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
···
"testing"
"time"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
-
"Coves/internal/core/users"
-
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
-
_ "github.com/lib/pq"
"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"
)
···
testCases := []struct {
name string
-
event jetstream.JetstreamEvent
shouldLog string
+
event jetstream.JetstreamEvent
}{
{
name: "Nil identity data",
···
if shouldFail.Load() {
t.Logf("Mock PDS: Simulating unavailability (request #%d)", requestCount.Load())
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
-
w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"ServiceUnavailable","message":"PDS temporarily unavailable"}`))
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"ServiceUnavailable","message":"PDS temporarily unavailable"}`))
return
}
t.Logf("Mock PDS: Serving request successfully (request #%d)", requestCount.Load())
// Simulate successful PDS response
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
w.Write([]byte(`{"did":"did:plc:pdstest123","handle":"pds.test"}`))
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"did":"did:plc:pdstest123","handle":"pds.test"}`))
}))
defer mockPDS.Close()
+14 -14
tests/integration/block_handle_resolution_test.go
···
package integration
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/community"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
···
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
-
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/community"
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
postgresRepo "Coves/internal/db/postgres"
)
···
// We expect 401 (no auth) but verify the error is NOT "Community not found"
// If handle resolution worked, we'd get past that validation
resp := w.Result()
-
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("Handle resolution failed - got 404 CommunityNotFound")
···
// Expected: 401 Unauthorized (because we didn't add auth context)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
var errorResp map[string]interface{}
-
json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&errorResp)
+
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&errorResp)
t.Logf("Response status: %d, body: %+v", resp.StatusCode, errorResp)
}
})
···
blockHandler.HandleBlock(w, req)
resp := w.Result()
-
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("@-prefixed handle resolution failed - got 404 CommunityNotFound")
···
blockHandler.HandleBlock(w, req)
resp := w.Result()
-
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("Scoped format resolution failed - got 404 CommunityNotFound")
···
blockHandler.HandleBlock(w, req)
resp := w.Result()
-
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("DID resolution failed - got 404 CommunityNotFound")
···
blockHandler.HandleBlock(w, req)
resp := w.Result()
-
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
// Should return 400 Bad Request for validation errors
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
···
}
var errorResp map[string]interface{}
-
json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&errorResp)
+
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&errorResp)
if errorCode, ok := errorResp["error"].(string); !ok || errorCode != "InvalidRequest" {
t.Errorf("Expected error code 'InvalidRequest', got %v", errorResp["error"])
···
blockHandler.HandleBlock(w, req)
resp := w.Result()
-
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
// Expected: 401 (auth check happens before resolution)
// In a real scenario with auth, invalid handle would return 404
···
blockHandler.HandleUnblock(w, req)
resp := w.Result()
-
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
// Should NOT be 404 (handle resolution should work)
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
···
// Expected: 401 (no auth context)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
var errorResp map[string]interface{}
-
json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&errorResp)
+
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&errorResp)
t.Logf("Response: status=%d, body=%+v", resp.StatusCode, errorResp)
}
})
···
blockHandler.HandleUnblock(w, req)
resp := w.Result()
-
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
// Expected: 401 (auth check happens before resolution)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
+3 -4
tests/integration/comment_consumer_test.go
···
package integration
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
+
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
+
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"context"
"fmt"
"testing"
"time"
-
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
-
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
-
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
)
func TestCommentConsumer_CreateComment(t *testing.T) {
+4 -5
tests/integration/comment_vote_test.go
···
package integration
import (
-
"context"
-
"fmt"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
"Coves/internal/core/users"
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
+
"context"
+
"fmt"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
)
// TestCommentVote_CreateAndUpdate tests voting on comments and vote count updates
+4 -5
tests/integration/community_hostedby_security_test.go
···
package integration
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
+
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
···
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
-
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
-
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
)
// TestHostedByVerification_DomainMatching tests that hostedBy domain must match handle domain
···
// Return a DID document with matching alsoKnownAs
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
+
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"id": "did:web:example.com",
"alsoKnownAs": ["at://example.com"],
"verificationMethod": [],
···
// Return a DID document WITHOUT alsoKnownAs field
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
+
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{
"id": "did:web:example.com",
"verificationMethod": [],
"service": []
+2 -3
tests/integration/community_repo_test.go
···
package integration
import (
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
+
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"context"
"fmt"
"testing"
"time"
-
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
-
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
)
func TestCommunityRepository_Create(t *testing.T) {
+6 -7
tests/integration/concurrent_scenarios_test.go
···
package integration
import (
-
"context"
-
"fmt"
-
"sync"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
"Coves/internal/core/users"
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
+
"context"
+
"fmt"
+
"sync"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
)
// TestConcurrentVoting_MultipleUsersOnSamePost tests race conditions when multiple users
···
wg.Add(numAttempts)
type result struct {
-
success bool
err error
+
success bool
}
results := make(chan result, numAttempts)
+3 -4
tests/integration/post_consumer_test.go
···
package integration
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
+
"Coves/internal/core/users"
+
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"context"
"fmt"
"testing"
"time"
-
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
-
"Coves/internal/core/users"
-
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
)
// TestPostConsumer_CommentCountReconciliation tests that post comment_count
+4 -5
tests/integration/post_creation_test.go
···
package integration
import (
-
"context"
-
"fmt"
-
"strings"
-
"testing"
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
"Coves/internal/core/users"
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
+
"context"
+
"fmt"
+
"strings"
+
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+5 -6
tests/integration/post_handler_test.go
···
package integration
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
+
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
···
"strings"
"testing"
-
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
-
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
-
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
-
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+5 -6
tests/integration/post_thumb_validation_test.go
···
package integration
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
+
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
···
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
-
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
-
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
-
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
-
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+5 -6
tests/integration/post_unfurl_test.go
···
package integration
import (
-
"context"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"fmt"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
···
"Coves/internal/core/unfurl"
"Coves/internal/core/users"
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
+
"context"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"fmt"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+3 -4
tests/integration/timeline_test.go
···
package integration
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/timeline"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
···
"testing"
"time"
-
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/timeline"
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
-
timelineCore "Coves/internal/core/timeline"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+23
static/.well-known/did.json
···
+
{
+
"@context": [
+
"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
+
"https://w3id.org/security/multikey/v1"
+
],
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"alsoKnownAs": ["at://coves.social"],
+
"verificationMethod": [
+
{
+
"id": "did:web:coves.social#atproto",
+
"type": "Multikey",
+
"controller": "did:web:coves.social",
+
"publicKeyMultibase": "zQ3shu1T3Y3MYoC1n7fCqkZqyrk8FiY3PV3BYM2JwyqcXFY6s"
+
}
+
],
+
"service": [
+
{
+
"id": "#atproto_pds",
+
"type": "AtprotoPersonalDataServer",
+
"serviceEndpoint": "https://pds.coves.me"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+1 -1
docs/E2E_TESTING.md
···
Query via API:
```bash
-
curl "http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.actor.getProfile?actor=alice.local.coves.dev"
+
curl "http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.actor.getprofile?actor=alice.local.coves.dev"
```
Expected response:
+3 -3
internal/api/routes/user.go
···
func RegisterUserRoutes(r chi.Router, service users.UserService) {
h := NewUserHandler(service)
-
// social.coves.actor.getProfile - query endpoint
-
r.Get("/xrpc/social.coves.actor.getProfile", h.GetProfile)
+
// social.coves.actor.getprofile - query endpoint
+
r.Get("/xrpc/social.coves.actor.getprofile", h.GetProfile)
// social.coves.actor.signup - procedure endpoint
r.Post("/xrpc/social.coves.actor.signup", h.Signup)
}
-
// GetProfile handles social.coves.actor.getProfile
+
// GetProfile handles social.coves.actor.getprofile
// Query endpoint that retrieves a user profile by DID or handle
func (h *UserHandler) GetProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
+1 -1
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/actor/getProfile.json
···
{
"lexicon": 1,
-
"id": "social.coves.actor.getProfile",
+
"id": "social.coves.actor.getprofile",
"defs": {
"main": {
"type": "query",
+1 -1
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/actor/updateProfile.json
···
{
"lexicon": 1,
-
"id": "social.coves.actor.updateProfile",
+
"id": "social.coves.actor.updateprofile",
"defs": {
"main": {
"type": "procedure",
+7 -4
docs/FEED_SYSTEM_IMPLEMENTATION.md
···
# Get personalized timeline (hot posts from subscriptions)
curl -X GET \
'http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getTimeline?sort=hot&limit=15' \
-
-H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGc...'
+
-H 'Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGc...' \
+
-H 'DPoP: eyJhbGc...'
# Get top posts from last week
curl -X GET \
'http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getTimeline?sort=top&timeframe=week&limit=20' \
-
-H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGc...'
+
-H 'Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGc...' \
+
-H 'DPoP: eyJhbGc...'
# Get newest posts with pagination
curl -X GET \
'http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getTimeline?sort=new&limit=10&cursor=<cursor>' \
-
-H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGc...'
+
-H 'Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGc...' \
+
-H 'DPoP: eyJhbGc...'
```
**Response:**
···
- โœ… Context timeout support
### Authentication (Timeline)
-
- โœ… JWT Bearer token required
+
- โœ… DPoP-bound access token required
- โœ… DID extracted from auth context
- โœ… Validates token signature (when AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false)
- โœ… Returns 401 on auth failure
+3 -3
docs/PRD_OAUTH.md
···
- โœ… Auth middleware protecting community endpoints
- โœ… Handlers updated to use `GetUserDID(r)`
- โœ… Comprehensive middleware auth tests (11 test cases)
-
- โœ… E2E tests updated to use Bearer tokens
+
- โœ… E2E tests updated to use DPoP-bound tokens
- โœ… Security logging with IP, method, path, issuer
- โœ… Scope validation (atproto required)
- โœ… Issuer HTTPS validation
···
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6ImF0K2p3dCIsImtpZCI6ImRpZDpwbGM6YWxpY2UjYXRwcm90by1wZHMifQ...
```
-
Format: `DPoP <access_token>`
+
Format: `DPoP <access_token>` (note: uses "DPoP" scheme, not "Bearer")
The access token is a JWT containing:
```json
···
- [x] All community endpoints reject requests without valid JWT structure
- [x] Integration tests pass with mock tokens (11/11 middleware tests passing)
- [x] Zero security regressions from X-User-DID (JWT validation is strictly better)
-
- [x] E2E tests updated to use proper Bearer token authentication
+
- [x] E2E tests updated to use proper DPoP token authentication
- [x] Build succeeds without compilation errors
### Phase 2 (Beta) - โœ… READY FOR TESTING
+477
internal/atproto/oauth/handlers_security_test.go
···
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"testing"
+
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
// TestIsAllowedMobileRedirectURI tests the mobile redirect URI allowlist with EXACT URI matching
+
// Only Universal Links (HTTPS) are allowed - custom schemes are blocked for security
+
func TestIsAllowedMobileRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
uri string
+
expected bool
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "allowed - Universal Link",
+
uri: "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",
+
expected: true,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - custom scheme coves-app (vulnerable to interception)",
+
uri: "coves-app://oauth/callback",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - custom scheme coves (vulnerable to interception)",
+
uri: "coves://oauth/callback",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - evil scheme",
+
uri: "evil://callback",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - http (not secure)",
+
uri: "http://example.com/callback",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - https different domain",
+
uri: "https://example.com/callback",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - https coves.social wrong path",
+
uri: "https://coves.social/wrong/path",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - invalid URI",
+
uri: "not a uri",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - empty string",
+
uri: "",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
result := isAllowedMobileRedirectURI(tt.uri)
+
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result,
+
"isAllowedMobileRedirectURI(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.uri, result, tt.expected)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestExtractScheme tests the scheme extraction function
+
func TestExtractScheme(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
uri string
+
expected string
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "https scheme",
+
uri: "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",
+
expected: "https",
+
},
+
{
+
name: "custom scheme",
+
uri: "coves-app://callback",
+
expected: "coves-app",
+
},
+
{
+
name: "invalid URI",
+
uri: "not a uri",
+
expected: "invalid",
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
result := extractScheme(tt.uri)
+
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestGenerateCSRFToken tests CSRF token generation
+
func TestGenerateCSRFToken(t *testing.T) {
+
// Generate two tokens and verify they are different (randomness check)
+
token1, err1 := generateCSRFToken()
+
require.NoError(t, err1)
+
require.NotEmpty(t, token1)
+
+
token2, err2 := generateCSRFToken()
+
require.NoError(t, err2)
+
require.NotEmpty(t, token2)
+
+
assert.NotEqual(t, token1, token2, "CSRF tokens should be unique")
+
+
// Verify token is base64 encoded (should decode without error)
+
assert.Greater(t, len(token1), 40, "CSRF token should be reasonably long (32 bytes base64 encoded)")
+
}
+
+
// TestHandleMobileLogin_RedirectURIValidation tests that HandleMobileLogin validates redirect URIs
+
func TestHandleMobileLogin_RedirectURIValidation(t *testing.T) {
+
// Note: This is a unit test for the validation logic only.
+
// Full integration tests with OAuth flow are in tests/integration/oauth_e2e_test.go
+
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
redirectURI string
+
expectedLog string
+
expectedStatus int
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "allowed - Universal Link",
+
redirectURI: "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",
+
expectedStatus: http.StatusBadRequest, // Will fail at StartAuthFlow (no OAuth client setup)
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected - custom scheme coves-app (insecure)",
+
redirectURI: "coves-app://oauth/callback",
+
expectedStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,
+
expectedLog: "rejected unauthorized mobile redirect URI",
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected evil scheme",
+
redirectURI: "evil://callback",
+
expectedStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,
+
expectedLog: "rejected unauthorized mobile redirect URI",
+
},
+
{
+
name: "rejected http",
+
redirectURI: "http://evil.com/callback",
+
expectedStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,
+
expectedLog: "scheme not allowed",
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Test the validation function directly
+
result := isAllowedMobileRedirectURI(tt.redirectURI)
+
if tt.expectedLog != "" {
+
assert.False(t, result, "Should reject %s", tt.redirectURI)
+
}
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestHandleCallback_CSRFValidation tests that HandleCallback validates CSRF tokens for mobile flow
+
func TestHandleCallback_CSRFValidation(t *testing.T) {
+
// This is a conceptual test structure. Full implementation would require:
+
// 1. Mock OAuthClient
+
// 2. Mock OAuth store
+
// 3. Simulated OAuth callback with cookies
+
+
t.Run("mobile callback requires CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Setup: Create request with mobile_redirect_uri cookie but NO oauth_csrf cookie
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: "https%3A%2F%2Fcoves.social%2Fapp%2Foauth%2Fcallback",
+
})
+
// Missing: oauth_csrf cookie
+
+
// This would be rejected with 403 Forbidden in the actual handler
+
// (Full test in integration tests with real OAuth flow)
+
+
assert.NotNil(t, req) // Placeholder assertion
+
})
+
+
t.Run("mobile callback with valid CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Setup: Create request with both cookies
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: "https%3A%2F%2Fcoves.social%2Fapp%2Foauth%2Fcallback",
+
})
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "oauth_csrf",
+
Value: "valid-csrf-token",
+
})
+
+
// This would be accepted (assuming valid OAuth code/state)
+
// (Full test in integration tests with real OAuth flow)
+
+
assert.NotNil(t, req) // Placeholder assertion
+
})
+
}
+
+
// TestHandleMobileCallback_RevalidatesRedirectURI tests that handleMobileCallback re-validates the redirect URI
+
func TestHandleMobileCallback_RevalidatesRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {
+
// This is a critical security test: even if an attacker somehow bypasses the initial check,
+
// the callback handler should re-validate the redirect URI before redirecting.
+
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
redirectURI string
+
shouldPass bool
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "allowed - Universal Link",
+
redirectURI: "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",
+
shouldPass: true,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "blocked - custom scheme (insecure)",
+
redirectURI: "coves-app://oauth/callback",
+
shouldPass: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "blocked - evil scheme",
+
redirectURI: "evil://callback",
+
shouldPass: false,
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
result := isAllowedMobileRedirectURI(tt.redirectURI)
+
assert.Equal(t, tt.shouldPass, result)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestGenerateMobileRedirectBinding tests the binding token generation
+
// The binding now includes the CSRF token for proper double-submit validation
+
func TestGenerateMobileRedirectBinding(t *testing.T) {
+
csrfToken := "test-csrf-token-12345"
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
redirectURI string
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "Universal Link",
+
redirectURI: "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",
+
},
+
{
+
name: "different path",
+
redirectURI: "https://coves.social/different/path",
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
binding1 := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, tt.redirectURI)
+
binding2 := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, tt.redirectURI)
+
+
// Same CSRF token + URI should produce same binding (deterministic)
+
assert.Equal(t, binding1, binding2, "binding should be deterministic for same inputs")
+
+
// Binding should not be empty
+
assert.NotEmpty(t, binding1, "binding should not be empty")
+
+
// Binding should be base64 encoded (should decode without error)
+
assert.Greater(t, len(binding1), 20, "binding should be reasonably long")
+
})
+
}
+
+
// Different URIs should produce different bindings
+
binding1 := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback")
+
binding2 := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, "https://coves.social/different/path")
+
assert.NotEqual(t, binding1, binding2, "different URIs should produce different bindings")
+
+
// Different CSRF tokens should produce different bindings
+
binding3 := generateMobileRedirectBinding("different-csrf-token", "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback")
+
assert.NotEqual(t, binding1, binding3, "different CSRF tokens should produce different bindings")
+
}
+
+
// TestValidateMobileRedirectBinding tests the binding validation
+
// Now validates both CSRF token and redirect URI together (double-submit pattern)
+
func TestValidateMobileRedirectBinding(t *testing.T) {
+
csrfToken := "test-csrf-token-for-validation"
+
redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"
+
validBinding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, redirectURI)
+
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
csrfToken string
+
redirectURI string
+
binding string
+
shouldPass bool
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "valid - correct CSRF token and redirect URI",
+
csrfToken: csrfToken,
+
redirectURI: redirectURI,
+
binding: validBinding,
+
shouldPass: true,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "invalid - wrong redirect URI",
+
csrfToken: csrfToken,
+
redirectURI: "https://coves.social/different/path",
+
binding: validBinding,
+
shouldPass: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "invalid - wrong CSRF token",
+
csrfToken: "wrong-csrf-token",
+
redirectURI: redirectURI,
+
binding: validBinding,
+
shouldPass: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "invalid - random binding",
+
csrfToken: csrfToken,
+
redirectURI: redirectURI,
+
binding: "random-invalid-binding",
+
shouldPass: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "invalid - empty binding",
+
csrfToken: csrfToken,
+
redirectURI: redirectURI,
+
binding: "",
+
shouldPass: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "invalid - empty CSRF token",
+
csrfToken: "",
+
redirectURI: redirectURI,
+
binding: validBinding,
+
shouldPass: false,
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
result := validateMobileRedirectBinding(tt.csrfToken, tt.redirectURI, tt.binding)
+
assert.Equal(t, tt.shouldPass, result)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestSessionFixationAttackPrevention tests that the binding prevents session fixation
+
func TestSessionFixationAttackPrevention(t *testing.T) {
+
// Simulate attack scenario:
+
// 1. Attacker plants a cookie for evil://steal with binding for evil://steal
+
// 2. User does a web login (no mobile_redirect_binding cookie)
+
// 3. Callback should NOT redirect to evil://steal
+
+
attackerCSRF := "attacker-csrf-token"
+
attackerRedirectURI := "evil://steal"
+
attackerBinding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(attackerCSRF, attackerRedirectURI)
+
+
// Later, user's legitimate mobile login
+
userCSRF := "user-csrf-token"
+
userRedirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"
+
userBinding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(userCSRF, userRedirectURI)
+
+
// The attacker's binding should NOT validate for the user's redirect URI
+
assert.False(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(userCSRF, userRedirectURI, attackerBinding),
+
"attacker's binding should not validate for user's CSRF token and redirect URI")
+
+
// The user's binding should validate for the user's CSRF token and redirect URI
+
assert.True(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(userCSRF, userRedirectURI, userBinding),
+
"user's binding should validate for user's CSRF token and redirect URI")
+
+
// Cross-validation should fail
+
assert.False(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(attackerCSRF, attackerRedirectURI, userBinding),
+
"user's binding should not validate for attacker's CSRF token and redirect URI")
+
}
+
+
// TestCSRFTokenValidation tests that CSRF token VALUE is validated, not just presence
+
func TestCSRFTokenValidation(t *testing.T) {
+
// This test verifies the fix for the P1 security issue:
+
// "The callback never validates the token... the csrfToken argument is ignored entirely"
+
//
+
// The fix ensures that the CSRF token VALUE is cryptographically bound to the
+
// binding token, so changing the CSRF token will invalidate the binding.
+
+
t.Run("CSRF token value must match", func(t *testing.T) {
+
originalCSRF := "original-csrf-token-from-login"
+
redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"
+
binding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(originalCSRF, redirectURI)
+
+
// Original CSRF token should validate
+
assert.True(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(originalCSRF, redirectURI, binding),
+
"original CSRF token should validate")
+
+
// Different CSRF token should NOT validate (this is the key security fix)
+
differentCSRF := "attacker-forged-csrf-token"
+
assert.False(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(differentCSRF, redirectURI, binding),
+
"different CSRF token should NOT validate - this is the security fix")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("attacker cannot forge binding without CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Attacker knows the redirect URI but not the CSRF token
+
redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"
+
victimCSRF := "victim-secret-csrf-token"
+
victimBinding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(victimCSRF, redirectURI)
+
+
// Attacker tries various CSRF tokens to forge the binding
+
attackerGuesses := []string{
+
"",
+
"guess1",
+
"attacker-csrf",
+
redirectURI, // trying the redirect URI as CSRF
+
}
+
+
for _, guess := range attackerGuesses {
+
assert.False(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(guess, redirectURI, victimBinding),
+
"attacker's CSRF guess %q should not validate", guess)
+
}
+
})
+
}
+
+
// TestConstantTimeCompare tests the timing-safe comparison function
+
func TestConstantTimeCompare(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
a string
+
b string
+
expected bool
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "equal strings",
+
a: "abc123",
+
b: "abc123",
+
expected: true,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "different strings same length",
+
a: "abc123",
+
b: "xyz789",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "different lengths",
+
a: "short",
+
b: "longer",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "empty strings",
+
a: "",
+
b: "",
+
expected: true,
+
},
+
{
+
name: "one empty",
+
a: "abc",
+
b: "",
+
expected: false,
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
result := constantTimeCompare(tt.a, tt.b)
+
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+152
internal/atproto/oauth/seal.go
···
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"crypto/aes"
+
"crypto/cipher"
+
"crypto/rand"
+
"encoding/base64"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"fmt"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
// SealedSession represents the data sealed in a mobile session token
+
type SealedSession struct {
+
DID string `json:"did"` // User's DID
+
SessionID string `json:"sid"` // Session identifier
+
ExpiresAt int64 `json:"exp"` // Unix timestamp when token expires
+
}
+
+
// SealSession creates an encrypted token containing session information.
+
// The token is encrypted using AES-256-GCM and encoded as base64url.
+
//
+
// Token format: base64url(nonce || ciphertext || tag)
+
// - nonce: 12 bytes (GCM standard nonce size)
+
// - ciphertext: encrypted JSON payload
+
// - tag: 16 bytes (GCM authentication tag)
+
//
+
// The sealed token can be safely given to mobile clients and used as
+
// a reference to the server-side session without exposing sensitive data.
+
func (c *OAuthClient) SealSession(did, sessionID string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
+
if len(c.SealSecret) == 0 {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("seal secret not configured")
+
}
+
+
if did == "" {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("DID is required")
+
}
+
+
if sessionID == "" {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("session ID is required")
+
}
+
+
// Create the session data
+
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()
+
session := SealedSession{
+
DID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
+
}
+
+
// Marshal to JSON
+
plaintext, err := json.Marshal(session)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal session: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Create AES cipher
+
block, err := aes.NewCipher(c.SealSecret)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create cipher: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Create GCM mode
+
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create GCM: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Generate random nonce
+
nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())
+
if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate nonce: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Encrypt and authenticate
+
// GCM.Seal appends the ciphertext and tag to the nonce
+
ciphertext := gcm.Seal(nonce, nonce, plaintext, nil)
+
+
// Encode as base64url (no padding)
+
token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(ciphertext)
+
+
return token, nil
+
}
+
+
// UnsealSession decrypts and validates a sealed session token.
+
// Returns the session information if the token is valid and not expired.
+
func (c *OAuthClient) UnsealSession(token string) (*SealedSession, error) {
+
if len(c.SealSecret) == 0 {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("seal secret not configured")
+
}
+
+
if token == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token is required")
+
}
+
+
// Decode from base64url
+
ciphertext, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token encoding: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Create AES cipher
+
block, err := aes.NewCipher(c.SealSecret)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create cipher: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Create GCM mode
+
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create GCM: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Verify minimum size (nonce + tag)
+
nonceSize := gcm.NonceSize()
+
if len(ciphertext) < nonceSize {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token: too short")
+
}
+
+
// Extract nonce and ciphertext
+
nonce := ciphertext[:nonceSize]
+
ciphertextData := ciphertext[nonceSize:]
+
+
// Decrypt and authenticate
+
plaintext, err := gcm.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertextData, nil)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt token: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Unmarshal JSON
+
var session SealedSession
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(plaintext, &session); err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal session: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Validate required fields
+
if session.DID == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid session: missing DID")
+
}
+
+
if session.SessionID == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid session: missing session ID")
+
}
+
+
// Check expiration
+
now := time.Now().Unix()
+
if session.ExpiresAt <= now {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token expired at %v", time.Unix(session.ExpiresAt, 0))
+
}
+
+
return &session, nil
+
}
+331
internal/atproto/oauth/seal_test.go
···
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"crypto/rand"
+
"encoding/base64"
+
"strings"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
// generateSealSecret generates a random 32-byte seal secret for testing
+
func generateSealSecret() []byte {
+
secret := make([]byte, 32)
+
if _, err := rand.Read(secret); err != nil {
+
panic(err)
+
}
+
return secret
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create client with seal secret
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
did := "did:plc:abc123"
+
sessionID := "session-xyz"
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
// Seal the session
+
token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
require.NotEmpty(t, token)
+
+
// Token should be base64url encoded
+
_, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "token should be valid base64url")
+
+
// Unseal the session
+
session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
require.NotNil(t, session)
+
+
// Verify data
+
assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)
+
assert.Equal(t, sessionID, session.SessionID)
+
+
// Verify expiration is approximately correct (within 1 second)
+
expectedExpiry := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()
+
assert.InDelta(t, expectedExpiry, session.ExpiresAt, 1.0)
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_ExpirationValidation(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
did := "did:plc:abc123"
+
sessionID := "session-xyz"
+
ttl := 2 * time.Second // Short TTL (must be >= 1 second due to Unix timestamp granularity)
+
+
// Seal the session
+
token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Should work immediately
+
session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)
+
+
// Wait well past expiration
+
time.Sleep(2500 * time.Millisecond)
+
+
// Should fail after expiration
+
session, err = client.UnsealSession(token)
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, session)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "token expired")
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_TamperedTokenDetection(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
did := "did:plc:abc123"
+
sessionID := "session-xyz"
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
// Seal the session
+
token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Tamper with the token by modifying one character
+
tampered := token[:len(token)-5] + "XXXX" + token[len(token)-1:]
+
+
// Should fail to unseal tampered token
+
session, err := client.UnsealSession(tampered)
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, session)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed to decrypt token")
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_InvalidTokenFormats(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
token string
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "empty token",
+
token: "",
+
},
+
{
+
name: "invalid base64",
+
token: "not-valid-base64!@#$",
+
},
+
{
+
name: "too short",
+
token: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("short")),
+
},
+
{
+
name: "random bytes",
+
token: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 50)),
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
session, err := client.UnsealSession(tt.token)
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, session)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_DifferentSecrets(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create two clients with different secrets
+
client1 := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
client2 := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
did := "did:plc:abc123"
+
sessionID := "session-xyz"
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
// Seal with client1
+
token, err := client1.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Try to unseal with client2 (different secret)
+
session, err := client2.UnsealSession(token)
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, session)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed to decrypt token")
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_NoSecretConfigured(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: nil,
+
}
+
+
did := "did:plc:abc123"
+
sessionID := "session-xyz"
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
// Should fail to seal without secret
+
token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Empty(t, token)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "seal secret not configured")
+
+
// Should fail to unseal without secret
+
session, err := client.UnsealSession("dummy-token")
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, session)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "seal secret not configured")
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_MissingRequiredFields(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
did string
+
sessionID string
+
errorMsg string
+
}{
+
{
+
name: "missing DID",
+
did: "",
+
sessionID: "session-123",
+
errorMsg: "DID is required",
+
},
+
{
+
name: "missing session ID",
+
did: "did:plc:abc123",
+
sessionID: "",
+
errorMsg: "session ID is required",
+
},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
token, err := client.SealSession(tt.did, tt.sessionID, ttl)
+
assert.Error(t, err)
+
assert.Empty(t, token)
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.errorMsg)
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_UniquenessPerCall(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
did := "did:plc:abc123"
+
sessionID := "session-xyz"
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
// Seal the same session twice
+
token1, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
token2, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Tokens should be different (different nonces)
+
assert.NotEqual(t, token1, token2, "tokens should be unique due to different nonces")
+
+
// But both should unseal to the same session data
+
session1, err := client.UnsealSession(token1)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
session2, err := client.UnsealSession(token2)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, session1.DID, session2.DID)
+
assert.Equal(t, session1.SessionID, session2.SessionID)
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_LongDIDAndSessionID(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
// Test with very long DID and session ID
+
did := "did:plc:" + strings.Repeat("a", 200)
+
sessionID := "session-" + strings.Repeat("x", 200)
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
// Should work with long values
+
token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)
+
assert.Equal(t, sessionID, session.SessionID)
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_URLSafeEncoding(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
did := "did:plc:abc123"
+
sessionID := "session-xyz"
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
// Seal multiple times to get different nonces
+
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+
token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Token should not contain URL-unsafe characters
+
assert.NotContains(t, token, "+", "token should not contain '+'")
+
assert.NotContains(t, token, "/", "token should not contain '/'")
+
assert.NotContains(t, token, "=", "token should not contain '='")
+
+
// Should unseal successfully
+
session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestSealSession_ConcurrentAccess(t *testing.T) {
+
client := &OAuthClient{
+
SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),
+
}
+
+
did := "did:plc:abc123"
+
sessionID := "session-xyz"
+
ttl := 1 * time.Hour
+
+
// Run concurrent seal/unseal operations
+
done := make(chan bool)
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
go func() {
+
for j := 0; j < 100; j++ {
+
token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)
+
}
+
done <- true
+
}()
+
}
+
+
// Wait for all goroutines
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
<-done
+
}
+
}
+614
internal/atproto/oauth/store.go
···
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"database/sql"
+
"errors"
+
"fmt"
+
"log/slog"
+
"net/url"
+
"strings"
+
"time"
+
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
+
"github.com/lib/pq"
+
)
+
+
var (
+
ErrSessionNotFound = errors.New("oauth session not found")
+
ErrAuthRequestNotFound = errors.New("oauth auth request not found")
+
)
+
+
// PostgresOAuthStore implements oauth.ClientAuthStore interface using PostgreSQL
+
type PostgresOAuthStore struct {
+
db *sql.DB
+
sessionTTL time.Duration
+
}
+
+
// NewPostgresOAuthStore creates a new PostgreSQL-backed OAuth store
+
func NewPostgresOAuthStore(db *sql.DB, sessionTTL time.Duration) oauth.ClientAuthStore {
+
if sessionTTL == 0 {
+
sessionTTL = 7 * 24 * time.Hour // Default to 7 days
+
}
+
return &PostgresOAuthStore{
+
db: db,
+
sessionTTL: sessionTTL,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// GetSession retrieves a session by DID and session ID
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) GetSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) (*oauth.ClientSessionData, error) {
+
query := `
+
SELECT
+
did, session_id, host_url, auth_server_iss,
+
auth_server_token_endpoint, auth_server_revocation_endpoint,
+
scopes, access_token, refresh_token,
+
dpop_authserver_nonce, dpop_pds_nonce, dpop_private_key_multibase
+
FROM oauth_sessions
+
WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2 AND expires_at > NOW()
+
`
+
+
var session oauth.ClientSessionData
+
var authServerIss, authServerTokenEndpoint, authServerRevocationEndpoint sql.NullString
+
var hostURL, dpopPrivateKeyMultibase sql.NullString
+
var scopes pq.StringArray
+
var dpopAuthServerNonce, dpopHostNonce sql.NullString
+
+
err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, did.String(), sessionID).Scan(
+
&session.AccountDID,
+
&session.SessionID,
+
&hostURL,
+
&authServerIss,
+
&authServerTokenEndpoint,
+
&authServerRevocationEndpoint,
+
&scopes,
+
&session.AccessToken,
+
&session.RefreshToken,
+
&dpopAuthServerNonce,
+
&dpopHostNonce,
+
&dpopPrivateKeyMultibase,
+
)
+
+
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+
return nil, ErrSessionNotFound
+
}
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get session: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Convert nullable fields
+
if hostURL.Valid {
+
session.HostURL = hostURL.String
+
}
+
if authServerIss.Valid {
+
session.AuthServerURL = authServerIss.String
+
}
+
if authServerTokenEndpoint.Valid {
+
session.AuthServerTokenEndpoint = authServerTokenEndpoint.String
+
}
+
if authServerRevocationEndpoint.Valid {
+
session.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint = authServerRevocationEndpoint.String
+
}
+
if dpopAuthServerNonce.Valid {
+
session.DPoPAuthServerNonce = dpopAuthServerNonce.String
+
}
+
if dpopHostNonce.Valid {
+
session.DPoPHostNonce = dpopHostNonce.String
+
}
+
if dpopPrivateKeyMultibase.Valid {
+
session.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase = dpopPrivateKeyMultibase.String
+
}
+
session.Scopes = scopes
+
+
return &session, nil
+
}
+
+
// SaveSession saves or updates a session (upsert operation)
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) SaveSession(ctx context.Context, sess oauth.ClientSessionData) error {
+
// Input validation per atProto OAuth security requirements
+
+
// Validate DID format
+
if _, err := syntax.ParseDID(sess.AccountDID.String()); err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid DID format: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Validate token lengths (max 10000 chars to prevent memory issues)
+
const maxTokenLength = 10000
+
if len(sess.AccessToken) > maxTokenLength {
+
return fmt.Errorf("access_token exceeds maximum length of %d characters", maxTokenLength)
+
}
+
if len(sess.RefreshToken) > maxTokenLength {
+
return fmt.Errorf("refresh_token exceeds maximum length of %d characters", maxTokenLength)
+
}
+
+
// Validate session ID is not empty
+
if sess.SessionID == "" {
+
return fmt.Errorf("session_id cannot be empty")
+
}
+
+
// Validate URLs if provided
+
if sess.HostURL != "" {
+
if _, err := url.Parse(sess.HostURL); err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid host_url: %w", err)
+
}
+
}
+
if sess.AuthServerURL != "" {
+
if _, err := url.Parse(sess.AuthServerURL); err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid auth_server URL: %w", err)
+
}
+
}
+
if sess.AuthServerTokenEndpoint != "" {
+
if _, err := url.Parse(sess.AuthServerTokenEndpoint); err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid auth_server_token_endpoint: %w", err)
+
}
+
}
+
if sess.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint != "" {
+
if _, err := url.Parse(sess.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint); err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid auth_server_revocation_endpoint: %w", err)
+
}
+
}
+
+
query := `
+
INSERT INTO oauth_sessions (
+
did, session_id, handle, pds_url, host_url,
+
access_token, refresh_token,
+
dpop_private_jwk, dpop_private_key_multibase,
+
dpop_authserver_nonce, dpop_pds_nonce,
+
auth_server_iss, auth_server_token_endpoint, auth_server_revocation_endpoint,
+
scopes, expires_at, created_at, updated_at
+
) VALUES (
+
$1, $2, $3, $4, $5,
+
$6, $7,
+
NULL, $8,
+
$9, $10,
+
$11, $12, $13,
+
$14, $15, NOW(), NOW()
+
)
+
ON CONFLICT (did, session_id) DO UPDATE SET
+
handle = EXCLUDED.handle,
+
pds_url = EXCLUDED.pds_url,
+
host_url = EXCLUDED.host_url,
+
access_token = EXCLUDED.access_token,
+
refresh_token = EXCLUDED.refresh_token,
+
dpop_private_key_multibase = EXCLUDED.dpop_private_key_multibase,
+
dpop_authserver_nonce = EXCLUDED.dpop_authserver_nonce,
+
dpop_pds_nonce = EXCLUDED.dpop_pds_nonce,
+
auth_server_iss = EXCLUDED.auth_server_iss,
+
auth_server_token_endpoint = EXCLUDED.auth_server_token_endpoint,
+
auth_server_revocation_endpoint = EXCLUDED.auth_server_revocation_endpoint,
+
scopes = EXCLUDED.scopes,
+
expires_at = EXCLUDED.expires_at,
+
updated_at = NOW()
+
`
+
+
// Calculate token expiration using configured TTL
+
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(s.sessionTTL)
+
+
// Convert empty strings to NULL for optional fields
+
var authServerRevocationEndpoint sql.NullString
+
if sess.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint != "" {
+
authServerRevocationEndpoint.String = sess.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint
+
authServerRevocationEndpoint.Valid = true
+
}
+
+
// Extract handle from DID (placeholder - in real implementation, resolve from identity)
+
// For now, use DID as handle since we don't have the handle in ClientSessionData
+
handle := sess.AccountDID.String()
+
+
// Use HostURL as PDS URL
+
pdsURL := sess.HostURL
+
if pdsURL == "" {
+
pdsURL = sess.AuthServerURL // Fallback to auth server URL
+
}
+
+
_, err := s.db.ExecContext(
+
ctx, query,
+
sess.AccountDID.String(),
+
sess.SessionID,
+
handle,
+
pdsURL,
+
sess.HostURL,
+
sess.AccessToken,
+
sess.RefreshToken,
+
sess.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase,
+
sess.DPoPAuthServerNonce,
+
sess.DPoPHostNonce,
+
sess.AuthServerURL,
+
sess.AuthServerTokenEndpoint,
+
authServerRevocationEndpoint,
+
pq.Array(sess.Scopes),
+
expiresAt,
+
)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save session: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// DeleteSession deletes a session by DID and session ID
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) DeleteSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) error {
+
query := `DELETE FROM oauth_sessions WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2`
+
+
result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, did.String(), sessionID)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete session: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
if rows == 0 {
+
return ErrSessionNotFound
+
}
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// GetAuthRequestInfo retrieves auth request information by state
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) (*oauth.AuthRequestData, error) {
+
query := `
+
SELECT
+
state, did, handle, pds_url, pkce_verifier,
+
dpop_private_key_multibase, dpop_authserver_nonce,
+
auth_server_iss, request_uri,
+
auth_server_token_endpoint, auth_server_revocation_endpoint,
+
scopes, created_at
+
FROM oauth_requests
+
WHERE state = $1
+
`
+
+
var info oauth.AuthRequestData
+
var did, handle, pdsURL sql.NullString
+
var dpopPrivateKeyMultibase, dpopAuthServerNonce sql.NullString
+
var requestURI, authServerTokenEndpoint, authServerRevocationEndpoint sql.NullString
+
var scopes pq.StringArray
+
var createdAt time.Time
+
+
err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, state).Scan(
+
&info.State,
+
&did,
+
&handle,
+
&pdsURL,
+
&info.PKCEVerifier,
+
&dpopPrivateKeyMultibase,
+
&dpopAuthServerNonce,
+
&info.AuthServerURL,
+
&requestURI,
+
&authServerTokenEndpoint,
+
&authServerRevocationEndpoint,
+
&scopes,
+
&createdAt,
+
)
+
+
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+
return nil, ErrAuthRequestNotFound
+
}
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get auth request info: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Parse DID if present
+
if did.Valid && did.String != "" {
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(did.String)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse DID: %w", err)
+
}
+
info.AccountDID = &parsedDID
+
}
+
+
// Convert nullable fields
+
if dpopPrivateKeyMultibase.Valid {
+
info.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase = dpopPrivateKeyMultibase.String
+
}
+
if dpopAuthServerNonce.Valid {
+
info.DPoPAuthServerNonce = dpopAuthServerNonce.String
+
}
+
if requestURI.Valid {
+
info.RequestURI = requestURI.String
+
}
+
if authServerTokenEndpoint.Valid {
+
info.AuthServerTokenEndpoint = authServerTokenEndpoint.String
+
}
+
if authServerRevocationEndpoint.Valid {
+
info.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint = authServerRevocationEndpoint.String
+
}
+
info.Scopes = scopes
+
+
return &info, nil
+
}
+
+
// SaveAuthRequestInfo saves auth request information (create only, not upsert)
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, info oauth.AuthRequestData) error {
+
query := `
+
INSERT INTO oauth_requests (
+
state, did, handle, pds_url, pkce_verifier,
+
dpop_private_key_multibase, dpop_authserver_nonce,
+
auth_server_iss, request_uri,
+
auth_server_token_endpoint, auth_server_revocation_endpoint,
+
scopes, return_url, created_at
+
) VALUES (
+
$1, $2, $3, $4, $5,
+
$6, $7,
+
$8, $9,
+
$10, $11,
+
$12, NULL, NOW()
+
)
+
`
+
+
// Extract DID string if present
+
var didStr sql.NullString
+
if info.AccountDID != nil {
+
didStr.String = info.AccountDID.String()
+
didStr.Valid = true
+
}
+
+
// Convert empty strings to NULL for optional fields
+
var authServerRevocationEndpoint sql.NullString
+
if info.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint != "" {
+
authServerRevocationEndpoint.String = info.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint
+
authServerRevocationEndpoint.Valid = true
+
}
+
+
// Placeholder values for handle and pds_url (not in AuthRequestData)
+
// In production, these would be resolved during the auth flow
+
handle := ""
+
pdsURL := ""
+
if info.AccountDID != nil {
+
handle = info.AccountDID.String() // Temporary placeholder
+
pdsURL = info.AuthServerURL // Temporary placeholder
+
}
+
+
_, err := s.db.ExecContext(
+
ctx, query,
+
info.State,
+
didStr,
+
handle,
+
pdsURL,
+
info.PKCEVerifier,
+
info.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase,
+
info.DPoPAuthServerNonce,
+
info.AuthServerURL,
+
info.RequestURI,
+
info.AuthServerTokenEndpoint,
+
authServerRevocationEndpoint,
+
pq.Array(info.Scopes),
+
)
+
if err != nil {
+
// Check for duplicate state
+
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "duplicate key") && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "oauth_requests_state_key") {
+
return fmt.Errorf("auth request with state already exists: %s", info.State)
+
}
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save auth request info: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// DeleteAuthRequestInfo deletes auth request information by state
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) error {
+
query := `DELETE FROM oauth_requests WHERE state = $1`
+
+
result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, state)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete auth request info: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
if rows == 0 {
+
return ErrAuthRequestNotFound
+
}
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// CleanupExpiredSessions removes sessions that have expired
+
// Should be called periodically (e.g., via cron job)
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
+
query := `DELETE FROM oauth_sessions WHERE expires_at < NOW()`
+
+
result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query)
+
if err != nil {
+
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to cleanup expired sessions: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
+
if err != nil {
+
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
return rows, nil
+
}
+
+
// CleanupExpiredAuthRequests removes auth requests older than 30 minutes
+
// Should be called periodically (e.g., via cron job)
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
+
query := `DELETE FROM oauth_requests WHERE created_at < NOW() - INTERVAL '30 minutes'`
+
+
result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query)
+
if err != nil {
+
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to cleanup expired auth requests: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
+
if err != nil {
+
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
return rows, nil
+
}
+
+
// MobileOAuthData holds mobile-specific OAuth flow data
+
type MobileOAuthData struct {
+
CSRFToken string
+
RedirectURI string
+
}
+
+
// mobileFlowContextKey is the context key for mobile flow data
+
type mobileFlowContextKey struct{}
+
+
// ContextWithMobileFlowData adds mobile flow data to a context.
+
// This is used by HandleMobileLogin to pass mobile data to the store wrapper,
+
// which will save it when SaveAuthRequestInfo is called by indigo.
+
func ContextWithMobileFlowData(ctx context.Context, data MobileOAuthData) context.Context {
+
return context.WithValue(ctx, mobileFlowContextKey{}, data)
+
}
+
+
// getMobileFlowDataFromContext retrieves mobile flow data from context, if present
+
func getMobileFlowDataFromContext(ctx context.Context) (MobileOAuthData, bool) {
+
data, ok := ctx.Value(mobileFlowContextKey{}).(MobileOAuthData)
+
return data, ok
+
}
+
+
// MobileAwareClientStore is a marker interface that indicates a store is properly
+
// configured for mobile OAuth flows. Only stores that intercept SaveAuthRequestInfo
+
// to save mobile CSRF data should implement this interface.
+
// This prevents silent mobile OAuth breakage when a plain PostgresOAuthStore is used.
+
type MobileAwareClientStore interface {
+
IsMobileAware() bool
+
}
+
+
// MobileAwareStoreWrapper wraps a ClientAuthStore to automatically save mobile
+
// CSRF data when SaveAuthRequestInfo is called during a mobile OAuth flow.
+
// This is necessary because indigo's StartAuthFlow doesn't expose the OAuth state,
+
// so we intercept the SaveAuthRequestInfo call to capture it.
+
type MobileAwareStoreWrapper struct {
+
oauth.ClientAuthStore
+
mobileStore MobileOAuthStore
+
}
+
+
// IsMobileAware implements MobileAwareClientStore, indicating this store
+
// properly saves mobile CSRF data during OAuth flow initiation.
+
func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) IsMobileAware() bool {
+
return true
+
}
+
+
// NewMobileAwareStoreWrapper creates a wrapper that intercepts SaveAuthRequestInfo
+
// to also save mobile CSRF data when present in context.
+
func NewMobileAwareStoreWrapper(store oauth.ClientAuthStore) *MobileAwareStoreWrapper {
+
wrapper := &MobileAwareStoreWrapper{
+
ClientAuthStore: store,
+
}
+
// Check if the underlying store implements MobileOAuthStore
+
if ms, ok := store.(MobileOAuthStore); ok {
+
wrapper.mobileStore = ms
+
}
+
return wrapper
+
}
+
+
// SaveAuthRequestInfo saves the auth request and also saves mobile CSRF data
+
// if mobile flow data is present in the context.
+
func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, info oauth.AuthRequestData) error {
+
// First, save the auth request to the underlying store
+
if err := w.ClientAuthStore.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, info); err != nil {
+
return err
+
}
+
+
// Check if this is a mobile flow (mobile data in context)
+
if mobileData, ok := getMobileFlowDataFromContext(ctx); ok && w.mobileStore != nil {
+
// Save mobile CSRF data tied to this OAuth state
+
// IMPORTANT: If this fails, we MUST propagate the error. Otherwise:
+
// 1. No server-side CSRF record is stored
+
// 2. Every mobile callback will "fail closed" to web flow
+
// 3. Mobile sign-in silently breaks with no indication
+
// Failing loudly here lets the user retry rather than being confused
+
// about why they're getting a web flow instead of mobile.
+
if err := w.mobileStore.SaveMobileOAuthData(ctx, info.State, mobileData); err != nil {
+
slog.Error("failed to save mobile CSRF data - mobile login will fail",
+
"state", info.State, "error", err)
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save mobile OAuth data: %w", err)
+
}
+
}
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// GetMobileOAuthData implements MobileOAuthStore interface by delegating to underlying store
+
func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) GetMobileOAuthData(ctx context.Context, state string) (*MobileOAuthData, error) {
+
if w.mobileStore != nil {
+
return w.mobileStore.GetMobileOAuthData(ctx, state)
+
}
+
return nil, nil
+
}
+
+
// SaveMobileOAuthData implements MobileOAuthStore interface by delegating to underlying store
+
func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) SaveMobileOAuthData(ctx context.Context, state string, data MobileOAuthData) error {
+
if w.mobileStore != nil {
+
return w.mobileStore.SaveMobileOAuthData(ctx, state, data)
+
}
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// UnwrapPostgresStore returns the underlying PostgresOAuthStore if present.
+
// This is useful for accessing cleanup methods that aren't part of the interface.
+
func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) UnwrapPostgresStore() *PostgresOAuthStore {
+
if ps, ok := w.ClientAuthStore.(*PostgresOAuthStore); ok {
+
return ps
+
}
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// SaveMobileOAuthData stores mobile CSRF data tied to an OAuth state
+
// This ties the CSRF token to the OAuth flow via the state parameter,
+
// which comes back through the OAuth response for server-side validation.
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) SaveMobileOAuthData(ctx context.Context, state string, data MobileOAuthData) error {
+
query := `
+
UPDATE oauth_requests
+
SET mobile_csrf_token = $2, mobile_redirect_uri = $3
+
WHERE state = $1
+
`
+
+
result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, state, data.CSRFToken, data.RedirectURI)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save mobile OAuth data: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
if rows == 0 {
+
return ErrAuthRequestNotFound
+
}
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// GetMobileOAuthData retrieves mobile CSRF data by OAuth state
+
// This is called during callback to compare the server-side CSRF token
+
// (retrieved by state from the OAuth response) against the cookie CSRF.
+
func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) GetMobileOAuthData(ctx context.Context, state string) (*MobileOAuthData, error) {
+
query := `
+
SELECT mobile_csrf_token, mobile_redirect_uri
+
FROM oauth_requests
+
WHERE state = $1
+
`
+
+
var csrfToken, redirectURI sql.NullString
+
err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, state).Scan(&csrfToken, &redirectURI)
+
+
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+
return nil, ErrAuthRequestNotFound
+
}
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get mobile OAuth data: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Return nil if no mobile data was stored (this was a web flow)
+
if !csrfToken.Valid {
+
return nil, nil
+
}
+
+
return &MobileOAuthData{
+
CSRFToken: csrfToken.String,
+
RedirectURI: redirectURI.String,
+
}, nil
+
}
+522
internal/atproto/oauth/store_test.go
···
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"database/sql"
+
"os"
+
"testing"
+
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
+
_ "github.com/lib/pq"
+
"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
// setupTestDB creates a test database connection and runs migrations
+
func setupTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
+
dsn := os.Getenv("TEST_DATABASE_URL")
+
if dsn == "" {
+
dsn = "postgres://test_user:test_password@localhost:5434/coves_test?sslmode=disable"
+
}
+
+
db, err := sql.Open("postgres", dsn)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to connect to test database")
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../db/migrations"), "Failed to run migrations")
+
+
return db
+
}
+
+
// cleanupOAuth removes all test OAuth data from the database
+
func cleanupOAuth(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB) {
+
_, err := db.Exec("DELETE FROM oauth_sessions WHERE did LIKE 'did:plc:test%'")
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to cleanup oauth_sessions")
+
+
_, err = db.Exec("DELETE FROM oauth_requests WHERE state LIKE 'test%'")
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to cleanup oauth_requests")
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_SaveAndGetSession(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:test123abc")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
session := oauth.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session123",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/revoke",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
AccessToken: "at_test_token_abc123",
+
RefreshToken: "rt_test_token_xyz789",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "nonce_auth_123",
+
DPoPHostNonce: "nonce_host_456",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
+
// Save session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session)
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Retrieve session
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, "session123")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.NotNil(t, retrieved)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.AccountDID.String(), retrieved.AccountDID.String())
+
assert.Equal(t, session.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.HostURL, retrieved.HostURL)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.AuthServerURL, retrieved.AuthServerURL)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.AuthServerTokenEndpoint, retrieved.AuthServerTokenEndpoint)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.AccessToken, retrieved.AccessToken)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.RefreshToken, retrieved.RefreshToken)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.DPoPAuthServerNonce, retrieved.DPoPAuthServerNonce)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.DPoPHostNonce, retrieved.DPoPHostNonce)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase, retrieved.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.Scopes, retrieved.Scopes)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_SaveSession_Upsert(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testupsert")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Initial session
+
session1 := oauth.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session_upsert",
+
HostURL: "https://pds1.example.com",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth1.example.com",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth1.example.com/oauth/token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
AccessToken: "old_access_token",
+
RefreshToken: "old_refresh_token",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session1)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Updated session (same DID and session ID)
+
session2 := oauth.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session_upsert",
+
HostURL: "https://pds2.example.com",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth2.example.com",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth2.example.com/oauth/token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},
+
AccessToken: "new_access_token",
+
RefreshToken: "new_refresh_token",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktX",
+
}
+
+
// Save again - should update
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session2)
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Retrieve should get updated values
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, "session_upsert")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, "new_access_token", retrieved.AccessToken)
+
assert.Equal(t, "new_refresh_token", retrieved.RefreshToken)
+
assert.Equal(t, "https://pds2.example.com", retrieved.HostURL)
+
assert.Equal(t, []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"}, retrieved.Scopes)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_GetSession_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:nonexistent")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, "nonexistent_session")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_DeleteSession(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testdelete")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
session := oauth.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session_delete",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
AccessToken: "test_token",
+
RefreshToken: "test_refresh",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
+
// Save session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Delete session
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, "session_delete")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Verify session is gone
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, "session_delete")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_DeleteSession_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:nonexistent")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, "nonexistent_session")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_SaveAndGetAuthRequestInfo(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testrequest")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
info := oauth.AuthRequestData{
+
State: "test_state_abc123",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
AccountDID: &did,
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
RequestURI: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:abc123",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/revoke",
+
PKCEVerifier: "verifier_xyz789",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "nonce_abc",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
+
// Save auth request info
+
err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, info)
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Retrieve auth request info
+
retrieved, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_state_abc123")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.NotNil(t, retrieved)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.State, retrieved.State)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.AuthServerURL, retrieved.AuthServerURL)
+
assert.NotNil(t, retrieved.AccountDID)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.AccountDID.String(), retrieved.AccountDID.String())
+
assert.Equal(t, info.Scopes, retrieved.Scopes)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.RequestURI, retrieved.RequestURI)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.AuthServerTokenEndpoint, retrieved.AuthServerTokenEndpoint)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.PKCEVerifier, retrieved.PKCEVerifier)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.DPoPAuthServerNonce, retrieved.DPoPAuthServerNonce)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase, retrieved.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_SaveAuthRequestInfo_NoDID(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
info := oauth.AuthRequestData{
+
State: "test_state_nodid",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
AccountDID: nil, // No DID provided
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
RequestURI: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:nodid",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
PKCEVerifier: "verifier_nodid",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "nonce_nodid",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
+
// Save auth request info without DID
+
err := store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, info)
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Retrieve and verify DID is nil
+
retrieved, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_state_nodid")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Nil(t, retrieved.AccountDID)
+
assert.Equal(t, info.State, retrieved.State)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_GetAuthRequestInfo_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
_, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "nonexistent_state")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthRequestNotFound)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_DeleteAuthRequestInfo(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
info := oauth.AuthRequestData{
+
State: "test_state_delete",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
RequestURI: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:delete",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
PKCEVerifier: "verifier_delete",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "nonce_delete",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
+
// Save auth request info
+
err := store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, info)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Delete auth request info
+
err = store.DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_state_delete")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Verify it's gone
+
_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_state_delete")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthRequestNotFound)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_DeleteAuthRequestInfo_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
err := store.DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "nonexistent_state")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthRequestNotFound)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_CleanupExpiredSessions(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
storeInterface := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
store, ok := storeInterface.(*PostgresOAuthStore)
+
require.True(t, ok, "store should be *PostgresOAuthStore")
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
did1, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testexpired1")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
did2, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testexpired2")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create an expired session (manually insert with past expiration)
+
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+
INSERT INTO oauth_sessions (
+
did, session_id, handle, pds_url, host_url,
+
access_token, refresh_token,
+
dpop_private_key_multibase, auth_server_iss,
+
auth_server_token_endpoint, scopes,
+
expires_at, created_at
+
) VALUES (
+
$1, $2, $3, $4, $5,
+
$6, $7,
+
$8, $9,
+
$10, $11,
+
NOW() - INTERVAL '1 day', NOW()
+
)
+
`, did1.String(), "expired_session", "test.handle", "https://pds.example.com", "https://pds.example.com",
+
"expired_token", "expired_refresh",
+
"z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH", "https://auth.example.com",
+
"https://auth.example.com/oauth/token", `{"atproto"}`)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create a valid session
+
validSession := oauth.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did2,
+
SessionID: "valid_session",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
AccessToken: "valid_token",
+
RefreshToken: "valid_refresh",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, validSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Cleanup expired sessions
+
count, err := store.CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx)
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count, "Should delete 1 expired session")
+
+
// Verify expired session is gone
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did1, "expired_session")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)
+
+
// Verify valid session still exists
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did2, "valid_session")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
storeInterface := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0)
+
pgStore, ok := storeInterface.(*PostgresOAuthStore)
+
require.True(t, ok, "store should be *PostgresOAuthStore")
+
store := oauth.ClientAuthStore(pgStore)
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Create an old auth request (manually insert with old timestamp)
+
_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `
+
INSERT INTO oauth_requests (
+
state, did, handle, pds_url, pkce_verifier,
+
dpop_private_key_multibase, dpop_authserver_nonce,
+
auth_server_iss, request_uri,
+
auth_server_token_endpoint, scopes,
+
created_at
+
) VALUES (
+
$1, $2, $3, $4, $5,
+
$6, $7,
+
$8, $9,
+
$10, $11,
+
NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour'
+
)
+
`, "test_old_state", "did:plc:testold", "test.handle", "https://pds.example.com",
+
"old_verifier", "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
"nonce_old", "https://auth.example.com", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:old",
+
"https://auth.example.com/oauth/token", `{"atproto"}`)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create a recent auth request
+
recentInfo := oauth.AuthRequestData{
+
State: "test_recent_state",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
RequestURI: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:recent",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
PKCEVerifier: "recent_verifier",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "nonce_recent",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, recentInfo)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Cleanup expired auth requests (older than 30 minutes)
+
count, err := pgStore.CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(ctx)
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count, "Should delete 1 expired auth request")
+
+
// Verify old request is gone
+
_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_old_state")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthRequestNotFound)
+
+
// Verify recent request still exists
+
_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_recent_state")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
}
+
+
func TestPostgresOAuthStore_MultipleSessions(t *testing.T) {
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)
+
+
store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testmulti")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create multiple sessions for the same DID
+
session1 := oauth.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "browser1",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
AccessToken: "token_browser1",
+
RefreshToken: "refresh_browser1",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",
+
}
+
+
session2 := oauth.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "mobile_app",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
AuthServerURL: "https://auth.example.com",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
AccessToken: "token_mobile",
+
RefreshToken: "refresh_mobile",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktX",
+
}
+
+
// Save both sessions
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session1)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session2)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Retrieve both sessions
+
retrieved1, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, "browser1")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, "token_browser1", retrieved1.AccessToken)
+
+
retrieved2, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, "mobile_app")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
assert.Equal(t, "token_mobile", retrieved2.AccessToken)
+
+
// Delete one session
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, "browser1")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Verify only browser1 is deleted
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, "browser1")
+
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)
+
+
// mobile_app should still exist
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, "mobile_app")
+
assert.NoError(t, err)
+
}
+99
internal/atproto/oauth/transport.go
···
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"fmt"
+
"net"
+
"net/http"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
// ssrfSafeTransport wraps http.Transport to prevent SSRF attacks
+
type ssrfSafeTransport struct {
+
base *http.Transport
+
allowPrivate bool // For dev/testing only
+
}
+
+
// isPrivateIP checks if an IP is in a private/reserved range
+
func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
+
if ip == nil {
+
return false
+
}
+
+
// Check for loopback
+
if ip.IsLoopback() {
+
return true
+
}
+
+
// Check for link-local
+
if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
+
return true
+
}
+
+
// Check for private ranges
+
privateRanges := []string{
+
"10.0.0.0/8",
+
"172.16.0.0/12",
+
"192.168.0.0/16",
+
"169.254.0.0/16",
+
"::1/128",
+
"fc00::/7",
+
"fe80::/10",
+
}
+
+
for _, cidr := range privateRanges {
+
_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
+
if err == nil && network.Contains(ip) {
+
return true
+
}
+
}
+
+
return false
+
}
+
+
func (t *ssrfSafeTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+
host := req.URL.Hostname()
+
+
// Resolve hostname to IP
+
ips, err := net.LookupIP(host)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve host: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Check all resolved IPs
+
if !t.allowPrivate {
+
for _, ip := range ips {
+
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SSRF blocked: %s resolves to private IP %s", host, ip)
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
+
return t.base.RoundTrip(req)
+
}
+
+
// NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient creates an HTTP client with SSRF protections
+
func NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(allowPrivate bool) *http.Client {
+
transport := &ssrfSafeTransport{
+
base: &http.Transport{
+
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{
+
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
+
KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
+
}).DialContext,
+
MaxIdleConns: 100,
+
IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
+
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
+
},
+
allowPrivate: allowPrivate,
+
}
+
+
return &http.Client{
+
Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
+
Transport: transport,
+
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+
if len(via) >= 5 {
+
return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")
+
}
+
return nil
+
},
+
}
+
}
+132
internal/atproto/oauth/transport_test.go
···
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"net"
+
"net/http"
+
"testing"
+
)
+
+
func TestIsPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
ip string
+
expected bool
+
}{
+
// Loopback addresses
+
{"IPv4 loopback", "127.0.0.1", true},
+
{"IPv6 loopback", "::1", true},
+
+
// Private IPv4 ranges
+
{"Private 10.x.x.x", "10.0.0.1", true},
+
{"Private 10.x.x.x edge", "10.255.255.255", true},
+
{"Private 172.16.x.x", "172.16.0.1", true},
+
{"Private 172.31.x.x edge", "172.31.255.255", true},
+
{"Private 192.168.x.x", "192.168.1.1", true},
+
{"Private 192.168.x.x edge", "192.168.255.255", true},
+
+
// Link-local addresses
+
{"Link-local IPv4", "169.254.1.1", true},
+
{"Link-local IPv6", "fe80::1", true},
+
+
// IPv6 private ranges
+
{"IPv6 unique local fc00", "fc00::1", true},
+
{"IPv6 unique local fd00", "fd00::1", true},
+
+
// Public addresses
+
{"Public IP 1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
+
{"Public IP 8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
+
{"Public IP 172.15.0.1", "172.15.0.1", false}, // Just before 172.16/12
+
{"Public IP 172.32.0.1", "172.32.0.1", false}, // Just after 172.31/12
+
{"Public IP 11.0.0.1", "11.0.0.1", false}, // Just after 10/8
+
{"Public IPv6", "2001:4860:4860::8888", false}, // Google DNS
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)
+
if ip == nil {
+
t.Fatalf("Failed to parse IP: %s", tt.ip)
+
}
+
+
result := isPrivateIP(ip)
+
if result != tt.expected {
+
t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(%s) = %v, expected %v", tt.ip, result, tt.expected)
+
}
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestIsPrivateIP_NilIP(t *testing.T) {
+
result := isPrivateIP(nil)
+
if result != false {
+
t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(nil) = %v, expected false", result)
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestNewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
allowPrivate bool
+
}{
+
{"Production client (no private IPs)", false},
+
{"Development client (allow private IPs)", true},
+
}
+
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
client := NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(tt.allowPrivate)
+
+
if client == nil {
+
t.Fatal("NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient returned nil")
+
}
+
+
if client.Timeout == 0 {
+
t.Error("Expected timeout to be set")
+
}
+
+
if client.Transport == nil {
+
t.Error("Expected transport to be set")
+
}
+
+
transport, ok := client.Transport.(*ssrfSafeTransport)
+
if !ok {
+
t.Error("Expected ssrfSafeTransport")
+
}
+
+
if transport.allowPrivate != tt.allowPrivate {
+
t.Errorf("Expected allowPrivate=%v, got %v", tt.allowPrivate, transport.allowPrivate)
+
}
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
+
func TestSSRFSafeHTTPClient_RedirectLimit(t *testing.T) {
+
client := NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(false)
+
+
// Simulate checking redirect limit
+
if client.CheckRedirect == nil {
+
t.Fatal("Expected CheckRedirect to be set")
+
}
+
+
// Test redirect limit (5 redirects)
+
var via []*http.Request
+
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
+
req := &http.Request{}
+
via = append(via, req)
+
}
+
+
err := client.CheckRedirect(nil, via)
+
if err == nil {
+
t.Error("Expected error for too many redirects")
+
}
+
if err.Error() != "too many redirects" {
+
t.Errorf("Expected 'too many redirects' error, got: %v", err)
+
}
+
+
// Test within limit (4 redirects)
+
via = via[:4]
+
err = client.CheckRedirect(nil, via)
+
if err != nil {
+
t.Errorf("Expected no error for 4 redirects, got: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+124
internal/db/migrations/019_update_oauth_for_indigo.sql
···
+
-- +goose Up
+
-- Update OAuth tables to match indigo's ClientAuthStore interface requirements
+
-- This migration adds columns needed for OAuth client sessions and auth requests
+
+
-- Update oauth_requests table
+
-- Add columns for request URI, auth server endpoints, scopes, and DPoP key
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests
+
ADD COLUMN request_uri TEXT,
+
ADD COLUMN auth_server_token_endpoint TEXT,
+
ADD COLUMN auth_server_revocation_endpoint TEXT,
+
ADD COLUMN scopes TEXT[],
+
ADD COLUMN dpop_private_key_multibase TEXT;
+
+
-- Make original dpop_private_jwk nullable (we now use dpop_private_key_multibase)
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests ALTER COLUMN dpop_private_jwk DROP NOT NULL;
+
+
-- Make did nullable (indigo's AuthRequestData.AccountDID is a pointer - optional)
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests ALTER COLUMN did DROP NOT NULL;
+
+
-- Make handle and pds_url nullable too (derived from DID resolution, not always available at auth request time)
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests ALTER COLUMN handle DROP NOT NULL;
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests ALTER COLUMN pds_url DROP NOT NULL;
+
+
-- Update existing oauth_requests data
+
-- Convert dpop_private_jwk (JSONB) to multibase format if needed
+
-- Note: This will leave the multibase column NULL for now since conversion requires crypto logic
+
-- The application will need to handle NULL values or regenerate keys on next auth flow
+
UPDATE oauth_requests
+
SET
+
auth_server_token_endpoint = auth_server_iss || '/oauth/token',
+
scopes = ARRAY['atproto']::TEXT[]
+
WHERE auth_server_token_endpoint IS NULL;
+
+
-- Add indexes for new columns
+
CREATE INDEX idx_oauth_requests_request_uri ON oauth_requests(request_uri) WHERE request_uri IS NOT NULL;
+
+
-- Update oauth_sessions table
+
-- Add session_id column (will become part of composite key)
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions
+
ADD COLUMN session_id TEXT,
+
ADD COLUMN host_url TEXT,
+
ADD COLUMN auth_server_token_endpoint TEXT,
+
ADD COLUMN auth_server_revocation_endpoint TEXT,
+
ADD COLUMN scopes TEXT[],
+
ADD COLUMN dpop_private_key_multibase TEXT;
+
+
-- Make original dpop_private_jwk nullable (we now use dpop_private_key_multibase)
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions ALTER COLUMN dpop_private_jwk DROP NOT NULL;
+
+
-- Populate session_id for existing sessions (use DID as default for single-session per account)
+
-- In production, you may want to generate unique session IDs
+
UPDATE oauth_sessions
+
SET
+
session_id = 'default',
+
host_url = pds_url,
+
auth_server_token_endpoint = auth_server_iss || '/oauth/token',
+
scopes = ARRAY['atproto']::TEXT[]
+
WHERE session_id IS NULL;
+
+
-- Make session_id NOT NULL after populating existing data
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions
+
ALTER COLUMN session_id SET NOT NULL;
+
+
-- Drop old unique constraint on did only
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions
+
DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS oauth_sessions_did_key;
+
+
-- Create new composite unique constraint for (did, session_id)
+
-- This allows multiple sessions per account
+
-- Note: UNIQUE constraint automatically creates an index, so no separate index needed
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions
+
ADD CONSTRAINT oauth_sessions_did_session_id_key UNIQUE (did, session_id);
+
+
-- Add comment explaining the schema change
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth_sessions.session_id IS 'Session identifier to support multiple concurrent sessions per account';
+
COMMENT ON CONSTRAINT oauth_sessions_did_session_id_key ON oauth_sessions IS 'Composite key allowing multiple sessions per DID';
+
+
-- +goose Down
+
-- Rollback: Remove added columns and restore original unique constraint
+
+
-- oauth_sessions rollback
+
-- Drop composite unique constraint (this also drops the associated index)
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions
+
DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS oauth_sessions_did_session_id_key;
+
+
-- Delete all but the most recent session per DID before restoring unique constraint
+
-- This ensures the UNIQUE (did) constraint can be added without conflicts
+
DELETE FROM oauth_sessions a
+
USING oauth_sessions b
+
WHERE a.did = b.did
+
AND a.created_at < b.created_at;
+
+
-- Restore old unique constraint
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions
+
ADD CONSTRAINT oauth_sessions_did_key UNIQUE (did);
+
+
-- Restore NOT NULL constraint on dpop_private_jwk
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions
+
ALTER COLUMN dpop_private_jwk SET NOT NULL;
+
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS dpop_private_key_multibase,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS scopes,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auth_server_revocation_endpoint,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auth_server_token_endpoint,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS host_url,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS session_id;
+
+
-- oauth_requests rollback
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_oauth_requests_request_uri;
+
+
-- Restore NOT NULL constraints
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests
+
ALTER COLUMN dpop_private_jwk SET NOT NULL,
+
ALTER COLUMN did SET NOT NULL,
+
ALTER COLUMN handle SET NOT NULL,
+
ALTER COLUMN pds_url SET NOT NULL;
+
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS dpop_private_key_multibase,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS scopes,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auth_server_revocation_endpoint,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auth_server_token_endpoint,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS request_uri;
+23
internal/db/migrations/020_add_mobile_oauth_csrf.sql
···
+
-- +goose Up
+
-- Add columns for mobile OAuth CSRF protection with server-side state
+
-- This ties the CSRF token to the OAuth state, allowing validation against
+
-- a value that comes back through the OAuth response (the state parameter)
+
-- rather than only validating cookies against each other.
+
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests
+
ADD COLUMN mobile_csrf_token TEXT,
+
ADD COLUMN mobile_redirect_uri TEXT;
+
+
-- Index for quick lookup of mobile data when callback is received
+
CREATE INDEX idx_oauth_requests_mobile_csrf ON oauth_requests(state)
+
WHERE mobile_csrf_token IS NOT NULL;
+
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth_requests.mobile_csrf_token IS 'CSRF token for mobile OAuth flows, validated against cookie on callback';
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth_requests.mobile_redirect_uri IS 'Mobile redirect URI (Universal Link) for this OAuth flow';
+
+
-- +goose Down
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_oauth_requests_mobile_csrf;
+
+
ALTER TABLE oauth_requests
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS mobile_redirect_uri,
+
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS mobile_csrf_token;
+137
internal/api/handlers/wellknown/universal_links.go
···
+
package wellknown
+
+
import (
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log/slog"
+
"net/http"
+
"os"
+
)
+
+
// HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation serves the iOS Universal Links configuration
+
// GET /.well-known/apple-app-site-association
+
//
+
// Universal Links provide cryptographic binding between the app and domain:
+
// - Requires apple-app-site-association file served over HTTPS
+
// - App must have Associated Domains capability configured
+
// - System verifies domain ownership before routing deep links
+
// - Prevents malicious apps from intercepting deep links
+
//
+
// Spec: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/supporting-universal-links-in-your-app
+
func HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// Get Apple App ID from environment (format: <Team ID>.<Bundle ID>)
+
// Example: "ABCD1234.social.coves.app"
+
// Find Team ID in Apple Developer Portal -> Membership
+
// Bundle ID is configured in Xcode project
+
appleAppID := os.Getenv("APPLE_APP_ID")
+
if appleAppID == "" {
+
// Development fallback - allows testing without real Team ID
+
// IMPORTANT: This MUST be set in production for Universal Links to work
+
appleAppID = "DEVELOPMENT.social.coves.app"
+
slog.Warn("APPLE_APP_ID not set, using development placeholder",
+
"app_id", appleAppID,
+
"note", "Set APPLE_APP_ID env var for production Universal Links")
+
}
+
+
// Apple requires application/json content type (no charset)
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
// Construct the response per Apple's spec
+
// See: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/applinks
+
response := map[string]interface{}{
+
"applinks": map[string]interface{}{
+
"apps": []string{}, // Must be empty array per Apple spec
+
"details": []map[string]interface{}{
+
{
+
"appID": appleAppID,
+
// Paths that trigger Universal Links when opened in Safari/other apps
+
// These URLs will open the app instead of the browser
+
"paths": []string{
+
"/app/oauth/callback", // Primary Universal Link OAuth callback
+
"/app/oauth/callback/*", // Catch-all for query params
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {
+
slog.Error("failed to encode apple-app-site-association", "error", err)
+
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+
return
+
}
+
+
slog.Debug("served apple-app-site-association", "app_id", appleAppID)
+
}
+
+
// HandleAssetLinks serves the Android App Links configuration
+
// GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json
+
//
+
// App Links provide cryptographic binding between the app and domain:
+
// - Requires assetlinks.json file served over HTTPS
+
// - App must have intent-filter with android:autoVerify="true"
+
// - System verifies domain ownership via SHA-256 certificate fingerprint
+
// - Prevents malicious apps from intercepting deep links
+
//
+
// Spec: https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/verify-android-applinks
+
func HandleAssetLinks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// Get Android package name from environment
+
// Example: "social.coves.app"
+
androidPackage := os.Getenv("ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME")
+
if androidPackage == "" {
+
androidPackage = "social.coves.app" // Default for development
+
slog.Warn("ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME not set, using default",
+
"package", androidPackage,
+
"note", "Set ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME env var for production App Links")
+
}
+
+
// Get SHA-256 fingerprint from environment
+
// This is the SHA-256 fingerprint of the app's signing certificate
+
//
+
// To get the fingerprint:
+
// Production: keytool -list -v -keystore release.jks -alias release
+
// Debug: keytool -list -v -keystore ~/.android/debug.keystore -alias androiddebugkey -storepass android -keypass android
+
//
+
// Look for "SHA256:" in the output
+
// Format: AA:BB:CC:DD:...:FF (64 hex characters separated by colons)
+
androidFingerprint := os.Getenv("ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT")
+
if androidFingerprint == "" {
+
// Development fallback - this won't work for real App Links verification
+
// IMPORTANT: This MUST be set in production for App Links to work
+
androidFingerprint = "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00"
+
slog.Warn("ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT not set, using development placeholder",
+
"fingerprint", androidFingerprint,
+
"note", "Set ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT env var for production App Links")
+
}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
// Construct the response per Google's Digital Asset Links spec
+
// See: https://developers.google.com/digital-asset-links/v1/getting-started
+
response := []map[string]interface{}{
+
{
+
// delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls grants the app permission
+
// to handle URLs for this domain
+
"relation": []string{"delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"},
+
"target": map[string]interface{}{
+
"namespace": "android_app",
+
"package_name": androidPackage,
+
// List of certificate fingerprints that can sign the app
+
// Multiple fingerprints can be provided for different signing keys
+
// (e.g., debug + release)
+
"sha256_cert_fingerprints": []string{
+
androidFingerprint,
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {
+
slog.Error("failed to encode assetlinks.json", "error", err)
+
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+
return
+
}
+
+
slog.Debug("served assetlinks.json",
+
"package", androidPackage,
+
"fingerprint", androidFingerprint)
+
}
+25
internal/api/routes/wellknown.go
···
+
package routes
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/wellknown"
+
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
)
+
+
// RegisterWellKnownRoutes registers RFC 8615 well-known URI endpoints
+
// These endpoints are used for service discovery and mobile app deep linking
+
//
+
// Spec: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615.html
+
func RegisterWellKnownRoutes(r chi.Router) {
+
// iOS Universal Links configuration
+
// Required for cryptographically-bound deep linking on iOS
+
// Must be served at exact path /.well-known/apple-app-site-association
+
// Content-Type: application/json (no redirects allowed)
+
r.Get("/.well-known/apple-app-site-association", wellknown.HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation)
+
+
// Android App Links configuration
+
// Required for cryptographically-bound deep linking on Android
+
// Must be served at exact path /.well-known/assetlinks.json
+
// Content-Type: application/json (no redirects allowed)
+
r.Get("/.well-known/assetlinks.json", wellknown.HandleAssetLinks)
+
}
+1 -1
internal/api/handlers/comments/middleware.go
···
// The middleware extracts the viewer DID from the Authorization header if present and valid,
// making it available via middleware.GetUserDID(r) in the handler.
// If no valid token is present, the request continues as anonymous (empty DID).
-
func OptionalAuthMiddleware(authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware, next http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
+
func OptionalAuthMiddleware(authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware, next http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
return authMiddleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(next))
}
+164 -312
internal/api/middleware/auth.go
···
package middleware
import (
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
"context"
-
"fmt"
+
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
+
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
)
// Context keys for storing user information
···
const (
UserDIDKey contextKey = "user_did"
-
JWTClaimsKey contextKey = "jwt_claims"
-
UserAccessToken contextKey = "user_access_token"
-
DPoPProofKey contextKey = "dpop_proof"
+
OAuthSessionKey contextKey = "oauth_session"
+
UserAccessToken contextKey = "user_access_token" // Kept for backward compatibility
)
-
// AtProtoAuthMiddleware enforces atProto OAuth authentication for protected routes
-
// Validates JWT Bearer tokens from the Authorization header
-
// Supports DPoP (RFC 9449) for token binding verification
-
type AtProtoAuthMiddleware struct {
-
jwksFetcher auth.JWKSFetcher
-
dpopVerifier *auth.DPoPVerifier
-
skipVerify bool // For Phase 1 testing only
+
// SessionUnsealer is an interface for unsealing session tokens
+
// This allows for mocking in tests
+
type SessionUnsealer interface {
+
UnsealSession(token string) (*oauth.SealedSession, error)
}
-
// NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware creates a new atProto auth middleware
-
// skipVerify: if true, only parses JWT without signature verification (Phase 1)
-
//
-
// if false, performs full signature verification (Phase 2)
-
//
-
// IMPORTANT: Call Stop() when shutting down to clean up background goroutines.
-
func NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher auth.JWKSFetcher, skipVerify bool) *AtProtoAuthMiddleware {
-
return &AtProtoAuthMiddleware{
-
jwksFetcher: jwksFetcher,
-
dpopVerifier: auth.NewDPoPVerifier(),
-
skipVerify: skipVerify,
-
}
+
// OAuthAuthMiddleware enforces OAuth authentication using sealed session tokens.
+
type OAuthAuthMiddleware struct {
+
unsealer SessionUnsealer
+
store oauthlib.ClientAuthStore
}
-
// Stop stops background goroutines. Call this when shutting down the server.
-
// This prevents goroutine leaks from the DPoP verifier's replay protection cache.
-
func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) Stop() {
-
if m.dpopVerifier != nil {
-
m.dpopVerifier.Stop()
+
// NewOAuthAuthMiddleware creates a new OAuth auth middleware using sealed session tokens.
+
func NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(unsealer SessionUnsealer, store oauthlib.ClientAuthStore) *OAuthAuthMiddleware {
+
return &OAuthAuthMiddleware{
+
unsealer: unsealer,
+
store: store,
}
}
-
// RequireAuth middleware ensures the user is authenticated with a valid JWT
-
// If not authenticated, returns 401
-
// If authenticated, injects user DID and JWT claims into context
+
// RequireAuth middleware ensures the user is authenticated.
+
// Supports sealed session tokens via:
+
// - Authorization: Bearer <sealed_token>
+
// - Cookie: coves_session=<sealed_token>
//
-
// Only accepts DPoP authorization scheme per RFC 9449:
-
// - Authorization: DPoP <token> (DPoP-bound tokens)
-
func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+
// If not authenticated, returns 401.
+
// If authenticated, injects user DID into context.
+
func (m *OAuthAuthMiddleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
// Extract Authorization header
+
var token string
+
+
// Try Authorization header first (for mobile/API clients)
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
-
if authHeader == "" {
-
writeAuthError(w, "Missing Authorization header")
-
return
+
if authHeader != "" {
+
var ok bool
+
token, ok = extractBearerToken(authHeader)
+
if !ok {
+
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid Authorization header format. Expected: Bearer <token>")
+
return
+
}
+
}
+
+
// If no header, try session cookie (for web clients)
+
if token == "" {
+
if cookie, err := r.Cookie("coves_session"); err == nil {
+
token = cookie.Value
+
}
}
-
// Only accept DPoP scheme per RFC 9449
-
// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235
-
token, ok := extractDPoPToken(authHeader)
-
if !ok {
-
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid Authorization header format. Expected: DPoP <token>")
+
// Must have authentication from either source
+
if token == "" {
+
writeAuthError(w, "Missing authentication")
return
}
-
var claims *auth.Claims
-
var err error
+
// Authenticate using sealed token
+
sealedSession, err := m.unsealer.UnsealSession(token)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=unseal_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
+
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid or expired token")
+
return
+
}
-
if m.skipVerify {
-
// Phase 1: Parse only (no signature verification)
-
claims, err = auth.ParseJWT(token)
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=parse_error ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
-
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid token")
-
return
-
}
-
} else {
-
// Phase 2: Full verification with signature check
-
//
-
// SECURITY: The access token MUST be verified before trusting any claims.
-
// DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, not a replacement for signature verification.
-
claims, err = auth.VerifyJWT(r.Context(), token, m.jwksFetcher)
-
if err != nil {
-
// Token verification failed - REJECT
-
// DO NOT fall back to DPoP-only verification, as that would trust unverified claims
-
issuer := "unknown"
-
if parsedClaims, parseErr := auth.ParseJWT(token); parseErr == nil {
-
issuer = parsedClaims.Issuer
-
}
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=verification_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s issuer=%s error=%v",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, issuer, err)
-
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid or expired token")
-
return
-
}
+
// Parse DID
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID(sealedSession.DID)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=invalid_did ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s error=%v",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, err)
+
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid DID in token")
+
return
+
}
-
// Token signature verified - now check if DPoP binding is required
-
// If the token has a cnf.jkt claim, DPoP proof is REQUIRED
-
dpopHeader := r.Header.Get("DPoP")
-
hasCnfJkt := claims.Confirmation != nil && claims.Confirmation["jkt"] != nil
-
-
if hasCnfJkt {
-
// Token has DPoP binding - REQUIRE valid DPoP proof
-
if dpopHeader == "" {
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=missing_dpop ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path)
-
writeAuthError(w, "DPoP proof required")
-
return
-
}
-
-
proof, err := m.verifyDPoPBinding(r, claims, dpopHeader, token)
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=dpop_verification_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
-
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid DPoP proof")
-
return
-
}
-
-
// Store verified DPoP proof in context
-
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), DPoPProofKey, proof)
-
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
-
} else if dpopHeader != "" {
-
// DPoP header present but token doesn't have cnf.jkt - this is suspicious
-
// Log warning but don't reject (could be a misconfigured client)
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] type=unexpected_dpop ip=%s method=%s path=%s warning=DPoP header present but token has no cnf.jkt",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path)
-
}
+
// Load full OAuth session from database
+
session, err := m.store.GetSession(r.Context(), did, sealedSession.SessionID)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=session_not_found ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s session_id=%s error=%v",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, sealedSession.SessionID, err)
+
writeAuthError(w, "Session not found or expired")
+
return
}
-
// Extract user DID from 'sub' claim
-
userDID := claims.Subject
-
if userDID == "" {
-
writeAuthError(w, "Missing user DID in token")
+
// Verify session DID matches token DID
+
if session.AccountDID.String() != sealedSession.DID {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=did_mismatch ip=%s method=%s path=%s token_did=%s session_did=%s",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, session.AccountDID.String())
+
writeAuthError(w, "Session DID mismatch")
return
}
-
// Inject user info and access token into context
-
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, userDID)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_SUCCESS] ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s session_id=%s",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, sealedSession.SessionID)
+
+
// Inject user info and session into context
+
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, sealedSession.DID)
+
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, OAuthSessionKey, session)
+
// Store access token for backward compatibility
+
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, session.AccessToken)
// Call next handler
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
-
// OptionalAuth middleware loads user info if authenticated, but doesn't require it
-
// Useful for endpoints that work for both authenticated and anonymous users
+
// OptionalAuth middleware loads user info if authenticated, but doesn't require it.
+
// Useful for endpoints that work for both authenticated and anonymous users.
+
//
+
// Supports sealed session tokens via:
+
// - Authorization: Bearer <sealed_token>
+
// - Cookie: coves_session=<sealed_token>
//
-
// Only accepts DPoP authorization scheme per RFC 9449:
-
// - Authorization: DPoP <token> (DPoP-bound tokens)
-
func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) OptionalAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+
// If authentication fails, continues without user context (does not return error).
+
func (m *OAuthAuthMiddleware) OptionalAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
// Extract Authorization header
+
var token string
+
+
// Try Authorization header first (for mobile/API clients)
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+
if authHeader != "" {
+
var ok bool
+
token, ok = extractBearerToken(authHeader)
+
if !ok {
+
// Invalid format - continue without user context
+
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
return
+
}
+
}
+
+
// If no header, try session cookie (for web clients)
+
if token == "" {
+
if cookie, err := r.Cookie("coves_session"); err == nil {
+
token = cookie.Value
+
}
+
}
-
// Only accept DPoP scheme per RFC 9449
-
// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235
-
token, ok := extractDPoPToken(authHeader)
-
if !ok {
-
// Not authenticated or invalid format - continue without user context
+
// If still no token, continue without authentication
+
if token == "" {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
-
var claims *auth.Claims
-
var err error
+
// Try to authenticate (don't write errors, just continue without user context on failure)
+
sealedSession, err := m.unsealer.UnsealSession(token)
+
if err != nil {
+
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
return
+
}
-
if m.skipVerify {
-
// Phase 1: Parse only
-
claims, err = auth.ParseJWT(token)
-
} else {
-
// Phase 2: Full verification
-
// SECURITY: Token MUST be verified before trusting claims
-
claims, err = auth.VerifyJWT(r.Context(), token, m.jwksFetcher)
+
// Parse DID
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID(sealedSession.DID)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: invalid DID: %v", err)
+
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
return
}
+
// Load full OAuth session from database
+
session, err := m.store.GetSession(r.Context(), did, sealedSession.SessionID)
if err != nil {
-
// Invalid token - continue without user context
-
log.Printf("Optional auth failed: %v", err)
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: session not found: %v", err)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
-
// Check DPoP binding if token has cnf.jkt (after successful verification)
-
// SECURITY: If token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header, we cannot trust it
-
// (could be a stolen token). Continue as unauthenticated.
-
if !m.skipVerify {
-
dpopHeader := r.Header.Get("DPoP")
-
hasCnfJkt := claims.Confirmation != nil && claims.Confirmation["jkt"] != nil
-
-
if hasCnfJkt {
-
if dpopHeader == "" {
-
// Token requires DPoP binding but no proof provided
-
// Cannot trust this token - continue without auth
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header - treating as unauthenticated (potential token theft)")
-
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-
return
-
}
-
-
proof, err := m.verifyDPoPBinding(r, claims, dpopHeader, token)
-
if err != nil {
-
// DPoP verification failed - cannot trust this token
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: DPoP verification failed - treating as unauthenticated: %v", err)
-
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-
return
-
}
-
-
// DPoP verified - inject proof into context
-
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, claims.Subject)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, DPoPProofKey, proof)
-
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
-
return
-
}
+
// Verify session DID matches token DID
+
if session.AccountDID.String() != sealedSession.DID {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: DID mismatch")
+
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
return
}
-
// No DPoP binding required - inject user info and access token into context
-
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, claims.Subject)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)
+
// Build authenticated context
+
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, sealedSession.DID)
+
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, OAuthSessionKey, session)
+
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, session.AccessToken)
-
// Call next handler
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
···
return did
}
-
// GetJWTClaims extracts the JWT claims from the request context
+
// GetOAuthSession extracts the OAuth session from the request context
// Returns nil if not authenticated
-
func GetJWTClaims(r *http.Request) *auth.Claims {
-
claims, _ := r.Context().Value(JWTClaimsKey).(*auth.Claims)
-
return claims
-
}
-
-
// SetTestUserDID sets the user DID in the context for testing purposes
-
// This function should ONLY be used in tests to mock authenticated users
-
func SetTestUserDID(ctx context.Context, userDID string) context.Context {
-
return context.WithValue(ctx, UserDIDKey, userDID)
+
// Handlers can use this to make authenticated PDS calls
+
func GetOAuthSession(r *http.Request) *oauthlib.ClientSessionData {
+
session, _ := r.Context().Value(OAuthSessionKey).(*oauthlib.ClientSessionData)
+
return session
}
// GetUserAccessToken extracts the user's access token from the request context
···
return token
}
-
// GetDPoPProof extracts the DPoP proof from the request context
-
// Returns nil if no DPoP proof was verified
-
func GetDPoPProof(r *http.Request) *auth.DPoPProof {
-
proof, _ := r.Context().Value(DPoPProofKey).(*auth.DPoPProof)
-
return proof
-
}
-
-
// verifyDPoPBinding verifies DPoP proof binding for an ALREADY VERIFIED token.
-
//
-
// SECURITY: This function ONLY verifies the DPoP proof and its binding to the token.
-
// The access token MUST be signature-verified BEFORE calling this function.
-
// DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, not a replacement for signature verification.
-
//
-
// This prevents token theft attacks by proving the client possesses the private key
-
// corresponding to the public key thumbprint in the token's cnf.jkt claim.
-
func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) verifyDPoPBinding(r *http.Request, claims *auth.Claims, dpopProofHeader, accessToken string) (*auth.DPoPProof, error) {
-
// Extract the cnf.jkt claim from the already-verified token
-
jkt, err := auth.ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token requires DPoP but missing cnf.jkt: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Build the HTTP URI for DPoP verification
-
// Use the full URL including scheme and host, respecting proxy headers
-
scheme, host := extractSchemeAndHost(r)
-
-
// Use EscapedPath to preserve percent-encoding (P3 fix)
-
// r.URL.Path is decoded, but DPoP proofs contain the raw encoded path
-
path := r.URL.EscapedPath()
-
if path == "" {
-
path = r.URL.Path // Fallback if EscapedPath returns empty
-
}
-
-
httpURI := scheme + "://" + host + path
-
-
// Verify the DPoP proof
-
proof, err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyDPoPProof(dpopProofHeader, r.Method, httpURI)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify the binding between the proof and the token (cnf.jkt)
-
if err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyTokenBinding(proof, jkt); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP binding verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify the access token hash (ath) if present in the proof
-
// Per RFC 9449 section 4.2, if ath is present, it MUST match the access token
-
if err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyAccessTokenHash(proof, accessToken); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP ath verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
return proof, nil
-
}
-
-
// extractSchemeAndHost extracts the scheme and host from the request,
-
// respecting proxy headers (X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Host, Forwarded).
-
// This is critical for DPoP verification when behind TLS-terminating proxies.
-
func extractSchemeAndHost(r *http.Request) (scheme, host string) {
-
// Start with request defaults
-
scheme = r.URL.Scheme
-
host = r.Host
-
-
// Check X-Forwarded-Proto for scheme (most common)
-
if forwardedProto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); forwardedProto != "" {
-
parts := strings.Split(forwardedProto, ",")
-
if len(parts) > 0 && strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) != "" {
-
scheme = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]))
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Check X-Forwarded-Host for host (common with nginx/traefik)
-
if forwardedHost := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"); forwardedHost != "" {
-
parts := strings.Split(forwardedHost, ",")
-
if len(parts) > 0 && strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) != "" {
-
host = strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Check standard Forwarded header (RFC 7239) - takes precedence if present
-
// Format: Forwarded: for=192.0.2.60;proto=http;by=203.0.113.43;host=example.com
-
// RFC 7239 allows: mixed-case keys (Proto, PROTO), quoted values (host="example.com")
-
if forwarded := r.Header.Get("Forwarded"); forwarded != "" {
-
// Parse the first entry (comma-separated list)
-
firstEntry := strings.Split(forwarded, ",")[0]
-
for _, part := range strings.Split(firstEntry, ";") {
-
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
-
// Split on first '=' to properly handle key=value pairs
-
if idx := strings.Index(part, "="); idx != -1 {
-
key := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(part[:idx]))
-
value := strings.TrimSpace(part[idx+1:])
-
// Strip optional quotes per RFC 7239 section 4
-
value = strings.Trim(value, "\"")
-
-
switch key {
-
case "proto":
-
scheme = strings.ToLower(value)
-
case "host":
-
host = value
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Fallback scheme detection from TLS
-
if scheme == "" {
-
if r.TLS != nil {
-
scheme = "https"
-
} else {
-
scheme = "http"
-
}
-
}
-
-
return strings.ToLower(scheme), host
-
}
-
-
// writeAuthError writes a JSON error response for authentication failures
-
func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {
-
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
-
// Simple error response matching XRPC error format
-
response := `{"error":"AuthenticationRequired","message":"` + message + `"}`
-
if _, err := w.Write([]byte(response)); err != nil {
-
log.Printf("Failed to write auth error response: %v", err)
-
}
+
// SetTestUserDID sets the user DID in the context for testing purposes
+
// This function should ONLY be used in tests to mock authenticated users
+
func SetTestUserDID(ctx context.Context, userDID string) context.Context {
+
return context.WithValue(ctx, UserDIDKey, userDID)
}
-
// extractDPoPToken extracts the token from a DPoP Authorization header.
-
// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235, so "DPoP", "dpop", "DPOP" are all valid.
-
// Returns the token and true if valid DPoP scheme, empty string and false otherwise.
-
func extractDPoPToken(authHeader string) (string, bool) {
+
// extractBearerToken extracts the token from a Bearer Authorization header.
+
// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235, so "Bearer", "bearer", "BEARER" are all valid.
+
// Returns the token and true if valid Bearer scheme, empty string and false otherwise.
+
func extractBearerToken(authHeader string) (string, bool) {
if authHeader == "" {
return "", false
}
-
// Split on first space: "DPoP <token>" -> ["DPoP", "<token>"]
+
// Split on first space: "Bearer <token>" -> ["Bearer", "<token>"]
parts := strings.SplitN(authHeader, " ", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
return "", false
}
// Case-insensitive scheme comparison per RFC 7235
-
if !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "DPoP") {
+
if !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") {
return "", false
}
···
return token, true
}
+
+
// writeAuthError writes a JSON error response for authentication failures
+
func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+
// Use json.NewEncoder to properly escape the message and prevent injection
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
+
"error": "AuthenticationRequired",
+
"message": message,
+
}); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to write auth error response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+511 -728
internal/api/middleware/auth_test.go
···
package middleware
import (
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
"context"
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"crypto/rand"
-
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
+
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
···
"testing"
"time"
-
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
-
"github.com/google/uuid"
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
)
-
// mockJWKSFetcher is a test double for JWKSFetcher
-
type mockJWKSFetcher struct {
-
shouldFail bool
+
// mockOAuthClient is a test double for OAuthClient
+
type mockOAuthClient struct {
+
sealSecret []byte
+
shouldFailSeal bool
}
-
func (m *mockJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
if m.shouldFail {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mock fetch failure")
+
func newMockOAuthClient() *mockOAuthClient {
+
// Create a 32-byte seal secret for testing
+
secret := []byte("test-secret-key-32-bytes-long!!")
+
return &mockOAuthClient{
+
sealSecret: secret,
}
-
// Return nil - we won't actually verify signatures in Phase 1 tests
-
return nil, nil
}
-
// createTestToken creates a test JWT with the given DID
-
func createTestToken(did string) string {
-
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
-
"sub": did,
-
"iss": "https://test.pds.local",
-
"scope": "atproto",
-
"exp": time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
-
"iat": time.Now().Unix(),
+
func (m *mockOAuthClient) UnsealSession(token string) (*oauth.SealedSession, error) {
+
if m.shouldFailSeal {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mock unseal failure")
}
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
return tokenString
+
// For testing, we'll decode a simple format: base64(did|sessionID|expiresAt)
+
// In production this would be AES-GCM encrypted
+
// Using pipe separator to avoid conflicts with colon in DIDs
+
decoded, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token encoding: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
parts := strings.Split(string(decoded), "|")
+
if len(parts) != 3 {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token format")
+
}
+
+
var expiresAt int64
+
_, _ = fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "%d", &expiresAt)
+
+
// Check expiration
+
if expiresAt <= time.Now().Unix() {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token expired")
+
}
+
+
return &oauth.SealedSession{
+
DID: parts[0],
+
SessionID: parts[1],
+
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
+
}, nil
+
}
+
+
// Helper to create a test sealed token
+
func (m *mockOAuthClient) createTestToken(did, sessionID string, ttl time.Duration) string {
+
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()
+
payload := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%d", did, sessionID, expiresAt)
+
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(payload))
+
}
+
+
// mockOAuthStore is a test double for ClientAuthStore
+
type mockOAuthStore struct {
+
sessions map[string]*oauthlib.ClientSessionData
+
}
+
+
func newMockOAuthStore() *mockOAuthStore {
+
return &mockOAuthStore{
+
sessions: make(map[string]*oauthlib.ClientSessionData),
+
}
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) GetSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) (*oauthlib.ClientSessionData, error) {
+
key := did.String() + ":" + sessionID
+
session, ok := m.sessions[key]
+
if !ok {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("session not found")
+
}
+
return session, nil
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_ValidToken tests that valid tokens are accepted with DPoP scheme (Phase 1)
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) SaveSession(ctx context.Context, session oauthlib.ClientSessionData) error {
+
key := session.AccountDID.String() + ":" + session.SessionID
+
m.sessions[key] = &session
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) DeleteSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) error {
+
key := did.String() + ":" + sessionID
+
delete(m.sessions, key)
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) (*oauthlib.AuthRequestData, error) {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, info oauthlib.AuthRequestData) error {
+
return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) error {
+
return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
+
}
+
+
// TestRequireAuth_ValidToken tests that valid sealed tokens are accepted
func TestRequireAuth_ValidToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true) // skipVerify=true
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
handlerCalled = true
// Verify DID was extracted and injected into context
-
did := GetUserDID(r)
-
if did != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", did)
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {
+
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)
}
-
// Verify claims were injected
-
claims := GetJWTClaims(r)
-
if claims == nil {
-
t.Error("expected claims to be non-nil")
+
// Verify OAuth session was injected
+
oauthSession := GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if oauthSession == nil {
+
t.Error("expected OAuth session to be non-nil")
return
}
-
if claims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("expected claims.Subject 'did:plc:test123', got %s", claims.Subject)
+
if oauthSession.SessionID != sessionID {
+
t.Errorf("expected session ID '%s', got %s", sessionID, oauthSession.SessionID)
+
}
+
+
// Verify access token is available
+
accessToken := GetUserAccessToken(r)
+
if accessToken != "test_access_token" {
+
t.Errorf("expected access token 'test_access_token', got %s", accessToken)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
-
token := createTestToken("did:plc:test123")
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+token)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
// TestRequireAuth_MissingAuthHeader tests that missing Authorization header is rejected
func TestRequireAuth_MissingAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat tests that non-DPoP tokens are rejected (including Bearer)
+
// TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat tests that non-Bearer tokens are rejected
func TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
tests := []struct {
name string
header string
}{
{"Basic auth", "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"},
-
{"Bearer scheme", "Bearer some-token"},
+
{"DPoP scheme", "DPoP some-token"},
{"Invalid format", "InvalidFormat"},
}
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_BearerRejectionErrorMessage verifies that Bearer tokens are rejected
-
// with a helpful error message guiding users to use DPoP scheme
-
func TestRequireAuth_BearerRejectionErrorMessage(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
-
-
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
t.Error("handler should not be called")
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer some-token")
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
-
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme verifies that Bearer scheme matching is case-insensitive
+
func TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
-
// Verify error message guides user to use DPoP
-
body := w.Body.String()
-
if !strings.Contains(body, "Expected: DPoP") {
-
t.Errorf("error message should guide user to use DPoP, got: %s", body)
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
}
-
}
-
-
// TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme verifies that DPoP scheme matching is case-insensitive
-
// per RFC 7235 which states HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive
-
func TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
-
// Create a valid JWT for testing
-
validToken := createValidJWT(t, "did:plc:test123", time.Hour)
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
testCases := []struct {
name string
scheme string
}{
-
{"lowercase", "dpop"},
-
{"uppercase", "DPOP"},
-
{"mixed_case", "DpOp"},
-
{"standard", "DPoP"},
+
{"lowercase", "bearer"},
+
{"uppercase", "BEARER"},
+
{"mixed_case", "BeArEr"},
+
{"standard", "Bearer"},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
···
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.scheme+" "+validToken)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.scheme+" "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_MalformedToken tests that malformed JWTs are rejected
-
func TestRequireAuth_MalformedToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
// TestRequireAuth_InvalidToken tests that malformed sealed tokens are rejected
+
func TestRequireAuth_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP not-a-valid-jwt")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-valid-sealed-token")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken tests that expired tokens are rejected
+
// TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken tests that expired sealed tokens are rejected
func TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
+
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called for expired token")
}))
-
// Create expired token
-
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
-
"sub": "did:plc:test123",
-
"iss": "https://test.pds.local",
-
"scope": "atproto",
-
"exp": time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour).Unix(), // Expired 1 hour ago
-
"iat": time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour).Unix(),
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
+
// Create expired token (expired 1 hour ago)
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, -time.Hour)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_MissingDID tests that tokens without DID are rejected
-
func TestRequireAuth_MissingDID(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
// TestRequireAuth_SessionNotFound tests that tokens with non-existent sessions are rejected
+
func TestRequireAuth_SessionNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
}))
-
// Create token without sub claim
-
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
-
// "sub" missing
-
"iss": "https://test.pds.local",
-
"scope": "atproto",
-
"exp": time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
-
"iat": time.Now().Unix(),
+
// Create token for session that doesn't exist in store
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:nonexistent", "session999", time.Hour)
+
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestRequireAuth_DIDMismatch tests that session DID must match token DID
+
func TestRequireAuth_DIDMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
+
// Create a session with different DID than token
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:different")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
}
+
// Store with key that matches token DID
+
key := "did:plc:test123:" + sessionID
+
store.sessions[key] = session
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
t.Error("handler should not be called when DID mismatches")
+
}))
+
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestOptionalAuth_WithToken tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid DPoP tokens
+
// TestOptionalAuth_WithToken tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid Bearer tokens
func TestOptionalAuth_WithToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
+
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
handlerCalled = true
// Verify DID was extracted
-
did := GetUserDID(r)
-
if did != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", did)
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {
+
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
-
token := createTestToken("did:plc:test123")
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+token)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
// TestOptionalAuth_WithoutToken tests that OptionalAuth allows requests without tokens
func TestOptionalAuth_WithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
···
// TestOptionalAuth_InvalidToken tests that OptionalAuth continues without auth on invalid token
func TestOptionalAuth_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
···
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP not-a-valid-jwt")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-valid-sealed-token")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestGetJWTClaims_NotAuthenticated tests that GetJWTClaims returns nil when not authenticated
-
func TestGetJWTClaims_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
+
// TestGetOAuthSession_NotAuthenticated tests that GetOAuthSession returns nil when not authenticated
+
func TestGetOAuthSession_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
claims := GetJWTClaims(req)
+
session := GetOAuthSession(req)
-
if claims != nil {
-
t.Errorf("expected nil claims, got %+v", claims)
+
if session != nil {
+
t.Errorf("expected nil session, got %+v", session)
}
}
-
// TestGetDPoPProof_NotAuthenticated tests that GetDPoPProof returns nil when no DPoP was verified
-
func TestGetDPoPProof_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
+
// TestGetUserAccessToken_NotAuthenticated tests that GetUserAccessToken returns empty when not authenticated
+
func TestGetUserAccessToken_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
proof := GetDPoPProof(req)
+
token := GetUserAccessToken(req)
-
if proof != nil {
-
t.Errorf("expected nil proof, got %+v", proof)
+
if token != "" {
+
t.Errorf("expected empty token, got %s", token)
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_WithDPoP_SecurityModel tests the correct DPoP security model:
-
// Token MUST be verified first, then DPoP is checked as an additional layer.
-
// DPoP is NOT a fallback for failed token verification.
-
func TestRequireAuth_WithDPoP_SecurityModel(t *testing.T) {
-
// Generate an ECDSA key pair for DPoP
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
+
// TestSetTestUserDID tests the testing helper function
+
func TestSetTestUserDID(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
ctx = SetTestUserDID(ctx, "did:plc:testuser")
-
// Calculate JWK thumbprint for cnf.jkt
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
+
did, ok := ctx.Value(UserDIDKey).(string)
+
if !ok {
+
t.Error("DID not found in context")
}
+
if did != "did:plc:testuser" {
+
t.Errorf("expected 'did:plc:testuser', got %s", did)
+
}
+
}
-
t.Run("DPoP_is_NOT_fallback_for_failed_verification", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// SECURITY TEST: When token verification fails, DPoP should NOT be used as fallback
-
// This prevents an attacker from forging a token with their own cnf.jkt
-
-
// Create a DPoP-bound access token (unsigned - will fail verification)
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:attacker",
-
Issuer: "https://external.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
+
// TestExtractBearerToken tests the Bearer token extraction logic
+
func TestExtractBearerToken(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
authHeader string
+
expectToken string
+
expectOK bool
+
}{
+
{"valid bearer", "Bearer token123", "token123", true},
+
{"lowercase bearer", "bearer token123", "token123", true},
+
{"uppercase bearer", "BEARER token123", "token123", true},
+
{"mixed case", "BeArEr token123", "token123", true},
+
{"empty header", "", "", false},
+
{"wrong scheme", "DPoP token123", "", false},
+
{"no token", "Bearer", "", false},
+
{"no space", "Bearertoken123", "", false},
+
{"extra spaces", "Bearer token123 ", "token123", true},
+
}
-
// Create valid DPoP proof (attacker has the private key)
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint")
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
token, ok := extractBearerToken(tt.authHeader)
+
if ok != tt.expectOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected ok=%v, got %v", tt.expectOK, ok)
+
}
+
if token != tt.expectToken {
+
t.Errorf("expected token '%s', got '%s'", tt.expectToken, token)
+
}
+
})
+
}
+
}
-
// Mock fetcher that fails (simulating external PDS without JWKS)
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false) // skipVerify=false
+
// TestRequireAuth_ValidCookie tests that valid session cookies are accepted
+
func TestRequireAuth_ValidCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
-
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: handler was called despite token verification failure")
-
}))
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
req.Header.Set("DPoP", dpopProof)
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
handlerCalled := false
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
-
// MUST reject - token verification failed, DPoP cannot substitute for signature verification
-
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-
t.Errorf("SECURITY: expected 401 for unverified token, got %d", w.Code)
+
// Verify DID was extracted and injected into context
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {
+
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)
}
-
})
-
t.Run("DPoP_required_when_cnf_jkt_present_in_verified_token", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// When token has cnf.jkt, DPoP header MUST be present
-
// This test uses skipVerify=true to simulate a verified token
-
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
+
// Verify OAuth session was injected
+
oauthSession := GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if oauthSession == nil {
+
t.Error("expected OAuth session to be non-nil")
+
return
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
-
// NO DPoP header - should fail when skipVerify is false
-
// Note: with skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true) // skipVerify=true for parsing
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
// No DPoP header
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
// With skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked, so this should succeed
-
if !handlerCalled {
-
t.Error("handler should be called when skipVerify=true")
+
if oauthSession.SessionID != sessionID {
+
t.Errorf("expected session ID '%s', got %s", sessionID, oauthSession.SessionID)
}
-
})
-
}
-
-
// TestRequireAuth_TokenVerificationFails_DPoPNotUsedAsFallback is the key security test.
-
// It ensures that DPoP cannot be used as a fallback when token signature verification fails.
-
func TestRequireAuth_TokenVerificationFails_DPoPNotUsedAsFallback(t *testing.T) {
-
// Generate a key pair (attacker's key)
-
attackerKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&attackerKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, _ := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
-
// Create a FORGED token claiming to be the victim
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:victim_user", // Attacker claims to be victim
-
Issuer: "https://untrusted.pds",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint, // Attacker uses their own key
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
-
// Attacker creates a valid DPoP proof with their key
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, attackerKey, "POST", "https://api.example.com/protected")
-
// Fetcher fails (external PDS without JWKS)
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false) // skipVerify=false - REAL verification
-
-
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
t.Fatalf("CRITICAL SECURITY FAILURE: Request authenticated as %s despite forged token!",
-
GetUserDID(r))
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://api.example.com/protected", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
req.Header.Set("DPoP", dpopProof)
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: token,
+
})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
// MUST reject - the token signature was never verified
-
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-
t.Errorf("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: Expected 401, got %d. Token was not properly verified!", w.Code)
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("handler was not called")
}
-
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedProto ensures we honor the external HTTPS
-
// scheme when TLS is terminated upstream and X-Forwarded-Proto is present.
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedProto(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
+
}
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_HeaderPrecedenceOverCookie tests that Authorization header takes precedence over cookie
+
func TestRequireAuth_HeaderPrecedenceOverCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
+
// Create two test sessions
+
did1 := syntax.DID("did:plc:header")
+
sessionID1 := "session_header"
+
session1 := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did1,
+
SessionID: sessionID1,
+
AccessToken: "header_token",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session1)
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "api.example.com"
-
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
-
-
// Pass a fake access token - ath verification will pass since we don't include ath in the DPoP proof
-
fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with forwarded proto, got %v", err)
+
did2 := syntax.DID("did:plc:cookie")
+
sessionID2 := "session_cookie"
+
session2 := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did2,
+
SessionID: sessionID2,
+
AccessToken: "cookie_token",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session2)
-
if proof == nil || proof.Claims == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")
-
}
-
}
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedHost ensures we honor X-Forwarded-Host header
-
// when behind a TLS-terminating proxy that rewrites the Host header.
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedHost(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
+
handlerCalled := false
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
+
// Should get header DID, not cookie DID
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:header" {
+
t.Errorf("expected header DID 'did:plc:header', got %s", extractedDID)
+
}
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
+
headerToken := client.createTestToken("did:plc:header", sessionID1, time.Hour)
+
cookieToken := client.createTestToken("did:plc:cookie", sessionID2, time.Hour)
-
// External URI that the client uses
-
externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+headerToken)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: cookieToken,
+
})
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
// Request hits internal service with internal hostname, but X-Forwarded-Host has public hostname
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service:8080/protected/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "internal-service:8080" // Internal host after proxy
-
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
-
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "api.example.com") // Original public host
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with X-Forwarded-Host, got %v", err)
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("handler was not called")
}
-
if proof == nil || proof.Claims == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesStandardForwardedHeader tests RFC 7239 Forwarded header parsing
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesStandardForwardedHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_MissingBothHeaderAndCookie tests that missing both auth methods is rejected
+
func TestRequireAuth_MissingBothHeaderAndCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
// External URI
-
externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
t.Error("handler should not be called")
+
}))
-
// Request with standard Forwarded header (RFC 7239)
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "internal-service"
-
req.Header.Set("Forwarded", "for=192.0.2.60;proto=https;host=api.example.com")
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
// No Authorization header and no cookie
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with Forwarded header, got %v", err)
-
}
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
if proof == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_ForwardedMixedCaseAndQuotes tests RFC 7239 edge cases:
-
// mixed-case keys (Proto vs proto) and quoted values (host="example.com")
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_ForwardedMixedCaseAndQuotes(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_InvalidCookie tests that malformed cookie tokens are rejected
+
func TestRequireAuth_InvalidCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
// External URI that the client uses
-
externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
t.Error("handler should not be called")
+
}))
-
// Request with RFC 7239 Forwarded header using:
-
// - Mixed-case keys: "Proto" instead of "proto", "Host" instead of "host"
-
// - Quoted value: Host="api.example.com" (legal per RFC 7239 section 4)
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "internal-service"
-
req.Header.Set("Forwarded", `for=192.0.2.60;Proto=https;Host="api.example.com"`)
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: "not-a-valid-sealed-token",
+
})
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with mixed-case/quoted Forwarded header, got %v", err)
-
}
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
if proof == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_AthValidation tests access token hash (ath) claim validation
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_AthValidation(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
+
// TestOptionalAuth_WithCookie tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid session cookies
+
func TestOptionalAuth_WithCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
accessToken := "real-access-token-12345"
-
-
t.Run("ath_matches_access_token", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create DPoP proof with ath claim matching the access token
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProofWithAth(t, privateKey, "GET", "https://api.example.com/resource", accessToken)
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://api.example.com/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "api.example.com"
+
handlerCalled := false
+
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, accessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected verification to succeed with matching ath, got %v", err)
-
}
-
if proof == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected proof to be returned")
+
// Verify DID was extracted
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {
+
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)
}
-
})
-
t.Run("ath_mismatch_rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create DPoP proof with ath for a DIFFERENT token
-
differentToken := "different-token-67890"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProofWithAth(t, privateKey, "POST", "https://api.example.com/resource", differentToken)
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://api.example.com/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "api.example.com"
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
-
// Try to use with the original access token - should fail
-
_, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, accessToken)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Fatal("SECURITY: expected verification to fail when ath doesn't match access token")
-
}
-
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ath") {
-
t.Errorf("error should mention ath mismatch, got: %v", err)
-
}
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: token,
})
-
}
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
// TestMiddlewareStop tests that the middleware can be stopped properly
-
func TestMiddlewareStop(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false)
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
// Stop should not panic and should clean up resources
-
middleware.Stop()
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("handler was not called")
+
}
-
// Calling Stop again should also be safe (idempotent-ish)
-
// Note: The underlying DPoPVerifier.Stop() closes a channel, so this might panic
-
// if not handled properly. We test that at least one Stop works.
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
+
}
}
-
// TestOptionalAuth_DPoPBoundToken_NoDPoPHeader tests that OptionalAuth treats
-
// tokens with cnf.jkt but no DPoP header as unauthenticated (potential token theft)
-
func TestOptionalAuth_DPoPBoundToken_NoDPoPHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
// Generate a key pair for DPoP binding
-
privateKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, _ := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
-
// Create a DPoP-bound token (has cnf.jkt)
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:user123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
+
// TestOptionalAuth_InvalidCookie tests that OptionalAuth continues without auth on invalid cookie
+
func TestOptionalAuth_InvalidCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
-
// Use skipVerify=true to simulate a verified token
-
// (In production, skipVerify would be false and VerifyJWT would be called)
-
// However, for this test we need skipVerify=false to trigger DPoP checking
-
// But the fetcher will fail, so let's use skipVerify=true and verify the logic
-
// Actually, the DPoP check only happens when skipVerify=false
-
-
t.Run("with_skipVerify_false", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// This will fail at JWT verification level, but that's expected
-
// The important thing is the code path for DPoP checking
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
var capturedDID string
-
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
capturedDID = GetUserDID(r)
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
// Deliberately NOT setting DPoP header
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
// Handler should be called (optional auth doesn't block)
-
if !handlerCalled {
-
t.Error("handler should be called")
-
}
+
handlerCalled := false
+
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
-
// But since JWT verification fails, user should not be authenticated
-
if capturedDID != "" {
-
t.Errorf("expected empty DID when verification fails, got %s", capturedDID)
+
// Verify no DID is set (invalid cookie ignored)
+
did := GetUserDID(r)
+
if did != "" {
+
t.Errorf("expected empty DID for invalid cookie, got %s", did)
}
-
})
-
t.Run("with_skipVerify_true_dpop_not_checked", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// When skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked (Phase 1 mode)
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
var capturedDID string
-
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
capturedDID = GetUserDID(r)
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
// No DPoP header
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
if !handlerCalled {
-
t.Error("handler should be called")
-
}
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
-
// With skipVerify=true, DPoP check is bypassed - token is trusted
-
if capturedDID != "did:plc:user123" {
-
t.Errorf("expected DID when skipVerify=true, got %s", capturedDID)
-
}
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: "not-a-valid-sealed-token",
})
-
}
-
-
// TestDPoPReplayProtection tests that the same DPoP proof cannot be used twice
-
func TestDPoPReplayProtection(t *testing.T) {
-
// This tests the NonceCache functionality
-
cache := auth.NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute)
-
defer cache.Stop()
-
-
jti := "unique-proof-id-123"
-
-
// First use should succeed
-
if !cache.CheckAndStore(jti) {
-
t.Error("First use of jti should succeed")
-
}
-
-
// Second use should fail (replay detected)
-
if cache.CheckAndStore(jti) {
-
t.Error("SECURITY: Replay attack not detected - same jti accepted twice")
-
}
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
// Different jti should succeed
-
if !cache.CheckAndStore("different-jti-456") {
-
t.Error("Different jti should succeed")
-
}
-
}
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
// Helper: createDPoPProof creates a DPoP proof JWT for testing
-
func createDPoPProof(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, method, uri string) string {
-
// Create JWK from public key
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
-
// Create DPoP claims with UUID for jti to ensure uniqueness across tests
-
claims := auth.DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
ID: uuid.New().String(),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("handler was not called")
}
-
// Create token with custom header
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = jwk
-
-
// Sign with private key
-
signedToken, err := token.SignedString(privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to sign DPoP proof: %v", err)
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
-
-
return signedToken
}
-
// Helper: createDPoPProofWithAth creates a DPoP proof JWT with ath (access token hash) claim
-
func createDPoPProofWithAth(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, method, uri, accessToken string) string {
-
// Create JWK from public key
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
-
// Calculate ath: base64url(SHA-256(access_token))
-
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(accessToken))
-
ath := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:])
-
-
// Create DPoP claims with ath
-
claims := auth.DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
ID: uuid.New().String(),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
AccessTokenHash: ath,
-
}
-
-
// Create token with custom header
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = jwk
-
-
// Sign with private key
-
signedToken, err := token.SignedString(privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to sign DPoP proof: %v", err)
+
// TestWriteAuthError_JSONEscaping tests that writeAuthError properly escapes messages
+
func TestWriteAuthError_JSONEscaping(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
message string
+
}{
+
{"simple message", "Missing authentication"},
+
{"message with quotes", `Invalid "token" format`},
+
{"message with newlines", "Invalid\ntoken\nformat"},
+
{"message with backslashes", `Invalid \ token`},
+
{"message with special chars", `Invalid <script>alert("xss")</script> token`},
+
{"message with unicode", "Invalid token: \u2028\u2029"},
}
-
return signedToken
-
}
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
writeAuthError(w, tt.message)
-
// Helper: ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK converts an ECDSA public key to JWK map
-
func ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(pubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) map[string]interface{} {
-
// Get curve name
-
var crv string
-
switch pubKey.Curve {
-
case elliptic.P256():
-
crv = "P-256"
-
case elliptic.P384():
-
crv = "P-384"
-
case elliptic.P521():
-
crv = "P-521"
-
default:
-
panic("unsupported curve")
-
}
+
// Verify status code
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
+
}
-
// Encode coordinates
-
xBytes := pubKey.X.Bytes()
-
yBytes := pubKey.Y.Bytes()
-
-
// Ensure proper byte length (pad if needed)
-
keySize := (pubKey.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
-
xPadded := make([]byte, keySize)
-
yPadded := make([]byte, keySize)
-
copy(xPadded[keySize-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
-
copy(yPadded[keySize-len(yBytes):], yBytes)
-
-
return map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": crv,
-
"x": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(xPadded),
-
"y": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(yPadded),
-
}
-
}
+
// Verify content type
+
if ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
+
t.Errorf("expected Content-Type 'application/json', got %s", ct)
+
}
-
// Helper: createValidJWT creates a valid unsigned JWT token for testing
-
// This is used with skipVerify=true middleware where signature verification is skipped
-
func createValidJWT(t *testing.T, subject string, expiry time.Duration) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: subject,
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(expiry)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
}
+
// Verify response is valid JSON
+
var response map[string]string
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &response); err != nil {
+
t.Fatalf("response is not valid JSON: %v\nBody: %s", err, w.Body.String())
+
}
-
// Create unsigned token (for skipVerify=true tests)
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
signedToken, err := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to create test JWT: %v", err)
+
// Verify fields
+
if response["error"] != "AuthenticationRequired" {
+
t.Errorf("expected error 'AuthenticationRequired', got %s", response["error"])
+
}
+
if response["message"] != tt.message {
+
t.Errorf("expected message %q, got %q", tt.message, response["message"])
+
}
+
})
}
-
-
return signedToken
}
+1 -1
internal/api/routes/post.go
···
// RegisterPostRoutes registers post-related XRPC endpoints on the router
// Implements social.coves.community.post.* lexicon endpoints
-
func RegisterPostRoutes(r chi.Router, service posts.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware) {
+
func RegisterPostRoutes(r chi.Router, service posts.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware) {
// Initialize handlers
createHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(service)
+1 -1
internal/api/routes/timeline.go
···
func RegisterTimelineRoutes(
r chi.Router,
timelineService timelineCore.Service,
-
authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware,
+
authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware,
) {
// Create handlers
getTimelineHandler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)
+291
tests/e2e/oauth_ratelimit_e2e_test.go
···
+
package e2e
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
)
+
+
// TestRateLimiting_E2E_OAuthEndpoints tests OAuth-specific rate limiting
+
// OAuth endpoints have stricter rate limits to prevent:
+
// - Credential stuffing attacks on login endpoints (10 req/min)
+
// - OAuth state exhaustion
+
// - Refresh token abuse (20 req/min)
+
func TestRateLimiting_E2E_OAuthEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
+
t.Run("Login endpoints have 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create rate limiter matching oauth.go config: 10 requests per minute
+
loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
// Mock OAuth login handler
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("OK"))
+
})
+
+
handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.200:12345"
+
+
// Make exactly 10 requests (at limit)
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Request %d should succeed", i+1)
+
}
+
+
// 11th request should be rate limited
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Request 11 should be rate limited")
+
assert.Contains(t, rr.Body.String(), "Rate limit exceeded", "Should have rate limit error message")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Mobile login endpoints have 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
})
+
+
handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.201:12345"
+
+
// Make 10 requests
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/mobile/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
}
+
+
// 11th request blocked
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/mobile/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Mobile login should be rate limited at 10 req/min")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Refresh endpoint has 20 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Refresh has higher limit (20 req/min) for legitimate token refresh
+
refreshLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(20, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
})
+
+
handler := refreshLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.202:12345"
+
+
// Make 20 requests
+
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Request %d should succeed", i+1)
+
}
+
+
// 21st request blocked
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Refresh should be rate limited at 20 req/min")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Logout endpoint has 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
logoutLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
})
+
+
handler := logoutLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.203:12345"
+
+
// Make 10 requests
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/logout", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
}
+
+
// 11th request blocked
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/logout", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Logout should be rate limited at 10 req/min")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("OAuth callback has 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Callback uses same limiter as login (part of auth flow)
+
callbackLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
})
+
+
handler := callbackLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.204:12345"
+
+
// Make 10 requests
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
}
+
+
// 11th request blocked
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Callback should be rate limited at 10 req/min")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("OAuth rate limits are stricter than global limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Verify OAuth limits are more restrictive than global 100 req/min
+
const globalLimit = 100
+
const oauthLoginLimit = 10
+
const oauthRefreshLimit = 20
+
+
assert.Less(t, oauthLoginLimit, globalLimit, "OAuth login limit should be stricter than global")
+
assert.Less(t, oauthRefreshLimit, globalLimit, "OAuth refresh limit should be stricter than global")
+
assert.Greater(t, oauthRefreshLimit, oauthLoginLimit, "Refresh limit should be higher than login (legitimate use case)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("OAuth limits prevent credential stuffing", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Simulate credential stuffing attack
+
loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// Simulate failed login attempts
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+
})
+
+
handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
attackerIP := "203.0.113.50:12345"
+
+
// Attacker tries 15 login attempts (credential stuffing)
+
successfulAttempts := 0
+
blockedAttempts := 0
+
+
for i := 0; i < 15; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = attackerIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
if rr.Code == http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
successfulAttempts++ // Reached handler (even if auth failed)
+
} else if rr.Code == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+
blockedAttempts++
+
}
+
}
+
+
// Rate limiter should block 5 attempts after first 10
+
assert.Equal(t, 10, successfulAttempts, "Should allow 10 login attempts")
+
assert.Equal(t, 5, blockedAttempts, "Should block 5 attempts after limit reached")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("OAuth limits are per-endpoint", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Each endpoint gets its own rate limiter
+
// This test verifies that limits are independent per endpoint
+
loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
refreshLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(20, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
loginHandler := loginLimiter.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
+
refreshHandler := refreshLimiter.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.205:12345"
+
+
// Exhaust login limit
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
loginHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
}
+
+
// Login limit exhausted
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
loginHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Login should be rate limited")
+
+
// Refresh endpoint should still work (independent limiter)
+
req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
+
refreshHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Refresh should not be affected by login rate limit")
+
})
+
}
+
+
// OAuth Rate Limiting Configuration Documentation
+
// ================================================
+
// This test file validates OAuth-specific rate limits applied in oauth.go:
+
//
+
// 1. Login Endpoints (Credential Stuffing Protection)
+
// - Endpoints: /oauth/login, /oauth/mobile/login, /oauth/callback
+
// - Limit: 10 requests per minute per IP
+
// - Reason: Prevent brute force and credential stuffing attacks
+
// - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:21
+
//
+
// 2. Refresh Endpoint (Token Refresh)
+
// - Endpoint: /oauth/refresh
+
// - Limit: 20 requests per minute per IP
+
// - Reason: Allow legitimate token refresh while preventing abuse
+
// - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:24
+
//
+
// 3. Logout Endpoint
+
// - Endpoint: /oauth/logout
+
// - Limit: 10 requests per minute per IP
+
// - Reason: Prevent session exhaustion attacks
+
// - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:27
+
//
+
// 4. Metadata Endpoints (No Extra Limit)
+
// - Endpoints: /oauth/client-metadata.json, /oauth/jwks.json
+
// - Limit: Global 100 requests per minute (from main.go)
+
// - Reason: Public metadata, not sensitive to rate abuse
+
//
+
// Security Benefits:
+
// - Credential Stuffing: Limits password guessing to 10 attempts/min
+
// - State Exhaustion: Prevents OAuth state generation spam
+
// - Token Abuse: Limits refresh token usage while allowing legitimate refresh
+
//
+
// Rate Limit Hierarchy:
+
// - OAuth login: 10 req/min (most restrictive)
+
// - OAuth refresh: 20 req/min (moderate)
+
// - Comments: 20 req/min (expensive queries)
+
// - Global: 100 req/min (baseline)
-208
tests/integration/jwt_verification_test.go
···
-
package integration
-
-
import (
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"
-
"fmt"
-
"net/http"
-
"net/http/httptest"
-
"os"
-
"strings"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
)
-
-
// TestJWTSignatureVerification tests end-to-end JWT signature verification
-
// with a real PDS-issued token. This verifies that AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false works.
-
//
-
// Flow:
-
// 1. Create account on local PDS (or use existing)
-
// 2. Authenticate to get a real signed JWT token
-
// 3. Verify our auth middleware can fetch JWKS and verify the signature
-
// 4. Test with AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false (production mode)
-
//
-
// NOTE: Local dev PDS (docker-compose.dev.yml) uses symmetric JWT_SECRET signing
-
// instead of asymmetric JWKS keys. This test verifies the code path works, but
-
// full JWKS verification requires a production PDS or setting up proper keys.
-
func TestJWTSignatureVerification(t *testing.T) {
-
// Skip in short mode since this requires real PDS
-
if testing.Short() {
-
t.Skip("Skipping JWT verification test in short mode")
-
}
-
-
pdsURL := os.Getenv("PDS_URL")
-
if pdsURL == "" {
-
pdsURL = "http://localhost:3001"
-
}
-
-
// Check if PDS is running
-
healthResp, err := http.Get(pdsURL + "/xrpc/_health")
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Skipf("PDS not running at %s: %v", pdsURL, err)
-
}
-
_ = healthResp.Body.Close()
-
-
// Check if JWKS is available (production PDS) or symmetric secret (dev PDS)
-
jwksResp, _ := http.Get(pdsURL + "/oauth/jwks")
-
if jwksResp != nil {
-
defer func() { _ = jwksResp.Body.Close() }()
-
}
-
-
t.Run("JWT parsing and middleware integration", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// Step 1: Create a test account on PDS
-
// Keep handle short to avoid PDS validation errors
-
timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000 // Last 5 digits
-
handle := fmt.Sprintf("jwt%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)
-
password := "testpass123"
-
email := fmt.Sprintf("jwt%d@test.com", timestamp)
-
-
accessToken, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)
-
}
-
t.Logf("โœ“ Created test account: %s (DID: %s)", handle, did)
-
t.Logf("โœ“ Received JWT token from PDS (length: %d)", len(accessToken))
-
-
// Step 3: Test JWT parsing (should work regardless of verification)
-
claims, err := auth.ParseJWT(accessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to parse JWT: %v", err)
-
}
-
t.Logf("โœ“ JWT parsed successfully")
-
t.Logf(" Subject (DID): %s", claims.Subject)
-
t.Logf(" Issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)
-
t.Logf(" Scope: %s", claims.Scope)
-
-
if claims.Subject != did {
-
t.Errorf("Token DID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", did, claims.Subject)
-
}
-
-
// Step 4: Test JWKS fetching and signature verification
-
// NOTE: Local dev PDS uses symmetric secret, not JWKS
-
// For production, we'd verify the full signature here
-
t.Log("Checking JWKS availability...")
-
-
jwksFetcher := auth.NewCachedJWKSFetcher(1 * time.Hour)
-
verifiedClaims, err := auth.VerifyJWT(httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil).Context(), accessToken, jwksFetcher)
-
if err != nil {
-
// Expected for local dev PDS - log and continue
-
t.Logf("โ„น๏ธ JWKS verification skipped (expected for local dev PDS): %v", err)
-
t.Logf(" Local PDS uses symmetric JWT_SECRET instead of JWKS")
-
t.Logf(" In production, this would verify against proper JWKS keys")
-
} else {
-
// Unexpected success - means we're testing against a production PDS
-
t.Logf("โœ“ JWT signature verified successfully!")
-
t.Logf(" Verified DID: %s", verifiedClaims.Subject)
-
t.Logf(" Verified Issuer: %s", verifiedClaims.Issuer)
-
-
if verifiedClaims.Subject != did {
-
t.Errorf("Verified token DID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", did, verifiedClaims.Subject)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Step 5: Test auth middleware with skipVerify=true (for dev PDS)
-
t.Log("Testing auth middleware with skipVerify=true (dev mode)...")
-
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher, true) // skipVerify=true for dev PDS
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
var extractedDID string
-
-
testHandler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
extractedDID = middleware.GetUserDID(r)
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success": true}`))
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
if !handlerCalled {
-
t.Errorf("Handler was not called - auth middleware rejected valid token")
-
t.Logf("Response status: %d", w.Code)
-
t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())
-
}
-
-
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
-
t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
-
t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())
-
}
-
-
if extractedDID != did {
-
t.Errorf("Middleware extracted wrong DID: expected %s, got %s", did, extractedDID)
-
}
-
-
t.Logf("โœ… Auth middleware with signature verification working correctly!")
-
t.Logf(" Handler called: %v", handlerCalled)
-
t.Logf(" Extracted DID: %s", extractedDID)
-
t.Logf(" Response status: %d", w.Code)
-
})
-
-
t.Run("Rejects tampered JWT", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create valid token
-
timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000
-
handle := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)
-
password := "testpass456"
-
email := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d@test.com", timestamp)
-
-
accessToken, _, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Tamper with the token more aggressively to break JWT structure
-
parts := splitToken(accessToken)
-
if len(parts) != 3 {
-
t.Fatalf("Invalid JWT structure: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-
}
-
// Replace the payload with invalid base64 that will fail decoding
-
tamperedToken := parts[0] + ".!!!invalid-base64!!!." + parts[2]
-
-
// Test with middleware (skipVerify=true since dev PDS doesn't use JWKS)
-
// Tampered payload should fail JWT parsing even without signature check
-
jwksFetcher := auth.NewCachedJWKSFetcher(1 * time.Hour)
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher, true)
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
testHandler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tamperedToken)
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
if handlerCalled {
-
t.Error("Handler was called for tampered token - should have been rejected")
-
}
-
-
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-
t.Errorf("Expected status 401 for tampered token, got %d", w.Code)
-
}
-
-
t.Logf("โœ… Middleware correctly rejected tampered token with status %d", w.Code)
-
})
-
-
t.Run("Rejects expired JWT with signature verification", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// For this test, we'd need to create a token and wait for expiry,
-
// or mock the time. For now, we'll just verify the validation logic exists.
-
// In production, PDS tokens expire after a certain period.
-
t.Log("โ„น๏ธ Expiration test would require waiting for token expiry or time mocking")
-
t.Log(" Token expiration validation is covered by unit tests in auth_test.go")
-
t.Skip("Skipping expiration test - requires time manipulation")
-
})
-
}
-
-
// splitToken splits a JWT into its three parts (header.payload.signature)
-
func splitToken(token string) []string {
-
return strings.Split(token, ".")
-
}
+910
tests/integration/oauth_e2e_test.go
···
+
package integration
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
+
"context"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"fmt"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"strings"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
_ "github.com/lib/pq"
+
"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
// TestOAuth_Components tests OAuth component functionality without requiring PDS.
+
// This validates all Coves OAuth code:
+
// - Session storage and retrieval (PostgreSQL)
+
// - Token sealing (AES-GCM encryption)
+
// - Token unsealing (decryption + validation)
+
// - Session cleanup
+
//
+
// NOTE: Full OAuth redirect flow testing requires both HTTPS PDS and HTTPS Coves deployment.
+
// The OAuth redirect flow is handled by indigo's library and enforces OAuth 2.0 spec
+
// (HTTPS required for authorization servers and redirect URIs).
+
func TestOAuth_Components(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth component test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
// Setup test database
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() {
+
if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+
t.Logf("Failed to close database: %v", err)
+
}
+
}()
+
+
// Run migrations to ensure OAuth tables exist
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”ง Testing OAuth Components")
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
require.NotNil(t, client, "OAuth client should be initialized")
+
+
// Use a test DID (doesn't need to exist on PDS for component tests)
+
testDID := "did:plc:componenttest123"
+
+
// Run component tests
+
testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession(t, ctx, nil, store, client, testDID, "")
+
+
t.Log("")
+
t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))
+
t.Log("โœ… OAuth Component Tests Complete")
+
t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))
+
t.Log("Components validated:")
+
t.Log(" โœ“ Session storage (PostgreSQL)")
+
t.Log(" โœ“ Token sealing (AES-GCM encryption)")
+
t.Log(" โœ“ Token unsealing (decryption + validation)")
+
t.Log(" โœ“ Session cleanup")
+
t.Log("")
+
t.Log("NOTE: Full OAuth redirect flow requires HTTPS PDS + HTTPS Coves")
+
t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))
+
}
+
+
// testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession tests OAuth components that work without PDS redirect flow.
+
// This is used when testing with localhost PDS, where the indigo library rejects http:// URLs.
+
func testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, _ interface{}, store oauthlib.ClientAuthStore, client *oauth.OAuthClient, userDID, _ string) {
+
t.Helper()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”ง Testing OAuth components with mocked session...")
+
+
// Parse DID
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(userDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should parse DID")
+
+
// Component 1: Session Storage
+
t.Log(" ๐Ÿ“ฆ Component 1: Testing session storage...")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: fmt.Sprintf("localhost-test-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()),
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "mocked-access-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should save session")
+
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve session")
+
require.Equal(t, testSession.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID)
+
require.Equal(t, testSession.AccessToken, retrieved.AccessToken)
+
t.Log(" โœ… Session storage working")
+
+
// Component 2: Token Sealing
+
t.Log(" ๐Ÿ” Component 2: Testing token sealing...")
+
sealedToken, err := client.SealSession(parsedDID.String(), testSession.SessionID, time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should seal token")
+
require.NotEmpty(t, sealedToken, "Sealed token should not be empty")
+
tokenPreview := sealedToken
+
if len(tokenPreview) > 50 {
+
tokenPreview = tokenPreview[:50]
+
}
+
t.Logf(" โœ… Token sealed: %s...", tokenPreview)
+
+
// Component 3: Token Unsealing
+
t.Log(" ๐Ÿ”“ Component 3: Testing token unsealing...")
+
unsealed, err := client.UnsealSession(sealedToken)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should unseal token")
+
require.Equal(t, userDID, unsealed.DID)
+
require.Equal(t, testSession.SessionID, unsealed.SessionID)
+
t.Log(" โœ… Token unsealing working")
+
+
// Component 4: Session Cleanup
+
t.Log(" ๐Ÿงน Component 4: Testing session cleanup...")
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should delete session")
+
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)
+
require.Error(t, err, "Session should not exist after deletion")
+
t.Log(" โœ… Session cleanup working")
+
+
t.Log("โœ… All OAuth components verified!")
+
t.Log("")
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ“ Summary: OAuth implementation validated with mocked session")
+
t.Log(" - Session storage: โœ“")
+
t.Log(" - Token sealing: โœ“")
+
t.Log(" - Token unsealing: โœ“")
+
t.Log(" - Session cleanup: โœ“")
+
t.Log("")
+
t.Log("โš ๏ธ To test full OAuth redirect flow, use a production PDS with HTTPS")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration tests that expired sealed tokens are rejected
+
func TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token expiration test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("โฐ Testing OAuth token expiration...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
_ = oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store) // Handler created for completeness
+
+
// Create test session with past expiration
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:expiredtest123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "expired-session",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "expired-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Manually update expiration to the past
+
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,
+
"UPDATE oauth_sessions SET expires_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 day' WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2",
+
did.String(), testSession.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Try to retrieve expired session
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, testSession.SessionID)
+
assert.Error(t, err, "Should not be able to retrieve expired session")
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound for expired session")
+
+
// Test cleanup of expired sessions
+
cleaned, err := store.(*oauth.PostgresOAuthStore).CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Cleanup should succeed")
+
assert.Greater(t, cleaned, int64(0), "Should have cleaned up at least one session")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Expired session handling verified (cleaned %d sessions)", cleaned)
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_InvalidToken tests that invalid/tampered tokens are rejected
+
func TestOAuthE2E_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth invalid token test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”’ Testing OAuth invalid token rejection...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)
+
+
// Setup test server with protected endpoint
+
r := chi.NewRouter()
+
r.Get("/api/me", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
sessData, err := handler.GetSessionFromRequest(r)
+
if err != nil {
+
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+
return
+
}
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"did": sessData.AccountDID.String()})
+
})
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(r)
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
// Test with invalid token formats
+
testCases := []struct {
+
name string
+
token string
+
}{
+
{"Empty token", ""},
+
{"Invalid base64", "not-valid-base64!!!"},
+
{"Tampered token", "dGFtcGVyZWQtdG9rZW4tZGF0YQ=="}, // Valid base64 but invalid content
+
{"Short token", "abc"},
+
}
+
+
for _, tc := range testCases {
+
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", server.URL+"/api/me", nil)
+
if tc.token != "" {
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tc.token)
+
}
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Invalid token should be rejected with 401")
+
})
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Invalid token rejection verified")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_SessionNotFound tests behavior when session doesn't exist in DB
+
func TestOAuthE2E_SessionNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session not found test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ” Testing OAuth session not found behavior...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Try to retrieve non-existent session
+
nonExistentDID, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:nonexistent123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, nonExistentDID, "nonexistent-session")
+
assert.Error(t, err, "Should return error for non-existent session")
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound")
+
+
// Try to delete non-existent session
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, nonExistentDID, "nonexistent-session")
+
assert.Error(t, err, "Should return error when deleting non-existent session")
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session not found handling verified")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_MultipleSessionsPerUser tests that a user can have multiple active sessions
+
func TestOAuthE2E_MultipleSessionsPerUser(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth multiple sessions test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ‘ฅ Testing multiple OAuth sessions per user...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Create a test DID
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:multisession123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create multiple sessions for the same user
+
sessions := []oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session-1-web",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "token-1",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
},
+
{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session-2-mobile",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "token-2",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
},
+
{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session-3-tablet",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "token-3",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Save all sessions
+
for i, session := range sessions {
+
err := store.SaveSession(ctx, session)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to save session %d", i+1)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Created %d sessions for user", len(sessions))
+
+
// Verify all sessions can be retrieved independently
+
for i, session := range sessions {
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, session.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to retrieve session %d", i+1)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID, "Session ID should match")
+
assert.Equal(t, session.AccessToken, retrieved.AccessToken, "Access token should match")
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… All sessions retrieved independently")
+
+
// Delete one session and verify others remain
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, sessions[0].SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to delete first session")
+
+
// Verify first session is deleted
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessions[0].SessionID)
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "First session should be deleted")
+
+
// Verify other sessions still exist
+
for i := 1; i < len(sessions); i++ {
+
_, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessions[i].SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Session %d should still exist", i+1)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Multiple sessions per user verified")
+
+
// Cleanup
+
for i := 1; i < len(sessions); i++ {
+
_ = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, sessions[i].SessionID)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_AuthRequestStorage tests OAuth auth request storage and retrieval
+
func TestOAuthE2E_AuthRequestStorage(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth auth request storage test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ“ Testing OAuth auth request storage...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Create test auth request data
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:authrequest123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
authRequest := oauthlib.AuthRequestData{
+
State: "test-state-12345",
+
AccountDID: &did,
+
PKCEVerifier: "test-pkce-verifier",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "test-dpop-key",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "test-nonce",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
RequestURI: "http://localhost:3001/authorize",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",
+
AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/revoke",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},
+
}
+
+
// Save auth request
+
err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to save auth request")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Auth request saved")
+
+
// Retrieve auth request
+
retrieved, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to retrieve auth request")
+
assert.Equal(t, authRequest.State, retrieved.State, "State should match")
+
assert.Equal(t, authRequest.PKCEVerifier, retrieved.PKCEVerifier, "PKCE verifier should match")
+
assert.Equal(t, authRequest.AuthServerURL, retrieved.AuthServerURL, "Auth server URL should match")
+
assert.Equal(t, len(authRequest.Scopes), len(retrieved.Scopes), "Scopes length should match")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Auth request retrieved and verified")
+
+
// Test duplicate state error
+
err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest)
+
assert.Error(t, err, "Should not allow duplicate state")
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "already exists", "Error should indicate duplicate")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Duplicate state prevention verified")
+
+
// Delete auth request
+
err = store.DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to delete auth request")
+
+
// Verify deletion
+
_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrAuthRequestNotFound, err, "Auth request should be deleted")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Auth request deletion verified")
+
+
// Test cleanup of expired auth requests
+
// Create an auth request and manually set created_at to the past
+
oldAuthRequest := oauthlib.AuthRequestData{
+
State: "old-state-12345",
+
PKCEVerifier: "old-verifier",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, oldAuthRequest)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Update created_at to 1 hour ago
+
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,
+
"UPDATE oauth_requests SET created_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour' WHERE state = $1",
+
oldAuthRequest.State)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Cleanup expired requests
+
cleaned, err := store.(*oauth.PostgresOAuthStore).CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(ctx)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Cleanup should succeed")
+
assert.Greater(t, cleaned, int64(0), "Should have cleaned up at least one auth request")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Expired auth request cleanup verified (cleaned %d requests)", cleaned)
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_TokenRefresh tests the refresh token flow
+
func TestOAuthE2E_TokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token refresh test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”„ Testing OAuth token refresh flow...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)
+
+
// Create a test DID and session
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:refreshtest123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create initial session with refresh token
+
initialSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "refresh-session-1",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",
+
AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/revoke",
+
AccessToken: "initial-access-token",
+
RefreshToken: "initial-refresh-token",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "test-dpop-key",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "test-nonce",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},
+
}
+
+
// Save the session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, initialSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should save initial session")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Initial session created")
+
+
// Create a sealed token for this session
+
sealedToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), initialSession.SessionID, time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should seal session token")
+
require.NotEmpty(t, sealedToken, "Sealed token should not be empty")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session token sealed")
+
+
// Setup test server with refresh endpoint
+
r := chi.NewRouter()
+
r.Post("/oauth/refresh", handler.HandleRefresh)
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(r)
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
t.Run("Valid refresh request", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// NOTE: This test verifies that the refresh endpoint can be called
+
// In a real scenario, the indigo client's RefreshTokens() would call the PDS
+
// Since we're in a component test, we're testing the Coves handler logic
+
+
// Create refresh request
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
"sealed_token": sealedToken,
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
// NOTE: In component testing mode, the indigo client may not have
+
// real PDS credentials, so RefreshTokens() might fail
+
// We're testing that the handler correctly processes the request
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
// In component test mode without real PDS, we may get 401
+
// In production with real PDS, this would return 200 with new tokens
+
t.Logf("Refresh response status: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
+
// The important thing is that the handler doesn't crash
+
// and properly validates the request structure
+
assert.True(t, resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized,
+
"Refresh should return either success or auth failure, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Invalid DID format (with valid token)", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create a sealed token with an invalid DID format
+
invalidDID := "invalid-did-format"
+
// Create the token with a valid DID first, then we'll try to use it with invalid DID in request
+
validToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), initialSession.SessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": invalidDID, // Invalid DID format in request
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
"sealed_token": validToken, // Valid token for different DID
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
// Should reject with 401 due to DID mismatch (not 400) since auth happens first
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"DID mismatch should be rejected with 401 (auth check happens before format validation)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Missing sealed_token (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
// Missing sealed_token - should be rejected for security
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Missing sealed_token should be rejected (proof of possession required)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Invalid sealed_token", func(t *testing.T) {
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
"sealed_token": "invalid-token-data",
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Invalid sealed_token should be rejected")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("DID mismatch (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create a sealed token for a different DID
+
wrongDID := "did:plc:wronguser123"
+
wrongToken, err := client.SealSession(wrongDID, initialSession.SessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Try to use it to refresh the original session
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(), // Claiming original DID
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
"sealed_token": wrongToken, // But token is for different DID
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"DID mismatch should be rejected (prevents session hijacking)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Session ID mismatch (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create a sealed token with wrong session ID
+
wrongSessionID := "wrong-session-id"
+
wrongToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), wrongSessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Try to use it to refresh the original session
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID, // Claiming original session
+
"sealed_token": wrongToken, // But token is for different session
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Session ID mismatch should be rejected (prevents session hijacking)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Non-existent session", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create a valid sealed token for a non-existent session
+
nonExistentSessionID := "nonexistent-session-id"
+
validToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), nonExistentSessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": nonExistentSessionID,
+
"sealed_token": validToken, // Valid token but session doesn't exist
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Non-existent session should be rejected with 401")
+
})
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Token refresh endpoint validation verified")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_SessionUpdate tests that refresh updates the session in database
+
func TestOAuthE2E_SessionUpdate(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session update test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ’พ Testing OAuth session update on refresh...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:sessionupdate123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
originalSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "update-session-1",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",
+
AccessToken: "original-access-token",
+
RefreshToken: "original-refresh-token",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "original-dpop-key",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save original session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, originalSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Original session saved")
+
+
// Simulate a token refresh by updating the session with new tokens
+
updatedSession := originalSession
+
updatedSession.AccessToken = "new-access-token"
+
updatedSession.RefreshToken = "new-refresh-token"
+
updatedSession.DPoPAuthServerNonce = "new-nonce"
+
+
// Update the session (upsert)
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, updatedSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session updated with new tokens")
+
+
// Retrieve the session and verify it was updated
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, originalSession.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve updated session")
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "new-access-token", retrieved.AccessToken,
+
"Access token should be updated")
+
assert.Equal(t, "new-refresh-token", retrieved.RefreshToken,
+
"Refresh token should be updated")
+
assert.Equal(t, "new-nonce", retrieved.DPoPAuthServerNonce,
+
"DPoP nonce should be updated")
+
+
// Verify session ID and DID remain the same
+
assert.Equal(t, originalSession.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID,
+
"Session ID should remain the same")
+
assert.Equal(t, did, retrieved.AccountDID,
+
"DID should remain the same")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session update verified - tokens refreshed in database")
+
+
// Verify updated_at was changed
+
var updatedAt time.Time
+
err = db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+
"SELECT updated_at FROM oauth_sessions WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2",
+
did.String(), originalSession.SessionID).Scan(&updatedAt)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Updated timestamp should be recent (within last minute)
+
assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now(), updatedAt, time.Minute,
+
"Session updated_at should be recent")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session timestamp update verified")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_RefreshTokenRotation tests refresh token rotation behavior
+
func TestOAuthE2E_RefreshTokenRotation(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth refresh token rotation test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”„ Testing OAuth refresh token rotation...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:rotation123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Simulate multiple refresh cycles
+
sessionID := "rotation-session-1"
+
tokens := []struct {
+
access string
+
refresh string
+
}{
+
{"access-token-v1", "refresh-token-v1"},
+
{"access-token-v2", "refresh-token-v2"},
+
{"access-token-v3", "refresh-token-v3"},
+
}
+
+
for i, tokenPair := range tokens {
+
session := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",
+
AccessToken: tokenPair.access,
+
RefreshToken: tokenPair.refresh,
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save/update session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should save session iteration %d", i+1)
+
+
// Retrieve and verify
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve session iteration %d", i+1)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, tokenPair.access, retrieved.AccessToken,
+
"Access token should match iteration %d", i+1)
+
assert.Equal(t, tokenPair.refresh, retrieved.RefreshToken,
+
"Refresh token should match iteration %d", i+1)
+
+
// Small delay to ensure timestamp differences
+
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Refresh token rotation verified through %d cycles", len(tokens))
+
+
// Verify final state
+
finalSession, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "access-token-v3", finalSession.AccessToken,
+
"Final access token should be from last rotation")
+
assert.Equal(t, "refresh-token-v3", finalSession.RefreshToken,
+
"Final refresh token should be from last rotation")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Token rotation state verified")
+
}
+312
tests/integration/oauth_session_fixation_test.go
···
+
package integration
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
+
"context"
+
"crypto/sha256"
+
"encoding/base64"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"net/url"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
// TestOAuth_SessionFixationAttackPrevention tests that the mobile redirect binding
+
// prevents session fixation attacks where an attacker plants a mobile_redirect_uri
+
// cookie, then the user does a web login, and credentials get sent to attacker's deep link.
+
//
+
// Attack scenario:
+
// 1. Attacker tricks user into visiting /oauth/mobile/login?redirect_uri=evil://steal
+
// 2. This plants a mobile_redirect_uri cookie (lives 10 minutes)
+
// 3. User later does normal web OAuth login via /oauth/login
+
// 4. HandleCallback sees the stale mobile_redirect_uri cookie
+
// 5. WITHOUT THE FIX: Callback sends sealed token, DID, session_id to attacker's deep link
+
// 6. WITH THE FIX: Binding mismatch is detected, mobile cookies cleared, user gets web session
+
func TestOAuth_SessionFixationAttackPrevention(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session fixation test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
// Setup test database
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() {
+
if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+
t.Logf("Failed to close database: %v", err)
+
}
+
}()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
require.NotNil(t, client, "OAuth client should be initialized")
+
+
// Setup handler
+
handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)
+
+
// Setup router
+
r := chi.NewRouter()
+
r.Get("/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)
+
+
t.Run("attack scenario - planted mobile cookie without binding", func(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Step 1: Simulate a successful OAuth callback (like a user did web login)
+
// We'll create a mock session to simulate what ProcessCallback would return
+
testDID := "did:plc:test123456"
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
sessionID := "test-session-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "test-access-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save the session (simulating successful OAuth flow)
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Step 2: Attacker planted a mobile_redirect_uri cookie (without binding)
+
// This simulates the cookie being planted earlier by attacker
+
attackerRedirectURI := "evil://steal"
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)
+
+
// Plant the attacker's cookie (URL escaped as it would be in real scenario)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: url.QueryEscape(attackerRedirectURI),
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
// NOTE: No mobile_redirect_binding cookie! This is the attack scenario.
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
// Step 3: Try to process the callback
+
// This would fail because ProcessCallback needs real OAuth code/state
+
// For this test, we're verifying the handler's security checks work
+
// even before ProcessCallback is called
+
+
// The handler will try to call ProcessCallback which will fail
+
// But we're testing that even if it succeeded, the mobile redirect
+
// validation would prevent the attack
+
handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)
+
+
// Step 4: Verify the attack was prevented
+
// The handler should reject the request due to missing binding
+
// Since ProcessCallback will fail first (no real OAuth code), we expect
+
// a 400 error, but the important thing is it doesn't redirect to evil://steal
+
+
assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,
+
"Should not redirect when ProcessCallback fails")
+
assert.NotContains(t, rec.Header().Get("Location"), "evil://",
+
"Should never redirect to attacker's URI")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("legitimate mobile flow - with valid binding", func(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Setup a legitimate mobile session
+
testDID := "did:plc:mobile123"
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
sessionID := "mobile-session-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "mobile-access-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save the session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create request with BOTH mobile_redirect_uri AND valid binding
+
// Use Universal Link URI that's in the allowlist
+
legitRedirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"
+
csrfToken := "valid-csrf-token-for-mobile"
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)
+
+
// Add mobile redirect URI cookie
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: url.QueryEscape(legitRedirectURI),
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Add CSRF token (required for mobile flow)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "oauth_csrf",
+
Value: csrfToken,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Add VALID binding cookie (this is what prevents the attack)
+
// In real flow, this would be set by HandleMobileLogin
+
// The binding now includes the CSRF token for double-submit validation
+
mobileBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(csrfToken, legitRedirectURI)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_binding",
+
Value: mobileBinding,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)
+
+
// This will also fail at ProcessCallback (no real OAuth code)
+
// but we're verifying the binding validation logic is in place
+
// In a real integration test with PDS, this would succeed
+
assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,
+
"Should not redirect when ProcessCallback fails (expected in mock test)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("binding mismatch - attacker tries wrong binding", func(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Setup session
+
testDID := "did:plc:bindingtest"
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
sessionID := "binding-test-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "binding-test-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Attacker tries to plant evil redirect with a binding from different URI
+
attackerRedirectURI := "evil://steal"
+
attackerCSRF := "attacker-csrf-token"
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)
+
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: url.QueryEscape(attackerRedirectURI),
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "oauth_csrf",
+
Value: attackerCSRF,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Use binding from a DIFFERENT CSRF token and URI (attacker's attempt to forge)
+
// Even if attacker knows the redirect URI, they don't know the user's CSRF token
+
wrongBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest("different-csrf", "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback")
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_binding",
+
Value: wrongBinding,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)
+
+
// Should fail due to binding mismatch (even before ProcessCallback)
+
// The binding validation happens after ProcessCallback in the real code,
+
// but the mismatch would be caught and cookies cleared
+
assert.NotContains(t, rec.Header().Get("Location"), "evil://",
+
"Should never redirect to attacker's URI on binding mismatch")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("CSRF token value mismatch - attacker tries different CSRF", func(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Setup session
+
testDID := "did:plc:csrftest"
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
sessionID := "csrf-test-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "csrf-test-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// This tests the P1 security fix: CSRF token VALUE must be validated, not just presence
+
// Attack scenario:
+
// 1. User starts mobile login with CSRF token A and redirect URI X
+
// 2. Binding = hash(A + X) is stored in cookie
+
// 3. Attacker somehow gets user to have CSRF token B in cookie (different from A)
+
// 4. Callback receives CSRF token B, redirect URI X, binding = hash(A + X)
+
// 5. hash(B + X) != hash(A + X), so attack is detected
+
+
originalCSRF := "original-csrf-token-set-at-login"
+
redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"
+
// Binding was created with original CSRF token
+
originalBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(originalCSRF, redirectURI)
+
+
// But attacker managed to change the CSRF cookie
+
attackerCSRF := "attacker-replaced-csrf"
+
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)
+
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: url.QueryEscape(redirectURI),
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Attacker's CSRF token (different from what created the binding)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "oauth_csrf",
+
Value: attackerCSRF,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Original binding (created with original CSRF token)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_binding",
+
Value: originalBinding,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)
+
+
// Should fail because hash(attackerCSRF + redirectURI) != hash(originalCSRF + redirectURI)
+
// This is the key security fix - CSRF token VALUE is now validated
+
assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,
+
"Should not redirect when CSRF token doesn't match binding")
+
})
+
}
+
+
// generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest generates a binding for testing
+
// This mirrors the actual logic in handlers_security.go:
+
// binding = base64(sha256(csrfToken + "|" + redirectURI)[:16])
+
func generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(csrfToken, mobileRedirectURI string) string {
+
combined := csrfToken + "|" + mobileRedirectURI
+
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(combined))
+
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:16])
+
}
+169
tests/integration/oauth_token_verification_test.go
···
+
package integration
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"fmt"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"os"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
// TestOAuthTokenVerification tests end-to-end OAuth token verification
+
// with real PDS-issued OAuth tokens. This replaces the old JWT verification test
+
// since we now use OAuth sealed session tokens instead of raw JWTs.
+
//
+
// Flow:
+
// 1. Create account on local PDS (or use existing)
+
// 2. Authenticate to get OAuth tokens and create sealed session token
+
// 3. Verify our auth middleware can unseal and validate the token
+
// 4. Test token validation and session retrieval
+
//
+
// NOTE: This test uses the E2E OAuth middleware which mocks the session unsealing
+
// for testing purposes. Real OAuth tokens from PDS would be sealed using the
+
// OAuth client's seal secret.
+
func TestOAuthTokenVerification(t *testing.T) {
+
// Skip in short mode since this requires real PDS
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token verification test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
pdsURL := os.Getenv("PDS_URL")
+
if pdsURL == "" {
+
pdsURL = "http://localhost:3001"
+
}
+
+
// Check if PDS is running
+
healthResp, err := http.Get(pdsURL + "/xrpc/_health")
+
if err != nil {
+
t.Skipf("PDS not running at %s: %v", pdsURL, err)
+
}
+
_ = healthResp.Body.Close()
+
+
t.Run("OAuth token validation and middleware integration", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Step 1: Create a test account on PDS
+
// Keep handle short to avoid PDS validation errors
+
timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000 // Last 5 digits
+
handle := fmt.Sprintf("oauth%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)
+
password := "testpass123"
+
email := fmt.Sprintf("oauth%d@test.com", timestamp)
+
+
_, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)
+
if err != nil {
+
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)
+
}
+
t.Logf("โœ“ Created test account: %s (DID: %s)", handle, did)
+
+
// Step 2: Create OAuth middleware with mock unsealer for testing
+
// In production, this would unseal real OAuth tokens from PDS
+
t.Log("Testing OAuth middleware with sealed session tokens...")
+
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
+
testToken := e2eAuth.AddUser(did)
+
+
handlerCalled := false
+
var extractedDID string
+
+
testHandler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
+
extractedDID = middleware.GetUserDID(r)
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success": true}`))
+
}))
+
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testToken)
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Errorf("Handler was not called - auth middleware rejected valid token")
+
t.Logf("Response status: %d", w.Code)
+
t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())
+
}
+
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
+
t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())
+
}
+
+
if extractedDID != did {
+
t.Errorf("Middleware extracted wrong DID: expected %s, got %s", did, extractedDID)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… OAuth middleware with token validation working correctly!")
+
t.Logf(" Handler called: %v", handlerCalled)
+
t.Logf(" Extracted DID: %s", extractedDID)
+
t.Logf(" Response status: %d", w.Code)
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Rejects tampered/invalid sealed tokens", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create valid user
+
timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000
+
handle := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)
+
password := "testpass456"
+
email := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d@test.com", timestamp)
+
+
_, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)
+
if err != nil {
+
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)
+
}
+
+
// Create OAuth middleware
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
+
validToken := e2eAuth.AddUser(did)
+
+
// Create various invalid tokens to test
+
testCases := []struct {
+
name string
+
token string
+
}{
+
{"Empty token", ""},
+
{"Invalid base64", "not-valid-base64!!!"},
+
{"Tampered token", "dGFtcGVyZWQtdG9rZW4tZGF0YQ=="}, // Valid base64 but not a real sealed session
+
{"Short token", "abc"},
+
{"Modified valid token", validToken + "extra"},
+
}
+
+
for _, tc := range testCases {
+
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
handlerCalled := false
+
testHandler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
if tc.token != "" {
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tc.token)
+
}
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+
if handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("Handler was called for invalid token - should have been rejected")
+
}
+
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("Expected status 401 for invalid token, got %d", w.Code)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ“ Middleware correctly rejected %s with status %d", tc.name, w.Code)
+
})
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… All invalid token types correctly rejected")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Session expiration handling", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// OAuth session expiration is handled at the database level
+
// See TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration in oauth_e2e_test.go for full expiration testing
+
t.Log("โ„น๏ธ Session expiration testing is covered in oauth_e2e_test.go")
+
t.Log(" OAuth sessions expire based on database timestamps and are cleaned up periodically")
+
t.Log(" This is different from JWT expiration which was timestamp-based in the token itself")
+
t.Skip("Session expiration is tested in oauth_e2e_test.go - see TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration")
+
})
+
}
+16 -20
tests/integration/community_e2e_test.go
···
package integration
import (
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/api/routes"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
···
t.Logf("โœ… Authenticated - Instance DID: %s", instanceDID)
-
// Initialize auth middleware with skipVerify=true
-
// IMPORTANT: PDS password authentication returns Bearer tokens (not DPoP-bound tokens).
-
// E2E tests use these Bearer tokens with the DPoP scheme header, which only works
-
// because skipVerify=true bypasses signature and DPoP binding verification.
-
// In production, skipVerify=false requires proper DPoP-bound tokens from OAuth flow.
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true)
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
+
// Initialize OAuth auth middleware for E2E testing
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
+
// Register the instance user for OAuth authentication
+
token := e2eAuth.AddUser(instanceDID)
// V2.0: Extract instance domain for community provisioning
var instanceDomain string
···
// Setup HTTP server with XRPC routes
r := chi.NewRouter()
-
routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, authMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators
+
routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators
httpServer := httptest.NewServer(r)
defer httpServer.Close()
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
+
// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
+
// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
+
// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create block request: %v", err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create block request: %v", err)
blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
+
blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
blockResp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(blockHttpReq)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create unblock request: %v", err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
+
// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
+22 -19
tests/integration/user_journey_e2e_test.go
···
package integration
import (
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/api/routes"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
···
"testing"
"time"
-
timelineCore "Coves/internal/core/timeline"
-
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
_ "github.com/lib/pq"
"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+
timelineCore "Coves/internal/core/timeline"
)
// TestFullUserJourney_E2E tests the complete user experience from signup to interaction:
···
commentConsumer := jetstream.NewCommentEventConsumer(commentRepo, db)
voteConsumer := jetstream.NewVoteEventConsumer(voteRepo, userService, db)
-
// Setup HTTP server with all routes
-
// IMPORTANT: skipVerify=true because PDS password auth returns Bearer tokens (not DPoP-bound).
-
// E2E tests use Bearer tokens with DPoP scheme header, which only works with skipVerify=true.
-
// In production, skipVerify=false requires proper DPoP-bound tokens from OAuth flow.
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true)
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
+
// Setup HTTP server with all routes using OAuth middleware
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
r := chi.NewRouter()
-
routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, authMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators
-
routes.RegisterPostRoutes(r, postService, authMiddleware)
-
routes.RegisterTimelineRoutes(r, timelineService, authMiddleware)
+
routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators
+
routes.RegisterPostRoutes(r, postService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware)
+
routes.RegisterTimelineRoutes(r, timelineService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware)
httpServer := httptest.NewServer(r)
defer httpServer.Close()
···
var (
userAHandle string
userADID string
-
userAToken string
+
userAToken string // PDS access token for direct PDS requests
+
userAAPIToken string // Coves API token for Coves API requests
userBHandle string
userBDID string
-
userBToken string
+
userBToken string // PDS access token for direct PDS requests
+
userBAPIToken string // Coves API token for Coves API requests
communityDID string
communityHandle string
postURI string
···
userA := createTestUser(t, db, userAHandle, userADID)
require.NotNil(t, userA)
+
// Register user with OAuth middleware for Coves API requests
+
userAAPIToken = e2eAuth.AddUser(userADID)
+
t.Logf("โœ… User A indexed in AppView")
})
···
httpServer.URL+"/xrpc/social.coves.community.create",
bytes.NewBuffer(reqBody))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+userAToken)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+userAAPIToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
···
httpServer.URL+"/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create",
bytes.NewBuffer(reqBody))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+userAToken)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+userAAPIToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
···
userB := createTestUser(t, db, userBHandle, userBDID)
require.NotNil(t, userB)
+
// Register user with OAuth middleware for Coves API requests
+
userBAPIToken = e2eAuth.AddUser(userBDID)
+
t.Logf("โœ… User B indexed in AppView")
})
···
httpServer.URL+"/xrpc/social.coves.community.subscribe",
bytes.NewBuffer(reqBody))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+userBToken)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+userBAPIToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
···
t.Run("9. User B - Verify Timeline Feed Shows Subscribed Community Posts", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("\n๐Ÿ“ฐ Part 9: User B checks timeline feed...")
-
// Use HTTP client to properly go through auth middleware with DPoP token
+
// Use HTTP client to properly go through auth middleware with Bearer token
req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet,
httpServer.URL+"/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getTimeline?sort=new&limit=10", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+userBToken)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+userBAPIToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
+5
go.sum
···
github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4/go.mod h1:m8KPJKqk1gH5J9DgRY2ASl2lWCfGKXixSwevea8zH2U=
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.1 h1:KOIHODQj58PmL80G2Eak4WdvUzjSJSm0vG72crDCqb8=
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.1/go.mod h1:L2yAIGWB3H+phAw1NxKwWM+7eUH/lU8pOMm5hHcoops=
+
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2 h1:Jmey33TE+b+rB7fT8MUy1u0I4L+NARQlK6LhzKPSyQE=
+
github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2/go.mod h1:sSbTewc+6wYHBBCW7ytsFSn836hqM7JxpglAy2Vzc58=
github.com/go-logr/logr v1.2.2/go.mod h1:jdQByPbusPIv2/zmleS9BjJVeZ6kBagPoEUsqbVz/1A=
github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.1 h1:pKouT5E8xu9zeFC39JXRDukb6JFQPXM5p5I91188VAQ=
github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.1/go.mod h1:9T104GzyrTigFIr8wt5mBrctHMim0Nb2HLGrmQ40KvY=
···
github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2/go.mod h1:P1XiOD3dCwIKUDQYPy72D8LYyHL2YPYrpS2s69NZV8Q=
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0 h1:pv4AsKCKKZuqlgs5sUmn4x8UlGa0kEVt/puTpKx9vvo=
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0/go.mod h1:fxCRLWMO43lRc8nhHWY6LGqRcf+1gQWArsqaEUEa5bE=
+
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.5.2/go.mod h1:v8dTdLbMG2kIc/vJvl+f65V22dbkXbowE6jgT/gNBxE=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0/go.mod h1:17dUlkBOakJ0+DkrSSNjCkIjxS6bF9zb3elmeNGIjoY=
+
github.com/google/go-querystring v1.1.0 h1:AnCroh3fv4ZBgVIf1Iwtovgjaw/GiKJo8M8yD/fhyJ8=
+
github.com/google/go-querystring v1.1.0/go.mod h1:Kcdr2DB4koayq7X8pmAG4sNG59So17icRSOU623lUBU=
github.com/google/renameio v0.1.0/go.mod h1:KWCgfxg9yswjAJkECMjeO8J8rahYeXnNhOm40UhjYkI=
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=
+5
.env.dev
···
# Also supports base64: prefix for consistency
OAUTH_COOKIE_SECRET=f1132c01b1a625a865c6c455a75ee793572cedb059cebe0c4c1ae4c446598f7d
+
# Seal secret for OAuth session tokens (AES-256-GCM encryption)
+
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
+
# This must be 32 bytes when base64-decoded for AES-256
+
# OAUTH_SEAL_SECRET=ryW6xNVxYhP6hCDA90NGCmK58Q2ONnkYXbHL0oZN2no=
+
# AppView public URL (used for OAuth callback and client metadata)
# Dev: http://127.0.0.1:8081 (use 127.0.0.1 instead of localhost per RFC 8252)
# Prod: https://coves.social
-73
cmd/genjwks/main.go
···
-
package main
-
-
import (
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"crypto/rand"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"fmt"
-
"log"
-
"os"
-
-
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwk"
-
)
-
-
// genjwks generates an ES256 keypair for OAuth client authentication
-
// The private key is stored in the config/env, public key is served at /oauth/jwks.json
-
//
-
// Usage:
-
//
-
// go run cmd/genjwks/main.go
-
//
-
// This will output a JSON private key that should be stored in OAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK
-
func main() {
-
fmt.Println("Generating ES256 keypair for OAuth client authentication...")
-
-
// Generate ES256 (NIST P-256) private key
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to generate private key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Convert to JWK
-
jwkKey, err := jwk.FromRaw(privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to create JWK from private key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Set key parameters
-
if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.KeyIDKey, "oauth-client-key"); err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to set kid: %v", err)
-
}
-
if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.AlgorithmKey, "ES256"); err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to set alg: %v", err)
-
}
-
if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.KeyUsageKey, "sig"); err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to set use: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Marshal to JSON
-
jsonData, err := json.MarshalIndent(jwkKey, "", " ")
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to marshal JWK: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Output instructions
-
fmt.Println("\nโœ… ES256 keypair generated successfully!")
-
fmt.Println("\n๐Ÿ“ Add this to your .env.dev file:")
-
fmt.Println("\nOAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK='" + string(jsonData) + "'")
-
fmt.Println("\nโš ๏ธ IMPORTANT:")
-
fmt.Println(" - Keep this private key SECRET")
-
fmt.Println(" - Never commit it to version control")
-
fmt.Println(" - Generate a new key for production")
-
fmt.Println(" - The public key will be automatically derived and served at /oauth/jwks.json")
-
-
// Optionally write to a file (not committed)
-
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "--save" {
-
filename := "oauth-private-key.json"
-
if err := os.WriteFile(filename, jsonData, 0o600); err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to write key file: %v", err)
-
}
-
fmt.Printf("\n๐Ÿ’พ Private key saved to %s (remember to add to .gitignore!)\n", filename)
-
}
-
}
-330
internal/atproto/auth/README.md
···
-
# atProto OAuth Authentication
-
-
This package implements third-party OAuth authentication for Coves, validating DPoP-bound access tokens from mobile apps and other atProto clients.
-
-
## Architecture
-
-
This is **third-party authentication** (validating incoming requests), not first-party authentication (logging users into Coves web frontend).
-
-
### Components
-
-
1. **JWT Parser** (`jwt.go`) - Parses and validates JWT tokens
-
2. **JWKS Fetcher** (`jwks_fetcher.go`) - Fetches and caches public keys from PDS authorization servers
-
3. **Auth Middleware** (`internal/api/middleware/auth.go`) - HTTP middleware that protects endpoints
-
-
### Flow
-
-
```
-
Client Request
-
โ†“
-
Authorization: DPoP <access_token>
-
DPoP: <proof-jwt>
-
โ†“
-
Auth Middleware
-
โ†“
-
Extract JWT โ†’ Parse Claims โ†’ Verify Signature (via JWKS) โ†’ Verify DPoP Proof
-
โ†“
-
Inject DID into Context โ†’ Call Handler
-
```
-
-
## Usage
-
-
### Phase 1: Parse-Only Mode (Testing)
-
-
Set `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true` to only parse JWTs without signature verification:
-
-
```bash
-
export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true
-
```
-
-
This is useful for:
-
- Initial integration testing
-
- Testing with mock tokens
-
- Debugging JWT structure
-
-
### Phase 2: Full Verification (Production)
-
-
Set `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false` (or unset) to enable full JWT signature verification:
-
-
```bash
-
export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false
-
# or just unset it
-
```
-
-
This is **required for production** and validates:
-
- JWT signature using PDS public key
-
- Token expiration
-
- Required claims (sub, iss)
-
- DID format
-
-
## Protected Endpoints
-
-
The following endpoints require authentication:
-
-
- `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.create`
-
- `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.update`
-
- `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.subscribe`
-
- `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.unsubscribe`
-
-
### Making Authenticated Requests
-
-
Include the JWT in the `Authorization` header:
-
-
```bash
-
curl -X POST https://coves.social/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \
-
-H "Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGc..." \
-
-H "DPoP: eyJhbGc..." \
-
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-
-d '{"name":"Gaming","hostedByDid":"did:plc:..."}'
-
```
-
-
### Getting User DID in Handlers
-
-
The middleware injects the authenticated user's DID into the request context:
-
-
```go
-
import "Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
-
func (h *Handler) HandleCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
// Extract authenticated user DID
-
userDID := middleware.GetUserDID(r)
-
if userDID == "" {
-
// Not authenticated (should never happen with RequireAuth middleware)
-
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
-
return
-
}
-
-
// Use userDID for authorization checks
-
// ...
-
}
-
```
-
-
## Key Caching
-
-
Public keys are fetched from PDS authorization servers and cached for 1 hour. The cache is automatically cleaned up hourly to remove expired entries.
-
-
### JWKS Discovery Flow
-
-
1. Extract `iss` claim from JWT (e.g., `https://pds.example.com`)
-
2. Fetch `https://pds.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`
-
3. Extract `jwks_uri` from metadata
-
4. Fetch JWKS from `jwks_uri`
-
5. Find matching key by `kid` from JWT header
-
6. Cache the JWKS for 1 hour
-
-
## DPoP Token Binding
-
-
DPoP (Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession) binds access tokens to client-controlled cryptographic keys, preventing token theft and replay attacks.
-
-
### What is DPoP?
-
-
DPoP is an OAuth extension (RFC 9449) that adds proof-of-possession semantics to bearer tokens. When a PDS issues a DPoP-bound access token:
-
-
1. Access token contains `cnf.jkt` claim (JWK thumbprint of client's public key)
-
2. Client creates a DPoP proof JWT signed with their private key
-
3. Server verifies the proof signature and checks it matches the token's `cnf.jkt`
-
-
### CRITICAL: DPoP Security Model
-
-
> โš ๏ธ **DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, NOT a replacement for token signature verification.**
-
-
The correct verification order is:
-
1. **ALWAYS verify the access token signature first** (via JWKS, HS256 shared secret, or DID resolution)
-
2. **If the verified token has `cnf.jkt`, REQUIRE valid DPoP proof**
-
3. **NEVER use DPoP as a fallback when signature verification fails**
-
-
**Why This Matters**: An attacker could create a fake token with `sub: "did:plc:victim"` and their own `cnf.jkt`, then present a valid DPoP proof signed with their key. If we accept DPoP as a fallback, the attacker can impersonate any user.
-
-
### How DPoP Works
-
-
```
-
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ” โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
-
โ”‚ Client โ”‚ โ”‚ Server โ”‚
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚ (Coves) โ”‚
-
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜ โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
-
โ”‚ โ”‚
-
โ”‚ 1. Authorization: DPoP <token> โ”‚
-
โ”‚ DPoP: <proof-jwt> โ”‚
-
โ”‚โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€>โ”‚
-
โ”‚ โ”‚
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ 2. VERIFY token signature
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ (REQUIRED - no fallback!)
-
โ”‚ โ”‚
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ 3. If token has cnf.jkt:
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ - Verify DPoP proof
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ - Check thumbprint match
-
โ”‚ โ”‚
-
โ”‚ 200 OK โ”‚
-
โ”‚<โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”‚
-
```
-
-
### When DPoP is Required
-
-
DPoP verification is **REQUIRED** when:
-
- Access token signature has been verified AND
-
- Access token contains `cnf.jkt` claim (DPoP-bound)
-
-
If the token has `cnf.jkt` but no DPoP header is present, the request is **REJECTED**.
-
-
### Replay Protection
-
-
DPoP proofs include a unique `jti` (JWT ID) claim. The server tracks seen `jti` values to prevent replay attacks:
-
-
```go
-
// Create a verifier with replay protection (default)
-
verifier := auth.NewDPoPVerifier()
-
defer verifier.Stop() // Stop cleanup goroutine on shutdown
-
-
// The verifier automatically rejects reused jti values within the proof validity window (5 minutes)
-
```
-
-
### DPoP Implementation
-
-
The `dpop.go` module provides:
-
-
```go
-
// Create a verifier with replay protection
-
verifier := auth.NewDPoPVerifier()
-
defer verifier.Stop()
-
-
// Verify the DPoP proof
-
proof, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(dpopHeader, "POST", "https://coves.social/xrpc/...")
-
if err != nil {
-
// Invalid proof (includes replay detection)
-
}
-
-
// Verify it binds to the VERIFIED access token
-
expectedThumbprint, err := auth.ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err != nil {
-
// Token not DPoP-bound
-
}
-
-
if err := verifier.VerifyTokenBinding(proof, expectedThumbprint); err != nil {
-
// Proof doesn't match token
-
}
-
```
-
-
### DPoP Proof Format
-
-
The DPoP header contains a JWT with:
-
-
**Header**:
-
- `typ`: `"dpop+jwt"` (required)
-
- `alg`: `"ES256"` (or other supported algorithm)
-
- `jwk`: Client's public key (JWK format)
-
-
**Claims**:
-
- `jti`: Unique proof identifier (tracked for replay protection)
-
- `htm`: HTTP method (e.g., `"POST"`)
-
- `htu`: HTTP URI (without query/fragment)
-
- `iat`: Timestamp (must be recent, within 5 minutes)
-
-
**Example**:
-
```json
-
{
-
"typ": "dpop+jwt",
-
"alg": "ES256",
-
"jwk": {
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "...",
-
"y": "..."
-
}
-
}
-
{
-
"jti": "unique-id-123",
-
"htm": "POST",
-
"htu": "https://coves.social/xrpc/social.coves.community.create",
-
"iat": 1700000000
-
}
-
```
-
-
## Security Considerations
-
-
### โœ… Implemented
-
-
- JWT signature verification with PDS public keys
-
- Token expiration validation
-
- DID format validation
-
- Required claims validation (sub, iss)
-
- Key caching with TTL
-
- Secure error messages (no internal details leaked)
-
- **DPoP proof verification** (proof-of-possession for token binding)
-
- **DPoP thumbprint validation** (prevents token theft attacks)
-
- **DPoP freshness checks** (5-minute proof validity window)
-
- **DPoP replay protection** (jti tracking with in-memory cache)
-
- **Secure DPoP model** (DPoP required AFTER signature verification, never as fallback)
-
-
### โš ๏ธ Not Yet Implemented
-
-
- Server-issued DPoP nonces (additional replay protection)
-
- Scope validation (checking `scope` claim)
-
- Audience validation (checking `aud` claim)
-
- Rate limiting per DID
-
- Token revocation checking
-
-
## Testing
-
-
Run the test suite:
-
-
```bash
-
go test ./internal/atproto/auth/... -v
-
```
-
-
### Manual Testing
-
-
1. **Phase 1 (Parse Only)**:
-
```bash
-
# Create a test JWT (use jwt.io or a tool)
-
export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true
-
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \
-
-H "Authorization: DPoP <test-jwt>" \
-
-H "DPoP: <test-dpop-proof>" \
-
-d '{"name":"Test","hostedByDid":"did:plc:test"}'
-
```
-
-
2. **Phase 2 (Full Verification)**:
-
```bash
-
# Use a real JWT from a PDS
-
export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false
-
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \
-
-H "Authorization: DPoP <real-jwt>" \
-
-H "DPoP: <real-dpop-proof>" \
-
-d '{"name":"Test","hostedByDid":"did:plc:test"}'
-
```
-
-
## Error Responses
-
-
### 401 Unauthorized
-
-
Missing or invalid token:
-
-
```json
-
{
-
"error": "AuthenticationRequired",
-
"message": "Missing Authorization header"
-
}
-
```
-
-
```json
-
{
-
"error": "AuthenticationRequired",
-
"message": "Invalid or expired token"
-
}
-
```
-
-
### Common Issues
-
-
1. **Missing Authorization header** โ†’ Add `Authorization: DPoP <token>` and `DPoP: <proof>`
-
2. **Token expired** โ†’ Get a new token from PDS
-
3. **Invalid signature** โ†’ Ensure token is from a valid PDS
-
4. **JWKS fetch fails** โ†’ Check PDS availability and network connectivity
-
-
## Future Enhancements
-
-
- [ ] DPoP nonce validation (server-managed nonce for additional replay protection)
-
- [ ] Scope-based authorization
-
- [ ] Audience claim validation
-
- [ ] Token revocation support
-
- [ ] Rate limiting per DID
-
- [ ] Metrics and monitoring
-122
internal/atproto/auth/did_key_fetcher.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"context"
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"encoding/base64"
-
"fmt"
-
"math/big"
-
"strings"
-
-
indigoCrypto "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
-
indigoIdentity "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/identity"
-
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
-
)
-
-
// DIDKeyFetcher fetches public keys from DID documents for JWT verification.
-
// This is the primary method for atproto service authentication, where:
-
// - The JWT issuer is the user's DID (e.g., did:plc:abc123)
-
// - The signing key is published in the user's DID document
-
// - Verification happens by resolving the DID and checking the signature
-
type DIDKeyFetcher struct {
-
directory indigoIdentity.Directory
-
}
-
-
// NewDIDKeyFetcher creates a new DID-based key fetcher.
-
func NewDIDKeyFetcher(directory indigoIdentity.Directory) *DIDKeyFetcher {
-
return &DIDKeyFetcher{
-
directory: directory,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// FetchPublicKey fetches the public key for verifying a JWT from the issuer's DID document.
-
// For DID issuers (did:plc: or did:web:), resolves the DID and extracts the signing key.
-
//
-
// Returns:
-
// - indigoCrypto.PublicKey for secp256k1 (ES256K) keys - use indigo for verification
-
// - *ecdsa.PublicKey for NIST curves (P-256, P-384, P-521) - compatible with golang-jwt
-
func (f *DIDKeyFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
// Only handle DID issuers
-
if !strings.HasPrefix(issuer, "did:") {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DIDKeyFetcher only handles DID issuers, got: %s", issuer)
-
}
-
-
// Parse the DID
-
did, err := syntax.ParseDID(issuer)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DID format: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Resolve the DID to get the identity (includes public keys)
-
ident, err := f.directory.LookupDID(ctx, did)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve DID %s: %w", issuer, err)
-
}
-
-
// Get the atproto signing key from the DID document
-
pubKey, err := ident.PublicKey()
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get public key from DID document: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Convert to JWK format to check curve type
-
jwk, err := pubKey.JWK()
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert public key to JWK: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// For secp256k1 (ES256K), return indigo's PublicKey directly
-
// since Go's crypto/ecdsa doesn't support this curve
-
if jwk.Curve == "secp256k1" {
-
return pubKey, nil
-
}
-
-
// For NIST curves, convert to Go's ecdsa.PublicKey for golang-jwt compatibility
-
return atcryptoJWKToECDSA(jwk)
-
}
-
-
// atcryptoJWKToECDSA converts an indigoCrypto.JWK to a Go ecdsa.PublicKey.
-
// Note: secp256k1 is handled separately in FetchPublicKey by returning indigo's PublicKey directly.
-
func atcryptoJWKToECDSA(jwk *indigoCrypto.JWK) (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
-
if jwk.KeyType != "EC" {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported JWK key type: %s (expected EC)", jwk.KeyType)
-
}
-
-
// Decode X and Y coordinates (base64url, no padding)
-
xBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK X coordinate encoding: %w", err)
-
}
-
yBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.Y)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK Y coordinate encoding: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
var ecCurve elliptic.Curve
-
switch jwk.Curve {
-
case "P-256":
-
ecCurve = elliptic.P256()
-
case "P-384":
-
ecCurve = elliptic.P384()
-
case "P-521":
-
ecCurve = elliptic.P521()
-
default:
-
// secp256k1 should be handled before calling this function
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported JWK curve for Go ecdsa: %s (secp256k1 uses indigo)", jwk.Curve)
-
}
-
-
// Create the public key
-
pubKey := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
-
Curve: ecCurve,
-
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(xBytes),
-
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(yBytes),
-
}
-
-
// Validate point is on curve
-
if !ecCurve.IsOnCurve(pubKey.X, pubKey.Y) {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid public key: point not on curve")
-
}
-
-
return pubKey, nil
-
}
-1308
internal/atproto/auth/dpop_test.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"crypto/rand"
-
"crypto/sha256"
-
"encoding/base64"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"strings"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
-
indigoCrypto "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
-
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
-
"github.com/google/uuid"
-
)
-
-
// === Test Helpers ===
-
-
// testECKey holds a test ES256 key pair
-
type testECKey struct {
-
privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
-
publicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
-
jwk map[string]interface{}
-
thumbprint string
-
}
-
-
// generateTestES256Key generates a test ES256 key pair and JWK
-
func generateTestES256Key(t *testing.T) *testECKey {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to generate test key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Encode public key coordinates as base64url
-
xBytes := privateKey.PublicKey.X.Bytes()
-
yBytes := privateKey.PublicKey.Y.Bytes()
-
-
// P-256 coordinates must be 32 bytes (pad if needed)
-
xBytes = padTo32Bytes(xBytes)
-
yBytes = padTo32Bytes(yBytes)
-
-
x := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(xBytes)
-
y := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(yBytes)
-
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": x,
-
"y": y,
-
}
-
-
// Calculate thumbprint
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
return &testECKey{
-
privateKey: privateKey,
-
publicKey: &privateKey.PublicKey,
-
jwk: jwk,
-
thumbprint: thumbprint,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// padTo32Bytes pads a byte slice to 32 bytes (required for P-256 coordinates)
-
func padTo32Bytes(b []byte) []byte {
-
if len(b) >= 32 {
-
return b
-
}
-
padded := make([]byte, 32)
-
copy(padded[32-len(b):], b)
-
return padded
-
}
-
-
// createDPoPProof creates a DPoP proof JWT for testing
-
func createDPoPProof(t *testing.T, key *testECKey, method, uri string, iat time.Time, jti string) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create DPoP proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
return tokenString
-
}
-
-
// === JWK Thumbprint Tests (RFC 7638) ===
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_EC_P256(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test with known values from RFC 7638 Appendix A (adapted for P-256)
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "WKn-ZIGevcwGIyyrzFoZNBdaq9_TsqzGl96oc0CWuis",
-
"y": "y77t-RvAHRKTsSGdIYUfweuOvwrvDD-Q3Hv5J0fSKbE",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint == "" {
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty thumbprint")
-
}
-
-
// Verify it's valid base64url
-
_, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(thumbprint)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Errorf("Thumbprint is not valid base64url: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify length (SHA-256 produces 32 bytes = 43 base64url chars)
-
if len(thumbprint) != 43 {
-
t.Errorf("Expected thumbprint length 43, got %d", len(thumbprint))
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_Deterministic(t *testing.T) {
-
// Same key should produce same thumbprint
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "test-x-coordinate",
-
"y": "test-y-coordinate",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint1, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("First CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
thumbprint2, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Second CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint1 != thumbprint2 {
-
t.Errorf("Thumbprints are not deterministic: %s != %s", thumbprint1, thumbprint2)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_DifferentKeys(t *testing.T) {
-
// Different keys should produce different thumbprints
-
jwk1 := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "coordinate-x-1",
-
"y": "coordinate-y-1",
-
}
-
-
jwk2 := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "coordinate-x-2",
-
"y": "coordinate-y-2",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint1, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk1)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("First CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
thumbprint2, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk2)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Second CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint1 == thumbprint2 {
-
t.Error("Different keys produced same thumbprint (collision)")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_MissingKty(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "test-x",
-
"y": "test-y",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing kty, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing kty") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about missing kty, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_EC_MissingCrv(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"x": "test-x",
-
"y": "test-y",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing crv, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing crv") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about missing crv, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_EC_MissingX(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"y": "test-y",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing x, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing x") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about missing x, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_EC_MissingY(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "test-x",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing y, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing y") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about missing y, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_RSA(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test RSA key thumbprint calculation
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "RSA",
-
"e": "AQAB",
-
"n": "test-modulus",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed for RSA: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint == "" {
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty thumbprint for RSA key")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_OKP(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test OKP (Octet Key Pair) thumbprint calculation
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "OKP",
-
"crv": "Ed25519",
-
"x": "test-x-coordinate",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed for OKP: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint == "" {
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty thumbprint for OKP key")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_UnsupportedKeyType(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "UNKNOWN",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for unsupported key type, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "unsupported JWK key type") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about unsupported key type, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_CanonicalJSON(t *testing.T) {
-
// RFC 7638 requires lexicographic ordering of keys in canonical JSON
-
// This test verifies that the canonical JSON is correctly ordered
-
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "x-coord",
-
"y": "y-coord",
-
}
-
-
// The canonical JSON should be: {"crv":"P-256","kty":"EC","x":"x-coord","y":"y-coord"}
-
// (lexicographically ordered: crv, kty, x, y)
-
-
canonical := map[string]string{
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"x": "x-coord",
-
"y": "y-coord",
-
}
-
-
canonicalJSON, err := json.Marshal(canonical)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal canonical JSON: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
expectedHash := sha256.Sum256(canonicalJSON)
-
expectedThumbprint := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(expectedHash[:])
-
-
actualThumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if actualThumbprint != expectedThumbprint {
-
t.Errorf("Thumbprint doesn't match expected canonical JSON hash\nExpected: %s\nGot: %s",
-
expectedThumbprint, actualThumbprint)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === DPoP Proof Verification Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for valid proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if result == nil {
-
t.Fatal("Expected non-nil proof result")
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.HTTPMethod != method {
-
t.Errorf("Expected method %s, got %s", method, result.Claims.HTTPMethod)
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.HTTPURI != uri {
-
t.Errorf("Expected URI %s, got %s", uri, result.Claims.HTTPURI)
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.ID != jti {
-
t.Errorf("Expected jti %s, got %s", jti, result.Claims.ID)
-
}
-
-
if result.Thumbprint != key.thumbprint {
-
t.Errorf("Expected thumbprint %s, got %s", key.thumbprint, result.Thumbprint)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
wrongKey := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
// Create proof with one key
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
// Parse and modify to use wrong key's JWK in header (signature won't match)
-
parts := splitJWT(proof)
-
header := parseJWTHeader(t, parts[0])
-
header["jwk"] = wrongKey.jwk
-
modifiedHeader := encodeJSON(t, header)
-
tamperedProof := modifiedHeader + "." + parts[1] + "." + parts[2]
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(tamperedProof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for invalid signature, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "signature verification failed") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected signature verification error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_WrongHTTPMethod(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
wrongMethod := "GET"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, wrongMethod, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for HTTP method mismatch, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "htm mismatch") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected htm mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_WrongURI(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
wrongURI := "https://api.example.com/different"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, wrongURI)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for URI mismatch, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "htu mismatch") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected htu mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_URIWithQuery(t *testing.T) {
-
// URI comparison should strip query and fragment
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
baseURI := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
uriWithQuery := baseURI + "?param=value"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, baseURI, iat, jti)
-
-
// Should succeed because query is stripped
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uriWithQuery)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for URI with query: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_URIWithFragment(t *testing.T) {
-
// URI comparison should strip query and fragment
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
baseURI := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
uriWithFragment := baseURI + "#section"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, baseURI, iat, jti)
-
-
// Should succeed because fragment is stripped
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uriWithFragment)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for URI with fragment: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ExpiredProof(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
// Proof issued 10 minutes ago (exceeds default MaxProofAge of 5 minutes)
-
iat := time.Now().Add(-10 * time.Minute)
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for expired proof, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "too old") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected 'too old' error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_FutureProof(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
// Proof issued 1 minute in the future (exceeds MaxClockSkew)
-
iat := time.Now().Add(1 * time.Minute)
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for future proof, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "in the future") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected 'in the future' error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_WithinClockSkew(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
// Proof issued 15 seconds in the future (within MaxClockSkew of 30s)
-
iat := time.Now().Add(15 * time.Second)
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for proof within clock skew: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_MissingJti(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
// No ID (jti)
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing jti, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jti") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jti error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_MissingTypHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
// Don't set typ header
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing typ header, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "typ must be 'dpop+jwt'") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected typ header error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_WrongTypHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "JWT" // Wrong typ
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for wrong typ header, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "typ must be 'dpop+jwt'") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected typ header error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_MissingJWK(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
// Don't include JWK
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing jwk header, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jwk") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jwk error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_CustomTimeSettings(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := &DPoPVerifier{
-
MaxClockSkew: 1 * time.Minute,
-
MaxProofAge: 10 * time.Minute,
-
}
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
// Proof issued 50 seconds in the future (within custom MaxClockSkew)
-
iat := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Second)
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed with custom time settings: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_HTTPMethodCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
-
// HTTP method comparison should be case-insensitive per spec
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "post"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
// Verify with uppercase method
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, "POST", uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for case-insensitive method: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === Token Binding Verification Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyTokenBinding_Matching(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify token binding with matching thumbprint
-
err = verifier.VerifyTokenBinding(result, key.thumbprint)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyTokenBinding failed for matching thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyTokenBinding_Mismatch(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
wrongKey := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify token binding with wrong thumbprint
-
err = verifier.VerifyTokenBinding(result, wrongKey.thumbprint)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for thumbprint mismatch, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "thumbprint mismatch") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected thumbprint mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === ExtractCnfJkt Tests ===
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
expectedJkt := "test-thumbprint-123"
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": expectedJkt,
-
},
-
}
-
-
jkt, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ExtractCnfJkt failed for valid claims: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if jkt != expectedJkt {
-
t.Errorf("Expected jkt %s, got %s", expectedJkt, jkt)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_MissingCnf(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
// No Confirmation
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing cnf, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing cnf claim") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing cnf error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_NilCnf(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: nil,
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for nil cnf, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing cnf claim") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing cnf error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_MissingJkt(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"other": "value",
-
},
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing jkt, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jkt") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jkt error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_EmptyJkt(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": "",
-
},
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for empty jkt, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jkt") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jkt error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_WrongType(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": 123, // Not a string
-
},
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for wrong type jkt, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jkt") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jkt error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === Helper Functions for Tests ===
-
-
// splitJWT splits a JWT into its three parts
-
func splitJWT(token string) []string {
-
return []string{
-
token[:strings.IndexByte(token, '.')],
-
token[strings.IndexByte(token, '.')+1 : strings.LastIndexByte(token, '.')],
-
token[strings.LastIndexByte(token, '.')+1:],
-
}
-
}
-
-
// parseJWTHeader parses a base64url-encoded JWT header
-
func parseJWTHeader(t *testing.T, encoded string) map[string]interface{} {
-
t.Helper()
-
decoded, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to decode header: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
var header map[string]interface{}
-
if err := json.Unmarshal(decoded, &header); err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to unmarshal header: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
return header
-
}
-
-
// encodeJSON encodes a value to base64url-encoded JSON
-
func encodeJSON(t *testing.T, v interface{}) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
data, err := json.Marshal(v)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal JSON: %v", err)
-
}
-
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(data)
-
}
-
-
// === ES256K (secp256k1) Test Helpers ===
-
-
// testES256KKey holds a test ES256K key pair using indigo
-
type testES256KKey struct {
-
privateKey indigoCrypto.PrivateKey
-
publicKey indigoCrypto.PublicKey
-
jwk map[string]interface{}
-
thumbprint string
-
}
-
-
// generateTestES256KKey generates a test ES256K (secp256k1) key pair and JWK
-
func generateTestES256KKey(t *testing.T) *testES256KKey {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
privateKey, err := indigoCrypto.GeneratePrivateKeyK256()
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to generate ES256K test key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
publicKey, err := privateKey.PublicKey()
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to get public key from ES256K private key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Get the JWK representation
-
jwkStruct, err := publicKey.JWK()
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to get JWK from ES256K public key: %v", err)
-
}
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": jwkStruct.KeyType,
-
"crv": jwkStruct.Curve,
-
"x": jwkStruct.X,
-
"y": jwkStruct.Y,
-
}
-
-
// Calculate thumbprint
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to calculate ES256K thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
return &testES256KKey{
-
privateKey: privateKey,
-
publicKey: publicKey,
-
jwk: jwk,
-
thumbprint: thumbprint,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// createES256KDPoPProof creates a DPoP proof JWT using ES256K for testing
-
func createES256KDPoPProof(t *testing.T, key *testES256KKey, method, uri string, iat time.Time, jti string) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
// Build claims
-
claims := map[string]interface{}{
-
"jti": jti,
-
"iat": iat.Unix(),
-
"htm": method,
-
"htu": uri,
-
}
-
-
// Build header
-
header := map[string]interface{}{
-
"typ": "dpop+jwt",
-
"alg": "ES256K",
-
"jwk": key.jwk,
-
}
-
-
// Encode header and claims
-
headerJSON, err := json.Marshal(header)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal header: %v", err)
-
}
-
claimsJSON, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal claims: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
headerB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
-
claimsB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(claimsJSON)
-
-
// Sign with indigo
-
signingInput := headerB64 + "." + claimsB64
-
signature, err := key.privateKey.HashAndSign([]byte(signingInput))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to sign ES256K proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
signatureB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)
-
return signingInput + "." + signatureB64
-
}
-
-
// === ES256K Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ES256K_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256KKey(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createES256KDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for valid ES256K proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if result == nil {
-
t.Fatal("Expected non-nil proof result")
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.HTTPMethod != method {
-
t.Errorf("Expected method %s, got %s", method, result.Claims.HTTPMethod)
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.HTTPURI != uri {
-
t.Errorf("Expected URI %s, got %s", uri, result.Claims.HTTPURI)
-
}
-
-
if result.Thumbprint != key.thumbprint {
-
t.Errorf("Expected thumbprint %s, got %s", key.thumbprint, result.Thumbprint)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ES256K_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256KKey(t)
-
wrongKey := generateTestES256KKey(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
// Create proof with one key
-
proof := createES256KDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
// Tamper by replacing JWK with wrong key
-
parts := splitJWT(proof)
-
header := parseJWTHeader(t, parts[0])
-
header["jwk"] = wrongKey.jwk
-
modifiedHeader := encodeJSON(t, header)
-
tamperedProof := modifiedHeader + "." + parts[1] + "." + parts[2]
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(tamperedProof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for invalid ES256K signature, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "signature verification failed") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected signature verification error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_ES256K(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test thumbprint calculation for secp256k1 keys
-
key := generateTestES256KKey(t)
-
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(key.jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed for ES256K: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint == "" {
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty thumbprint for ES256K key")
-
}
-
-
// Verify it's valid base64url
-
_, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(thumbprint)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Errorf("ES256K thumbprint is not valid base64url: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify length (SHA-256 produces 32 bytes = 43 base64url chars)
-
if len(thumbprint) != 43 {
-
t.Errorf("Expected ES256K thumbprint length 43, got %d", len(thumbprint))
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === Algorithm-Curve Binding Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_AlgorithmCurveMismatch_ES256KWithP256Key(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t) // P-256 key
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
// Create a proof claiming ES256K but using P-256 key
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["alg"] = "ES256K" // Claim ES256K
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk // But use P-256 key
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for ES256K algorithm with P-256 curve, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "requires curve secp256k1") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected curve mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_AlgorithmCurveMismatch_ES256WithSecp256k1Key(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256KKey(t) // secp256k1 key
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
// Build claims
-
claims := map[string]interface{}{
-
"jti": jti,
-
"iat": iat.Unix(),
-
"htm": method,
-
"htu": uri,
-
}
-
-
// Build header claiming ES256 but using secp256k1 key
-
header := map[string]interface{}{
-
"typ": "dpop+jwt",
-
"alg": "ES256", // Claim ES256
-
"jwk": key.jwk, // But use secp256k1 key
-
}
-
-
headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
-
claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
-
-
headerB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
-
claimsB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(claimsJSON)
-
-
signingInput := headerB64 + "." + claimsB64
-
signature, err := key.privateKey.HashAndSign([]byte(signingInput))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to sign: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
proof := signingInput + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for ES256 algorithm with secp256k1 curve, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "requires curve P-256") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected curve mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === exp/nbf Validation Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ExpiredWithExpClaim(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute)
-
exp := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Minute) // Expired 1 minute ago
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for expired proof with exp claim, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "expired") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected expiration error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_NotYetValidWithNbfClaim(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
nbf := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute) // Not valid for another 5 minutes
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(nbf),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for not-yet-valid proof with nbf claim, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "not valid before") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected not-before error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ValidWithExpClaimInFuture(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
exp := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute) // Valid for 5 more minutes
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for valid proof with exp in future: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if result == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected non-nil result for valid proof")
-
}
-
}
-189
internal/atproto/auth/jwks_fetcher.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"context"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"fmt"
-
"net/http"
-
"strings"
-
"sync"
-
"time"
-
)
-
-
// CachedJWKSFetcher fetches and caches JWKS from authorization servers
-
type CachedJWKSFetcher struct {
-
cache map[string]*cachedJWKS
-
httpClient *http.Client
-
cacheMutex sync.RWMutex
-
cacheTTL time.Duration
-
}
-
-
type cachedJWKS struct {
-
jwks *JWKS
-
expiresAt time.Time
-
}
-
-
// NewCachedJWKSFetcher creates a new JWKS fetcher with caching
-
func NewCachedJWKSFetcher(cacheTTL time.Duration) *CachedJWKSFetcher {
-
return &CachedJWKSFetcher{
-
cache: make(map[string]*cachedJWKS),
-
httpClient: &http.Client{
-
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
-
},
-
cacheTTL: cacheTTL,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// FetchPublicKey fetches the public key for verifying a JWT from the issuer
-
// Implements JWKSFetcher interface
-
// Returns interface{} to support both RSA and ECDSA keys
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
// Extract key ID from token
-
kid, err := ExtractKeyID(token)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to extract key ID: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Get JWKS from cache or fetch
-
jwks, err := f.getJWKS(ctx, issuer)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
// Find the key by ID
-
jwk, err := jwks.FindKeyByID(kid)
-
if err != nil {
-
// Key not found in cache - try refreshing
-
jwks, err = f.fetchJWKS(ctx, issuer)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh JWKS: %w", err)
-
}
-
f.cacheJWKS(issuer, jwks)
-
-
// Try again with fresh JWKS
-
jwk, err = jwks.FindKeyByID(kid)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Convert JWK to public key (RSA or ECDSA)
-
return jwk.ToPublicKey()
-
}
-
-
// getJWKS gets JWKS from cache or fetches if not cached/expired
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) getJWKS(ctx context.Context, issuer string) (*JWKS, error) {
-
// Check cache first
-
f.cacheMutex.RLock()
-
cached, exists := f.cache[issuer]
-
f.cacheMutex.RUnlock()
-
-
if exists && time.Now().Before(cached.expiresAt) {
-
return cached.jwks, nil
-
}
-
-
// Not in cache or expired - fetch from issuer
-
jwks, err := f.fetchJWKS(ctx, issuer)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
// Cache it
-
f.cacheJWKS(issuer, jwks)
-
-
return jwks, nil
-
}
-
-
// fetchJWKS fetches JWKS from the authorization server
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) fetchJWKS(ctx context.Context, issuer string) (*JWKS, error) {
-
// Step 1: Fetch OAuth server metadata to get JWKS URI
-
metadataURL := strings.TrimSuffix(issuer, "/") + "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"
-
-
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", metadataURL, nil)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create metadata request: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
resp, err := f.httpClient.Do(req)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch metadata: %w", err)
-
}
-
defer func() {
-
_ = resp.Body.Close()
-
}()
-
-
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("metadata endpoint returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
-
}
-
-
var metadata struct {
-
JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri"`
-
}
-
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&metadata); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode metadata: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
if metadata.JWKSURI == "" {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("jwks_uri not found in metadata")
-
}
-
-
// Step 2: Fetch JWKS from the JWKS URI
-
jwksReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", metadata.JWKSURI, nil)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create JWKS request: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
jwksResp, err := f.httpClient.Do(jwksReq)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch JWKS: %w", err)
-
}
-
defer func() {
-
_ = jwksResp.Body.Close()
-
}()
-
-
if jwksResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("JWKS endpoint returned status %d", jwksResp.StatusCode)
-
}
-
-
var jwks JWKS
-
if err := json.NewDecoder(jwksResp.Body).Decode(&jwks); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWKS: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
if len(jwks.Keys) == 0 {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no keys found in JWKS")
-
}
-
-
return &jwks, nil
-
}
-
-
// cacheJWKS stores JWKS in the cache
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) cacheJWKS(issuer string, jwks *JWKS) {
-
f.cacheMutex.Lock()
-
defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()
-
-
f.cache[issuer] = &cachedJWKS{
-
jwks: jwks,
-
expiresAt: time.Now().Add(f.cacheTTL),
-
}
-
}
-
-
// ClearCache clears the entire JWKS cache
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) ClearCache() {
-
f.cacheMutex.Lock()
-
defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()
-
f.cache = make(map[string]*cachedJWKS)
-
}
-
-
// CleanupExpiredCache removes expired entries from the cache
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) CleanupExpiredCache() {
-
f.cacheMutex.Lock()
-
defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()
-
-
now := time.Now()
-
for issuer, cached := range f.cache {
-
if now.After(cached.expiresAt) {
-
delete(f.cache, issuer)
-
}
-
}
-
}
-496
internal/atproto/auth/jwt_test.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"context"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
-
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
-
)
-
-
func TestParseJWT(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a test JWT token
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto transition:generic",
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Test parsing
-
parsedClaims, err := ParseJWT(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ParseJWT failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if parsedClaims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Subject)
-
}
-
-
if parsedClaims.Issuer != "https://test-pds.example.com" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected issuer 'https://test-pds.example.com', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Issuer)
-
}
-
-
if parsedClaims.Scope != "atproto transition:generic" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected scope 'atproto transition:generic', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Scope)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWT_MissingSubject(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a token without subject
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Test parsing - should fail
-
_, err = ParseJWT(tokenString)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing subject, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWT_MissingIssuer(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a token without issuer
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Test parsing - should fail
-
_, err = ParseJWT(tokenString)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing issuer, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWT_WithBearerPrefix(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a test JWT token
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Test parsing with Bearer prefix
-
parsedClaims, err := ParseJWT("Bearer " + tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ParseJWT failed with Bearer prefix: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if parsedClaims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Subject)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestValidateClaims_Expired(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)), // Expired
-
},
-
}
-
-
err := validateClaims(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for expired token, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestValidateClaims_InvalidDID(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "invalid-did-format",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
-
err := validateClaims(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for invalid DID format, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractKeyID(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a test JWT token with kid in header
-
token := jwt.New(jwt.SigningMethodRS256)
-
token.Header["kid"] = "test-key-id"
-
token.Claims = &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
},
-
}
-
-
// Sign with a dummy RSA key (we just need a valid token structure)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("dummy"))
-
if err == nil {
-
// If it succeeds (shouldn't with wrong key type, but let's handle it)
-
kid, err := ExtractKeyID(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Logf("ExtractKeyID failed (expected if signing fails): %v", err)
-
} else if kid != "test-key-id" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected kid 'test-key-id', got '%s'", kid)
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === HS256 Verification Tests ===
-
-
// mockJWKSFetcher is a mock implementation of JWKSFetcher for testing
-
type mockJWKSFetcher struct {
-
publicKey interface{}
-
err error
-
}
-
-
func (m *mockJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
return m.publicKey, m.err
-
}
-
-
func createHS256Token(t *testing.T, subject, issuer, secret string, expiry time.Duration) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: subject,
-
Issuer: issuer,
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(expiry)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto transition:generic",
-
}
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte(secret))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
return tokenString
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
// Setup: Configure environment for HS256 verification
-
secret := "test-jwt-secret-key-12345"
-
issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", secret)
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, secret, 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify token
-
claims, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyJWT failed for valid HS256 token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if claims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", claims.Subject)
-
}
-
if claims.Issuer != issuer {
-
t.Errorf("Expected issuer '%s', got '%s'", issuer, claims.Issuer)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_WrongSecret(t *testing.T) {
-
// Setup: Configure environment with one secret, sign with another
-
issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "correct-secret")
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
// Create token with wrong secret
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, "wrong-secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify should fail
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for HS256 token with wrong secret, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_SecretNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {
-
// Setup: Whitelist issuer but don't configure secret
-
issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "") // Ensure secret is not set (empty = not configured)
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, "any-secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify should fail with descriptive error
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error when PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === Algorithm Confusion Attack Prevention Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_AlgorithmConfusionAttack_HS256WithNonWhitelistedIssuer(t *testing.T) {
-
// SECURITY TEST: This tests the algorithm confusion attack prevention
-
// An attacker tries to use HS256 with an issuer that should use RS256/ES256
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://trusted.example.com") // Different from token issuer
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
// Create HS256 token with non-whitelisted issuer (simulating attack)
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:attacker", "https://victim-pds.example.com", "some-secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify should fail because issuer is not in HS256 whitelist
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: HS256 token accepted for non-whitelisted issuer")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "not in HS256_ISSUERS whitelist") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about HS256 not allowed for issuer, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_AlgorithmConfusionAttack_EmptyWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
-
// SECURITY TEST: When no issuers are whitelisted for HS256, all HS256 tokens should be rejected
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "") // Empty whitelist
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://any-pds.example.com", "some-secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify should fail because no issuers are whitelisted for HS256
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: HS256 token accepted with empty issuer whitelist")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_IssuerRequiresHS256ButTokenUsesRS256(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test that issuer whitelisted for HS256 rejects tokens claiming to use RS256
-
issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "test-secret")
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
// Create RS256-signed token (can't actually sign without RSA key, but we can test the header check)
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: issuer,
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
-
// This will create an invalid signature but valid header structure
-
// The test should fail at algorithm check, not signature verification
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString([]byte("dummy-key"))
-
-
if tokenString != "" {
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error when HS256 issuer receives non-HS256 token")
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === ParseJWTHeader Tests ===
-
-
func TestParseJWTHeader_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://test.example.com", "secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
header, err := ParseJWTHeader(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ParseJWTHeader failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if header.Alg != AlgorithmHS256 {
-
t.Errorf("Expected alg '%s', got '%s'", AlgorithmHS256, header.Alg)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWTHeader_WithBearerPrefix(t *testing.T) {
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://test.example.com", "secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
header, err := ParseJWTHeader("Bearer " + tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ParseJWTHeader failed with Bearer prefix: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if header.Alg != AlgorithmHS256 {
-
t.Errorf("Expected alg '%s', got '%s'", AlgorithmHS256, header.Alg)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWTHeader_InvalidFormat(t *testing.T) {
-
testCases := []struct {
-
name string
-
input string
-
}{
-
{"empty string", ""},
-
{"single part", "abc"},
-
{"two parts", "abc.def"},
-
{"too many parts", "a.b.c.d"},
-
}
-
-
for _, tc := range testCases {
-
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-
_, err := ParseJWTHeader(tc.input)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error for invalid JWT format '%s', got nil", tc.input)
-
}
-
})
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === shouldUseHS256 and isHS256IssuerWhitelisted Tests ===
-
-
func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_Whitelisted(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com,https://pds2.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds1.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected pds1 to be whitelisted")
-
}
-
if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds2.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected pds2 to be whitelisted")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_NotWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
if isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://attacker.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected non-whitelisted issuer to return false")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_EmptyWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "") // Empty whitelist
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
if isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://any.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected false when whitelist is empty (safe default)")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_WhitespaceHandling(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", " https://pds1.example.com , https://pds2.example.com ")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds1.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected whitespace-trimmed issuer to be whitelisted")
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === shouldUseHS256 Tests (kid-based logic) ===
-
-
func TestShouldUseHS256_WithKid_AlwaysFalse(t *testing.T) {
-
// Tokens with kid should NEVER use HS256, regardless of issuer whitelist
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://whitelisted.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
header := &JWTHeader{
-
Alg: AlgorithmHS256,
-
Kid: "some-key-id", // Has kid
-
}
-
-
// Even whitelisted issuer should not use HS256 if token has kid
-
if shouldUseHS256(header, "https://whitelisted.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Tokens with kid should never use HS256 (supports federation)")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestShouldUseHS256_WithoutKid_WhitelistedIssuer(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
header := &JWTHeader{
-
Alg: AlgorithmHS256,
-
Kid: "", // No kid
-
}
-
-
if !shouldUseHS256(header, "https://my-pds.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Token without kid from whitelisted issuer should use HS256")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestShouldUseHS256_WithoutKid_NotWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
header := &JWTHeader{
-
Alg: AlgorithmHS256,
-
Kid: "", // No kid
-
}
-
-
if shouldUseHS256(header, "https://external-pds.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Token without kid from non-whitelisted issuer should NOT use HS256")
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Helper function
-
func contains(s, substr string) bool {
-
return len(s) >= len(substr) && (s == substr || len(s) > 0 && containsHelper(s, substr))
-
}
-
-
func containsHelper(s, substr string) bool {
-
for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ {
-
if s[i:i+len(substr)] == substr {
-
return true
-
}
-
}
-
return false
-
}
+1
docker-compose.prod.yml
···
# Instance identity
INSTANCE_DID: did:web:coves.social
INSTANCE_DOMAIN: coves.social
+
APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL: https://coves.social
# PDS connection (separate domain!)
PDS_URL: https://coves.me
+3 -1
internal/atproto/oauth/client.go
···
clientConfig = oauth.NewLocalhostConfig(callbackURL, config.Scopes)
} else {
// Production mode: public OAuth client with HTTPS
+
// client_id must be the URL of the client metadata document per atproto OAuth spec
+
clientID := config.PublicURL + "/oauth/client-metadata.json"
callbackURL := config.PublicURL + "/oauth/callback"
-
clientConfig = oauth.NewPublicConfig(config.PublicURL, callbackURL, config.Scopes)
+
clientConfig = oauth.NewPublicConfig(clientID, callbackURL, config.Scopes)
}
// Set user agent
+6 -5
internal/api/routes/oauth.go
···
// Use login limiter since callback completes the authentication flow
r.With(corsMiddleware(allowedOrigins), loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)
-
// Mobile Universal Link callback route
-
// This route is used for iOS Universal Links and Android App Links
-
// Path must match the path in .well-known/apple-app-site-association
-
// Uses the same handler as web callback - the system routes it to the mobile app
-
r.With(loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/app/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)
+
// Mobile Universal Link callback route (fallback when app doesn't intercept)
+
// This route exists for iOS Universal Links and Android App Links.
+
// When properly configured, the mobile OS intercepts this URL and opens the app
+
// BEFORE the request reaches the server. If this handler is reached, it means
+
// Universal Links failed to intercept.
+
r.With(loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/app/oauth/callback", handler.HandleMobileDeepLinkFallback)
// Session management - dedicated rate limits
r.With(logoutLimiter.Middleware).Post("/oauth/logout", handler.HandleLogout)
+11
static/.well-known/apple-app-site-association
···
+
{
+
"applinks": {
+
"apps": [],
+
"details": [
+
{
+
"appID": "TEAM_ID.social.coves",
+
"paths": ["/app/oauth/callback"]
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
}
+10
static/.well-known/assetlinks.json
···
+
[{
+
"relation": ["delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"],
+
"target": {
+
"namespace": "android_app",
+
"package_name": "social.coves",
+
"sha256_cert_fingerprints": [
+
"0B:D8:8C:99:66:25:E5:CD:06:54:80:88:01:6F:B7:38:B9:F4:5B:41:71:F7:95:C8:68:94:87:AD:EA:9F:D9:ED"
+
]
+
}
+
}]
+16 -9
internal/atproto/oauth/handlers_test.go
···
}
// TestIsMobileRedirectURI tests mobile redirect URI validation with EXACT URI matching
-
// Only Universal Links (HTTPS) are allowed - custom schemes are blocked for security
+
// Per atproto spec, custom schemes must match client_id hostname in reverse-domain order
func TestIsMobileRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
uri string
expected bool
}{
-
{"https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback", true}, // Universal Link - allowed
-
{"coves-app://oauth/callback", false}, // Custom scheme - blocked (insecure)
-
{"coves://oauth/callback", false}, // Custom scheme - blocked (insecure)
-
{"coves-app://callback", false}, // Custom scheme - blocked
-
{"coves://oauth", false}, // Custom scheme - blocked
-
{"myapp://oauth", false}, // Not in allowlist
-
{"https://example.com", false}, // Wrong domain
-
{"http://localhost", false}, // HTTP not allowed
+
// Custom scheme per atproto spec (reverse domain of coves.social)
+
{"social.coves:/callback", true},
+
{"social.coves://callback", true},
+
{"social.coves:/oauth/callback", true},
+
{"social.coves://oauth/callback", true},
+
// Universal Link - allowed (strongest security)
+
{"https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback", true},
+
// Wrong custom schemes - not reverse-domain of coves.social
+
{"coves-app://oauth/callback", false},
+
{"coves://oauth/callback", false},
+
{"coves.social://callback", false}, // Not reversed
+
{"myapp://oauth", false},
+
// Wrong domain/scheme
+
{"https://example.com", false},
+
{"http://localhost", false},
{"", false},
{"not-a-uri", false},
}
+41
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/feed/vote/delete.json
···
+
{
+
"lexicon": 1,
+
"id": "social.coves.feed.vote.delete",
+
"defs": {
+
"main": {
+
"type": "procedure",
+
"description": "Delete a vote on a post or comment",
+
"input": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["subject"],
+
"properties": {
+
"subject": {
+
"type": "ref",
+
"ref": "com.atproto.repo.strongRef",
+
"description": "Strong reference to the post or comment to remove the vote from"
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"output": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"properties": {}
+
}
+
},
+
"errors": [
+
{
+
"name": "VoteNotFound",
+
"description": "No vote found for this subject"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "NotAuthorized",
+
"description": "User is not authorized to delete this vote"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
}
+
}
+115
internal/api/handlers/vote/create_vote.go
···
+
package vote
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
)
+
+
// CreateVoteHandler handles vote creation
+
type CreateVoteHandler struct {
+
service votes.Service
+
}
+
+
// NewCreateVoteHandler creates a new create vote handler
+
func NewCreateVoteHandler(service votes.Service) *CreateVoteHandler {
+
return &CreateVoteHandler{
+
service: service,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// CreateVoteInput represents the request body for creating a vote
+
type CreateVoteInput struct {
+
Subject struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
} `json:"subject"`
+
Direction string `json:"direction"`
+
}
+
+
// CreateVoteOutput represents the response body for creating a vote
+
type CreateVoteOutput struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
}
+
+
// HandleCreateVote creates a vote on a post or comment
+
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.vote.create
+
//
+
// Request body: { "subject": { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." }, "direction": "up" }
+
// Response: { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." }
+
//
+
// Behavior:
+
// - If no vote exists: creates new vote with given direction
+
// - If vote exists with same direction: deletes vote (toggle off)
+
// - If vote exists with different direction: updates to new direction
+
func (h *CreateVoteHandler) HandleCreateVote(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Parse request body
+
var input CreateVoteInput
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Validate required fields
+
if input.Subject.URI == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.uri is required")
+
return
+
}
+
if input.Subject.CID == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.cid is required")
+
return
+
}
+
if input.Direction == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "direction is required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Validate direction
+
if input.Direction != "up" && input.Direction != "down" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "direction must be 'up' or 'down'")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)
+
session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if session == nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Create vote request
+
req := votes.CreateVoteRequest{
+
Subject: votes.StrongRef{
+
URI: input.Subject.URI,
+
CID: input.Subject.CID,
+
},
+
Direction: input.Direction,
+
}
+
+
// Call service to create vote
+
response, err := h.service.CreateVote(r.Context(), session, req)
+
if err != nil {
+
handleServiceError(w, err)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Return success response
+
output := CreateVoteOutput{
+
URI: response.URI,
+
CID: response.CID,
+
}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+93
internal/api/handlers/vote/delete_vote.go
···
+
package vote
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
)
+
+
// DeleteVoteHandler handles vote deletion
+
type DeleteVoteHandler struct {
+
service votes.Service
+
}
+
+
// NewDeleteVoteHandler creates a new delete vote handler
+
func NewDeleteVoteHandler(service votes.Service) *DeleteVoteHandler {
+
return &DeleteVoteHandler{
+
service: service,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// DeleteVoteInput represents the request body for deleting a vote
+
type DeleteVoteInput struct {
+
Subject struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
} `json:"subject"`
+
}
+
+
// DeleteVoteOutput represents the response body for deleting a vote
+
// Per lexicon: output is an empty object
+
type DeleteVoteOutput struct{}
+
+
// HandleDeleteVote removes a vote from a post or comment
+
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.vote.delete
+
//
+
// Request body: { "subject": { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." } }
+
// Response: { "success": true }
+
func (h *DeleteVoteHandler) HandleDeleteVote(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Parse request body
+
var input DeleteVoteInput
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Validate required fields
+
if input.Subject.URI == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.uri is required")
+
return
+
}
+
if input.Subject.CID == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.cid is required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)
+
session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if session == nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Create delete vote request
+
req := votes.DeleteVoteRequest{
+
Subject: votes.StrongRef{
+
URI: input.Subject.URI,
+
CID: input.Subject.CID,
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Call service to delete vote
+
err := h.service.DeleteVote(r.Context(), session, req)
+
if err != nil {
+
handleServiceError(w, err)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Return success response (empty object per lexicon)
+
output := DeleteVoteOutput{}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+24
internal/api/routes/vote.go
···
+
package routes
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/vote"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
+
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
)
+
+
// RegisterVoteRoutes registers vote-related XRPC endpoints on the router
+
// Implements social.coves.feed.vote.* lexicon endpoints
+
func RegisterVoteRoutes(r chi.Router, voteService votes.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware) {
+
// Initialize handlers
+
createHandler := vote.NewCreateVoteHandler(voteService)
+
deleteHandler := vote.NewDeleteVoteHandler(voteService)
+
+
// Procedure endpoints (POST) - require authentication
+
// social.coves.feed.vote.create - create or update a vote on a post/comment
+
r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post("/xrpc/social.coves.feed.vote.create", createHandler.HandleCreateVote)
+
+
// social.coves.feed.vote.delete - delete a vote from a post/comment
+
r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post("/xrpc/social.coves.feed.vote.delete", deleteHandler.HandleDeleteVote)
+
}
+16
tests/integration/helpers.go
···
// AddSession adds a session to the store
func (m *MockOAuthStore) AddSession(did, sessionID, accessToken string) {
+
m.AddSessionWithPDS(did, sessionID, accessToken, getTestPDSURL())
+
}
+
+
// AddSessionWithPDS adds a session to the store with a specific PDS URL
+
func (m *MockOAuthStore) AddSessionWithPDS(did, sessionID, accessToken, pdsURL string) {
key := did + ":" + sessionID
parsedDID, _ := syntax.ParseDID(did)
m.sessions[key] = &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
AccountDID: parsedDID,
SessionID: sessionID,
AccessToken: accessToken,
+
HostURL: pdsURL,
}
}
···
e.store.AddSession(did, sessionID, "access-token-"+did)
return token
}
+
+
// AddUserWithPDSToken registers a user with their real PDS access token
+
// Use this for E2E tests that need to write to the real PDS
+
func (e *E2EOAuthMiddleware) AddUserWithPDSToken(did, pdsAccessToken, pdsURL string) string {
+
token := "test-token-" + did
+
sessionID := "session-" + did
+
e.unsealer.AddSession(token, did, sessionID)
+
e.store.AddSessionWithPDS(did, sessionID, pdsAccessToken, pdsURL)
+
return token
+
}
+3
.beads/beads.left.jsonl
···
+
{"id":"Coves-95q","content_hash":"8ec99d598f067780436b985f9ad57f0fa19632026981038df4f65f192186620b","title":"Add comprehensive API documentation","description":"","status":"open","priority":2,"issue_type":"task","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:34.835721854-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:34.835721854-08:00","source_repo":".","dependencies":[{"issue_id":"Coves-95q","depends_on_id":"Coves-e16","type":"blocks","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:46.273899399-08:00","created_by":"daemon"}]}
+
{"id":"Coves-e16","content_hash":"7c5d0fc8f0e7f626be3dad62af0e8412467330bad01a244e5a7e52ac5afff1c1","title":"Complete post creation and moderation features","description":"","status":"open","priority":1,"issue_type":"feature","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:12.885991306-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:12.885991306-08:00","source_repo":"."}
+
{"id":"Coves-fce","content_hash":"26b3e16b99f827316ee0d741cc959464bd0c813446c95aef8105c7fd1e6b09ff","title":"Implement aggregator feed federation","description":"","status":"open","priority":1,"issue_type":"feature","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:21.453326012-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:21.453326012-08:00","source_repo":"."}
+1
.beads/beads.left.meta.json
···
+
{"version":"0.23.1","timestamp":"2025-12-02T18:25:24.009187871-08:00","commit":"00d7d8d"}
+5 -28
cmd/server/main.go
···
commentRepo := postgresRepo.NewCommentRepository(db)
log.Println("โœ… Comment repository initialized (Jetstream indexing only)")
-
// Initialize subject validator for votes (checks posts and comments exist)
-
subjectValidator := votes.NewCompositeSubjectValidator(
-
// Post existence checker
-
func(ctx context.Context, uri string) (bool, error) {
-
_, err := postRepo.GetByURI(ctx, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
if err == posts.ErrNotFound {
-
return false, nil
-
}
-
return false, err
-
}
-
return true, nil
-
},
-
// Comment existence checker
-
func(ctx context.Context, uri string) (bool, error) {
-
_, err := commentRepo.GetByURI(ctx, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
if err == comments.ErrCommentNotFound {
-
return false, nil
-
}
-
return false, err
-
}
-
return true, nil
-
},
-
)
-
// Initialize vote service (for XRPC API endpoints)
-
voteService := votes.NewService(voteRepo, subjectValidator, oauthClient, oauthStore, nil)
-
log.Println("โœ… Vote service initialized (with OAuth authentication and subject validation)")
+
// Note: We don't validate subject existence - the vote goes to the user's PDS regardless.
+
// The Jetstream consumer handles orphaned votes correctly by only updating counts for
+
// non-deleted subjects. This avoids race conditions and eventual consistency issues.
+
voteService := votes.NewService(voteRepo, oauthClient, oauthStore, nil)
+
log.Println("โœ… Vote service initialized (with OAuth authentication)")
// Initialize comment service (for query API)
// Requires user and community repos for proper author/community hydration per lexicon
-3
internal/api/handlers/vote/errors.go
···
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrVoteNotFound):
// Matches: social.coves.feed.vote.delete#VoteNotFound
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "VoteNotFound", "No vote found for this subject")
-
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrSubjectNotFound):
-
// Matches: social.coves.feed.vote.create#SubjectNotFound
-
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "SubjectNotFound", "The subject post or comment was not found")
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrInvalidDirection):
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Vote direction must be 'up' or 'down'")
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrInvalidSubject):
+4 -4
internal/atproto/oauth/handlers_security.go
···
// - Android: Verified via /.well-known/assetlinks.json
var allowedMobileRedirectURIs = map[string]bool{
// Custom scheme per atproto spec (reverse-domain of coves.social)
-
"social.coves:/callback": true,
-
"social.coves://callback": true, // Some platforms add double slash
-
"social.coves:/oauth/callback": true, // Alternative path
-
"social.coves://oauth/callback": true,
+
"social.coves:/callback": true,
+
"social.coves://callback": true, // Some platforms add double slash
+
"social.coves:/oauth/callback": true, // Alternative path
+
"social.coves://oauth/callback": true,
// Universal Links - cryptographically bound to app (preferred for security)
"https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback": true,
}
-3
internal/core/votes/errors.go
···
// ErrVoteNotFound indicates the requested vote doesn't exist
ErrVoteNotFound = errors.New("vote not found")
-
// ErrSubjectNotFound indicates the post/comment being voted on doesn't exist
-
ErrSubjectNotFound = errors.New("subject not found")
-
// ErrInvalidDirection indicates the vote direction is not "up" or "down"
ErrInvalidDirection = errors.New("invalid vote direction: must be 'up' or 'down'")
+14 -27
internal/core/votes/service_impl.go
···
// voteService implements the Service interface for vote operations
type voteService struct {
-
repo Repository
-
subjectValidator SubjectValidator
-
oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient
-
oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore
-
logger *slog.Logger
+
repo Repository
+
oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient
+
oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore
+
logger *slog.Logger
}
// NewService creates a new vote service instance
-
// subjectValidator can be nil to skip subject existence checks (not recommended for production)
-
func NewService(repo Repository, subjectValidator SubjectValidator, oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient, oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore, logger *slog.Logger) Service {
+
func NewService(repo Repository, oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient, oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore, logger *slog.Logger) Service {
if logger == nil {
logger = slog.Default()
}
return &voteService{
-
repo: repo,
-
subjectValidator: subjectValidator,
-
oauthClient: oauthClient,
-
oauthStore: oauthStore,
-
logger: logger,
+
repo: repo,
+
oauthClient: oauthClient,
+
oauthStore: oauthStore,
+
logger: logger,
}
}
···
return nil, ErrInvalidSubject
}
-
// Validate subject exists in AppView (post or comment)
-
// This prevents creating votes on non-existent content
-
if s.subjectValidator != nil {
-
exists, err := s.subjectValidator.SubjectExists(ctx, req.Subject.URI)
-
if err != nil {
-
s.logger.Error("failed to validate subject existence",
-
"error", err,
-
"subject", req.Subject.URI)
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to validate subject: %w", err)
-
}
-
if !exists {
-
return nil, ErrSubjectNotFound
-
}
-
}
+
// Note: We intentionally don't validate subject existence here.
+
// The vote record goes to the user's PDS regardless. The Jetstream consumer
+
// handles orphaned votes correctly by only updating counts for non-deleted subjects.
+
// This avoids race conditions and eventual consistency issues.
// Check for existing vote by querying PDS directly (source of truth)
// This avoids eventual consistency issues with the AppView database
···
// Parse the listRecords response
var result struct {
+
Cursor string `json:"cursor"`
Records []struct {
URI string `json:"uri"`
CID string `json:"cid"`
···
CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt"`
} `json:"value"`
} `json:"records"`
-
Cursor string `json:"cursor"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &result); err != nil {
+3 -2
internal/db/postgres/vote_repo.go
···
return nil
}
-
// GetByURI retrieves a vote by its AT-URI
+
// GetByURI retrieves an active vote by its AT-URI
// Used by Jetstream consumer for DELETE operations
+
// Returns ErrVoteNotFound for soft-deleted votes
func (r *postgresVoteRepo) GetByURI(ctx context.Context, uri string) (*votes.Vote, error) {
query := `
SELECT
···
subject_uri, subject_cid, direction,
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at
FROM votes
-
WHERE uri = $1
+
WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
`
var vote votes.Vote