A community based topic aggregation platform built on atproto

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+5465 -5430
.beads
cmd
genjwks
reindex-votes
server
internal
scripts
static
tests
+137
internal/api/handlers/wellknown/universal_links.go
···
···
+
package wellknown
+
+
import (
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log/slog"
+
"net/http"
+
"os"
+
)
+
+
// HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation serves the iOS Universal Links configuration
+
// GET /.well-known/apple-app-site-association
+
//
+
// Universal Links provide cryptographic binding between the app and domain:
+
// - Requires apple-app-site-association file served over HTTPS
+
// - App must have Associated Domains capability configured
+
// - System verifies domain ownership before routing deep links
+
// - Prevents malicious apps from intercepting deep links
+
//
+
// Spec: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/supporting-universal-links-in-your-app
+
func HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// Get Apple App ID from environment (format: <Team ID>.<Bundle ID>)
+
// Example: "ABCD1234.social.coves.app"
+
// Find Team ID in Apple Developer Portal -> Membership
+
// Bundle ID is configured in Xcode project
+
appleAppID := os.Getenv("APPLE_APP_ID")
+
if appleAppID == "" {
+
// Development fallback - allows testing without real Team ID
+
// IMPORTANT: This MUST be set in production for Universal Links to work
+
appleAppID = "DEVELOPMENT.social.coves.app"
+
slog.Warn("APPLE_APP_ID not set, using development placeholder",
+
"app_id", appleAppID,
+
"note", "Set APPLE_APP_ID env var for production Universal Links")
+
}
+
+
// Apple requires application/json content type (no charset)
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
// Construct the response per Apple's spec
+
// See: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/applinks
+
response := map[string]interface{}{
+
"applinks": map[string]interface{}{
+
"apps": []string{}, // Must be empty array per Apple spec
+
"details": []map[string]interface{}{
+
{
+
"appID": appleAppID,
+
// Paths that trigger Universal Links when opened in Safari/other apps
+
// These URLs will open the app instead of the browser
+
"paths": []string{
+
"/app/oauth/callback", // Primary Universal Link OAuth callback
+
"/app/oauth/callback/*", // Catch-all for query params
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {
+
slog.Error("failed to encode apple-app-site-association", "error", err)
+
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+
return
+
}
+
+
slog.Debug("served apple-app-site-association", "app_id", appleAppID)
+
}
+
+
// HandleAssetLinks serves the Android App Links configuration
+
// GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json
+
//
+
// App Links provide cryptographic binding between the app and domain:
+
// - Requires assetlinks.json file served over HTTPS
+
// - App must have intent-filter with android:autoVerify="true"
+
// - System verifies domain ownership via SHA-256 certificate fingerprint
+
// - Prevents malicious apps from intercepting deep links
+
//
+
// Spec: https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/verify-android-applinks
+
func HandleAssetLinks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// Get Android package name from environment
+
// Example: "social.coves.app"
+
androidPackage := os.Getenv("ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME")
+
if androidPackage == "" {
+
androidPackage = "social.coves.app" // Default for development
+
slog.Warn("ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME not set, using default",
+
"package", androidPackage,
+
"note", "Set ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME env var for production App Links")
+
}
+
+
// Get SHA-256 fingerprint from environment
+
// This is the SHA-256 fingerprint of the app's signing certificate
+
//
+
// To get the fingerprint:
+
// Production: keytool -list -v -keystore release.jks -alias release
+
// Debug: keytool -list -v -keystore ~/.android/debug.keystore -alias androiddebugkey -storepass android -keypass android
+
//
+
// Look for "SHA256:" in the output
+
// Format: AA:BB:CC:DD:...:FF (64 hex characters separated by colons)
+
androidFingerprint := os.Getenv("ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT")
+
if androidFingerprint == "" {
+
// Development fallback - this won't work for real App Links verification
+
// IMPORTANT: This MUST be set in production for App Links to work
+
androidFingerprint = "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00"
+
slog.Warn("ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT not set, using development placeholder",
+
"fingerprint", androidFingerprint,
+
"note", "Set ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT env var for production App Links")
+
}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
// Construct the response per Google's Digital Asset Links spec
+
// See: https://developers.google.com/digital-asset-links/v1/getting-started
+
response := []map[string]interface{}{
+
{
+
// delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls grants the app permission
+
// to handle URLs for this domain
+
"relation": []string{"delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"},
+
"target": map[string]interface{}{
+
"namespace": "android_app",
+
"package_name": androidPackage,
+
// List of certificate fingerprints that can sign the app
+
// Multiple fingerprints can be provided for different signing keys
+
// (e.g., debug + release)
+
"sha256_cert_fingerprints": []string{
+
androidFingerprint,
+
},
+
},
+
},
+
}
+
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {
+
slog.Error("failed to encode assetlinks.json", "error", err)
+
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+
return
+
}
+
+
slog.Debug("served assetlinks.json",
+
"package", androidPackage,
+
"fingerprint", androidFingerprint)
+
}
+25
internal/api/routes/wellknown.go
···
···
+
package routes
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/wellknown"
+
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
)
+
+
// RegisterWellKnownRoutes registers RFC 8615 well-known URI endpoints
+
// These endpoints are used for service discovery and mobile app deep linking
+
//
+
// Spec: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615.html
+
func RegisterWellKnownRoutes(r chi.Router) {
+
// iOS Universal Links configuration
+
// Required for cryptographically-bound deep linking on iOS
+
// Must be served at exact path /.well-known/apple-app-site-association
+
// Content-Type: application/json (no redirects allowed)
+
r.Get("/.well-known/apple-app-site-association", wellknown.HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation)
+
+
// Android App Links configuration
+
// Required for cryptographically-bound deep linking on Android
+
// Must be served at exact path /.well-known/assetlinks.json
+
// Content-Type: application/json (no redirects allowed)
+
r.Get("/.well-known/assetlinks.json", wellknown.HandleAssetLinks)
+
}
+1 -1
internal/api/handlers/comments/middleware.go
···
// The middleware extracts the viewer DID from the Authorization header if present and valid,
// making it available via middleware.GetUserDID(r) in the handler.
// If no valid token is present, the request continues as anonymous (empty DID).
-
func OptionalAuthMiddleware(authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware, next http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
return authMiddleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(next))
}
···
// The middleware extracts the viewer DID from the Authorization header if present and valid,
// making it available via middleware.GetUserDID(r) in the handler.
// If no valid token is present, the request continues as anonymous (empty DID).
+
func OptionalAuthMiddleware(authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware, next http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
return authMiddleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(next))
}
+164 -312
internal/api/middleware/auth.go
···
package middleware
import (
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"
"context"
-
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// Context keys for storing user information
···
const (
UserDIDKey contextKey = "user_did"
-
JWTClaimsKey contextKey = "jwt_claims"
-
UserAccessToken contextKey = "user_access_token"
-
DPoPProofKey contextKey = "dpop_proof"
)
-
// AtProtoAuthMiddleware enforces atProto OAuth authentication for protected routes
-
// Validates JWT Bearer tokens from the Authorization header
-
// Supports DPoP (RFC 9449) for token binding verification
-
type AtProtoAuthMiddleware struct {
-
jwksFetcher auth.JWKSFetcher
-
dpopVerifier *auth.DPoPVerifier
-
skipVerify bool // For Phase 1 testing only
}
-
// NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware creates a new atProto auth middleware
-
// skipVerify: if true, only parses JWT without signature verification (Phase 1)
-
//
-
// if false, performs full signature verification (Phase 2)
-
//
-
// IMPORTANT: Call Stop() when shutting down to clean up background goroutines.
-
func NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher auth.JWKSFetcher, skipVerify bool) *AtProtoAuthMiddleware {
-
return &AtProtoAuthMiddleware{
-
jwksFetcher: jwksFetcher,
-
dpopVerifier: auth.NewDPoPVerifier(),
-
skipVerify: skipVerify,
-
}
}
-
// Stop stops background goroutines. Call this when shutting down the server.
-
// This prevents goroutine leaks from the DPoP verifier's replay protection cache.
-
func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) Stop() {
-
if m.dpopVerifier != nil {
-
m.dpopVerifier.Stop()
}
}
-
// RequireAuth middleware ensures the user is authenticated with a valid JWT
-
// If not authenticated, returns 401
-
// If authenticated, injects user DID and JWT claims into context
//
-
// Only accepts DPoP authorization scheme per RFC 9449:
-
// - Authorization: DPoP <token> (DPoP-bound tokens)
-
func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
// Extract Authorization header
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
-
if authHeader == "" {
-
writeAuthError(w, "Missing Authorization header")
-
return
}
-
// Only accept DPoP scheme per RFC 9449
-
// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235
-
token, ok := extractDPoPToken(authHeader)
-
if !ok {
-
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid Authorization header format. Expected: DPoP <token>")
return
}
-
var claims *auth.Claims
-
var err error
-
if m.skipVerify {
-
// Phase 1: Parse only (no signature verification)
-
claims, err = auth.ParseJWT(token)
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=parse_error ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
-
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid token")
-
return
-
}
-
} else {
-
// Phase 2: Full verification with signature check
-
//
-
// SECURITY: The access token MUST be verified before trusting any claims.
-
// DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, not a replacement for signature verification.
-
claims, err = auth.VerifyJWT(r.Context(), token, m.jwksFetcher)
-
if err != nil {
-
// Token verification failed - REJECT
-
// DO NOT fall back to DPoP-only verification, as that would trust unverified claims
-
issuer := "unknown"
-
if parsedClaims, parseErr := auth.ParseJWT(token); parseErr == nil {
-
issuer = parsedClaims.Issuer
-
}
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=verification_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s issuer=%s error=%v",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, issuer, err)
-
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid or expired token")
-
return
-
}
-
// Token signature verified - now check if DPoP binding is required
-
// If the token has a cnf.jkt claim, DPoP proof is REQUIRED
-
dpopHeader := r.Header.Get("DPoP")
-
hasCnfJkt := claims.Confirmation != nil && claims.Confirmation["jkt"] != nil
-
-
if hasCnfJkt {
-
// Token has DPoP binding - REQUIRE valid DPoP proof
-
if dpopHeader == "" {
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=missing_dpop ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path)
-
writeAuthError(w, "DPoP proof required")
-
return
-
}
-
-
proof, err := m.verifyDPoPBinding(r, claims, dpopHeader, token)
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=dpop_verification_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
-
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid DPoP proof")
-
return
-
}
-
-
// Store verified DPoP proof in context
-
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), DPoPProofKey, proof)
-
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
-
} else if dpopHeader != "" {
-
// DPoP header present but token doesn't have cnf.jkt - this is suspicious
-
// Log warning but don't reject (could be a misconfigured client)
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] type=unexpected_dpop ip=%s method=%s path=%s warning=DPoP header present but token has no cnf.jkt",
-
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path)
-
}
}
-
// Extract user DID from 'sub' claim
-
userDID := claims.Subject
-
if userDID == "" {
-
writeAuthError(w, "Missing user DID in token")
return
}
-
// Inject user info and access token into context
-
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, userDID)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)
// Call next handler
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
-
// OptionalAuth middleware loads user info if authenticated, but doesn't require it
-
// Useful for endpoints that work for both authenticated and anonymous users
//
-
// Only accepts DPoP authorization scheme per RFC 9449:
-
// - Authorization: DPoP <token> (DPoP-bound tokens)
-
func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) OptionalAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
// Extract Authorization header
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
-
// Only accept DPoP scheme per RFC 9449
-
// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235
-
token, ok := extractDPoPToken(authHeader)
-
if !ok {
-
// Not authenticated or invalid format - continue without user context
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
-
var claims *auth.Claims
-
var err error
-
if m.skipVerify {
-
// Phase 1: Parse only
-
claims, err = auth.ParseJWT(token)
-
} else {
-
// Phase 2: Full verification
-
// SECURITY: Token MUST be verified before trusting claims
-
claims, err = auth.VerifyJWT(r.Context(), token, m.jwksFetcher)
}
if err != nil {
-
// Invalid token - continue without user context
-
log.Printf("Optional auth failed: %v", err)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
-
// Check DPoP binding if token has cnf.jkt (after successful verification)
-
// SECURITY: If token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header, we cannot trust it
-
// (could be a stolen token). Continue as unauthenticated.
-
if !m.skipVerify {
-
dpopHeader := r.Header.Get("DPoP")
-
hasCnfJkt := claims.Confirmation != nil && claims.Confirmation["jkt"] != nil
-
-
if hasCnfJkt {
-
if dpopHeader == "" {
-
// Token requires DPoP binding but no proof provided
-
// Cannot trust this token - continue without auth
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header - treating as unauthenticated (potential token theft)")
-
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-
return
-
}
-
-
proof, err := m.verifyDPoPBinding(r, claims, dpopHeader, token)
-
if err != nil {
-
// DPoP verification failed - cannot trust this token
-
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: DPoP verification failed - treating as unauthenticated: %v", err)
-
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-
return
-
}
-
-
// DPoP verified - inject proof into context
-
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, claims.Subject)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, DPoPProofKey, proof)
-
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
-
return
-
}
}
-
// No DPoP binding required - inject user info and access token into context
-
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, claims.Subject)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)
-
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)
-
// Call next handler
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
···
return did
}
-
// GetJWTClaims extracts the JWT claims from the request context
// Returns nil if not authenticated
-
func GetJWTClaims(r *http.Request) *auth.Claims {
-
claims, _ := r.Context().Value(JWTClaimsKey).(*auth.Claims)
-
return claims
-
}
-
-
// SetTestUserDID sets the user DID in the context for testing purposes
-
// This function should ONLY be used in tests to mock authenticated users
-
func SetTestUserDID(ctx context.Context, userDID string) context.Context {
-
return context.WithValue(ctx, UserDIDKey, userDID)
}
// GetUserAccessToken extracts the user's access token from the request context
···
return token
}
-
// GetDPoPProof extracts the DPoP proof from the request context
-
// Returns nil if no DPoP proof was verified
-
func GetDPoPProof(r *http.Request) *auth.DPoPProof {
-
proof, _ := r.Context().Value(DPoPProofKey).(*auth.DPoPProof)
-
return proof
-
}
-
-
// verifyDPoPBinding verifies DPoP proof binding for an ALREADY VERIFIED token.
-
//
-
// SECURITY: This function ONLY verifies the DPoP proof and its binding to the token.
-
// The access token MUST be signature-verified BEFORE calling this function.
-
// DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, not a replacement for signature verification.
-
//
-
// This prevents token theft attacks by proving the client possesses the private key
-
// corresponding to the public key thumbprint in the token's cnf.jkt claim.
-
func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) verifyDPoPBinding(r *http.Request, claims *auth.Claims, dpopProofHeader, accessToken string) (*auth.DPoPProof, error) {
-
// Extract the cnf.jkt claim from the already-verified token
-
jkt, err := auth.ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token requires DPoP but missing cnf.jkt: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Build the HTTP URI for DPoP verification
-
// Use the full URL including scheme and host, respecting proxy headers
-
scheme, host := extractSchemeAndHost(r)
-
-
// Use EscapedPath to preserve percent-encoding (P3 fix)
-
// r.URL.Path is decoded, but DPoP proofs contain the raw encoded path
-
path := r.URL.EscapedPath()
-
if path == "" {
-
path = r.URL.Path // Fallback if EscapedPath returns empty
-
}
-
-
httpURI := scheme + "://" + host + path
-
-
// Verify the DPoP proof
-
proof, err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyDPoPProof(dpopProofHeader, r.Method, httpURI)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify the binding between the proof and the token (cnf.jkt)
-
if err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyTokenBinding(proof, jkt); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP binding verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify the access token hash (ath) if present in the proof
-
// Per RFC 9449 section 4.2, if ath is present, it MUST match the access token
-
if err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyAccessTokenHash(proof, accessToken); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP ath verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
return proof, nil
-
}
-
-
// extractSchemeAndHost extracts the scheme and host from the request,
-
// respecting proxy headers (X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Host, Forwarded).
-
// This is critical for DPoP verification when behind TLS-terminating proxies.
-
func extractSchemeAndHost(r *http.Request) (scheme, host string) {
-
// Start with request defaults
-
scheme = r.URL.Scheme
-
host = r.Host
-
-
// Check X-Forwarded-Proto for scheme (most common)
-
if forwardedProto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); forwardedProto != "" {
-
parts := strings.Split(forwardedProto, ",")
-
if len(parts) > 0 && strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) != "" {
-
scheme = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]))
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Check X-Forwarded-Host for host (common with nginx/traefik)
-
if forwardedHost := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"); forwardedHost != "" {
-
parts := strings.Split(forwardedHost, ",")
-
if len(parts) > 0 && strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) != "" {
-
host = strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Check standard Forwarded header (RFC 7239) - takes precedence if present
-
// Format: Forwarded: for=192.0.2.60;proto=http;by=203.0.113.43;host=example.com
-
// RFC 7239 allows: mixed-case keys (Proto, PROTO), quoted values (host="example.com")
-
if forwarded := r.Header.Get("Forwarded"); forwarded != "" {
-
// Parse the first entry (comma-separated list)
-
firstEntry := strings.Split(forwarded, ",")[0]
-
for _, part := range strings.Split(firstEntry, ";") {
-
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
-
// Split on first '=' to properly handle key=value pairs
-
if idx := strings.Index(part, "="); idx != -1 {
-
key := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(part[:idx]))
-
value := strings.TrimSpace(part[idx+1:])
-
// Strip optional quotes per RFC 7239 section 4
-
value = strings.Trim(value, "\"")
-
-
switch key {
-
case "proto":
-
scheme = strings.ToLower(value)
-
case "host":
-
host = value
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Fallback scheme detection from TLS
-
if scheme == "" {
-
if r.TLS != nil {
-
scheme = "https"
-
} else {
-
scheme = "http"
-
}
-
}
-
-
return strings.ToLower(scheme), host
-
}
-
-
// writeAuthError writes a JSON error response for authentication failures
-
func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {
-
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
-
// Simple error response matching XRPC error format
-
response := `{"error":"AuthenticationRequired","message":"` + message + `"}`
-
if _, err := w.Write([]byte(response)); err != nil {
-
log.Printf("Failed to write auth error response: %v", err)
-
}
}
-
// extractDPoPToken extracts the token from a DPoP Authorization header.
-
// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235, so "DPoP", "dpop", "DPOP" are all valid.
-
// Returns the token and true if valid DPoP scheme, empty string and false otherwise.
-
func extractDPoPToken(authHeader string) (string, bool) {
if authHeader == "" {
return "", false
}
-
// Split on first space: "DPoP <token>" -> ["DPoP", "<token>"]
parts := strings.SplitN(authHeader, " ", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
return "", false
}
// Case-insensitive scheme comparison per RFC 7235
-
if !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "DPoP") {
return "", false
}
···
return token, true
}
···
package middleware
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
"context"
+
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
+
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
)
// Context keys for storing user information
···
const (
UserDIDKey contextKey = "user_did"
+
OAuthSessionKey contextKey = "oauth_session"
+
UserAccessToken contextKey = "user_access_token" // Kept for backward compatibility
)
+
// SessionUnsealer is an interface for unsealing session tokens
+
// This allows for mocking in tests
+
type SessionUnsealer interface {
+
UnsealSession(token string) (*oauth.SealedSession, error)
}
+
// OAuthAuthMiddleware enforces OAuth authentication using sealed session tokens.
+
type OAuthAuthMiddleware struct {
+
unsealer SessionUnsealer
+
store oauthlib.ClientAuthStore
}
+
// NewOAuthAuthMiddleware creates a new OAuth auth middleware using sealed session tokens.
+
func NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(unsealer SessionUnsealer, store oauthlib.ClientAuthStore) *OAuthAuthMiddleware {
+
return &OAuthAuthMiddleware{
+
unsealer: unsealer,
+
store: store,
}
}
+
// RequireAuth middleware ensures the user is authenticated.
+
// Supports sealed session tokens via:
+
// - Authorization: Bearer <sealed_token>
+
// - Cookie: coves_session=<sealed_token>
//
+
// If not authenticated, returns 401.
+
// If authenticated, injects user DID into context.
+
func (m *OAuthAuthMiddleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
var token string
+
+
// Try Authorization header first (for mobile/API clients)
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+
if authHeader != "" {
+
var ok bool
+
token, ok = extractBearerToken(authHeader)
+
if !ok {
+
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid Authorization header format. Expected: Bearer <token>")
+
return
+
}
+
}
+
+
// If no header, try session cookie (for web clients)
+
if token == "" {
+
if cookie, err := r.Cookie("coves_session"); err == nil {
+
token = cookie.Value
+
}
}
+
// Must have authentication from either source
+
if token == "" {
+
writeAuthError(w, "Missing authentication")
return
}
+
// Authenticate using sealed token
+
sealedSession, err := m.unsealer.UnsealSession(token)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=unseal_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
+
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid or expired token")
+
return
+
}
+
// Parse DID
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID(sealedSession.DID)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=invalid_did ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s error=%v",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, err)
+
writeAuthError(w, "Invalid DID in token")
+
return
+
}
+
// Load full OAuth session from database
+
session, err := m.store.GetSession(r.Context(), did, sealedSession.SessionID)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=session_not_found ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s session_id=%s error=%v",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, sealedSession.SessionID, err)
+
writeAuthError(w, "Session not found or expired")
+
return
}
+
// Verify session DID matches token DID
+
if session.AccountDID.String() != sealedSession.DID {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=did_mismatch ip=%s method=%s path=%s token_did=%s session_did=%s",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, session.AccountDID.String())
+
writeAuthError(w, "Session DID mismatch")
return
}
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_SUCCESS] ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s session_id=%s",
+
r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, sealedSession.SessionID)
+
+
// Inject user info and session into context
+
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, sealedSession.DID)
+
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, OAuthSessionKey, session)
+
// Store access token for backward compatibility
+
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, session.AccessToken)
// Call next handler
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
+
// OptionalAuth middleware loads user info if authenticated, but doesn't require it.
+
// Useful for endpoints that work for both authenticated and anonymous users.
+
//
+
// Supports sealed session tokens via:
+
// - Authorization: Bearer <sealed_token>
+
// - Cookie: coves_session=<sealed_token>
//
+
// If authentication fails, continues without user context (does not return error).
+
func (m *OAuthAuthMiddleware) OptionalAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
var token string
+
+
// Try Authorization header first (for mobile/API clients)
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+
if authHeader != "" {
+
var ok bool
+
token, ok = extractBearerToken(authHeader)
+
if !ok {
+
// Invalid format - continue without user context
+
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
return
+
}
+
}
+
+
// If no header, try session cookie (for web clients)
+
if token == "" {
+
if cookie, err := r.Cookie("coves_session"); err == nil {
+
token = cookie.Value
+
}
+
}
+
// If still no token, continue without authentication
+
if token == "" {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
+
// Try to authenticate (don't write errors, just continue without user context on failure)
+
sealedSession, err := m.unsealer.UnsealSession(token)
+
if err != nil {
+
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
return
+
}
+
// Parse DID
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID(sealedSession.DID)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: invalid DID: %v", err)
+
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
return
}
+
// Load full OAuth session from database
+
session, err := m.store.GetSession(r.Context(), did, sealedSession.SessionID)
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: session not found: %v", err)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
+
// Verify session DID matches token DID
+
if session.AccountDID.String() != sealedSession.DID {
+
log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: DID mismatch")
+
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+
return
}
+
// Build authenticated context
+
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, sealedSession.DID)
+
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, OAuthSessionKey, session)
+
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, session.AccessToken)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
···
return did
}
+
// GetOAuthSession extracts the OAuth session from the request context
// Returns nil if not authenticated
+
// Handlers can use this to make authenticated PDS calls
+
func GetOAuthSession(r *http.Request) *oauthlib.ClientSessionData {
+
session, _ := r.Context().Value(OAuthSessionKey).(*oauthlib.ClientSessionData)
+
return session
}
// GetUserAccessToken extracts the user's access token from the request context
···
return token
}
+
// SetTestUserDID sets the user DID in the context for testing purposes
+
// This function should ONLY be used in tests to mock authenticated users
+
func SetTestUserDID(ctx context.Context, userDID string) context.Context {
+
return context.WithValue(ctx, UserDIDKey, userDID)
}
+
// extractBearerToken extracts the token from a Bearer Authorization header.
+
// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235, so "Bearer", "bearer", "BEARER" are all valid.
+
// Returns the token and true if valid Bearer scheme, empty string and false otherwise.
+
func extractBearerToken(authHeader string) (string, bool) {
if authHeader == "" {
return "", false
}
+
// Split on first space: "Bearer <token>" -> ["Bearer", "<token>"]
parts := strings.SplitN(authHeader, " ", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
return "", false
}
// Case-insensitive scheme comparison per RFC 7235
+
if !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") {
return "", false
}
···
return token, true
}
+
+
// writeAuthError writes a JSON error response for authentication failures
+
func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+
// Use json.NewEncoder to properly escape the message and prevent injection
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
+
"error": "AuthenticationRequired",
+
"message": message,
+
}); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to write auth error response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+511 -728
internal/api/middleware/auth_test.go
···
package middleware
import (
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"
"context"
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"crypto/rand"
-
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
···
"testing"
"time"
-
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
-
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
-
// mockJWKSFetcher is a test double for JWKSFetcher
-
type mockJWKSFetcher struct {
-
shouldFail bool
}
-
func (m *mockJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
if m.shouldFail {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mock fetch failure")
}
-
// Return nil - we won't actually verify signatures in Phase 1 tests
-
return nil, nil
}
-
// createTestToken creates a test JWT with the given DID
-
func createTestToken(did string) string {
-
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
-
"sub": did,
-
"iss": "https://test.pds.local",
-
"scope": "atproto",
-
"exp": time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
-
"iat": time.Now().Unix(),
}
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
return tokenString
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_ValidToken tests that valid tokens are accepted with DPoP scheme (Phase 1)
func TestRequireAuth_ValidToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true) // skipVerify=true
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
handlerCalled = true
// Verify DID was extracted and injected into context
-
did := GetUserDID(r)
-
if did != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", did)
}
-
// Verify claims were injected
-
claims := GetJWTClaims(r)
-
if claims == nil {
-
t.Error("expected claims to be non-nil")
return
}
-
if claims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("expected claims.Subject 'did:plc:test123', got %s", claims.Subject)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
-
token := createTestToken("did:plc:test123")
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
// TestRequireAuth_MissingAuthHeader tests that missing Authorization header is rejected
func TestRequireAuth_MissingAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat tests that non-DPoP tokens are rejected (including Bearer)
func TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
tests := []struct {
name string
header string
}{
{"Basic auth", "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"},
-
{"Bearer scheme", "Bearer some-token"},
{"Invalid format", "InvalidFormat"},
}
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_BearerRejectionErrorMessage verifies that Bearer tokens are rejected
-
// with a helpful error message guiding users to use DPoP scheme
-
func TestRequireAuth_BearerRejectionErrorMessage(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
-
-
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
t.Error("handler should not be called")
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer some-token")
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
-
}
-
// Verify error message guides user to use DPoP
-
body := w.Body.String()
-
if !strings.Contains(body, "Expected: DPoP") {
-
t.Errorf("error message should guide user to use DPoP, got: %s", body)
}
-
}
-
-
// TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme verifies that DPoP scheme matching is case-insensitive
-
// per RFC 7235 which states HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive
-
func TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
-
// Create a valid JWT for testing
-
validToken := createValidJWT(t, "did:plc:test123", time.Hour)
testCases := []struct {
name string
scheme string
}{
-
{"lowercase", "dpop"},
-
{"uppercase", "DPOP"},
-
{"mixed_case", "DpOp"},
-
{"standard", "DPoP"},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
···
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.scheme+" "+validToken)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_MalformedToken tests that malformed JWTs are rejected
-
func TestRequireAuth_MalformedToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP not-a-valid-jwt")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken tests that expired tokens are rejected
func TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called for expired token")
}))
-
// Create expired token
-
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
-
"sub": "did:plc:test123",
-
"iss": "https://test.pds.local",
-
"scope": "atproto",
-
"exp": time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour).Unix(), // Expired 1 hour ago
-
"iat": time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour).Unix(),
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_MissingDID tests that tokens without DID are rejected
-
func TestRequireAuth_MissingDID(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
}))
-
// Create token without sub claim
-
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
-
// "sub" missing
-
"iss": "https://test.pds.local",
-
"scope": "atproto",
-
"exp": time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
-
"iat": time.Now().Unix(),
}
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestOptionalAuth_WithToken tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid DPoP tokens
func TestOptionalAuth_WithToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
handlerCalled = true
// Verify DID was extracted
-
did := GetUserDID(r)
-
if did != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", did)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
-
token := createTestToken("did:plc:test123")
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
// TestOptionalAuth_WithoutToken tests that OptionalAuth allows requests without tokens
func TestOptionalAuth_WithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
···
// TestOptionalAuth_InvalidToken tests that OptionalAuth continues without auth on invalid token
func TestOptionalAuth_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
···
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP not-a-valid-jwt")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
-
// TestGetJWTClaims_NotAuthenticated tests that GetJWTClaims returns nil when not authenticated
-
func TestGetJWTClaims_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
claims := GetJWTClaims(req)
-
if claims != nil {
-
t.Errorf("expected nil claims, got %+v", claims)
}
}
-
// TestGetDPoPProof_NotAuthenticated tests that GetDPoPProof returns nil when no DPoP was verified
-
func TestGetDPoPProof_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
proof := GetDPoPProof(req)
-
if proof != nil {
-
t.Errorf("expected nil proof, got %+v", proof)
}
}
-
// TestRequireAuth_WithDPoP_SecurityModel tests the correct DPoP security model:
-
// Token MUST be verified first, then DPoP is checked as an additional layer.
-
// DPoP is NOT a fallback for failed token verification.
-
func TestRequireAuth_WithDPoP_SecurityModel(t *testing.T) {
-
// Generate an ECDSA key pair for DPoP
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
-
// Calculate JWK thumbprint for cnf.jkt
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
}
-
t.Run("DPoP_is_NOT_fallback_for_failed_verification", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// SECURITY TEST: When token verification fails, DPoP should NOT be used as fallback
-
// This prevents an attacker from forging a token with their own cnf.jkt
-
-
// Create a DPoP-bound access token (unsigned - will fail verification)
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:attacker",
-
Issuer: "https://external.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
// Create valid DPoP proof (attacker has the private key)
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint")
-
// Mock fetcher that fails (simulating external PDS without JWKS)
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false) // skipVerify=false
-
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: handler was called despite token verification failure")
-
}))
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
req.Header.Set("DPoP", dpopProof)
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
// MUST reject - token verification failed, DPoP cannot substitute for signature verification
-
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-
t.Errorf("SECURITY: expected 401 for unverified token, got %d", w.Code)
}
-
})
-
t.Run("DPoP_required_when_cnf_jkt_present_in_verified_token", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// When token has cnf.jkt, DPoP header MUST be present
-
// This test uses skipVerify=true to simulate a verified token
-
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
-
// NO DPoP header - should fail when skipVerify is false
-
// Note: with skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true) // skipVerify=true for parsing
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
// No DPoP header
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
// With skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked, so this should succeed
-
if !handlerCalled {
-
t.Error("handler should be called when skipVerify=true")
}
-
})
-
}
-
-
// TestRequireAuth_TokenVerificationFails_DPoPNotUsedAsFallback is the key security test.
-
// It ensures that DPoP cannot be used as a fallback when token signature verification fails.
-
func TestRequireAuth_TokenVerificationFails_DPoPNotUsedAsFallback(t *testing.T) {
-
// Generate a key pair (attacker's key)
-
attackerKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&attackerKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, _ := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
-
// Create a FORGED token claiming to be the victim
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:victim_user", // Attacker claims to be victim
-
Issuer: "https://untrusted.pds",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint, // Attacker uses their own key
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
-
// Attacker creates a valid DPoP proof with their key
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, attackerKey, "POST", "https://api.example.com/protected")
-
// Fetcher fails (external PDS without JWKS)
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false) // skipVerify=false - REAL verification
-
-
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
t.Fatalf("CRITICAL SECURITY FAILURE: Request authenticated as %s despite forged token!",
-
GetUserDID(r))
}))
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://api.example.com/protected", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
req.Header.Set("DPoP", dpopProof)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
// MUST reject - the token signature was never verified
-
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-
t.Errorf("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: Expected 401, got %d. Token was not properly verified!", w.Code)
}
-
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedProto ensures we honor the external HTTPS
-
// scheme when TLS is terminated upstream and X-Forwarded-Proto is present.
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedProto(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
}
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "api.example.com"
-
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
-
-
// Pass a fake access token - ath verification will pass since we don't include ath in the DPoP proof
-
fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with forwarded proto, got %v", err)
}
-
if proof == nil || proof.Claims == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")
-
}
-
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedHost ensures we honor X-Forwarded-Host header
-
// when behind a TLS-terminating proxy that rewrites the Host header.
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedHost(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
// External URI that the client uses
-
externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)
-
// Request hits internal service with internal hostname, but X-Forwarded-Host has public hostname
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service:8080/protected/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "internal-service:8080" // Internal host after proxy
-
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
-
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "api.example.com") // Original public host
-
fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with X-Forwarded-Host, got %v", err)
}
-
if proof == nil || proof.Claims == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")
}
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesStandardForwardedHeader tests RFC 7239 Forwarded header parsing
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesStandardForwardedHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
// External URI
-
externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)
-
// Request with standard Forwarded header (RFC 7239)
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "internal-service"
-
req.Header.Set("Forwarded", "for=192.0.2.60;proto=https;host=api.example.com")
-
fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with Forwarded header, got %v", err)
-
}
-
if proof == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")
}
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_ForwardedMixedCaseAndQuotes tests RFC 7239 edge cases:
-
// mixed-case keys (Proto vs proto) and quoted values (host="example.com")
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_ForwardedMixedCaseAndQuotes(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
// External URI that the client uses
-
externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)
-
// Request with RFC 7239 Forwarded header using:
-
// - Mixed-case keys: "Proto" instead of "proto", "Host" instead of "host"
-
// - Quoted value: Host="api.example.com" (legal per RFC 7239 section 4)
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "internal-service"
-
req.Header.Set("Forwarded", `for=192.0.2.60;Proto=https;Host="api.example.com"`)
-
fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with mixed-case/quoted Forwarded header, got %v", err)
-
}
-
if proof == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")
}
}
-
// TestVerifyDPoPBinding_AthValidation tests access token hash (ath) claim validation
-
func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_AthValidation(t *testing.T) {
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)
-
}
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
}
-
claims := &auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
accessToken := "real-access-token-12345"
-
-
t.Run("ath_matches_access_token", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create DPoP proof with ath claim matching the access token
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProofWithAth(t, privateKey, "GET", "https://api.example.com/resource", accessToken)
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://api.example.com/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "api.example.com"
-
proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, accessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("expected verification to succeed with matching ath, got %v", err)
-
}
-
if proof == nil {
-
t.Fatal("expected proof to be returned")
}
-
})
-
t.Run("ath_mismatch_rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create DPoP proof with ath for a DIFFERENT token
-
differentToken := "different-token-67890"
-
dpopProof := createDPoPProofWithAth(t, privateKey, "POST", "https://api.example.com/resource", differentToken)
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://api.example.com/resource", nil)
-
req.Host = "api.example.com"
-
// Try to use with the original access token - should fail
-
_, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, accessToken)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Fatal("SECURITY: expected verification to fail when ath doesn't match access token")
-
}
-
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ath") {
-
t.Errorf("error should mention ath mismatch, got: %v", err)
-
}
})
-
}
-
// TestMiddlewareStop tests that the middleware can be stopped properly
-
func TestMiddlewareStop(t *testing.T) {
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false)
-
// Stop should not panic and should clean up resources
-
middleware.Stop()
-
// Calling Stop again should also be safe (idempotent-ish)
-
// Note: The underlying DPoPVerifier.Stop() closes a channel, so this might panic
-
// if not handled properly. We test that at least one Stop works.
}
-
// TestOptionalAuth_DPoPBoundToken_NoDPoPHeader tests that OptionalAuth treats
-
// tokens with cnf.jkt but no DPoP header as unauthenticated (potential token theft)
-
func TestOptionalAuth_DPoPBoundToken_NoDPoPHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
// Generate a key pair for DPoP binding
-
privateKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
thumbprint, _ := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
-
// Create a DPoP-bound token (has cnf.jkt)
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:user123",
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": thumbprint,
-
},
-
}
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
-
// Use skipVerify=true to simulate a verified token
-
// (In production, skipVerify would be false and VerifyJWT would be called)
-
// However, for this test we need skipVerify=false to trigger DPoP checking
-
// But the fetcher will fail, so let's use skipVerify=true and verify the logic
-
// Actually, the DPoP check only happens when skipVerify=false
-
-
t.Run("with_skipVerify_false", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// This will fail at JWT verification level, but that's expected
-
// The important thing is the code path for DPoP checking
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
var capturedDID string
-
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
capturedDID = GetUserDID(r)
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
// Deliberately NOT setting DPoP header
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
// Handler should be called (optional auth doesn't block)
-
if !handlerCalled {
-
t.Error("handler should be called")
-
}
-
// But since JWT verification fails, user should not be authenticated
-
if capturedDID != "" {
-
t.Errorf("expected empty DID when verification fails, got %s", capturedDID)
}
-
})
-
t.Run("with_skipVerify_true_dpop_not_checked", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// When skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked (Phase 1 mode)
-
fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}
-
middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)
-
defer middleware.Stop()
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
var capturedDID string
-
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
capturedDID = GetUserDID(r)
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)
-
// No DPoP header
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
if !handlerCalled {
-
t.Error("handler should be called")
-
}
-
// With skipVerify=true, DPoP check is bypassed - token is trusted
-
if capturedDID != "did:plc:user123" {
-
t.Errorf("expected DID when skipVerify=true, got %s", capturedDID)
-
}
})
-
}
-
-
// TestDPoPReplayProtection tests that the same DPoP proof cannot be used twice
-
func TestDPoPReplayProtection(t *testing.T) {
-
// This tests the NonceCache functionality
-
cache := auth.NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute)
-
defer cache.Stop()
-
-
jti := "unique-proof-id-123"
-
-
// First use should succeed
-
if !cache.CheckAndStore(jti) {
-
t.Error("First use of jti should succeed")
-
}
-
-
// Second use should fail (replay detected)
-
if cache.CheckAndStore(jti) {
-
t.Error("SECURITY: Replay attack not detected - same jti accepted twice")
-
}
-
// Different jti should succeed
-
if !cache.CheckAndStore("different-jti-456") {
-
t.Error("Different jti should succeed")
-
}
-
}
-
// Helper: createDPoPProof creates a DPoP proof JWT for testing
-
func createDPoPProof(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, method, uri string) string {
-
// Create JWK from public key
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
-
// Create DPoP claims with UUID for jti to ensure uniqueness across tests
-
claims := auth.DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
ID: uuid.New().String(),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
}
-
// Create token with custom header
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = jwk
-
-
// Sign with private key
-
signedToken, err := token.SignedString(privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to sign DPoP proof: %v", err)
}
-
-
return signedToken
}
-
// Helper: createDPoPProofWithAth creates a DPoP proof JWT with ath (access token hash) claim
-
func createDPoPProofWithAth(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, method, uri, accessToken string) string {
-
// Create JWK from public key
-
jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-
-
// Calculate ath: base64url(SHA-256(access_token))
-
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(accessToken))
-
ath := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:])
-
-
// Create DPoP claims with ath
-
claims := auth.DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
ID: uuid.New().String(),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
AccessTokenHash: ath,
-
}
-
-
// Create token with custom header
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = jwk
-
-
// Sign with private key
-
signedToken, err := token.SignedString(privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to sign DPoP proof: %v", err)
}
-
return signedToken
-
}
-
// Helper: ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK converts an ECDSA public key to JWK map
-
func ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(pubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) map[string]interface{} {
-
// Get curve name
-
var crv string
-
switch pubKey.Curve {
-
case elliptic.P256():
-
crv = "P-256"
-
case elliptic.P384():
-
crv = "P-384"
-
case elliptic.P521():
-
crv = "P-521"
-
default:
-
panic("unsupported curve")
-
}
-
// Encode coordinates
-
xBytes := pubKey.X.Bytes()
-
yBytes := pubKey.Y.Bytes()
-
-
// Ensure proper byte length (pad if needed)
-
keySize := (pubKey.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
-
xPadded := make([]byte, keySize)
-
yPadded := make([]byte, keySize)
-
copy(xPadded[keySize-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
-
copy(yPadded[keySize-len(yBytes):], yBytes)
-
-
return map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": crv,
-
"x": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(xPadded),
-
"y": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(yPadded),
-
}
-
}
-
// Helper: createValidJWT creates a valid unsigned JWT token for testing
-
// This is used with skipVerify=true middleware where signature verification is skipped
-
func createValidJWT(t *testing.T, subject string, expiry time.Duration) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
claims := auth.Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: subject,
-
Issuer: "https://test.pds.local",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(expiry)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto",
-
}
-
// Create unsigned token (for skipVerify=true tests)
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)
-
signedToken, err := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("failed to create test JWT: %v", err)
}
-
-
return signedToken
}
···
package middleware
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
+
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
···
"testing"
"time"
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
)
+
// mockOAuthClient is a test double for OAuthClient
+
type mockOAuthClient struct {
+
sealSecret []byte
+
shouldFailSeal bool
}
+
func newMockOAuthClient() *mockOAuthClient {
+
// Create a 32-byte seal secret for testing
+
secret := []byte("test-secret-key-32-bytes-long!!")
+
return &mockOAuthClient{
+
sealSecret: secret,
}
}
+
func (m *mockOAuthClient) UnsealSession(token string) (*oauth.SealedSession, error) {
+
if m.shouldFailSeal {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mock unseal failure")
}
+
// For testing, we'll decode a simple format: base64(did|sessionID|expiresAt)
+
// In production this would be AES-GCM encrypted
+
// Using pipe separator to avoid conflicts with colon in DIDs
+
decoded, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token encoding: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
parts := strings.Split(string(decoded), "|")
+
if len(parts) != 3 {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token format")
+
}
+
+
var expiresAt int64
+
_, _ = fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "%d", &expiresAt)
+
+
// Check expiration
+
if expiresAt <= time.Now().Unix() {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token expired")
+
}
+
+
return &oauth.SealedSession{
+
DID: parts[0],
+
SessionID: parts[1],
+
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
+
}, nil
+
}
+
+
// Helper to create a test sealed token
+
func (m *mockOAuthClient) createTestToken(did, sessionID string, ttl time.Duration) string {
+
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()
+
payload := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%d", did, sessionID, expiresAt)
+
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(payload))
+
}
+
+
// mockOAuthStore is a test double for ClientAuthStore
+
type mockOAuthStore struct {
+
sessions map[string]*oauthlib.ClientSessionData
+
}
+
+
func newMockOAuthStore() *mockOAuthStore {
+
return &mockOAuthStore{
+
sessions: make(map[string]*oauthlib.ClientSessionData),
+
}
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) GetSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) (*oauthlib.ClientSessionData, error) {
+
key := did.String() + ":" + sessionID
+
session, ok := m.sessions[key]
+
if !ok {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("session not found")
+
}
+
return session, nil
}
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) SaveSession(ctx context.Context, session oauthlib.ClientSessionData) error {
+
key := session.AccountDID.String() + ":" + session.SessionID
+
m.sessions[key] = &session
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) DeleteSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) error {
+
key := did.String() + ":" + sessionID
+
delete(m.sessions, key)
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) (*oauthlib.AuthRequestData, error) {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, info oauthlib.AuthRequestData) error {
+
return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockOAuthStore) DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) error {
+
return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")
+
}
+
+
// TestRequireAuth_ValidToken tests that valid sealed tokens are accepted
func TestRequireAuth_ValidToken(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
handlerCalled = true
// Verify DID was extracted and injected into context
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {
+
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)
}
+
// Verify OAuth session was injected
+
oauthSession := GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if oauthSession == nil {
+
t.Error("expected OAuth session to be non-nil")
return
}
+
if oauthSession.SessionID != sessionID {
+
t.Errorf("expected session ID '%s', got %s", sessionID, oauthSession.SessionID)
+
}
+
+
// Verify access token is available
+
accessToken := GetUserAccessToken(r)
+
if accessToken != "test_access_token" {
+
t.Errorf("expected access token 'test_access_token', got %s", accessToken)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
// TestRequireAuth_MissingAuthHeader tests that missing Authorization header is rejected
func TestRequireAuth_MissingAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
···
}
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat tests that non-Bearer tokens are rejected
func TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
tests := []struct {
name string
header string
}{
{"Basic auth", "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"},
+
{"DPoP scheme", "DPoP some-token"},
{"Invalid format", "InvalidFormat"},
}
···
}
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme verifies that Bearer scheme matching is case-insensitive
+
func TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
testCases := []struct {
name string
scheme string
}{
+
{"lowercase", "bearer"},
+
{"uppercase", "BEARER"},
+
{"mixed_case", "BeArEr"},
+
{"standard", "Bearer"},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
···
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.scheme+" "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_InvalidToken tests that malformed sealed tokens are rejected
+
func TestRequireAuth_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-valid-sealed-token")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken tests that expired sealed tokens are rejected
func TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
+
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called for expired token")
}))
+
// Create expired token (expired 1 hour ago)
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, -time.Hour)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_SessionNotFound tests that tokens with non-existent sessions are rejected
+
func TestRequireAuth_SessionNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("handler should not be called")
}))
+
// Create token for session that doesn't exist in store
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:nonexistent", "session999", time.Hour)
+
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestRequireAuth_DIDMismatch tests that session DID must match token DID
+
func TestRequireAuth_DIDMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
+
// Create a session with different DID than token
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:different")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
}
+
// Store with key that matches token DID
+
key := "did:plc:test123:" + sessionID
+
store.sessions[key] = session
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
t.Error("handler should not be called when DID mismatches")
+
}))
+
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
+
// TestOptionalAuth_WithToken tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid Bearer tokens
func TestOptionalAuth_WithToken(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
+
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
handlerCalled = true
// Verify DID was extracted
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {
+
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
// TestOptionalAuth_WithoutToken tests that OptionalAuth allows requests without tokens
func TestOptionalAuth_WithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
···
// TestOptionalAuth_InvalidToken tests that OptionalAuth continues without auth on invalid token
func TestOptionalAuth_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
handlerCalled := false
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
···
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-valid-sealed-token")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
···
}
}
+
// TestGetOAuthSession_NotAuthenticated tests that GetOAuthSession returns nil when not authenticated
+
func TestGetOAuthSession_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
session := GetOAuthSession(req)
+
if session != nil {
+
t.Errorf("expected nil session, got %+v", session)
}
}
+
// TestGetUserAccessToken_NotAuthenticated tests that GetUserAccessToken returns empty when not authenticated
+
func TestGetUserAccessToken_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
token := GetUserAccessToken(req)
+
if token != "" {
+
t.Errorf("expected empty token, got %s", token)
}
}
+
// TestSetTestUserDID tests the testing helper function
+
func TestSetTestUserDID(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
ctx = SetTestUserDID(ctx, "did:plc:testuser")
+
did, ok := ctx.Value(UserDIDKey).(string)
+
if !ok {
+
t.Error("DID not found in context")
}
+
if did != "did:plc:testuser" {
+
t.Errorf("expected 'did:plc:testuser', got %s", did)
+
}
+
}
+
// TestExtractBearerToken tests the Bearer token extraction logic
+
func TestExtractBearerToken(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
authHeader string
+
expectToken string
+
expectOK bool
+
}{
+
{"valid bearer", "Bearer token123", "token123", true},
+
{"lowercase bearer", "bearer token123", "token123", true},
+
{"uppercase bearer", "BEARER token123", "token123", true},
+
{"mixed case", "BeArEr token123", "token123", true},
+
{"empty header", "", "", false},
+
{"wrong scheme", "DPoP token123", "", false},
+
{"no token", "Bearer", "", false},
+
{"no space", "Bearertoken123", "", false},
+
{"extra spaces", "Bearer token123 ", "token123", true},
+
}
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
token, ok := extractBearerToken(tt.authHeader)
+
if ok != tt.expectOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected ok=%v, got %v", tt.expectOK, ok)
+
}
+
if token != tt.expectToken {
+
t.Errorf("expected token '%s', got '%s'", tt.expectToken, token)
+
}
+
})
+
}
+
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_ValidCookie tests that valid session cookies are accepted
+
func TestRequireAuth_ValidCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
+
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
handlerCalled := false
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
+
// Verify DID was extracted and injected into context
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {
+
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)
}
+
// Verify OAuth session was injected
+
oauthSession := GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if oauthSession == nil {
+
t.Error("expected OAuth session to be non-nil")
+
return
}
+
if oauthSession.SessionID != sessionID {
+
t.Errorf("expected session ID '%s', got %s", sessionID, oauthSession.SessionID)
}
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: token,
+
})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("handler was not called")
}
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
+
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_HeaderPrecedenceOverCookie tests that Authorization header takes precedence over cookie
+
func TestRequireAuth_HeaderPrecedenceOverCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
// Create two test sessions
+
did1 := syntax.DID("did:plc:header")
+
sessionID1 := "session_header"
+
session1 := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did1,
+
SessionID: sessionID1,
+
AccessToken: "header_token",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session1)
+
did2 := syntax.DID("did:plc:cookie")
+
sessionID2 := "session_cookie"
+
session2 := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did2,
+
SessionID: sessionID2,
+
AccessToken: "cookie_token",
+
HostURL: "https://pds.example.com",
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session2)
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
handlerCalled := false
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
+
// Should get header DID, not cookie DID
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:header" {
+
t.Errorf("expected header DID 'did:plc:header', got %s", extractedDID)
+
}
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
headerToken := client.createTestToken("did:plc:header", sessionID1, time.Hour)
+
cookieToken := client.createTestToken("did:plc:cookie", sessionID2, time.Hour)
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+headerToken)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: cookieToken,
+
})
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("handler was not called")
}
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_MissingBothHeaderAndCookie tests that missing both auth methods is rejected
+
func TestRequireAuth_MissingBothHeaderAndCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
t.Error("handler should not be called")
+
}))
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
// No Authorization header and no cookie
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
+
// TestRequireAuth_InvalidCookie tests that malformed cookie tokens are rejected
+
func TestRequireAuth_InvalidCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
t.Error("handler should not be called")
+
}))
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: "not-a-valid-sealed-token",
+
})
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
+
// TestOptionalAuth_WithCookie tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid session cookies
+
func TestOptionalAuth_WithCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
// Create a test session
+
did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")
+
sessionID := "session123"
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
AccessToken: "test_access_token",
}
+
_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
handlerCalled := false
+
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
+
// Verify DID was extracted
+
extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)
+
if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {
+
t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)
}
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: token,
})
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("handler was not called")
+
}
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
+
}
}
+
// TestOptionalAuth_InvalidCookie tests that OptionalAuth continues without auth on invalid cookie
+
func TestOptionalAuth_InvalidCookie(t *testing.T) {
+
client := newMockOAuthClient()
+
store := newMockOAuthStore()
+
middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)
+
handlerCalled := false
+
handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
+
// Verify no DID is set (invalid cookie ignored)
+
did := GetUserDID(r)
+
if did != "" {
+
t.Errorf("expected empty DID for invalid cookie, got %s", did)
}
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "coves_session",
+
Value: "not-a-valid-sealed-token",
})
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("handler was not called")
}
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
+
// TestWriteAuthError_JSONEscaping tests that writeAuthError properly escapes messages
+
func TestWriteAuthError_JSONEscaping(t *testing.T) {
+
tests := []struct {
+
name string
+
message string
+
}{
+
{"simple message", "Missing authentication"},
+
{"message with quotes", `Invalid "token" format`},
+
{"message with newlines", "Invalid\ntoken\nformat"},
+
{"message with backslashes", `Invalid \ token`},
+
{"message with special chars", `Invalid <script>alert("xss")</script> token`},
+
{"message with unicode", "Invalid token: \u2028\u2029"},
}
+
for _, tt := range tests {
+
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
writeAuthError(w, tt.message)
+
// Verify status code
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)
+
}
+
// Verify content type
+
if ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {
+
t.Errorf("expected Content-Type 'application/json', got %s", ct)
+
}
+
// Verify response is valid JSON
+
var response map[string]string
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &response); err != nil {
+
t.Fatalf("response is not valid JSON: %v\nBody: %s", err, w.Body.String())
+
}
+
// Verify fields
+
if response["error"] != "AuthenticationRequired" {
+
t.Errorf("expected error 'AuthenticationRequired', got %s", response["error"])
+
}
+
if response["message"] != tt.message {
+
t.Errorf("expected message %q, got %q", tt.message, response["message"])
+
}
+
})
}
}
+1 -1
internal/api/routes/community.go
···
// RegisterCommunityRoutes registers community-related XRPC endpoints on the router
// Implements social.coves.community.* lexicon endpoints
// allowedCommunityCreators restricts who can create communities. If empty, anyone can create.
-
func RegisterCommunityRoutes(r chi.Router, service communities.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware, allowedCommunityCreators []string) {
// Initialize handlers
createHandler := community.NewCreateHandler(service, allowedCommunityCreators)
getHandler := community.NewGetHandler(service)
···
// RegisterCommunityRoutes registers community-related XRPC endpoints on the router
// Implements social.coves.community.* lexicon endpoints
// allowedCommunityCreators restricts who can create communities. If empty, anyone can create.
+
func RegisterCommunityRoutes(r chi.Router, service communities.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware, allowedCommunityCreators []string) {
// Initialize handlers
createHandler := community.NewCreateHandler(service, allowedCommunityCreators)
getHandler := community.NewGetHandler(service)
+1 -1
internal/api/routes/post.go
···
// RegisterPostRoutes registers post-related XRPC endpoints on the router
// Implements social.coves.community.post.* lexicon endpoints
-
func RegisterPostRoutes(r chi.Router, service posts.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware) {
// Initialize handlers
createHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(service)
···
// RegisterPostRoutes registers post-related XRPC endpoints on the router
// Implements social.coves.community.post.* lexicon endpoints
+
func RegisterPostRoutes(r chi.Router, service posts.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware) {
// Initialize handlers
createHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(service)
+291
tests/e2e/oauth_ratelimit_e2e_test.go
···
···
+
package e2e
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
)
+
+
// TestRateLimiting_E2E_OAuthEndpoints tests OAuth-specific rate limiting
+
// OAuth endpoints have stricter rate limits to prevent:
+
// - Credential stuffing attacks on login endpoints (10 req/min)
+
// - OAuth state exhaustion
+
// - Refresh token abuse (20 req/min)
+
func TestRateLimiting_E2E_OAuthEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
+
t.Run("Login endpoints have 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create rate limiter matching oauth.go config: 10 requests per minute
+
loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
// Mock OAuth login handler
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("OK"))
+
})
+
+
handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.200:12345"
+
+
// Make exactly 10 requests (at limit)
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Request %d should succeed", i+1)
+
}
+
+
// 11th request should be rate limited
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Request 11 should be rate limited")
+
assert.Contains(t, rr.Body.String(), "Rate limit exceeded", "Should have rate limit error message")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Mobile login endpoints have 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
})
+
+
handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.201:12345"
+
+
// Make 10 requests
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/mobile/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
}
+
+
// 11th request blocked
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/mobile/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Mobile login should be rate limited at 10 req/min")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Refresh endpoint has 20 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Refresh has higher limit (20 req/min) for legitimate token refresh
+
refreshLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(20, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
})
+
+
handler := refreshLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.202:12345"
+
+
// Make 20 requests
+
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Request %d should succeed", i+1)
+
}
+
+
// 21st request blocked
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Refresh should be rate limited at 20 req/min")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Logout endpoint has 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
logoutLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
})
+
+
handler := logoutLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.203:12345"
+
+
// Make 10 requests
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/logout", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
}
+
+
// 11th request blocked
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/logout", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Logout should be rate limited at 10 req/min")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("OAuth callback has 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Callback uses same limiter as login (part of auth flow)
+
callbackLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
})
+
+
handler := callbackLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.204:12345"
+
+
// Make 10 requests
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
}
+
+
// 11th request blocked
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Callback should be rate limited at 10 req/min")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("OAuth rate limits are stricter than global limit", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Verify OAuth limits are more restrictive than global 100 req/min
+
const globalLimit = 100
+
const oauthLoginLimit = 10
+
const oauthRefreshLimit = 20
+
+
assert.Less(t, oauthLoginLimit, globalLimit, "OAuth login limit should be stricter than global")
+
assert.Less(t, oauthRefreshLimit, globalLimit, "OAuth refresh limit should be stricter than global")
+
assert.Greater(t, oauthRefreshLimit, oauthLoginLimit, "Refresh limit should be higher than login (legitimate use case)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("OAuth limits prevent credential stuffing", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Simulate credential stuffing attack
+
loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// Simulate failed login attempts
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+
})
+
+
handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)
+
attackerIP := "203.0.113.50:12345"
+
+
// Attacker tries 15 login attempts (credential stuffing)
+
successfulAttempts := 0
+
blockedAttempts := 0
+
+
for i := 0; i < 15; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = attackerIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
+
if rr.Code == http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
successfulAttempts++ // Reached handler (even if auth failed)
+
} else if rr.Code == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+
blockedAttempts++
+
}
+
}
+
+
// Rate limiter should block 5 attempts after first 10
+
assert.Equal(t, 10, successfulAttempts, "Should allow 10 login attempts")
+
assert.Equal(t, 5, blockedAttempts, "Should block 5 attempts after limit reached")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("OAuth limits are per-endpoint", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Each endpoint gets its own rate limiter
+
// This test verifies that limits are independent per endpoint
+
loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)
+
refreshLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(20, 1*time.Minute)
+
+
loginHandler := loginLimiter.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
+
refreshHandler := refreshLimiter.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
+
clientIP := "192.168.1.205:12345"
+
+
// Exhaust login limit
+
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
loginHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)
+
}
+
+
// Login limit exhausted
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
loginHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Login should be rate limited")
+
+
// Refresh endpoint should still work (independent limiter)
+
req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)
+
req.RemoteAddr = clientIP
+
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
+
refreshHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Refresh should not be affected by login rate limit")
+
})
+
}
+
+
// OAuth Rate Limiting Configuration Documentation
+
// ================================================
+
// This test file validates OAuth-specific rate limits applied in oauth.go:
+
//
+
// 1. Login Endpoints (Credential Stuffing Protection)
+
// - Endpoints: /oauth/login, /oauth/mobile/login, /oauth/callback
+
// - Limit: 10 requests per minute per IP
+
// - Reason: Prevent brute force and credential stuffing attacks
+
// - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:21
+
//
+
// 2. Refresh Endpoint (Token Refresh)
+
// - Endpoint: /oauth/refresh
+
// - Limit: 20 requests per minute per IP
+
// - Reason: Allow legitimate token refresh while preventing abuse
+
// - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:24
+
//
+
// 3. Logout Endpoint
+
// - Endpoint: /oauth/logout
+
// - Limit: 10 requests per minute per IP
+
// - Reason: Prevent session exhaustion attacks
+
// - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:27
+
//
+
// 4. Metadata Endpoints (No Extra Limit)
+
// - Endpoints: /oauth/client-metadata.json, /oauth/jwks.json
+
// - Limit: Global 100 requests per minute (from main.go)
+
// - Reason: Public metadata, not sensitive to rate abuse
+
//
+
// Security Benefits:
+
// - Credential Stuffing: Limits password guessing to 10 attempts/min
+
// - State Exhaustion: Prevents OAuth state generation spam
+
// - Token Abuse: Limits refresh token usage while allowing legitimate refresh
+
//
+
// Rate Limit Hierarchy:
+
// - OAuth login: 10 req/min (most restrictive)
+
// - OAuth refresh: 20 req/min (moderate)
+
// - Comments: 20 req/min (expensive queries)
+
// - Global: 100 req/min (baseline)
-208
tests/integration/jwt_verification_test.go
···
-
package integration
-
-
import (
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"
-
"fmt"
-
"net/http"
-
"net/http/httptest"
-
"os"
-
"strings"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
)
-
-
// TestJWTSignatureVerification tests end-to-end JWT signature verification
-
// with a real PDS-issued token. This verifies that AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false works.
-
//
-
// Flow:
-
// 1. Create account on local PDS (or use existing)
-
// 2. Authenticate to get a real signed JWT token
-
// 3. Verify our auth middleware can fetch JWKS and verify the signature
-
// 4. Test with AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false (production mode)
-
//
-
// NOTE: Local dev PDS (docker-compose.dev.yml) uses symmetric JWT_SECRET signing
-
// instead of asymmetric JWKS keys. This test verifies the code path works, but
-
// full JWKS verification requires a production PDS or setting up proper keys.
-
func TestJWTSignatureVerification(t *testing.T) {
-
// Skip in short mode since this requires real PDS
-
if testing.Short() {
-
t.Skip("Skipping JWT verification test in short mode")
-
}
-
-
pdsURL := os.Getenv("PDS_URL")
-
if pdsURL == "" {
-
pdsURL = "http://localhost:3001"
-
}
-
-
// Check if PDS is running
-
healthResp, err := http.Get(pdsURL + "/xrpc/_health")
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Skipf("PDS not running at %s: %v", pdsURL, err)
-
}
-
_ = healthResp.Body.Close()
-
-
// Check if JWKS is available (production PDS) or symmetric secret (dev PDS)
-
jwksResp, _ := http.Get(pdsURL + "/oauth/jwks")
-
if jwksResp != nil {
-
defer func() { _ = jwksResp.Body.Close() }()
-
}
-
-
t.Run("JWT parsing and middleware integration", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// Step 1: Create a test account on PDS
-
// Keep handle short to avoid PDS validation errors
-
timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000 // Last 5 digits
-
handle := fmt.Sprintf("jwt%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)
-
password := "testpass123"
-
email := fmt.Sprintf("jwt%d@test.com", timestamp)
-
-
accessToken, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)
-
}
-
t.Logf("โœ“ Created test account: %s (DID: %s)", handle, did)
-
t.Logf("โœ“ Received JWT token from PDS (length: %d)", len(accessToken))
-
-
// Step 3: Test JWT parsing (should work regardless of verification)
-
claims, err := auth.ParseJWT(accessToken)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to parse JWT: %v", err)
-
}
-
t.Logf("โœ“ JWT parsed successfully")
-
t.Logf(" Subject (DID): %s", claims.Subject)
-
t.Logf(" Issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)
-
t.Logf(" Scope: %s", claims.Scope)
-
-
if claims.Subject != did {
-
t.Errorf("Token DID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", did, claims.Subject)
-
}
-
-
// Step 4: Test JWKS fetching and signature verification
-
// NOTE: Local dev PDS uses symmetric secret, not JWKS
-
// For production, we'd verify the full signature here
-
t.Log("Checking JWKS availability...")
-
-
jwksFetcher := auth.NewCachedJWKSFetcher(1 * time.Hour)
-
verifiedClaims, err := auth.VerifyJWT(httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil).Context(), accessToken, jwksFetcher)
-
if err != nil {
-
// Expected for local dev PDS - log and continue
-
t.Logf("โ„น๏ธ JWKS verification skipped (expected for local dev PDS): %v", err)
-
t.Logf(" Local PDS uses symmetric JWT_SECRET instead of JWKS")
-
t.Logf(" In production, this would verify against proper JWKS keys")
-
} else {
-
// Unexpected success - means we're testing against a production PDS
-
t.Logf("โœ“ JWT signature verified successfully!")
-
t.Logf(" Verified DID: %s", verifiedClaims.Subject)
-
t.Logf(" Verified Issuer: %s", verifiedClaims.Issuer)
-
-
if verifiedClaims.Subject != did {
-
t.Errorf("Verified token DID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", did, verifiedClaims.Subject)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Step 5: Test auth middleware with skipVerify=true (for dev PDS)
-
t.Log("Testing auth middleware with skipVerify=true (dev mode)...")
-
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher, true) // skipVerify=true for dev PDS
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
var extractedDID string
-
-
testHandler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
extractedDID = middleware.GetUserDID(r)
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success": true}`))
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
if !handlerCalled {
-
t.Errorf("Handler was not called - auth middleware rejected valid token")
-
t.Logf("Response status: %d", w.Code)
-
t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())
-
}
-
-
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
-
t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
-
t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())
-
}
-
-
if extractedDID != did {
-
t.Errorf("Middleware extracted wrong DID: expected %s, got %s", did, extractedDID)
-
}
-
-
t.Logf("โœ… Auth middleware with signature verification working correctly!")
-
t.Logf(" Handler called: %v", handlerCalled)
-
t.Logf(" Extracted DID: %s", extractedDID)
-
t.Logf(" Response status: %d", w.Code)
-
})
-
-
t.Run("Rejects tampered JWT", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create valid token
-
timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000
-
handle := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)
-
password := "testpass456"
-
email := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d@test.com", timestamp)
-
-
accessToken, _, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Tamper with the token more aggressively to break JWT structure
-
parts := splitToken(accessToken)
-
if len(parts) != 3 {
-
t.Fatalf("Invalid JWT structure: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-
}
-
// Replace the payload with invalid base64 that will fail decoding
-
tamperedToken := parts[0] + ".!!!invalid-base64!!!." + parts[2]
-
-
// Test with middleware (skipVerify=true since dev PDS doesn't use JWKS)
-
// Tampered payload should fail JWT parsing even without signature check
-
jwksFetcher := auth.NewCachedJWKSFetcher(1 * time.Hour)
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher, true)
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
-
-
handlerCalled := false
-
testHandler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
handlerCalled = true
-
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-
}))
-
-
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tamperedToken)
-
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
-
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
-
-
if handlerCalled {
-
t.Error("Handler was called for tampered token - should have been rejected")
-
}
-
-
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
-
t.Errorf("Expected status 401 for tampered token, got %d", w.Code)
-
}
-
-
t.Logf("โœ… Middleware correctly rejected tampered token with status %d", w.Code)
-
})
-
-
t.Run("Rejects expired JWT with signature verification", func(t *testing.T) {
-
// For this test, we'd need to create a token and wait for expiry,
-
// or mock the time. For now, we'll just verify the validation logic exists.
-
// In production, PDS tokens expire after a certain period.
-
t.Log("โ„น๏ธ Expiration test would require waiting for token expiry or time mocking")
-
t.Log(" Token expiration validation is covered by unit tests in auth_test.go")
-
t.Skip("Skipping expiration test - requires time manipulation")
-
})
-
}
-
-
// splitToken splits a JWT into its three parts (header.payload.signature)
-
func splitToken(token string) []string {
-
return strings.Split(token, ".")
-
}
···
+910
tests/integration/oauth_e2e_test.go
···
···
+
package integration
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
+
"context"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"fmt"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"strings"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
_ "github.com/lib/pq"
+
"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
// TestOAuth_Components tests OAuth component functionality without requiring PDS.
+
// This validates all Coves OAuth code:
+
// - Session storage and retrieval (PostgreSQL)
+
// - Token sealing (AES-GCM encryption)
+
// - Token unsealing (decryption + validation)
+
// - Session cleanup
+
//
+
// NOTE: Full OAuth redirect flow testing requires both HTTPS PDS and HTTPS Coves deployment.
+
// The OAuth redirect flow is handled by indigo's library and enforces OAuth 2.0 spec
+
// (HTTPS required for authorization servers and redirect URIs).
+
func TestOAuth_Components(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth component test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
// Setup test database
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() {
+
if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+
t.Logf("Failed to close database: %v", err)
+
}
+
}()
+
+
// Run migrations to ensure OAuth tables exist
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”ง Testing OAuth Components")
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
require.NotNil(t, client, "OAuth client should be initialized")
+
+
// Use a test DID (doesn't need to exist on PDS for component tests)
+
testDID := "did:plc:componenttest123"
+
+
// Run component tests
+
testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession(t, ctx, nil, store, client, testDID, "")
+
+
t.Log("")
+
t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))
+
t.Log("โœ… OAuth Component Tests Complete")
+
t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))
+
t.Log("Components validated:")
+
t.Log(" โœ“ Session storage (PostgreSQL)")
+
t.Log(" โœ“ Token sealing (AES-GCM encryption)")
+
t.Log(" โœ“ Token unsealing (decryption + validation)")
+
t.Log(" โœ“ Session cleanup")
+
t.Log("")
+
t.Log("NOTE: Full OAuth redirect flow requires HTTPS PDS + HTTPS Coves")
+
t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))
+
}
+
+
// testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession tests OAuth components that work without PDS redirect flow.
+
// This is used when testing with localhost PDS, where the indigo library rejects http:// URLs.
+
func testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, _ interface{}, store oauthlib.ClientAuthStore, client *oauth.OAuthClient, userDID, _ string) {
+
t.Helper()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”ง Testing OAuth components with mocked session...")
+
+
// Parse DID
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(userDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should parse DID")
+
+
// Component 1: Session Storage
+
t.Log(" ๐Ÿ“ฆ Component 1: Testing session storage...")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: fmt.Sprintf("localhost-test-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()),
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "mocked-access-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should save session")
+
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve session")
+
require.Equal(t, testSession.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID)
+
require.Equal(t, testSession.AccessToken, retrieved.AccessToken)
+
t.Log(" โœ… Session storage working")
+
+
// Component 2: Token Sealing
+
t.Log(" ๐Ÿ” Component 2: Testing token sealing...")
+
sealedToken, err := client.SealSession(parsedDID.String(), testSession.SessionID, time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should seal token")
+
require.NotEmpty(t, sealedToken, "Sealed token should not be empty")
+
tokenPreview := sealedToken
+
if len(tokenPreview) > 50 {
+
tokenPreview = tokenPreview[:50]
+
}
+
t.Logf(" โœ… Token sealed: %s...", tokenPreview)
+
+
// Component 3: Token Unsealing
+
t.Log(" ๐Ÿ”“ Component 3: Testing token unsealing...")
+
unsealed, err := client.UnsealSession(sealedToken)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should unseal token")
+
require.Equal(t, userDID, unsealed.DID)
+
require.Equal(t, testSession.SessionID, unsealed.SessionID)
+
t.Log(" โœ… Token unsealing working")
+
+
// Component 4: Session Cleanup
+
t.Log(" ๐Ÿงน Component 4: Testing session cleanup...")
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should delete session")
+
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)
+
require.Error(t, err, "Session should not exist after deletion")
+
t.Log(" โœ… Session cleanup working")
+
+
t.Log("โœ… All OAuth components verified!")
+
t.Log("")
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ“ Summary: OAuth implementation validated with mocked session")
+
t.Log(" - Session storage: โœ“")
+
t.Log(" - Token sealing: โœ“")
+
t.Log(" - Token unsealing: โœ“")
+
t.Log(" - Session cleanup: โœ“")
+
t.Log("")
+
t.Log("โš ๏ธ To test full OAuth redirect flow, use a production PDS with HTTPS")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration tests that expired sealed tokens are rejected
+
func TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token expiration test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("โฐ Testing OAuth token expiration...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
_ = oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store) // Handler created for completeness
+
+
// Create test session with past expiration
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:expiredtest123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "expired-session",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "expired-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Manually update expiration to the past
+
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,
+
"UPDATE oauth_sessions SET expires_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 day' WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2",
+
did.String(), testSession.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Try to retrieve expired session
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, testSession.SessionID)
+
assert.Error(t, err, "Should not be able to retrieve expired session")
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound for expired session")
+
+
// Test cleanup of expired sessions
+
cleaned, err := store.(*oauth.PostgresOAuthStore).CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Cleanup should succeed")
+
assert.Greater(t, cleaned, int64(0), "Should have cleaned up at least one session")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Expired session handling verified (cleaned %d sessions)", cleaned)
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_InvalidToken tests that invalid/tampered tokens are rejected
+
func TestOAuthE2E_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth invalid token test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”’ Testing OAuth invalid token rejection...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)
+
+
// Setup test server with protected endpoint
+
r := chi.NewRouter()
+
r.Get("/api/me", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
sessData, err := handler.GetSessionFromRequest(r)
+
if err != nil {
+
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+
return
+
}
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"did": sessData.AccountDID.String()})
+
})
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(r)
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
// Test with invalid token formats
+
testCases := []struct {
+
name string
+
token string
+
}{
+
{"Empty token", ""},
+
{"Invalid base64", "not-valid-base64!!!"},
+
{"Tampered token", "dGFtcGVyZWQtdG9rZW4tZGF0YQ=="}, // Valid base64 but invalid content
+
{"Short token", "abc"},
+
}
+
+
for _, tc := range testCases {
+
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", server.URL+"/api/me", nil)
+
if tc.token != "" {
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tc.token)
+
}
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Invalid token should be rejected with 401")
+
})
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Invalid token rejection verified")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_SessionNotFound tests behavior when session doesn't exist in DB
+
func TestOAuthE2E_SessionNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session not found test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ” Testing OAuth session not found behavior...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Try to retrieve non-existent session
+
nonExistentDID, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:nonexistent123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, nonExistentDID, "nonexistent-session")
+
assert.Error(t, err, "Should return error for non-existent session")
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound")
+
+
// Try to delete non-existent session
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, nonExistentDID, "nonexistent-session")
+
assert.Error(t, err, "Should return error when deleting non-existent session")
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session not found handling verified")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_MultipleSessionsPerUser tests that a user can have multiple active sessions
+
func TestOAuthE2E_MultipleSessionsPerUser(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth multiple sessions test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ‘ฅ Testing multiple OAuth sessions per user...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Create a test DID
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:multisession123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create multiple sessions for the same user
+
sessions := []oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session-1-web",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "token-1",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
},
+
{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session-2-mobile",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "token-2",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
},
+
{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "session-3-tablet",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "token-3",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Save all sessions
+
for i, session := range sessions {
+
err := store.SaveSession(ctx, session)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to save session %d", i+1)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Created %d sessions for user", len(sessions))
+
+
// Verify all sessions can be retrieved independently
+
for i, session := range sessions {
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, session.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to retrieve session %d", i+1)
+
assert.Equal(t, session.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID, "Session ID should match")
+
assert.Equal(t, session.AccessToken, retrieved.AccessToken, "Access token should match")
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… All sessions retrieved independently")
+
+
// Delete one session and verify others remain
+
err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, sessions[0].SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to delete first session")
+
+
// Verify first session is deleted
+
_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessions[0].SessionID)
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "First session should be deleted")
+
+
// Verify other sessions still exist
+
for i := 1; i < len(sessions); i++ {
+
_, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessions[i].SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Session %d should still exist", i+1)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Multiple sessions per user verified")
+
+
// Cleanup
+
for i := 1; i < len(sessions); i++ {
+
_ = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, sessions[i].SessionID)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_AuthRequestStorage tests OAuth auth request storage and retrieval
+
func TestOAuthE2E_AuthRequestStorage(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth auth request storage test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ“ Testing OAuth auth request storage...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Create test auth request data
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:authrequest123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
authRequest := oauthlib.AuthRequestData{
+
State: "test-state-12345",
+
AccountDID: &did,
+
PKCEVerifier: "test-pkce-verifier",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "test-dpop-key",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "test-nonce",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
RequestURI: "http://localhost:3001/authorize",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",
+
AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/revoke",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},
+
}
+
+
// Save auth request
+
err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to save auth request")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Auth request saved")
+
+
// Retrieve auth request
+
retrieved, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to retrieve auth request")
+
assert.Equal(t, authRequest.State, retrieved.State, "State should match")
+
assert.Equal(t, authRequest.PKCEVerifier, retrieved.PKCEVerifier, "PKCE verifier should match")
+
assert.Equal(t, authRequest.AuthServerURL, retrieved.AuthServerURL, "Auth server URL should match")
+
assert.Equal(t, len(authRequest.Scopes), len(retrieved.Scopes), "Scopes length should match")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Auth request retrieved and verified")
+
+
// Test duplicate state error
+
err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest)
+
assert.Error(t, err, "Should not allow duplicate state")
+
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "already exists", "Error should indicate duplicate")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Duplicate state prevention verified")
+
+
// Delete auth request
+
err = store.DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to delete auth request")
+
+
// Verify deletion
+
_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)
+
assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrAuthRequestNotFound, err, "Auth request should be deleted")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Auth request deletion verified")
+
+
// Test cleanup of expired auth requests
+
// Create an auth request and manually set created_at to the past
+
oldAuthRequest := oauthlib.AuthRequestData{
+
State: "old-state-12345",
+
PKCEVerifier: "old-verifier",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, oldAuthRequest)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Update created_at to 1 hour ago
+
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,
+
"UPDATE oauth_requests SET created_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour' WHERE state = $1",
+
oldAuthRequest.State)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Cleanup expired requests
+
cleaned, err := store.(*oauth.PostgresOAuthStore).CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(ctx)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Cleanup should succeed")
+
assert.Greater(t, cleaned, int64(0), "Should have cleaned up at least one auth request")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Expired auth request cleanup verified (cleaned %d requests)", cleaned)
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_TokenRefresh tests the refresh token flow
+
func TestOAuthE2E_TokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token refresh test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”„ Testing OAuth token refresh flow...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)
+
+
// Create a test DID and session
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:refreshtest123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create initial session with refresh token
+
initialSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "refresh-session-1",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",
+
AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/revoke",
+
AccessToken: "initial-access-token",
+
RefreshToken: "initial-refresh-token",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "test-dpop-key",
+
DPoPAuthServerNonce: "test-nonce",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},
+
}
+
+
// Save the session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, initialSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should save initial session")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Initial session created")
+
+
// Create a sealed token for this session
+
sealedToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), initialSession.SessionID, time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should seal session token")
+
require.NotEmpty(t, sealedToken, "Sealed token should not be empty")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session token sealed")
+
+
// Setup test server with refresh endpoint
+
r := chi.NewRouter()
+
r.Post("/oauth/refresh", handler.HandleRefresh)
+
+
server := httptest.NewServer(r)
+
defer server.Close()
+
+
t.Run("Valid refresh request", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// NOTE: This test verifies that the refresh endpoint can be called
+
// In a real scenario, the indigo client's RefreshTokens() would call the PDS
+
// Since we're in a component test, we're testing the Coves handler logic
+
+
// Create refresh request
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
"sealed_token": sealedToken,
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
// NOTE: In component testing mode, the indigo client may not have
+
// real PDS credentials, so RefreshTokens() might fail
+
// We're testing that the handler correctly processes the request
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
// In component test mode without real PDS, we may get 401
+
// In production with real PDS, this would return 200 with new tokens
+
t.Logf("Refresh response status: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
+
// The important thing is that the handler doesn't crash
+
// and properly validates the request structure
+
assert.True(t, resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized,
+
"Refresh should return either success or auth failure, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Invalid DID format (with valid token)", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create a sealed token with an invalid DID format
+
invalidDID := "invalid-did-format"
+
// Create the token with a valid DID first, then we'll try to use it with invalid DID in request
+
validToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), initialSession.SessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": invalidDID, // Invalid DID format in request
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
"sealed_token": validToken, // Valid token for different DID
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
// Should reject with 401 due to DID mismatch (not 400) since auth happens first
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"DID mismatch should be rejected with 401 (auth check happens before format validation)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Missing sealed_token (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
// Missing sealed_token - should be rejected for security
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Missing sealed_token should be rejected (proof of possession required)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Invalid sealed_token", func(t *testing.T) {
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
"sealed_token": "invalid-token-data",
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Invalid sealed_token should be rejected")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("DID mismatch (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create a sealed token for a different DID
+
wrongDID := "did:plc:wronguser123"
+
wrongToken, err := client.SealSession(wrongDID, initialSession.SessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Try to use it to refresh the original session
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(), // Claiming original DID
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,
+
"sealed_token": wrongToken, // But token is for different DID
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"DID mismatch should be rejected (prevents session hijacking)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Session ID mismatch (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create a sealed token with wrong session ID
+
wrongSessionID := "wrong-session-id"
+
wrongToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), wrongSessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Try to use it to refresh the original session
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": initialSession.SessionID, // Claiming original session
+
"sealed_token": wrongToken, // But token is for different session
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Session ID mismatch should be rejected (prevents session hijacking)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Non-existent session", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create a valid sealed token for a non-existent session
+
nonExistentSessionID := "nonexistent-session-id"
+
validToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), nonExistentSessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{
+
"did": did.String(),
+
"session_id": nonExistentSessionID,
+
"sealed_token": validToken, // Valid token but session doesn't exist
+
}
+
+
reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,
+
"Non-existent session should be rejected with 401")
+
})
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Token refresh endpoint validation verified")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_SessionUpdate tests that refresh updates the session in database
+
func TestOAuthE2E_SessionUpdate(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session update test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ’พ Testing OAuth session update on refresh...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:sessionupdate123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
originalSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: "update-session-1",
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",
+
AccessToken: "original-access-token",
+
RefreshToken: "original-refresh-token",
+
DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "original-dpop-key",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save original session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, originalSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Original session saved")
+
+
// Simulate a token refresh by updating the session with new tokens
+
updatedSession := originalSession
+
updatedSession.AccessToken = "new-access-token"
+
updatedSession.RefreshToken = "new-refresh-token"
+
updatedSession.DPoPAuthServerNonce = "new-nonce"
+
+
// Update the session (upsert)
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, updatedSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session updated with new tokens")
+
+
// Retrieve the session and verify it was updated
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, originalSession.SessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve updated session")
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "new-access-token", retrieved.AccessToken,
+
"Access token should be updated")
+
assert.Equal(t, "new-refresh-token", retrieved.RefreshToken,
+
"Refresh token should be updated")
+
assert.Equal(t, "new-nonce", retrieved.DPoPAuthServerNonce,
+
"DPoP nonce should be updated")
+
+
// Verify session ID and DID remain the same
+
assert.Equal(t, originalSession.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID,
+
"Session ID should remain the same")
+
assert.Equal(t, did, retrieved.AccountDID,
+
"DID should remain the same")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session update verified - tokens refreshed in database")
+
+
// Verify updated_at was changed
+
var updatedAt time.Time
+
err = db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+
"SELECT updated_at FROM oauth_sessions WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2",
+
did.String(), originalSession.SessionID).Scan(&updatedAt)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Updated timestamp should be recent (within last minute)
+
assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now(), updatedAt, time.Minute,
+
"Session updated_at should be recent")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Session timestamp update verified")
+
}
+
+
// TestOAuthE2E_RefreshTokenRotation tests refresh token rotation behavior
+
func TestOAuthE2E_RefreshTokenRotation(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth refresh token rotation test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
t.Log("๐Ÿ”„ Testing OAuth refresh token rotation...")
+
+
// Setup OAuth store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
+
// Create a test session
+
did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:rotation123")
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Simulate multiple refresh cycles
+
sessionID := "rotation-session-1"
+
tokens := []struct {
+
access string
+
refresh string
+
}{
+
{"access-token-v1", "refresh-token-v1"},
+
{"access-token-v2", "refresh-token-v2"},
+
{"access-token-v3", "refresh-token-v3"},
+
}
+
+
for i, tokenPair := range tokens {
+
session := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",
+
AccessToken: tokenPair.access,
+
RefreshToken: tokenPair.refresh,
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save/update session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should save session iteration %d", i+1)
+
+
// Retrieve and verify
+
retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve session iteration %d", i+1)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, tokenPair.access, retrieved.AccessToken,
+
"Access token should match iteration %d", i+1)
+
assert.Equal(t, tokenPair.refresh, retrieved.RefreshToken,
+
"Refresh token should match iteration %d", i+1)
+
+
// Small delay to ensure timestamp differences
+
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Refresh token rotation verified through %d cycles", len(tokens))
+
+
// Verify final state
+
finalSession, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessionID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
assert.Equal(t, "access-token-v3", finalSession.AccessToken,
+
"Final access token should be from last rotation")
+
assert.Equal(t, "refresh-token-v3", finalSession.RefreshToken,
+
"Final refresh token should be from last rotation")
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… Token rotation state verified")
+
}
+312
tests/integration/oauth_session_fixation_test.go
···
···
+
package integration
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
+
"context"
+
"crypto/sha256"
+
"encoding/base64"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"net/url"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
)
+
+
// TestOAuth_SessionFixationAttackPrevention tests that the mobile redirect binding
+
// prevents session fixation attacks where an attacker plants a mobile_redirect_uri
+
// cookie, then the user does a web login, and credentials get sent to attacker's deep link.
+
//
+
// Attack scenario:
+
// 1. Attacker tricks user into visiting /oauth/mobile/login?redirect_uri=evil://steal
+
// 2. This plants a mobile_redirect_uri cookie (lives 10 minutes)
+
// 3. User later does normal web OAuth login via /oauth/login
+
// 4. HandleCallback sees the stale mobile_redirect_uri cookie
+
// 5. WITHOUT THE FIX: Callback sends sealed token, DID, session_id to attacker's deep link
+
// 6. WITH THE FIX: Binding mismatch is detected, mobile cookies cleared, user gets web session
+
func TestOAuth_SessionFixationAttackPrevention(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session fixation test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
// Setup test database
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
defer func() {
+
if err := db.Close(); err != nil {
+
t.Logf("Failed to close database: %v", err)
+
}
+
}()
+
+
// Run migrations
+
require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))
+
require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))
+
+
// Setup OAuth client and store
+
store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)
+
client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)
+
require.NotNil(t, client, "OAuth client should be initialized")
+
+
// Setup handler
+
handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)
+
+
// Setup router
+
r := chi.NewRouter()
+
r.Get("/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)
+
+
t.Run("attack scenario - planted mobile cookie without binding", func(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Step 1: Simulate a successful OAuth callback (like a user did web login)
+
// We'll create a mock session to simulate what ProcessCallback would return
+
testDID := "did:plc:test123456"
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
sessionID := "test-session-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "test-access-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save the session (simulating successful OAuth flow)
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Step 2: Attacker planted a mobile_redirect_uri cookie (without binding)
+
// This simulates the cookie being planted earlier by attacker
+
attackerRedirectURI := "evil://steal"
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)
+
+
// Plant the attacker's cookie (URL escaped as it would be in real scenario)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: url.QueryEscape(attackerRedirectURI),
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
// NOTE: No mobile_redirect_binding cookie! This is the attack scenario.
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
// Step 3: Try to process the callback
+
// This would fail because ProcessCallback needs real OAuth code/state
+
// For this test, we're verifying the handler's security checks work
+
// even before ProcessCallback is called
+
+
// The handler will try to call ProcessCallback which will fail
+
// But we're testing that even if it succeeded, the mobile redirect
+
// validation would prevent the attack
+
handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)
+
+
// Step 4: Verify the attack was prevented
+
// The handler should reject the request due to missing binding
+
// Since ProcessCallback will fail first (no real OAuth code), we expect
+
// a 400 error, but the important thing is it doesn't redirect to evil://steal
+
+
assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,
+
"Should not redirect when ProcessCallback fails")
+
assert.NotContains(t, rec.Header().Get("Location"), "evil://",
+
"Should never redirect to attacker's URI")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("legitimate mobile flow - with valid binding", func(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Setup a legitimate mobile session
+
testDID := "did:plc:mobile123"
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
sessionID := "mobile-session-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "mobile-access-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
// Save the session
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Create request with BOTH mobile_redirect_uri AND valid binding
+
// Use Universal Link URI that's in the allowlist
+
legitRedirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"
+
csrfToken := "valid-csrf-token-for-mobile"
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)
+
+
// Add mobile redirect URI cookie
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: url.QueryEscape(legitRedirectURI),
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Add CSRF token (required for mobile flow)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "oauth_csrf",
+
Value: csrfToken,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Add VALID binding cookie (this is what prevents the attack)
+
// In real flow, this would be set by HandleMobileLogin
+
// The binding now includes the CSRF token for double-submit validation
+
mobileBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(csrfToken, legitRedirectURI)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_binding",
+
Value: mobileBinding,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)
+
+
// This will also fail at ProcessCallback (no real OAuth code)
+
// but we're verifying the binding validation logic is in place
+
// In a real integration test with PDS, this would succeed
+
assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,
+
"Should not redirect when ProcessCallback fails (expected in mock test)")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("binding mismatch - attacker tries wrong binding", func(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Setup session
+
testDID := "did:plc:bindingtest"
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
sessionID := "binding-test-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "binding-test-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Attacker tries to plant evil redirect with a binding from different URI
+
attackerRedirectURI := "evil://steal"
+
attackerCSRF := "attacker-csrf-token"
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)
+
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: url.QueryEscape(attackerRedirectURI),
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "oauth_csrf",
+
Value: attackerCSRF,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Use binding from a DIFFERENT CSRF token and URI (attacker's attempt to forge)
+
// Even if attacker knows the redirect URI, they don't know the user's CSRF token
+
wrongBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest("different-csrf", "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback")
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_binding",
+
Value: wrongBinding,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)
+
+
// Should fail due to binding mismatch (even before ProcessCallback)
+
// The binding validation happens after ProcessCallback in the real code,
+
// but the mismatch would be caught and cookies cleared
+
assert.NotContains(t, rec.Header().Get("Location"), "evil://",
+
"Should never redirect to attacker's URI on binding mismatch")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("CSRF token value mismatch - attacker tries different CSRF", func(t *testing.T) {
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Setup session
+
testDID := "did:plc:csrftest"
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
sessionID := "csrf-test-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")
+
testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: parsedDID,
+
SessionID: sessionID,
+
HostURL: "http://localhost:3001",
+
AccessToken: "csrf-test-token",
+
Scopes: []string{"atproto"},
+
}
+
+
err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// This tests the P1 security fix: CSRF token VALUE must be validated, not just presence
+
// Attack scenario:
+
// 1. User starts mobile login with CSRF token A and redirect URI X
+
// 2. Binding = hash(A + X) is stored in cookie
+
// 3. Attacker somehow gets user to have CSRF token B in cookie (different from A)
+
// 4. Callback receives CSRF token B, redirect URI X, binding = hash(A + X)
+
// 5. hash(B + X) != hash(A + X), so attack is detected
+
+
originalCSRF := "original-csrf-token-set-at-login"
+
redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"
+
// Binding was created with original CSRF token
+
originalBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(originalCSRF, redirectURI)
+
+
// But attacker managed to change the CSRF cookie
+
attackerCSRF := "attacker-replaced-csrf"
+
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)
+
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_uri",
+
Value: url.QueryEscape(redirectURI),
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Attacker's CSRF token (different from what created the binding)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "oauth_csrf",
+
Value: attackerCSRF,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
// Original binding (created with original CSRF token)
+
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
+
Name: "mobile_redirect_binding",
+
Value: originalBinding,
+
Path: "/oauth",
+
})
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)
+
+
// Should fail because hash(attackerCSRF + redirectURI) != hash(originalCSRF + redirectURI)
+
// This is the key security fix - CSRF token VALUE is now validated
+
assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,
+
"Should not redirect when CSRF token doesn't match binding")
+
})
+
}
+
+
// generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest generates a binding for testing
+
// This mirrors the actual logic in handlers_security.go:
+
// binding = base64(sha256(csrfToken + "|" + redirectURI)[:16])
+
func generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(csrfToken, mobileRedirectURI string) string {
+
combined := csrfToken + "|" + mobileRedirectURI
+
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(combined))
+
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:16])
+
}
+169
tests/integration/oauth_token_verification_test.go
···
···
+
package integration
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"fmt"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/http/httptest"
+
"os"
+
"testing"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
// TestOAuthTokenVerification tests end-to-end OAuth token verification
+
// with real PDS-issued OAuth tokens. This replaces the old JWT verification test
+
// since we now use OAuth sealed session tokens instead of raw JWTs.
+
//
+
// Flow:
+
// 1. Create account on local PDS (or use existing)
+
// 2. Authenticate to get OAuth tokens and create sealed session token
+
// 3. Verify our auth middleware can unseal and validate the token
+
// 4. Test token validation and session retrieval
+
//
+
// NOTE: This test uses the E2E OAuth middleware which mocks the session unsealing
+
// for testing purposes. Real OAuth tokens from PDS would be sealed using the
+
// OAuth client's seal secret.
+
func TestOAuthTokenVerification(t *testing.T) {
+
// Skip in short mode since this requires real PDS
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token verification test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
pdsURL := os.Getenv("PDS_URL")
+
if pdsURL == "" {
+
pdsURL = "http://localhost:3001"
+
}
+
+
// Check if PDS is running
+
healthResp, err := http.Get(pdsURL + "/xrpc/_health")
+
if err != nil {
+
t.Skipf("PDS not running at %s: %v", pdsURL, err)
+
}
+
_ = healthResp.Body.Close()
+
+
t.Run("OAuth token validation and middleware integration", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Step 1: Create a test account on PDS
+
// Keep handle short to avoid PDS validation errors
+
timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000 // Last 5 digits
+
handle := fmt.Sprintf("oauth%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)
+
password := "testpass123"
+
email := fmt.Sprintf("oauth%d@test.com", timestamp)
+
+
_, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)
+
if err != nil {
+
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)
+
}
+
t.Logf("โœ“ Created test account: %s (DID: %s)", handle, did)
+
+
// Step 2: Create OAuth middleware with mock unsealer for testing
+
// In production, this would unseal real OAuth tokens from PDS
+
t.Log("Testing OAuth middleware with sealed session tokens...")
+
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
+
testToken := e2eAuth.AddUser(did)
+
+
handlerCalled := false
+
var extractedDID string
+
+
testHandler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
+
extractedDID = middleware.GetUserDID(r)
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success": true}`))
+
}))
+
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testToken)
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+
if !handlerCalled {
+
t.Errorf("Handler was not called - auth middleware rejected valid token")
+
t.Logf("Response status: %d", w.Code)
+
t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())
+
}
+
+
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+
t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
+
t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())
+
}
+
+
if extractedDID != did {
+
t.Errorf("Middleware extracted wrong DID: expected %s, got %s", did, extractedDID)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… OAuth middleware with token validation working correctly!")
+
t.Logf(" Handler called: %v", handlerCalled)
+
t.Logf(" Extracted DID: %s", extractedDID)
+
t.Logf(" Response status: %d", w.Code)
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Rejects tampered/invalid sealed tokens", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// Create valid user
+
timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000
+
handle := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)
+
password := "testpass456"
+
email := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d@test.com", timestamp)
+
+
_, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)
+
if err != nil {
+
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)
+
}
+
+
// Create OAuth middleware
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
+
validToken := e2eAuth.AddUser(did)
+
+
// Create various invalid tokens to test
+
testCases := []struct {
+
name string
+
token string
+
}{
+
{"Empty token", ""},
+
{"Invalid base64", "not-valid-base64!!!"},
+
{"Tampered token", "dGFtcGVyZWQtdG9rZW4tZGF0YQ=="}, // Valid base64 but not a real sealed session
+
{"Short token", "abc"},
+
{"Modified valid token", validToken + "extra"},
+
}
+
+
for _, tc := range testCases {
+
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+
handlerCalled := false
+
testHandler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
handlerCalled = true
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
}))
+
+
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
+
if tc.token != "" {
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tc.token)
+
}
+
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+
if handlerCalled {
+
t.Error("Handler was called for invalid token - should have been rejected")
+
}
+
+
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+
t.Errorf("Expected status 401 for invalid token, got %d", w.Code)
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ“ Middleware correctly rejected %s with status %d", tc.name, w.Code)
+
})
+
}
+
+
t.Logf("โœ… All invalid token types correctly rejected")
+
})
+
+
t.Run("Session expiration handling", func(t *testing.T) {
+
// OAuth session expiration is handled at the database level
+
// See TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration in oauth_e2e_test.go for full expiration testing
+
t.Log("โ„น๏ธ Session expiration testing is covered in oauth_e2e_test.go")
+
t.Log(" OAuth sessions expire based on database timestamps and are cleaned up periodically")
+
t.Log(" This is different from JWT expiration which was timestamp-based in the token itself")
+
t.Skip("Session expiration is tested in oauth_e2e_test.go - see TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration")
+
})
+
}
+20 -19
tests/integration/aggregator_e2e_test.go
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/aggregator"
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
"Coves/internal/core/aggregators"
···
getAuthorizationsHandler := aggregator.NewGetAuthorizationsHandler(aggregatorService)
listForCommunityHandler := aggregator.NewListForCommunityHandler(aggregatorService)
createPostHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(postService)
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true) // Skip JWT verification for testing
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
ctx := context.Background()
···
// Part 1: Service Declaration via Real PDS
// ====================================================================================
// Store DIDs, tokens, and URIs for use across all test parts
-
var aggregatorDID, aggregatorToken, aggregatorHandle, communityDID, communityToken, authorizationRkey string
t.Run("1. Service Declaration - PDS Account โ†’ Write Record โ†’ Jetstream โ†’ AppView DB", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("\n๐Ÿ“ Part 1: Create aggregator account and publish service declaration to PDS...")
···
t.Logf("โœ“ Created aggregator account: %s (%s)", aggregatorHandle, aggregatorDID)
// STEP 2: Write service declaration to aggregator's repository on PDS
configSchema := map[string]interface{}{
"type": "object",
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
-
// Create JWT for aggregator (not a user)
-
aggregatorJWT := createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+aggregatorJWT)
// Execute request through auth middleware + handler
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
// STEP 2: Verify post creation succeeded
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID))
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Post %d should succeed", i)
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID))
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "10th post should succeed (at limit)")
···
req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID))
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
-
handler = authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
// Should be rate limited
···
err := aggregatorConsumer.HandleEvent(ctx, &unAuthAggEvent)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Try to create post without authorization
reqBody := map[string]interface{}{
"community": communityDID,
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(unauthorizedAggDID))
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
// Should be forbidden
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID))
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rr.Code, "Should reject post from disabled aggregator")
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/aggregator"
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
"Coves/internal/core/aggregators"
···
getAuthorizationsHandler := aggregator.NewGetAuthorizationsHandler(aggregatorService)
listForCommunityHandler := aggregator.NewListForCommunityHandler(aggregatorService)
createPostHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(postService)
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
ctx := context.Background()
···
// Part 1: Service Declaration via Real PDS
// ====================================================================================
// Store DIDs, tokens, and URIs for use across all test parts
+
var aggregatorDID, aggregatorToken, aggregatorAPIToken, aggregatorHandle, communityDID, communityToken, authorizationRkey string
t.Run("1. Service Declaration - PDS Account โ†’ Write Record โ†’ Jetstream โ†’ AppView DB", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("\n๐Ÿ“ Part 1: Create aggregator account and publish service declaration to PDS...")
···
t.Logf("โœ“ Created aggregator account: %s (%s)", aggregatorHandle, aggregatorDID)
+
// Register aggregator user with OAuth middleware for API requests
+
aggregatorAPIToken = e2eAuth.AddUser(aggregatorDID)
+
// STEP 2: Write service declaration to aggregator's repository on PDS
configSchema := map[string]interface{}{
"type": "object",
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)
// Execute request through auth middleware + handler
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
// STEP 2: Verify post creation succeeded
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Post %d should succeed", i)
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "10th post should succeed (at limit)")
···
req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler = e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
// Should be rate limited
···
err := aggregatorConsumer.HandleEvent(ctx, &unAuthAggEvent)
require.NoError(t, err)
+
// Register unauthorized aggregator with OAuth middleware
+
unauthorizedAPIToken := e2eAuth.AddUser(unauthorizedAggDID)
+
// Try to create post without authorization
reqBody := map[string]interface{}{
"community": communityDID,
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+unauthorizedAPIToken)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
// Should be forbidden
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rr.Code, "Should reject post from disabled aggregator")
+16 -20
tests/integration/community_e2e_test.go
···
package integration
import (
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/api/routes"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
···
t.Logf("โœ… Authenticated - Instance DID: %s", instanceDID)
-
// Initialize auth middleware with skipVerify=true
-
// IMPORTANT: PDS password authentication returns Bearer tokens (not DPoP-bound tokens).
-
// E2E tests use these Bearer tokens with the DPoP scheme header, which only works
-
// because skipVerify=true bypasses signature and DPoP binding verification.
-
// In production, skipVerify=false requires proper DPoP-bound tokens from OAuth flow.
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true)
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
// V2.0: Extract instance domain for community provisioning
var instanceDomain string
···
// Setup HTTP server with XRPC routes
r := chi.NewRouter()
-
routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, authMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators
httpServer := httptest.NewServer(r)
defer httpServer.Close()
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create block request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create block request: %v", err)
}
blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
blockResp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(blockHttpReq)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create unblock request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
package integration
import (
"Coves/internal/api/routes"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
···
t.Logf("โœ… Authenticated - Instance DID: %s", instanceDID)
+
// Initialize OAuth auth middleware for E2E testing
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
+
// Register the instance user for OAuth authentication
+
token := e2eAuth.AddUser(instanceDID)
// V2.0: Extract instance domain for community provisioning
var instanceDomain string
···
// Setup HTTP server with XRPC routes
r := chi.NewRouter()
+
routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators
httpServer := httptest.NewServer(r)
defer httpServer.Close()
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create block request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create block request: %v", err)
}
blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
blockResp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(blockHttpReq)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create unblock request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
···
t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
+7 -9
tests/integration/post_e2e_test.go
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"
-
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
···
postService := posts.NewPostService(postRepo, communityService, nil, nil, nil, pdsURL) // nil aggregatorService, blobService, unfurlService for user-only tests
-
// Setup auth middleware (skip JWT verification for testing)
-
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true)
-
defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine
// Setup HTTP handler
createHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(postService)
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
// Create a simple JWT for testing (Phase 1: no signature verification)
-
// In production, this would be a real OAuth token from PDS
-
testJWT := createSimpleTestJWT(author.DID)
-
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+testJWT)
// Execute request through auth middleware + handler
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
-
handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
// Check response
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"
"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"
"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"
"Coves/internal/core/communities"
···
postService := posts.NewPostService(postRepo, communityService, nil, nil, nil, pdsURL) // nil aggregatorService, blobService, unfurlService for user-only tests
+
// Setup OAuth auth middleware for E2E testing
+
e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()
// Setup HTTP handler
createHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(postService)
···
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
// Register the author user with OAuth middleware and get test token
+
// For Coves API handlers, use Bearer scheme with OAuth middleware
+
token := e2eAuth.AddUser(author.DID)
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
// Execute request through auth middleware + handler
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createHandler.HandleCreate))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
// Check response
-73
cmd/genjwks/main.go
···
-
package main
-
-
import (
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"crypto/rand"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"fmt"
-
"log"
-
"os"
-
-
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwk"
-
)
-
-
// genjwks generates an ES256 keypair for OAuth client authentication
-
// The private key is stored in the config/env, public key is served at /oauth/jwks.json
-
//
-
// Usage:
-
//
-
// go run cmd/genjwks/main.go
-
//
-
// This will output a JSON private key that should be stored in OAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK
-
func main() {
-
fmt.Println("Generating ES256 keypair for OAuth client authentication...")
-
-
// Generate ES256 (NIST P-256) private key
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to generate private key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Convert to JWK
-
jwkKey, err := jwk.FromRaw(privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to create JWK from private key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Set key parameters
-
if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.KeyIDKey, "oauth-client-key"); err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to set kid: %v", err)
-
}
-
if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.AlgorithmKey, "ES256"); err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to set alg: %v", err)
-
}
-
if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.KeyUsageKey, "sig"); err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to set use: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Marshal to JSON
-
jsonData, err := json.MarshalIndent(jwkKey, "", " ")
-
if err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to marshal JWK: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Output instructions
-
fmt.Println("\nโœ… ES256 keypair generated successfully!")
-
fmt.Println("\n๐Ÿ“ Add this to your .env.dev file:")
-
fmt.Println("\nOAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK='" + string(jsonData) + "'")
-
fmt.Println("\nโš ๏ธ IMPORTANT:")
-
fmt.Println(" - Keep this private key SECRET")
-
fmt.Println(" - Never commit it to version control")
-
fmt.Println(" - Generate a new key for production")
-
fmt.Println(" - The public key will be automatically derived and served at /oauth/jwks.json")
-
-
// Optionally write to a file (not committed)
-
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "--save" {
-
filename := "oauth-private-key.json"
-
if err := os.WriteFile(filename, jsonData, 0o600); err != nil {
-
log.Fatalf("Failed to write key file: %v", err)
-
}
-
fmt.Printf("\n๐Ÿ’พ Private key saved to %s (remember to add to .gitignore!)\n", filename)
-
}
-
}
···
-330
internal/atproto/auth/README.md
···
-
# atProto OAuth Authentication
-
-
This package implements third-party OAuth authentication for Coves, validating DPoP-bound access tokens from mobile apps and other atProto clients.
-
-
## Architecture
-
-
This is **third-party authentication** (validating incoming requests), not first-party authentication (logging users into Coves web frontend).
-
-
### Components
-
-
1. **JWT Parser** (`jwt.go`) - Parses and validates JWT tokens
-
2. **JWKS Fetcher** (`jwks_fetcher.go`) - Fetches and caches public keys from PDS authorization servers
-
3. **Auth Middleware** (`internal/api/middleware/auth.go`) - HTTP middleware that protects endpoints
-
-
### Flow
-
-
```
-
Client Request
-
โ†“
-
Authorization: DPoP <access_token>
-
DPoP: <proof-jwt>
-
โ†“
-
Auth Middleware
-
โ†“
-
Extract JWT โ†’ Parse Claims โ†’ Verify Signature (via JWKS) โ†’ Verify DPoP Proof
-
โ†“
-
Inject DID into Context โ†’ Call Handler
-
```
-
-
## Usage
-
-
### Phase 1: Parse-Only Mode (Testing)
-
-
Set `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true` to only parse JWTs without signature verification:
-
-
```bash
-
export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true
-
```
-
-
This is useful for:
-
- Initial integration testing
-
- Testing with mock tokens
-
- Debugging JWT structure
-
-
### Phase 2: Full Verification (Production)
-
-
Set `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false` (or unset) to enable full JWT signature verification:
-
-
```bash
-
export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false
-
# or just unset it
-
```
-
-
This is **required for production** and validates:
-
- JWT signature using PDS public key
-
- Token expiration
-
- Required claims (sub, iss)
-
- DID format
-
-
## Protected Endpoints
-
-
The following endpoints require authentication:
-
-
- `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.create`
-
- `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.update`
-
- `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.subscribe`
-
- `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.unsubscribe`
-
-
### Making Authenticated Requests
-
-
Include the JWT in the `Authorization` header:
-
-
```bash
-
curl -X POST https://coves.social/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \
-
-H "Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGc..." \
-
-H "DPoP: eyJhbGc..." \
-
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-
-d '{"name":"Gaming","hostedByDid":"did:plc:..."}'
-
```
-
-
### Getting User DID in Handlers
-
-
The middleware injects the authenticated user's DID into the request context:
-
-
```go
-
import "Coves/internal/api/middleware"
-
-
func (h *Handler) HandleCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-
// Extract authenticated user DID
-
userDID := middleware.GetUserDID(r)
-
if userDID == "" {
-
// Not authenticated (should never happen with RequireAuth middleware)
-
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
-
return
-
}
-
-
// Use userDID for authorization checks
-
// ...
-
}
-
```
-
-
## Key Caching
-
-
Public keys are fetched from PDS authorization servers and cached for 1 hour. The cache is automatically cleaned up hourly to remove expired entries.
-
-
### JWKS Discovery Flow
-
-
1. Extract `iss` claim from JWT (e.g., `https://pds.example.com`)
-
2. Fetch `https://pds.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`
-
3. Extract `jwks_uri` from metadata
-
4. Fetch JWKS from `jwks_uri`
-
5. Find matching key by `kid` from JWT header
-
6. Cache the JWKS for 1 hour
-
-
## DPoP Token Binding
-
-
DPoP (Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession) binds access tokens to client-controlled cryptographic keys, preventing token theft and replay attacks.
-
-
### What is DPoP?
-
-
DPoP is an OAuth extension (RFC 9449) that adds proof-of-possession semantics to bearer tokens. When a PDS issues a DPoP-bound access token:
-
-
1. Access token contains `cnf.jkt` claim (JWK thumbprint of client's public key)
-
2. Client creates a DPoP proof JWT signed with their private key
-
3. Server verifies the proof signature and checks it matches the token's `cnf.jkt`
-
-
### CRITICAL: DPoP Security Model
-
-
> โš ๏ธ **DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, NOT a replacement for token signature verification.**
-
-
The correct verification order is:
-
1. **ALWAYS verify the access token signature first** (via JWKS, HS256 shared secret, or DID resolution)
-
2. **If the verified token has `cnf.jkt`, REQUIRE valid DPoP proof**
-
3. **NEVER use DPoP as a fallback when signature verification fails**
-
-
**Why This Matters**: An attacker could create a fake token with `sub: "did:plc:victim"` and their own `cnf.jkt`, then present a valid DPoP proof signed with their key. If we accept DPoP as a fallback, the attacker can impersonate any user.
-
-
### How DPoP Works
-
-
```
-
โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ” โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
-
โ”‚ Client โ”‚ โ”‚ Server โ”‚
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ โ”‚ (Coves) โ”‚
-
โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜ โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜
-
โ”‚ โ”‚
-
โ”‚ 1. Authorization: DPoP <token> โ”‚
-
โ”‚ DPoP: <proof-jwt> โ”‚
-
โ”‚โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€>โ”‚
-
โ”‚ โ”‚
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ 2. VERIFY token signature
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ (REQUIRED - no fallback!)
-
โ”‚ โ”‚
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ 3. If token has cnf.jkt:
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ - Verify DPoP proof
-
โ”‚ โ”‚ - Check thumbprint match
-
โ”‚ โ”‚
-
โ”‚ 200 OK โ”‚
-
โ”‚<โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”‚
-
```
-
-
### When DPoP is Required
-
-
DPoP verification is **REQUIRED** when:
-
- Access token signature has been verified AND
-
- Access token contains `cnf.jkt` claim (DPoP-bound)
-
-
If the token has `cnf.jkt` but no DPoP header is present, the request is **REJECTED**.
-
-
### Replay Protection
-
-
DPoP proofs include a unique `jti` (JWT ID) claim. The server tracks seen `jti` values to prevent replay attacks:
-
-
```go
-
// Create a verifier with replay protection (default)
-
verifier := auth.NewDPoPVerifier()
-
defer verifier.Stop() // Stop cleanup goroutine on shutdown
-
-
// The verifier automatically rejects reused jti values within the proof validity window (5 minutes)
-
```
-
-
### DPoP Implementation
-
-
The `dpop.go` module provides:
-
-
```go
-
// Create a verifier with replay protection
-
verifier := auth.NewDPoPVerifier()
-
defer verifier.Stop()
-
-
// Verify the DPoP proof
-
proof, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(dpopHeader, "POST", "https://coves.social/xrpc/...")
-
if err != nil {
-
// Invalid proof (includes replay detection)
-
}
-
-
// Verify it binds to the VERIFIED access token
-
expectedThumbprint, err := auth.ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err != nil {
-
// Token not DPoP-bound
-
}
-
-
if err := verifier.VerifyTokenBinding(proof, expectedThumbprint); err != nil {
-
// Proof doesn't match token
-
}
-
```
-
-
### DPoP Proof Format
-
-
The DPoP header contains a JWT with:
-
-
**Header**:
-
- `typ`: `"dpop+jwt"` (required)
-
- `alg`: `"ES256"` (or other supported algorithm)
-
- `jwk`: Client's public key (JWK format)
-
-
**Claims**:
-
- `jti`: Unique proof identifier (tracked for replay protection)
-
- `htm`: HTTP method (e.g., `"POST"`)
-
- `htu`: HTTP URI (without query/fragment)
-
- `iat`: Timestamp (must be recent, within 5 minutes)
-
-
**Example**:
-
```json
-
{
-
"typ": "dpop+jwt",
-
"alg": "ES256",
-
"jwk": {
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "...",
-
"y": "..."
-
}
-
}
-
{
-
"jti": "unique-id-123",
-
"htm": "POST",
-
"htu": "https://coves.social/xrpc/social.coves.community.create",
-
"iat": 1700000000
-
}
-
```
-
-
## Security Considerations
-
-
### โœ… Implemented
-
-
- JWT signature verification with PDS public keys
-
- Token expiration validation
-
- DID format validation
-
- Required claims validation (sub, iss)
-
- Key caching with TTL
-
- Secure error messages (no internal details leaked)
-
- **DPoP proof verification** (proof-of-possession for token binding)
-
- **DPoP thumbprint validation** (prevents token theft attacks)
-
- **DPoP freshness checks** (5-minute proof validity window)
-
- **DPoP replay protection** (jti tracking with in-memory cache)
-
- **Secure DPoP model** (DPoP required AFTER signature verification, never as fallback)
-
-
### โš ๏ธ Not Yet Implemented
-
-
- Server-issued DPoP nonces (additional replay protection)
-
- Scope validation (checking `scope` claim)
-
- Audience validation (checking `aud` claim)
-
- Rate limiting per DID
-
- Token revocation checking
-
-
## Testing
-
-
Run the test suite:
-
-
```bash
-
go test ./internal/atproto/auth/... -v
-
```
-
-
### Manual Testing
-
-
1. **Phase 1 (Parse Only)**:
-
```bash
-
# Create a test JWT (use jwt.io or a tool)
-
export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true
-
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \
-
-H "Authorization: DPoP <test-jwt>" \
-
-H "DPoP: <test-dpop-proof>" \
-
-d '{"name":"Test","hostedByDid":"did:plc:test"}'
-
```
-
-
2. **Phase 2 (Full Verification)**:
-
```bash
-
# Use a real JWT from a PDS
-
export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false
-
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \
-
-H "Authorization: DPoP <real-jwt>" \
-
-H "DPoP: <real-dpop-proof>" \
-
-d '{"name":"Test","hostedByDid":"did:plc:test"}'
-
```
-
-
## Error Responses
-
-
### 401 Unauthorized
-
-
Missing or invalid token:
-
-
```json
-
{
-
"error": "AuthenticationRequired",
-
"message": "Missing Authorization header"
-
}
-
```
-
-
```json
-
{
-
"error": "AuthenticationRequired",
-
"message": "Invalid or expired token"
-
}
-
```
-
-
### Common Issues
-
-
1. **Missing Authorization header** โ†’ Add `Authorization: DPoP <token>` and `DPoP: <proof>`
-
2. **Token expired** โ†’ Get a new token from PDS
-
3. **Invalid signature** โ†’ Ensure token is from a valid PDS
-
4. **JWKS fetch fails** โ†’ Check PDS availability and network connectivity
-
-
## Future Enhancements
-
-
- [ ] DPoP nonce validation (server-managed nonce for additional replay protection)
-
- [ ] Scope-based authorization
-
- [ ] Audience claim validation
-
- [ ] Token revocation support
-
- [ ] Rate limiting per DID
-
- [ ] Metrics and monitoring
···
-52
internal/atproto/auth/combined_key_fetcher.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"context"
-
"fmt"
-
"strings"
-
-
indigoIdentity "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/identity"
-
)
-
-
// CombinedKeyFetcher handles JWT public key fetching for both:
-
// - DID issuers (did:plc:, did:web:) โ†’ resolves via DID document
-
// - URL issuers (https://) โ†’ fetches via JWKS endpoint (legacy/fallback)
-
//
-
// For atproto service authentication, the issuer is typically the user's DID,
-
// and the signing key is published in their DID document.
-
type CombinedKeyFetcher struct {
-
didFetcher *DIDKeyFetcher
-
jwksFetcher JWKSFetcher
-
}
-
-
// NewCombinedKeyFetcher creates a key fetcher that supports both DID and URL issuers.
-
// Parameters:
-
// - directory: Indigo's identity directory for DID resolution
-
// - jwksFetcher: fallback JWKS fetcher for URL issuers (can be nil if not needed)
-
func NewCombinedKeyFetcher(directory indigoIdentity.Directory, jwksFetcher JWKSFetcher) *CombinedKeyFetcher {
-
return &CombinedKeyFetcher{
-
didFetcher: NewDIDKeyFetcher(directory),
-
jwksFetcher: jwksFetcher,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// FetchPublicKey fetches the public key for verifying a JWT.
-
// Routes to the appropriate fetcher based on issuer format:
-
// - DID (did:plc:, did:web:) โ†’ DIDKeyFetcher
-
// - URL (https://) โ†’ JWKSFetcher
-
func (f *CombinedKeyFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
// Check if issuer is a DID
-
if strings.HasPrefix(issuer, "did:") {
-
return f.didFetcher.FetchPublicKey(ctx, issuer, token)
-
}
-
-
// Check if issuer is a URL (https:// or http:// in dev)
-
if strings.HasPrefix(issuer, "https://") || strings.HasPrefix(issuer, "http://") {
-
if f.jwksFetcher == nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("URL issuer %s requires JWKS fetcher, but none configured", issuer)
-
}
-
return f.jwksFetcher.FetchPublicKey(ctx, issuer, token)
-
}
-
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported issuer format: %s (expected DID or URL)", issuer)
-
}
···
-122
internal/atproto/auth/did_key_fetcher.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"context"
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"encoding/base64"
-
"fmt"
-
"math/big"
-
"strings"
-
-
indigoCrypto "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
-
indigoIdentity "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/identity"
-
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
-
)
-
-
// DIDKeyFetcher fetches public keys from DID documents for JWT verification.
-
// This is the primary method for atproto service authentication, where:
-
// - The JWT issuer is the user's DID (e.g., did:plc:abc123)
-
// - The signing key is published in the user's DID document
-
// - Verification happens by resolving the DID and checking the signature
-
type DIDKeyFetcher struct {
-
directory indigoIdentity.Directory
-
}
-
-
// NewDIDKeyFetcher creates a new DID-based key fetcher.
-
func NewDIDKeyFetcher(directory indigoIdentity.Directory) *DIDKeyFetcher {
-
return &DIDKeyFetcher{
-
directory: directory,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// FetchPublicKey fetches the public key for verifying a JWT from the issuer's DID document.
-
// For DID issuers (did:plc: or did:web:), resolves the DID and extracts the signing key.
-
//
-
// Returns:
-
// - indigoCrypto.PublicKey for secp256k1 (ES256K) keys - use indigo for verification
-
// - *ecdsa.PublicKey for NIST curves (P-256, P-384, P-521) - compatible with golang-jwt
-
func (f *DIDKeyFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
// Only handle DID issuers
-
if !strings.HasPrefix(issuer, "did:") {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DIDKeyFetcher only handles DID issuers, got: %s", issuer)
-
}
-
-
// Parse the DID
-
did, err := syntax.ParseDID(issuer)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DID format: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Resolve the DID to get the identity (includes public keys)
-
ident, err := f.directory.LookupDID(ctx, did)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve DID %s: %w", issuer, err)
-
}
-
-
// Get the atproto signing key from the DID document
-
pubKey, err := ident.PublicKey()
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get public key from DID document: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Convert to JWK format to check curve type
-
jwk, err := pubKey.JWK()
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to convert public key to JWK: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// For secp256k1 (ES256K), return indigo's PublicKey directly
-
// since Go's crypto/ecdsa doesn't support this curve
-
if jwk.Curve == "secp256k1" {
-
return pubKey, nil
-
}
-
-
// For NIST curves, convert to Go's ecdsa.PublicKey for golang-jwt compatibility
-
return atcryptoJWKToECDSA(jwk)
-
}
-
-
// atcryptoJWKToECDSA converts an indigoCrypto.JWK to a Go ecdsa.PublicKey.
-
// Note: secp256k1 is handled separately in FetchPublicKey by returning indigo's PublicKey directly.
-
func atcryptoJWKToECDSA(jwk *indigoCrypto.JWK) (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
-
if jwk.KeyType != "EC" {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported JWK key type: %s (expected EC)", jwk.KeyType)
-
}
-
-
// Decode X and Y coordinates (base64url, no padding)
-
xBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK X coordinate encoding: %w", err)
-
}
-
yBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.Y)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK Y coordinate encoding: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
var ecCurve elliptic.Curve
-
switch jwk.Curve {
-
case "P-256":
-
ecCurve = elliptic.P256()
-
case "P-384":
-
ecCurve = elliptic.P384()
-
case "P-521":
-
ecCurve = elliptic.P521()
-
default:
-
// secp256k1 should be handled before calling this function
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported JWK curve for Go ecdsa: %s (secp256k1 uses indigo)", jwk.Curve)
-
}
-
-
// Create the public key
-
pubKey := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
-
Curve: ecCurve,
-
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(xBytes),
-
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(yBytes),
-
}
-
-
// Validate point is on curve
-
if !ecCurve.IsOnCurve(pubKey.X, pubKey.Y) {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid public key: point not on curve")
-
}
-
-
return pubKey, nil
-
}
···
-616
internal/atproto/auth/dpop.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"crypto/sha256"
-
"encoding/base64"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"fmt"
-
"strings"
-
"sync"
-
"time"
-
-
indigoCrypto "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
-
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
-
)
-
-
// NonceCache provides replay protection for DPoP proofs by tracking seen jti values.
-
// This prevents an attacker from reusing a captured DPoP proof within the validity window.
-
// Per RFC 9449 Section 11.1, servers SHOULD prevent replay attacks.
-
type NonceCache struct {
-
seen map[string]time.Time // jti -> expiration time
-
stopCh chan struct{}
-
maxAge time.Duration // How long to keep entries
-
cleanup time.Duration // How often to clean up expired entries
-
mu sync.RWMutex
-
}
-
-
// NewNonceCache creates a new nonce cache for DPoP replay protection.
-
// maxAge should match or exceed DPoPVerifier.MaxProofAge.
-
func NewNonceCache(maxAge time.Duration) *NonceCache {
-
nc := &NonceCache{
-
seen: make(map[string]time.Time),
-
maxAge: maxAge,
-
cleanup: maxAge / 2, // Clean up at half the max age
-
stopCh: make(chan struct{}),
-
}
-
-
// Start background cleanup goroutine
-
go nc.cleanupLoop()
-
-
return nc
-
}
-
-
// CheckAndStore checks if a jti has been seen before and stores it if not.
-
// Returns true if the jti is fresh (not a replay), false if it's a replay.
-
func (nc *NonceCache) CheckAndStore(jti string) bool {
-
nc.mu.Lock()
-
defer nc.mu.Unlock()
-
-
now := time.Now()
-
expiry := now.Add(nc.maxAge)
-
-
// Check if already seen
-
if existingExpiry, seen := nc.seen[jti]; seen {
-
// Still valid (not expired) - this is a replay
-
if existingExpiry.After(now) {
-
return false
-
}
-
// Expired entry - allow reuse and update expiry
-
}
-
-
// Store the new jti
-
nc.seen[jti] = expiry
-
return true
-
}
-
-
// cleanupLoop periodically removes expired entries from the cache
-
func (nc *NonceCache) cleanupLoop() {
-
ticker := time.NewTicker(nc.cleanup)
-
defer ticker.Stop()
-
-
for {
-
select {
-
case <-ticker.C:
-
nc.cleanupExpired()
-
case <-nc.stopCh:
-
return
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// cleanupExpired removes expired entries from the cache
-
func (nc *NonceCache) cleanupExpired() {
-
nc.mu.Lock()
-
defer nc.mu.Unlock()
-
-
now := time.Now()
-
for jti, expiry := range nc.seen {
-
if expiry.Before(now) {
-
delete(nc.seen, jti)
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Stop stops the cleanup goroutine. Call this when done with the cache.
-
func (nc *NonceCache) Stop() {
-
close(nc.stopCh)
-
}
-
-
// Size returns the number of entries in the cache (for testing/monitoring)
-
func (nc *NonceCache) Size() int {
-
nc.mu.RLock()
-
defer nc.mu.RUnlock()
-
return len(nc.seen)
-
}
-
-
// DPoPClaims represents the claims in a DPoP proof JWT (RFC 9449)
-
type DPoPClaims struct {
-
jwt.RegisteredClaims
-
-
// HTTP method of the request (e.g., "GET", "POST")
-
HTTPMethod string `json:"htm"`
-
-
// HTTP URI of the request (without query and fragment parts)
-
HTTPURI string `json:"htu"`
-
-
// Access token hash (optional, for token binding)
-
AccessTokenHash string `json:"ath,omitempty"`
-
}
-
-
// DPoPProof represents a parsed and verified DPoP proof
-
type DPoPProof struct {
-
RawPublicJWK map[string]interface{}
-
Claims *DPoPClaims
-
PublicKey interface{} // *ecdsa.PublicKey or similar
-
Thumbprint string // JWK thumbprint (base64url)
-
}
-
-
// DPoPVerifier verifies DPoP proofs for OAuth token binding
-
type DPoPVerifier struct {
-
// Optional: custom nonce validation function (for server-issued nonces)
-
ValidateNonce func(nonce string) bool
-
-
// NonceCache for replay protection (optional but recommended)
-
// If nil, jti replay protection is disabled
-
NonceCache *NonceCache
-
-
// Maximum allowed clock skew for timestamp validation
-
MaxClockSkew time.Duration
-
-
// Maximum age of DPoP proof (prevents replay with old proofs)
-
MaxProofAge time.Duration
-
}
-
-
// NewDPoPVerifier creates a DPoP verifier with sensible defaults including replay protection
-
func NewDPoPVerifier() *DPoPVerifier {
-
maxProofAge := 5 * time.Minute
-
return &DPoPVerifier{
-
MaxClockSkew: 30 * time.Second,
-
MaxProofAge: maxProofAge,
-
NonceCache: NewNonceCache(maxProofAge),
-
}
-
}
-
-
// NewDPoPVerifierWithoutReplayProtection creates a DPoP verifier without replay protection.
-
// This should only be used in testing or when replay protection is handled externally.
-
func NewDPoPVerifierWithoutReplayProtection() *DPoPVerifier {
-
return &DPoPVerifier{
-
MaxClockSkew: 30 * time.Second,
-
MaxProofAge: 5 * time.Minute,
-
NonceCache: nil, // No replay protection
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Stop stops background goroutines. Call this when shutting down.
-
func (v *DPoPVerifier) Stop() {
-
if v.NonceCache != nil {
-
v.NonceCache.Stop()
-
}
-
}
-
-
// VerifyDPoPProof verifies a DPoP proof JWT and returns the parsed proof.
-
// This supports all atProto-compatible ECDSA algorithms including ES256K (secp256k1).
-
func (v *DPoPVerifier) VerifyDPoPProof(dpopProof, httpMethod, httpURI string) (*DPoPProof, error) {
-
// Manually parse the JWT to support ES256K (which golang-jwt doesn't recognize)
-
header, claims, err := parseJWTHeaderAndClaims(dpopProof)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse DPoP proof: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Extract and validate the typ header
-
typ, ok := header["typ"].(string)
-
if !ok || typ != "dpop+jwt" {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DPoP proof: typ must be 'dpop+jwt', got '%s'", typ)
-
}
-
-
alg, ok := header["alg"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DPoP proof: missing alg header")
-
}
-
-
// Extract the JWK from the header first (needed for algorithm-curve validation)
-
jwkRaw, ok := header["jwk"]
-
if !ok {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DPoP proof: missing jwk header")
-
}
-
-
jwkMap, ok := jwkRaw.(map[string]interface{})
-
if !ok {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DPoP proof: jwk must be an object")
-
}
-
-
// Validate the algorithm is supported and matches the JWK curve
-
// This is critical for security - prevents algorithm confusion attacks
-
if err := validateAlgorithmCurveBinding(alg, jwkMap); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DPoP proof: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Parse the public key using indigo's crypto package
-
// This supports all atProto curves including secp256k1 (ES256K)
-
publicKey, err := parseJWKToIndigoPublicKey(jwkMap)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid DPoP proof JWK: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Calculate the JWK thumbprint
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwkMap)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to calculate JWK thumbprint: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify the signature using indigo's crypto package
-
// This works for all ECDSA algorithms including ES256K
-
if err := verifyJWTSignatureWithIndigo(dpopProof, publicKey); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof signature verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Validate the claims
-
if err := v.validateDPoPClaims(claims, httpMethod, httpURI); err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
return &DPoPProof{
-
Claims: claims,
-
PublicKey: publicKey,
-
Thumbprint: thumbprint,
-
RawPublicJWK: jwkMap,
-
}, nil
-
}
-
-
// validateDPoPClaims validates the DPoP proof claims
-
func (v *DPoPVerifier) validateDPoPClaims(claims *DPoPClaims, expectedMethod, expectedURI string) error {
-
// Validate jti (unique identifier) is present
-
if claims.ID == "" {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof missing jti claim")
-
}
-
-
// Validate htm (HTTP method)
-
if !strings.EqualFold(claims.HTTPMethod, expectedMethod) {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof htm mismatch: expected %s, got %s", expectedMethod, claims.HTTPMethod)
-
}
-
-
// Validate htu (HTTP URI) - compare without query/fragment
-
expectedURIBase := stripQueryFragment(expectedURI)
-
claimURIBase := stripQueryFragment(claims.HTTPURI)
-
if expectedURIBase != claimURIBase {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof htu mismatch: expected %s, got %s", expectedURIBase, claimURIBase)
-
}
-
-
// Validate iat (issued at) is present and recent
-
if claims.IssuedAt == nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof missing iat claim")
-
}
-
-
now := time.Now()
-
iat := claims.IssuedAt.Time
-
-
// Check clock skew (not too far in the future)
-
if iat.After(now.Add(v.MaxClockSkew)) {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof iat is in the future")
-
}
-
-
// Check proof age (not too old)
-
if now.Sub(iat) > v.MaxProofAge {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof is too old (issued %v ago, max %v)", now.Sub(iat), v.MaxProofAge)
-
}
-
-
// SECURITY: Validate exp claim if present (RFC standard JWT validation)
-
// While DPoP proofs typically use iat + MaxProofAge, if exp is included it must be honored
-
if claims.ExpiresAt != nil {
-
expWithSkew := claims.ExpiresAt.Time.Add(v.MaxClockSkew)
-
if now.After(expWithSkew) {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof expired at %v", claims.ExpiresAt.Time)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// SECURITY: Validate nbf claim if present (RFC standard JWT validation)
-
if claims.NotBefore != nil {
-
nbfWithSkew := claims.NotBefore.Time.Add(-v.MaxClockSkew)
-
if now.Before(nbfWithSkew) {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof not valid before %v", claims.NotBefore.Time)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// SECURITY: Check for replay attack using jti
-
// Per RFC 9449 Section 11.1, servers SHOULD prevent replay attacks
-
if v.NonceCache != nil {
-
if !v.NonceCache.CheckAndStore(claims.ID) {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof replay detected: jti %s already used", claims.ID)
-
}
-
}
-
-
return nil
-
}
-
-
// VerifyTokenBinding verifies that the DPoP proof binds to the access token
-
// by comparing the proof's thumbprint to the token's cnf.jkt claim
-
func (v *DPoPVerifier) VerifyTokenBinding(proof *DPoPProof, expectedThumbprint string) error {
-
if proof.Thumbprint != expectedThumbprint {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof thumbprint mismatch: token expects %s, proof has %s",
-
expectedThumbprint, proof.Thumbprint)
-
}
-
return nil
-
}
-
-
// VerifyAccessTokenHash verifies the DPoP proof's ath (access token hash) claim
-
// matches the SHA-256 hash of the presented access token.
-
// Per RFC 9449 section 4.2, if ath is present, the RS MUST verify it.
-
func (v *DPoPVerifier) VerifyAccessTokenHash(proof *DPoPProof, accessToken string) error {
-
// If ath claim is not present, that's acceptable per RFC 9449
-
// (ath is only required when the RS mandates it)
-
if proof.Claims.AccessTokenHash == "" {
-
return nil
-
}
-
-
// Calculate the expected ath: base64url(SHA-256(access_token))
-
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(accessToken))
-
expectedAth := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:])
-
-
if proof.Claims.AccessTokenHash != expectedAth {
-
return fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof ath mismatch: proof bound to different access token")
-
}
-
-
return nil
-
}
-
-
// CalculateJWKThumbprint calculates the JWK thumbprint per RFC 7638
-
// The thumbprint is the base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the canonical JWK representation
-
func CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk map[string]interface{}) (string, error) {
-
kty, ok := jwk["kty"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("JWK missing kty")
-
}
-
-
// Build the canonical JWK representation based on key type
-
// Per RFC 7638, only specific members are included, in lexicographic order
-
var canonical map[string]string
-
-
switch kty {
-
case "EC":
-
crv, ok := jwk["crv"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("EC JWK missing crv")
-
}
-
x, ok := jwk["x"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("EC JWK missing x")
-
}
-
y, ok := jwk["y"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("EC JWK missing y")
-
}
-
// Lexicographic order: crv, kty, x, y
-
canonical = map[string]string{
-
"crv": crv,
-
"kty": kty,
-
"x": x,
-
"y": y,
-
}
-
case "RSA":
-
e, ok := jwk["e"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("RSA JWK missing e")
-
}
-
n, ok := jwk["n"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("RSA JWK missing n")
-
}
-
// Lexicographic order: e, kty, n
-
canonical = map[string]string{
-
"e": e,
-
"kty": kty,
-
"n": n,
-
}
-
case "OKP":
-
crv, ok := jwk["crv"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("OKP JWK missing crv")
-
}
-
x, ok := jwk["x"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("OKP JWK missing x")
-
}
-
// Lexicographic order: crv, kty, x
-
canonical = map[string]string{
-
"crv": crv,
-
"kty": kty,
-
"x": x,
-
}
-
default:
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported JWK key type: %s", kty)
-
}
-
-
// Serialize to JSON (Go's json.Marshal produces lexicographically ordered keys for map[string]string)
-
canonicalJSON, err := json.Marshal(canonical)
-
if err != nil {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to serialize canonical JWK: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// SHA-256 hash
-
hash := sha256.Sum256(canonicalJSON)
-
-
// Base64url encode (no padding)
-
thumbprint := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:])
-
-
return thumbprint, nil
-
}
-
-
// validateAlgorithmCurveBinding validates that the JWT algorithm matches the JWK curve.
-
// This is critical for security - an attacker could claim alg: "ES256K" but provide
-
// a P-256 key, potentially bypassing algorithm binding requirements.
-
func validateAlgorithmCurveBinding(alg string, jwkMap map[string]interface{}) error {
-
kty, ok := jwkMap["kty"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return fmt.Errorf("JWK missing kty")
-
}
-
-
// ECDSA algorithms require EC key type
-
switch alg {
-
case "ES256K", "ES256", "ES384", "ES512":
-
if kty != "EC" {
-
return fmt.Errorf("algorithm %s requires EC key type, got %s", alg, kty)
-
}
-
case "RS256", "RS384", "RS512", "PS256", "PS384", "PS512":
-
return fmt.Errorf("RSA algorithms not yet supported for DPoP: %s", alg)
-
default:
-
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported DPoP algorithm: %s", alg)
-
}
-
-
// Validate curve matches algorithm
-
crv, ok := jwkMap["crv"].(string)
-
if !ok {
-
return fmt.Errorf("EC JWK missing crv")
-
}
-
-
var expectedCurve string
-
switch alg {
-
case "ES256K":
-
expectedCurve = "secp256k1"
-
case "ES256":
-
expectedCurve = "P-256"
-
case "ES384":
-
expectedCurve = "P-384"
-
case "ES512":
-
expectedCurve = "P-521"
-
}
-
-
if crv != expectedCurve {
-
return fmt.Errorf("algorithm %s requires curve %s, got %s", alg, expectedCurve, crv)
-
}
-
-
return nil
-
}
-
-
// parseJWKToIndigoPublicKey parses a JWK map to an indigo PublicKey.
-
// This returns indigo's PublicKey interface which supports all atProto curves
-
// including secp256k1 (ES256K), P-256 (ES256), P-384 (ES384), and P-521 (ES512).
-
func parseJWKToIndigoPublicKey(jwkMap map[string]interface{}) (indigoCrypto.PublicKey, error) {
-
// Convert map to JSON bytes for indigo's parser
-
jwkBytes, err := json.Marshal(jwkMap)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to serialize JWK: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Parse with indigo's crypto package - this supports all atProto curves
-
// including secp256k1 (ES256K) which Go's crypto/elliptic doesn't support
-
pubKey, err := indigoCrypto.ParsePublicJWKBytes(jwkBytes)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWK: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
return pubKey, nil
-
}
-
-
// parseJWTHeaderAndClaims manually parses a JWT's header and claims without using golang-jwt.
-
// This is necessary to support ES256K (secp256k1) which golang-jwt doesn't recognize.
-
func parseJWTHeaderAndClaims(tokenString string) (map[string]interface{}, *DPoPClaims, error) {
-
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
-
if len(parts) != 3 {
-
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-
}
-
-
// Decode header
-
headerBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT header: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
var header map[string]interface{}
-
if err := json.Unmarshal(headerBytes, &header); err != nil {
-
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT header: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Decode claims
-
claimsBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT claims: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Parse into raw map first to extract standard claims
-
var rawClaims map[string]interface{}
-
if err := json.Unmarshal(claimsBytes, &rawClaims); err != nil {
-
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT claims: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Build DPoPClaims struct
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{}
-
-
// Extract jti
-
if jti, ok := rawClaims["jti"].(string); ok {
-
claims.ID = jti
-
}
-
-
// Extract iat (issued at)
-
if iat, ok := rawClaims["iat"].(float64); ok {
-
t := time.Unix(int64(iat), 0)
-
claims.IssuedAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(t)
-
}
-
-
// Extract exp (expiration) if present
-
if exp, ok := rawClaims["exp"].(float64); ok {
-
t := time.Unix(int64(exp), 0)
-
claims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(t)
-
}
-
-
// Extract nbf (not before) if present
-
if nbf, ok := rawClaims["nbf"].(float64); ok {
-
t := time.Unix(int64(nbf), 0)
-
claims.NotBefore = jwt.NewNumericDate(t)
-
}
-
-
// Extract htm (HTTP method)
-
if htm, ok := rawClaims["htm"].(string); ok {
-
claims.HTTPMethod = htm
-
}
-
-
// Extract htu (HTTP URI)
-
if htu, ok := rawClaims["htu"].(string); ok {
-
claims.HTTPURI = htu
-
}
-
-
// Extract ath (access token hash) if present
-
if ath, ok := rawClaims["ath"].(string); ok {
-
claims.AccessTokenHash = ath
-
}
-
-
return header, claims, nil
-
}
-
-
// verifyJWTSignatureWithIndigo verifies a JWT signature using indigo's crypto package.
-
// This is used instead of golang-jwt for algorithms not supported by golang-jwt (like ES256K).
-
// It parses the JWT, extracts the signing input and signature, and uses indigo's
-
// PublicKey.HashAndVerifyLenient() for verification.
-
//
-
// JWT format: header.payload.signature (all base64url-encoded)
-
// Signature is verified over the raw bytes of "header.payload"
-
// (indigo's HashAndVerifyLenient handles SHA-256 hashing internally)
-
func verifyJWTSignatureWithIndigo(tokenString string, pubKey indigoCrypto.PublicKey) error {
-
// Split the JWT into parts
-
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
-
if len(parts) != 3 {
-
return fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-
}
-
-
// The signing input is "header.payload" (without decoding)
-
signingInput := parts[0] + "." + parts[1]
-
-
// Decode the signature from base64url
-
signature, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
-
if err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT signature: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Use indigo's verification - HashAndVerifyLenient handles hashing internally
-
// and accepts both low-S and high-S signatures for maximum compatibility
-
err = pubKey.HashAndVerifyLenient([]byte(signingInput), signature)
-
if err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("signature verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
return nil
-
}
-
-
// stripQueryFragment removes query and fragment from a URI
-
func stripQueryFragment(uri string) string {
-
if idx := strings.Index(uri, "?"); idx != -1 {
-
uri = uri[:idx]
-
}
-
if idx := strings.Index(uri, "#"); idx != -1 {
-
uri = uri[:idx]
-
}
-
return uri
-
}
-
-
// ExtractCnfJkt extracts the cnf.jkt (confirmation key thumbprint) from JWT claims
-
func ExtractCnfJkt(claims *Claims) (string, error) {
-
if claims.Confirmation == nil {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("token missing cnf claim (no DPoP binding)")
-
}
-
-
jkt, ok := claims.Confirmation["jkt"].(string)
-
if !ok || jkt == "" {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("token cnf claim missing jkt (DPoP key thumbprint)")
-
}
-
-
return jkt, nil
-
}
···
-1308
internal/atproto/auth/dpop_test.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"crypto/rand"
-
"crypto/sha256"
-
"encoding/base64"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"strings"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
-
indigoCrypto "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
-
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
-
"github.com/google/uuid"
-
)
-
-
// === Test Helpers ===
-
-
// testECKey holds a test ES256 key pair
-
type testECKey struct {
-
privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
-
publicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
-
jwk map[string]interface{}
-
thumbprint string
-
}
-
-
// generateTestES256Key generates a test ES256 key pair and JWK
-
func generateTestES256Key(t *testing.T) *testECKey {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to generate test key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Encode public key coordinates as base64url
-
xBytes := privateKey.PublicKey.X.Bytes()
-
yBytes := privateKey.PublicKey.Y.Bytes()
-
-
// P-256 coordinates must be 32 bytes (pad if needed)
-
xBytes = padTo32Bytes(xBytes)
-
yBytes = padTo32Bytes(yBytes)
-
-
x := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(xBytes)
-
y := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(yBytes)
-
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": x,
-
"y": y,
-
}
-
-
// Calculate thumbprint
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
return &testECKey{
-
privateKey: privateKey,
-
publicKey: &privateKey.PublicKey,
-
jwk: jwk,
-
thumbprint: thumbprint,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// padTo32Bytes pads a byte slice to 32 bytes (required for P-256 coordinates)
-
func padTo32Bytes(b []byte) []byte {
-
if len(b) >= 32 {
-
return b
-
}
-
padded := make([]byte, 32)
-
copy(padded[32-len(b):], b)
-
return padded
-
}
-
-
// createDPoPProof creates a DPoP proof JWT for testing
-
func createDPoPProof(t *testing.T, key *testECKey, method, uri string, iat time.Time, jti string) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create DPoP proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
return tokenString
-
}
-
-
// === JWK Thumbprint Tests (RFC 7638) ===
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_EC_P256(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test with known values from RFC 7638 Appendix A (adapted for P-256)
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "WKn-ZIGevcwGIyyrzFoZNBdaq9_TsqzGl96oc0CWuis",
-
"y": "y77t-RvAHRKTsSGdIYUfweuOvwrvDD-Q3Hv5J0fSKbE",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint == "" {
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty thumbprint")
-
}
-
-
// Verify it's valid base64url
-
_, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(thumbprint)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Errorf("Thumbprint is not valid base64url: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify length (SHA-256 produces 32 bytes = 43 base64url chars)
-
if len(thumbprint) != 43 {
-
t.Errorf("Expected thumbprint length 43, got %d", len(thumbprint))
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_Deterministic(t *testing.T) {
-
// Same key should produce same thumbprint
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "test-x-coordinate",
-
"y": "test-y-coordinate",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint1, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("First CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
thumbprint2, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Second CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint1 != thumbprint2 {
-
t.Errorf("Thumbprints are not deterministic: %s != %s", thumbprint1, thumbprint2)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_DifferentKeys(t *testing.T) {
-
// Different keys should produce different thumbprints
-
jwk1 := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "coordinate-x-1",
-
"y": "coordinate-y-1",
-
}
-
-
jwk2 := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "coordinate-x-2",
-
"y": "coordinate-y-2",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint1, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk1)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("First CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
thumbprint2, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk2)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Second CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint1 == thumbprint2 {
-
t.Error("Different keys produced same thumbprint (collision)")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_MissingKty(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "test-x",
-
"y": "test-y",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing kty, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing kty") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about missing kty, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_EC_MissingCrv(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"x": "test-x",
-
"y": "test-y",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing crv, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing crv") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about missing crv, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_EC_MissingX(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"y": "test-y",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing x, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing x") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about missing x, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_EC_MissingY(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "test-x",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing y, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing y") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about missing y, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_RSA(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test RSA key thumbprint calculation
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "RSA",
-
"e": "AQAB",
-
"n": "test-modulus",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed for RSA: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint == "" {
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty thumbprint for RSA key")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_OKP(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test OKP (Octet Key Pair) thumbprint calculation
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "OKP",
-
"crv": "Ed25519",
-
"x": "test-x-coordinate",
-
}
-
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed for OKP: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint == "" {
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty thumbprint for OKP key")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_UnsupportedKeyType(t *testing.T) {
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "UNKNOWN",
-
}
-
-
_, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for unsupported key type, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "unsupported JWK key type") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about unsupported key type, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_CanonicalJSON(t *testing.T) {
-
// RFC 7638 requires lexicographic ordering of keys in canonical JSON
-
// This test verifies that the canonical JSON is correctly ordered
-
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"x": "x-coord",
-
"y": "y-coord",
-
}
-
-
// The canonical JSON should be: {"crv":"P-256","kty":"EC","x":"x-coord","y":"y-coord"}
-
// (lexicographically ordered: crv, kty, x, y)
-
-
canonical := map[string]string{
-
"crv": "P-256",
-
"kty": "EC",
-
"x": "x-coord",
-
"y": "y-coord",
-
}
-
-
canonicalJSON, err := json.Marshal(canonical)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal canonical JSON: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
expectedHash := sha256.Sum256(canonicalJSON)
-
expectedThumbprint := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(expectedHash[:])
-
-
actualThumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if actualThumbprint != expectedThumbprint {
-
t.Errorf("Thumbprint doesn't match expected canonical JSON hash\nExpected: %s\nGot: %s",
-
expectedThumbprint, actualThumbprint)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === DPoP Proof Verification Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for valid proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if result == nil {
-
t.Fatal("Expected non-nil proof result")
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.HTTPMethod != method {
-
t.Errorf("Expected method %s, got %s", method, result.Claims.HTTPMethod)
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.HTTPURI != uri {
-
t.Errorf("Expected URI %s, got %s", uri, result.Claims.HTTPURI)
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.ID != jti {
-
t.Errorf("Expected jti %s, got %s", jti, result.Claims.ID)
-
}
-
-
if result.Thumbprint != key.thumbprint {
-
t.Errorf("Expected thumbprint %s, got %s", key.thumbprint, result.Thumbprint)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
wrongKey := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
// Create proof with one key
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
// Parse and modify to use wrong key's JWK in header (signature won't match)
-
parts := splitJWT(proof)
-
header := parseJWTHeader(t, parts[0])
-
header["jwk"] = wrongKey.jwk
-
modifiedHeader := encodeJSON(t, header)
-
tamperedProof := modifiedHeader + "." + parts[1] + "." + parts[2]
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(tamperedProof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for invalid signature, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "signature verification failed") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected signature verification error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_WrongHTTPMethod(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
wrongMethod := "GET"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, wrongMethod, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for HTTP method mismatch, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "htm mismatch") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected htm mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_WrongURI(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
wrongURI := "https://api.example.com/different"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, wrongURI)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for URI mismatch, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "htu mismatch") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected htu mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_URIWithQuery(t *testing.T) {
-
// URI comparison should strip query and fragment
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
baseURI := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
uriWithQuery := baseURI + "?param=value"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, baseURI, iat, jti)
-
-
// Should succeed because query is stripped
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uriWithQuery)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for URI with query: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_URIWithFragment(t *testing.T) {
-
// URI comparison should strip query and fragment
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
baseURI := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
uriWithFragment := baseURI + "#section"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, baseURI, iat, jti)
-
-
// Should succeed because fragment is stripped
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uriWithFragment)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for URI with fragment: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ExpiredProof(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
// Proof issued 10 minutes ago (exceeds default MaxProofAge of 5 minutes)
-
iat := time.Now().Add(-10 * time.Minute)
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for expired proof, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "too old") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected 'too old' error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_FutureProof(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
// Proof issued 1 minute in the future (exceeds MaxClockSkew)
-
iat := time.Now().Add(1 * time.Minute)
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for future proof, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "in the future") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected 'in the future' error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_WithinClockSkew(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
// Proof issued 15 seconds in the future (within MaxClockSkew of 30s)
-
iat := time.Now().Add(15 * time.Second)
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for proof within clock skew: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_MissingJti(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
// No ID (jti)
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing jti, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jti") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jti error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_MissingTypHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
// Don't set typ header
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing typ header, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "typ must be 'dpop+jwt'") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected typ header error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_WrongTypHeader(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "JWT" // Wrong typ
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for wrong typ header, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "typ must be 'dpop+jwt'") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected typ header error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_MissingJWK(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
// Don't include JWK
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing jwk header, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jwk") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jwk error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_CustomTimeSettings(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := &DPoPVerifier{
-
MaxClockSkew: 1 * time.Minute,
-
MaxProofAge: 10 * time.Minute,
-
}
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
// Proof issued 50 seconds in the future (within custom MaxClockSkew)
-
iat := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Second)
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed with custom time settings: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_HTTPMethodCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
-
// HTTP method comparison should be case-insensitive per spec
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "post"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
// Verify with uppercase method
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, "POST", uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for case-insensitive method: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === Token Binding Verification Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyTokenBinding_Matching(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify token binding with matching thumbprint
-
err = verifier.VerifyTokenBinding(result, key.thumbprint)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyTokenBinding failed for matching thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyTokenBinding_Mismatch(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
wrongKey := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify token binding with wrong thumbprint
-
err = verifier.VerifyTokenBinding(result, wrongKey.thumbprint)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for thumbprint mismatch, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "thumbprint mismatch") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected thumbprint mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === ExtractCnfJkt Tests ===
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
expectedJkt := "test-thumbprint-123"
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": expectedJkt,
-
},
-
}
-
-
jkt, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ExtractCnfJkt failed for valid claims: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if jkt != expectedJkt {
-
t.Errorf("Expected jkt %s, got %s", expectedJkt, jkt)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_MissingCnf(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
// No Confirmation
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing cnf, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing cnf claim") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing cnf error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_NilCnf(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: nil,
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for nil cnf, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing cnf claim") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing cnf error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_MissingJkt(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"other": "value",
-
},
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing jkt, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jkt") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jkt error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_EmptyJkt(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": "",
-
},
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for empty jkt, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jkt") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jkt error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractCnfJkt_WrongType(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{
-
"jkt": 123, // Not a string
-
},
-
}
-
-
_, err := ExtractCnfJkt(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for wrong type jkt, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "missing jkt") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected missing jkt error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === Helper Functions for Tests ===
-
-
// splitJWT splits a JWT into its three parts
-
func splitJWT(token string) []string {
-
return []string{
-
token[:strings.IndexByte(token, '.')],
-
token[strings.IndexByte(token, '.')+1 : strings.LastIndexByte(token, '.')],
-
token[strings.LastIndexByte(token, '.')+1:],
-
}
-
}
-
-
// parseJWTHeader parses a base64url-encoded JWT header
-
func parseJWTHeader(t *testing.T, encoded string) map[string]interface{} {
-
t.Helper()
-
decoded, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to decode header: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
var header map[string]interface{}
-
if err := json.Unmarshal(decoded, &header); err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to unmarshal header: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
return header
-
}
-
-
// encodeJSON encodes a value to base64url-encoded JSON
-
func encodeJSON(t *testing.T, v interface{}) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
data, err := json.Marshal(v)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal JSON: %v", err)
-
}
-
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(data)
-
}
-
-
// === ES256K (secp256k1) Test Helpers ===
-
-
// testES256KKey holds a test ES256K key pair using indigo
-
type testES256KKey struct {
-
privateKey indigoCrypto.PrivateKey
-
publicKey indigoCrypto.PublicKey
-
jwk map[string]interface{}
-
thumbprint string
-
}
-
-
// generateTestES256KKey generates a test ES256K (secp256k1) key pair and JWK
-
func generateTestES256KKey(t *testing.T) *testES256KKey {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
privateKey, err := indigoCrypto.GeneratePrivateKeyK256()
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to generate ES256K test key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
publicKey, err := privateKey.PublicKey()
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to get public key from ES256K private key: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Get the JWK representation
-
jwkStruct, err := publicKey.JWK()
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to get JWK from ES256K public key: %v", err)
-
}
-
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": jwkStruct.KeyType,
-
"crv": jwkStruct.Curve,
-
"x": jwkStruct.X,
-
"y": jwkStruct.Y,
-
}
-
-
// Calculate thumbprint
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to calculate ES256K thumbprint: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
return &testES256KKey{
-
privateKey: privateKey,
-
publicKey: publicKey,
-
jwk: jwk,
-
thumbprint: thumbprint,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// createES256KDPoPProof creates a DPoP proof JWT using ES256K for testing
-
func createES256KDPoPProof(t *testing.T, key *testES256KKey, method, uri string, iat time.Time, jti string) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
-
// Build claims
-
claims := map[string]interface{}{
-
"jti": jti,
-
"iat": iat.Unix(),
-
"htm": method,
-
"htu": uri,
-
}
-
-
// Build header
-
header := map[string]interface{}{
-
"typ": "dpop+jwt",
-
"alg": "ES256K",
-
"jwk": key.jwk,
-
}
-
-
// Encode header and claims
-
headerJSON, err := json.Marshal(header)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal header: %v", err)
-
}
-
claimsJSON, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to marshal claims: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
headerB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
-
claimsB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(claimsJSON)
-
-
// Sign with indigo
-
signingInput := headerB64 + "." + claimsB64
-
signature, err := key.privateKey.HashAndSign([]byte(signingInput))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to sign ES256K proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
signatureB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)
-
return signingInput + "." + signatureB64
-
}
-
-
// === ES256K Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ES256K_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256KKey(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
proof := createES256KDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for valid ES256K proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if result == nil {
-
t.Fatal("Expected non-nil proof result")
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.HTTPMethod != method {
-
t.Errorf("Expected method %s, got %s", method, result.Claims.HTTPMethod)
-
}
-
-
if result.Claims.HTTPURI != uri {
-
t.Errorf("Expected URI %s, got %s", uri, result.Claims.HTTPURI)
-
}
-
-
if result.Thumbprint != key.thumbprint {
-
t.Errorf("Expected thumbprint %s, got %s", key.thumbprint, result.Thumbprint)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ES256K_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256KKey(t)
-
wrongKey := generateTestES256KKey(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
// Create proof with one key
-
proof := createES256KDPoPProof(t, key, method, uri, iat, jti)
-
-
// Tamper by replacing JWK with wrong key
-
parts := splitJWT(proof)
-
header := parseJWTHeader(t, parts[0])
-
header["jwk"] = wrongKey.jwk
-
modifiedHeader := encodeJSON(t, header)
-
tamperedProof := modifiedHeader + "." + parts[1] + "." + parts[2]
-
-
_, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(tamperedProof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for invalid ES256K signature, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "signature verification failed") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected signature verification error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestCalculateJWKThumbprint_ES256K(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test thumbprint calculation for secp256k1 keys
-
key := generateTestES256KKey(t)
-
-
thumbprint, err := CalculateJWKThumbprint(key.jwk)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("CalculateJWKThumbprint failed for ES256K: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if thumbprint == "" {
-
t.Error("Expected non-empty thumbprint for ES256K key")
-
}
-
-
// Verify it's valid base64url
-
_, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(thumbprint)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Errorf("ES256K thumbprint is not valid base64url: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Verify length (SHA-256 produces 32 bytes = 43 base64url chars)
-
if len(thumbprint) != 43 {
-
t.Errorf("Expected ES256K thumbprint length 43, got %d", len(thumbprint))
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === Algorithm-Curve Binding Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_AlgorithmCurveMismatch_ES256KWithP256Key(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t) // P-256 key
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
// Create a proof claiming ES256K but using P-256 key
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["alg"] = "ES256K" // Claim ES256K
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk // But use P-256 key
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for ES256K algorithm with P-256 curve, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "requires curve secp256k1") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected curve mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_AlgorithmCurveMismatch_ES256WithSecp256k1Key(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256KKey(t) // secp256k1 key
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
// Build claims
-
claims := map[string]interface{}{
-
"jti": jti,
-
"iat": iat.Unix(),
-
"htm": method,
-
"htu": uri,
-
}
-
-
// Build header claiming ES256 but using secp256k1 key
-
header := map[string]interface{}{
-
"typ": "dpop+jwt",
-
"alg": "ES256", // Claim ES256
-
"jwk": key.jwk, // But use secp256k1 key
-
}
-
-
headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(header)
-
claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
-
-
headerB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
-
claimsB64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(claimsJSON)
-
-
signingInput := headerB64 + "." + claimsB64
-
signature, err := key.privateKey.HashAndSign([]byte(signingInput))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to sign: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
proof := signingInput + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for ES256 algorithm with secp256k1 curve, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "requires curve P-256") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected curve mismatch error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === exp/nbf Validation Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ExpiredWithExpClaim(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute)
-
exp := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Minute) // Expired 1 minute ago
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for expired proof with exp claim, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "expired") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected expiration error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_NotYetValidWithNbfClaim(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
nbf := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute) // Not valid for another 5 minutes
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(nbf),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
_, err = verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for not-yet-valid proof with nbf claim, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "not valid before") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected not-before error, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyDPoPProof_ValidWithExpClaimInFuture(t *testing.T) {
-
verifier := NewDPoPVerifier()
-
key := generateTestES256Key(t)
-
-
method := "POST"
-
uri := "https://api.example.com/resource"
-
iat := time.Now()
-
exp := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Minute) // Valid for 5 more minutes
-
jti := uuid.New().String()
-
-
claims := &DPoPClaims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
ID: jti,
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(iat),
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
-
},
-
HTTPMethod: method,
-
HTTPURI: uri,
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)
-
token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"
-
token.Header["jwk"] = key.jwk
-
-
proof, err := token.SignedString(key.privateKey)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test proof: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
result, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(proof, method, uri)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyDPoPProof failed for valid proof with exp in future: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if result == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected non-nil result for valid proof")
-
}
-
}
···
-189
internal/atproto/auth/jwks_fetcher.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"context"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"fmt"
-
"net/http"
-
"strings"
-
"sync"
-
"time"
-
)
-
-
// CachedJWKSFetcher fetches and caches JWKS from authorization servers
-
type CachedJWKSFetcher struct {
-
cache map[string]*cachedJWKS
-
httpClient *http.Client
-
cacheMutex sync.RWMutex
-
cacheTTL time.Duration
-
}
-
-
type cachedJWKS struct {
-
jwks *JWKS
-
expiresAt time.Time
-
}
-
-
// NewCachedJWKSFetcher creates a new JWKS fetcher with caching
-
func NewCachedJWKSFetcher(cacheTTL time.Duration) *CachedJWKSFetcher {
-
return &CachedJWKSFetcher{
-
cache: make(map[string]*cachedJWKS),
-
httpClient: &http.Client{
-
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
-
},
-
cacheTTL: cacheTTL,
-
}
-
}
-
-
// FetchPublicKey fetches the public key for verifying a JWT from the issuer
-
// Implements JWKSFetcher interface
-
// Returns interface{} to support both RSA and ECDSA keys
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
// Extract key ID from token
-
kid, err := ExtractKeyID(token)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to extract key ID: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Get JWKS from cache or fetch
-
jwks, err := f.getJWKS(ctx, issuer)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
// Find the key by ID
-
jwk, err := jwks.FindKeyByID(kid)
-
if err != nil {
-
// Key not found in cache - try refreshing
-
jwks, err = f.fetchJWKS(ctx, issuer)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh JWKS: %w", err)
-
}
-
f.cacheJWKS(issuer, jwks)
-
-
// Try again with fresh JWKS
-
jwk, err = jwks.FindKeyByID(kid)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Convert JWK to public key (RSA or ECDSA)
-
return jwk.ToPublicKey()
-
}
-
-
// getJWKS gets JWKS from cache or fetches if not cached/expired
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) getJWKS(ctx context.Context, issuer string) (*JWKS, error) {
-
// Check cache first
-
f.cacheMutex.RLock()
-
cached, exists := f.cache[issuer]
-
f.cacheMutex.RUnlock()
-
-
if exists && time.Now().Before(cached.expiresAt) {
-
return cached.jwks, nil
-
}
-
-
// Not in cache or expired - fetch from issuer
-
jwks, err := f.fetchJWKS(ctx, issuer)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
// Cache it
-
f.cacheJWKS(issuer, jwks)
-
-
return jwks, nil
-
}
-
-
// fetchJWKS fetches JWKS from the authorization server
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) fetchJWKS(ctx context.Context, issuer string) (*JWKS, error) {
-
// Step 1: Fetch OAuth server metadata to get JWKS URI
-
metadataURL := strings.TrimSuffix(issuer, "/") + "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"
-
-
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", metadataURL, nil)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create metadata request: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
resp, err := f.httpClient.Do(req)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch metadata: %w", err)
-
}
-
defer func() {
-
_ = resp.Body.Close()
-
}()
-
-
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("metadata endpoint returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
-
}
-
-
var metadata struct {
-
JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri"`
-
}
-
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&metadata); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode metadata: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
if metadata.JWKSURI == "" {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("jwks_uri not found in metadata")
-
}
-
-
// Step 2: Fetch JWKS from the JWKS URI
-
jwksReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", metadata.JWKSURI, nil)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create JWKS request: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
jwksResp, err := f.httpClient.Do(jwksReq)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch JWKS: %w", err)
-
}
-
defer func() {
-
_ = jwksResp.Body.Close()
-
}()
-
-
if jwksResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("JWKS endpoint returned status %d", jwksResp.StatusCode)
-
}
-
-
var jwks JWKS
-
if err := json.NewDecoder(jwksResp.Body).Decode(&jwks); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWKS: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
if len(jwks.Keys) == 0 {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no keys found in JWKS")
-
}
-
-
return &jwks, nil
-
}
-
-
// cacheJWKS stores JWKS in the cache
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) cacheJWKS(issuer string, jwks *JWKS) {
-
f.cacheMutex.Lock()
-
defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()
-
-
f.cache[issuer] = &cachedJWKS{
-
jwks: jwks,
-
expiresAt: time.Now().Add(f.cacheTTL),
-
}
-
}
-
-
// ClearCache clears the entire JWKS cache
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) ClearCache() {
-
f.cacheMutex.Lock()
-
defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()
-
f.cache = make(map[string]*cachedJWKS)
-
}
-
-
// CleanupExpiredCache removes expired entries from the cache
-
func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) CleanupExpiredCache() {
-
f.cacheMutex.Lock()
-
defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()
-
-
now := time.Now()
-
for issuer, cached := range f.cache {
-
if now.After(cached.expiresAt) {
-
delete(f.cache, issuer)
-
}
-
}
-
}
···
-709
internal/atproto/auth/jwt.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"context"
-
"crypto/ecdsa"
-
"crypto/elliptic"
-
"crypto/rsa"
-
"encoding/base64"
-
"encoding/json"
-
"fmt"
-
"math/big"
-
"net/url"
-
"os"
-
"strings"
-
"sync"
-
"time"
-
-
indigoCrypto "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atcrypto"
-
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
-
)
-
-
// jwtConfig holds cached JWT configuration to avoid reading env vars on every request
-
type jwtConfig struct {
-
hs256Issuers map[string]struct{} // Set of whitelisted HS256 issuers
-
pdsJWTSecret []byte // Cached PDS_JWT_SECRET
-
isDevEnv bool // Cached IS_DEV_ENV
-
}
-
-
var (
-
cachedConfig *jwtConfig
-
configOnce sync.Once
-
)
-
-
// InitJWTConfig initializes the JWT configuration from environment variables.
-
// This should be called once at startup. If not called explicitly, it will be
-
// initialized lazily on first use.
-
func InitJWTConfig() {
-
configOnce.Do(func() {
-
cachedConfig = &jwtConfig{
-
hs256Issuers: make(map[string]struct{}),
-
isDevEnv: os.Getenv("IS_DEV_ENV") == "true",
-
}
-
-
// Parse HS256_ISSUERS into a set for O(1) lookup
-
if issuers := os.Getenv("HS256_ISSUERS"); issuers != "" {
-
for _, issuer := range strings.Split(issuers, ",") {
-
issuer = strings.TrimSpace(issuer)
-
if issuer != "" {
-
cachedConfig.hs256Issuers[issuer] = struct{}{}
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Cache PDS_JWT_SECRET
-
if secret := os.Getenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET"); secret != "" {
-
cachedConfig.pdsJWTSecret = []byte(secret)
-
}
-
})
-
}
-
-
// getConfig returns the cached config, initializing if needed
-
func getConfig() *jwtConfig {
-
InitJWTConfig()
-
return cachedConfig
-
}
-
-
// ResetJWTConfigForTesting resets the cached config to allow re-initialization.
-
// This should ONLY be used in tests.
-
func ResetJWTConfigForTesting() {
-
cachedConfig = nil
-
configOnce = sync.Once{}
-
}
-
-
// Algorithm constants for JWT signing methods
-
const (
-
AlgorithmHS256 = "HS256"
-
AlgorithmRS256 = "RS256"
-
AlgorithmES256 = "ES256"
-
)
-
-
// JWTHeader represents the parsed JWT header
-
type JWTHeader struct {
-
Alg string `json:"alg"`
-
Kid string `json:"kid"`
-
Typ string `json:"typ,omitempty"`
-
}
-
-
// Claims represents the standard JWT claims we care about
-
type Claims struct {
-
jwt.RegisteredClaims
-
// Confirmation claim for DPoP token binding (RFC 9449)
-
// Contains "jkt" (JWK thumbprint) when token is bound to a DPoP key
-
Confirmation map[string]interface{} `json:"cnf,omitempty"`
-
Scope string `json:"scope,omitempty"`
-
}
-
-
// stripBearerPrefix removes the "Bearer " prefix from a token string
-
func stripBearerPrefix(tokenString string) string {
-
tokenString = strings.TrimPrefix(tokenString, "Bearer ")
-
return strings.TrimSpace(tokenString)
-
}
-
-
// ParseJWTHeader extracts and parses the JWT header from a token string
-
// This is a reusable function for getting algorithm and key ID information
-
func ParseJWTHeader(tokenString string) (*JWTHeader, error) {
-
tokenString = stripBearerPrefix(tokenString)
-
-
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
-
if len(parts) != 3 {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-
}
-
-
headerBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT header: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
var header JWTHeader
-
if err := json.Unmarshal(headerBytes, &header); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT header: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
return &header, nil
-
}
-
-
// shouldUseHS256 determines if a token should use HS256 verification
-
// This prevents algorithm confusion attacks by using multiple signals:
-
// 1. If the token has a `kid` (key ID), it MUST use asymmetric verification
-
// 2. If no `kid`, only allow HS256 from whitelisted issuers (your own PDS)
-
//
-
// This approach supports open federation because:
-
// - External PDSes publish keys via JWKS and include `kid` in their tokens
-
// - Only your own PDS (which shares PDS_JWT_SECRET) uses HS256 without `kid`
-
func shouldUseHS256(header *JWTHeader, issuer string) bool {
-
// If token has a key ID, it MUST use asymmetric verification
-
// This is the primary defense against algorithm confusion attacks
-
if header.Kid != "" {
-
return false
-
}
-
-
// No kid - check if issuer is whitelisted for HS256
-
// This should only include your own PDS URL(s)
-
return isHS256IssuerWhitelisted(issuer)
-
}
-
-
// isHS256IssuerWhitelisted checks if the issuer is in the HS256 whitelist
-
// Only your own PDS should be in this list - external PDSes should use JWKS
-
func isHS256IssuerWhitelisted(issuer string) bool {
-
cfg := getConfig()
-
_, whitelisted := cfg.hs256Issuers[issuer]
-
return whitelisted
-
}
-
-
// ParseJWT parses a JWT token without verification (Phase 1)
-
// Returns the claims if the token is valid JSON and has required fields
-
func ParseJWT(tokenString string) (*Claims, error) {
-
// Remove "Bearer " prefix if present
-
tokenString = stripBearerPrefix(tokenString)
-
-
// Parse without verification first to extract claims
-
parser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
-
token, _, err := parser.ParseUnverified(tokenString, &Claims{})
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
-
if !ok {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid claims type")
-
}
-
-
// Validate required fields
-
if claims.Subject == "" {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing 'sub' claim (user DID)")
-
}
-
-
// atProto PDSes may use 'aud' instead of 'iss' for the authorization server
-
// If 'iss' is missing, use 'aud' as the authorization server identifier
-
if claims.Issuer == "" {
-
if len(claims.Audience) > 0 {
-
claims.Issuer = claims.Audience[0]
-
} else {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing both 'iss' and 'aud' claims (authorization server)")
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Validate claims (even in Phase 1, we need basic validation like expiry)
-
if err := validateClaims(claims); err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
return claims, nil
-
}
-
-
// VerifyJWT verifies a JWT token's signature and claims (Phase 2)
-
// Fetches the public key from the issuer's JWKS endpoint and validates the signature
-
// For HS256 tokens from whitelisted issuers, uses the shared PDS_JWT_SECRET
-
//
-
// SECURITY: Algorithm is determined by the issuer whitelist, NOT the token header,
-
// to prevent algorithm confusion attacks where an attacker could re-sign a token
-
// with HS256 using a public key as the secret.
-
func VerifyJWT(ctx context.Context, tokenString string, keyFetcher JWKSFetcher) (*Claims, error) {
-
// Strip Bearer prefix once at the start
-
tokenString = stripBearerPrefix(tokenString)
-
-
// First parse to get the issuer (needed to determine expected algorithm)
-
claims, err := ParseJWT(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
// Parse header to get the claimed algorithm (for validation)
-
header, err := ParseJWTHeader(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
// SECURITY: Determine verification method based on token characteristics
-
// 1. Tokens with `kid` MUST use asymmetric verification (supports federation)
-
// 2. Tokens without `kid` can use HS256 only from whitelisted issuers (your own PDS)
-
useHS256 := shouldUseHS256(header, claims.Issuer)
-
-
if useHS256 {
-
// Verify token actually claims to use HS256
-
if header.Alg != AlgorithmHS256 {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected HS256 for issuer %s but token uses %s", claims.Issuer, header.Alg)
-
}
-
return verifyHS256Token(tokenString)
-
}
-
-
// Token must use asymmetric verification
-
// Reject HS256 tokens that don't meet the criteria above
-
if header.Alg == AlgorithmHS256 {
-
if header.Kid != "" {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HS256 tokens with kid must use asymmetric verification")
-
}
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HS256 not allowed for issuer %s (not in HS256_ISSUERS whitelist)", claims.Issuer)
-
}
-
-
// For RSA/ECDSA, fetch public key from JWKS and verify
-
return verifyAsymmetricToken(ctx, tokenString, claims.Issuer, keyFetcher)
-
}
-
-
// verifyHS256Token verifies a JWT using HMAC-SHA256 with the shared secret
-
func verifyHS256Token(tokenString string) (*Claims, error) {
-
cfg := getConfig()
-
if len(cfg.pdsJWTSecret) == 0 {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HS256 verification failed: PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured")
-
}
-
-
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &Claims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
-
if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
-
}
-
return cfg.pdsJWTSecret, nil
-
})
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HS256 verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
if !token.Valid {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HS256 verification failed: token signature invalid")
-
}
-
-
verifiedClaims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
-
if !ok {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HS256 verification failed: invalid claims type")
-
}
-
-
if err := validateClaims(verifiedClaims); err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
return verifiedClaims, nil
-
}
-
-
// verifyAsymmetricToken verifies a JWT using RSA or ECDSA with a public key from JWKS.
-
// For ES256K (secp256k1), uses indigo's crypto package since golang-jwt doesn't support it.
-
func verifyAsymmetricToken(ctx context.Context, tokenString, issuer string, keyFetcher JWKSFetcher) (*Claims, error) {
-
// Parse header to check algorithm
-
header, err := ParseJWTHeader(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT header: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// ES256K (secp256k1) requires special handling via indigo's crypto package
-
// golang-jwt doesn't recognize ES256K as a valid signing method
-
if header.Alg == "ES256K" {
-
return verifyES256KToken(ctx, tokenString, issuer, keyFetcher)
-
}
-
-
// For standard algorithms (ES256, ES384, ES512, RS256, etc.), use golang-jwt
-
publicKey, err := keyFetcher.FetchPublicKey(ctx, issuer, tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch public key: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &Claims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
-
// Validate signing method - support both RSA and ECDSA (atProto uses ES256 primarily)
-
switch token.Method.(type) {
-
case *jwt.SigningMethodRSA, *jwt.SigningMethodECDSA:
-
// Valid signing methods for atProto
-
default:
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
-
}
-
return publicKey, nil
-
})
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("asymmetric verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
if !token.Valid {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("asymmetric verification failed: token signature invalid")
-
}
-
-
verifiedClaims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
-
if !ok {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("asymmetric verification failed: invalid claims type")
-
}
-
-
if err := validateClaims(verifiedClaims); err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
return verifiedClaims, nil
-
}
-
-
// verifyES256KToken verifies a JWT signed with ES256K (secp256k1) using indigo's crypto package.
-
// This is necessary because golang-jwt doesn't support ES256K as a signing method.
-
func verifyES256KToken(ctx context.Context, tokenString, issuer string, keyFetcher JWKSFetcher) (*Claims, error) {
-
// Fetch the public key - for ES256K, the fetcher returns a JWK map or indigo PublicKey
-
keyData, err := keyFetcher.FetchPublicKey(ctx, issuer, tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch public key for ES256K: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Convert to indigo PublicKey based on what the fetcher returned
-
var pubKey indigoCrypto.PublicKey
-
switch k := keyData.(type) {
-
case indigoCrypto.PublicKey:
-
// Already an indigo PublicKey (from DIDKeyFetcher or updated JWKSFetcher)
-
pubKey = k
-
case map[string]interface{}:
-
// Raw JWK map - parse with indigo
-
pubKey, err = parseJWKMapToIndigoPublicKey(k)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse ES256K JWK: %w", err)
-
}
-
default:
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ES256K verification requires indigo PublicKey or JWK map, got %T", keyData)
-
}
-
-
// Verify signature using indigo
-
if err := verifyJWTSignatureWithIndigoKey(tokenString, pubKey); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ES256K signature verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Parse claims (signature already verified)
-
claims, err := parseJWTClaimsManually(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse ES256K JWT claims: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
if err := validateClaims(claims); err != nil {
-
return nil, err
-
}
-
-
return claims, nil
-
}
-
-
// parseJWKMapToIndigoPublicKey converts a JWK map to an indigo PublicKey.
-
// This uses indigo's crypto package which supports all atProto curves including secp256k1.
-
func parseJWKMapToIndigoPublicKey(jwkMap map[string]interface{}) (indigoCrypto.PublicKey, error) {
-
// Convert map to JSON bytes for indigo's parser
-
jwkBytes, err := json.Marshal(jwkMap)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to serialize JWK: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Parse with indigo's crypto package - supports all atProto curves
-
pubKey, err := indigoCrypto.ParsePublicJWKBytes(jwkBytes)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWK with indigo: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
return pubKey, nil
-
}
-
-
// verifyJWTSignatureWithIndigoKey verifies a JWT signature using indigo's crypto package.
-
// This works for all ECDSA algorithms including ES256K (secp256k1).
-
func verifyJWTSignatureWithIndigoKey(tokenString string, pubKey indigoCrypto.PublicKey) error {
-
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
-
if len(parts) != 3 {
-
return fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-
}
-
-
// The signing input is "header.payload" (without decoding)
-
signingInput := parts[0] + "." + parts[1]
-
-
// Decode the signature from base64url
-
signature, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
-
if err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT signature: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Use indigo's verification - HashAndVerifyLenient handles hashing internally
-
// and accepts both low-S and high-S signatures for maximum compatibility
-
if err := pubKey.HashAndVerifyLenient([]byte(signingInput), signature); err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("signature verification failed: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
return nil
-
}
-
-
// parseJWTClaimsManually parses JWT claims without using golang-jwt.
-
// This is used for ES256K tokens where golang-jwt would reject the algorithm.
-
func parseJWTClaimsManually(tokenString string) (*Claims, error) {
-
parts := strings.Split(tokenString, ".")
-
if len(parts) != 3 {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-
}
-
-
// Decode claims
-
claimsBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWT claims: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Parse into raw map first
-
var rawClaims map[string]interface{}
-
if err := json.Unmarshal(claimsBytes, &rawClaims); err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT claims: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Build Claims struct
-
claims := &Claims{}
-
-
// Extract sub (subject/DID)
-
if sub, ok := rawClaims["sub"].(string); ok {
-
claims.Subject = sub
-
}
-
-
// Extract iss (issuer)
-
if iss, ok := rawClaims["iss"].(string); ok {
-
claims.Issuer = iss
-
}
-
-
// Extract aud (audience) - can be string or array
-
switch aud := rawClaims["aud"].(type) {
-
case string:
-
claims.Audience = jwt.ClaimStrings{aud}
-
case []interface{}:
-
for _, a := range aud {
-
if s, ok := a.(string); ok {
-
claims.Audience = append(claims.Audience, s)
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Extract exp (expiration)
-
if exp, ok := rawClaims["exp"].(float64); ok {
-
t := time.Unix(int64(exp), 0)
-
claims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(t)
-
}
-
-
// Extract iat (issued at)
-
if iat, ok := rawClaims["iat"].(float64); ok {
-
t := time.Unix(int64(iat), 0)
-
claims.IssuedAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(t)
-
}
-
-
// Extract nbf (not before)
-
if nbf, ok := rawClaims["nbf"].(float64); ok {
-
t := time.Unix(int64(nbf), 0)
-
claims.NotBefore = jwt.NewNumericDate(t)
-
}
-
-
// Extract jti (JWT ID)
-
if jti, ok := rawClaims["jti"].(string); ok {
-
claims.ID = jti
-
}
-
-
// Extract scope
-
if scope, ok := rawClaims["scope"].(string); ok {
-
claims.Scope = scope
-
}
-
-
// Extract cnf (confirmation) for DPoP binding
-
if cnf, ok := rawClaims["cnf"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
-
claims.Confirmation = cnf
-
}
-
-
return claims, nil
-
}
-
-
// validateClaims performs additional validation on JWT claims
-
func validateClaims(claims *Claims) error {
-
now := time.Now()
-
-
// Check expiration
-
if claims.ExpiresAt != nil && claims.ExpiresAt.Before(now) {
-
return fmt.Errorf("token has expired")
-
}
-
-
// Check not before
-
if claims.NotBefore != nil && claims.NotBefore.After(now) {
-
return fmt.Errorf("token not yet valid")
-
}
-
-
// Validate DID format in sub claim
-
if !strings.HasPrefix(claims.Subject, "did:") {
-
return fmt.Errorf("invalid DID format in 'sub' claim: %s", claims.Subject)
-
}
-
-
// Validate issuer is either an HTTPS URL or a DID
-
// atProto uses DIDs (did:web:, did:plc:) or HTTPS URLs as issuer identifiers
-
// In dev mode (IS_DEV_ENV=true), allow HTTP for local PDS testing
-
isHTTP := strings.HasPrefix(claims.Issuer, "http://")
-
isHTTPS := strings.HasPrefix(claims.Issuer, "https://")
-
isDID := strings.HasPrefix(claims.Issuer, "did:")
-
-
if !isHTTPS && !isDID && !isHTTP {
-
return fmt.Errorf("issuer must be HTTPS URL, HTTP URL (dev only), or DID, got: %s", claims.Issuer)
-
}
-
-
// In production, reject HTTP issuers (only for non-dev environments)
-
cfg := getConfig()
-
if isHTTP && !cfg.isDevEnv {
-
return fmt.Errorf("HTTP issuer not allowed in production, got: %s", claims.Issuer)
-
}
-
-
// Parse to ensure it's a valid URL
-
if _, err := url.Parse(claims.Issuer); err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("invalid issuer URL: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Validate scope if present (lenient: allow empty, but reject wrong scopes)
-
if claims.Scope != "" && !strings.Contains(claims.Scope, "atproto") {
-
return fmt.Errorf("token missing required 'atproto' scope, got: %s", claims.Scope)
-
}
-
-
return nil
-
}
-
-
// JWKSFetcher defines the interface for fetching public keys from JWKS endpoints
-
// Returns interface{} to support both RSA and ECDSA keys
-
type JWKSFetcher interface {
-
FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error)
-
}
-
-
// JWK represents a JSON Web Key from a JWKS endpoint
-
// Supports both RSA and EC (ECDSA) keys
-
type JWK struct {
-
Kid string `json:"kid"` // Key ID
-
Kty string `json:"kty"` // Key type ("RSA" or "EC")
-
Alg string `json:"alg"` // Algorithm (e.g., "RS256", "ES256")
-
Use string `json:"use"` // Public key use (should be "sig" for signatures)
-
// RSA fields
-
N string `json:"n,omitempty"` // RSA modulus
-
E string `json:"e,omitempty"` // RSA exponent
-
// EC fields
-
Crv string `json:"crv,omitempty"` // EC curve (e.g., "P-256")
-
X string `json:"x,omitempty"` // EC x coordinate
-
Y string `json:"y,omitempty"` // EC y coordinate
-
}
-
-
// ToPublicKey converts a JWK to a public key (RSA, ECDSA, or indigo for secp256k1).
-
//
-
// Returns:
-
// - *rsa.PublicKey for RSA keys
-
// - *ecdsa.PublicKey for NIST EC curves (P-256, P-384, P-521)
-
// - map[string]interface{} for secp256k1 (ES256K) - parsed by indigo
-
func (j *JWK) ToPublicKey() (interface{}, error) {
-
switch j.Kty {
-
case "RSA":
-
return j.toRSAPublicKey()
-
case "EC":
-
// For secp256k1, return raw JWK map for indigo to parse
-
if j.Crv == "secp256k1" {
-
return j.toJWKMap(), nil
-
}
-
return j.toECPublicKey()
-
default:
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type: %s", j.Kty)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// toJWKMap converts the JWK struct to a map for indigo parsing
-
func (j *JWK) toJWKMap() map[string]interface{} {
-
m := map[string]interface{}{
-
"kty": j.Kty,
-
}
-
if j.Kid != "" {
-
m["kid"] = j.Kid
-
}
-
if j.Alg != "" {
-
m["alg"] = j.Alg
-
}
-
if j.Use != "" {
-
m["use"] = j.Use
-
}
-
// RSA fields
-
if j.N != "" {
-
m["n"] = j.N
-
}
-
if j.E != "" {
-
m["e"] = j.E
-
}
-
// EC fields
-
if j.Crv != "" {
-
m["crv"] = j.Crv
-
}
-
if j.X != "" {
-
m["x"] = j.X
-
}
-
if j.Y != "" {
-
m["y"] = j.Y
-
}
-
return m
-
}
-
-
// toRSAPublicKey converts a JWK to an RSA public key
-
func (j *JWK) toRSAPublicKey() (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
-
// Decode modulus
-
nBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(j.N)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode RSA modulus: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Decode exponent
-
eBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(j.E)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode RSA exponent: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Convert exponent to int
-
var eInt int
-
for _, b := range eBytes {
-
eInt = eInt*256 + int(b)
-
}
-
-
return &rsa.PublicKey{
-
N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(nBytes),
-
E: eInt,
-
}, nil
-
}
-
-
// toECPublicKey converts a JWK to an ECDSA public key
-
func (j *JWK) toECPublicKey() (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
-
// Determine curve
-
var curve elliptic.Curve
-
switch j.Crv {
-
case "P-256":
-
curve = elliptic.P256()
-
case "P-384":
-
curve = elliptic.P384()
-
case "P-521":
-
curve = elliptic.P521()
-
default:
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported EC curve: %s", j.Crv)
-
}
-
-
// Decode X coordinate
-
xBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(j.X)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode EC x coordinate: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
// Decode Y coordinate
-
yBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(j.Y)
-
if err != nil {
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode EC y coordinate: %w", err)
-
}
-
-
return &ecdsa.PublicKey{
-
Curve: curve,
-
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(xBytes),
-
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(yBytes),
-
}, nil
-
}
-
-
// JWKS represents a JSON Web Key Set
-
type JWKS struct {
-
Keys []JWK `json:"keys"`
-
}
-
-
// FindKeyByID finds a key in the JWKS by its key ID
-
func (j *JWKS) FindKeyByID(kid string) (*JWK, error) {
-
for _, key := range j.Keys {
-
if key.Kid == kid {
-
return &key, nil
-
}
-
}
-
return nil, fmt.Errorf("key with kid %s not found", kid)
-
}
-
-
// ExtractKeyID extracts the key ID from a JWT token header
-
func ExtractKeyID(tokenString string) (string, error) {
-
header, err := ParseJWTHeader(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
return "", err
-
}
-
-
if header.Kid == "" {
-
return "", fmt.Errorf("missing kid in token header")
-
}
-
-
return header.Kid, nil
-
}
···
-496
internal/atproto/auth/jwt_test.go
···
-
package auth
-
-
import (
-
"context"
-
"testing"
-
"time"
-
-
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
-
)
-
-
func TestParseJWT(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a test JWT token
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto transition:generic",
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Test parsing
-
parsedClaims, err := ParseJWT(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ParseJWT failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if parsedClaims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Subject)
-
}
-
-
if parsedClaims.Issuer != "https://test-pds.example.com" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected issuer 'https://test-pds.example.com', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Issuer)
-
}
-
-
if parsedClaims.Scope != "atproto transition:generic" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected scope 'atproto transition:generic', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Scope)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWT_MissingSubject(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a token without subject
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Test parsing - should fail
-
_, err = ParseJWT(tokenString)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing subject, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWT_MissingIssuer(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a token without issuer
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Test parsing - should fail
-
_, err = ParseJWT(tokenString)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for missing issuer, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWT_WithBearerPrefix(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a test JWT token
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
// Test parsing with Bearer prefix
-
parsedClaims, err := ParseJWT("Bearer " + tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ParseJWT failed with Bearer prefix: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if parsedClaims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Subject)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestValidateClaims_Expired(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)), // Expired
-
},
-
}
-
-
err := validateClaims(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for expired token, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestValidateClaims_InvalidDID(t *testing.T) {
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "invalid-did-format",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
-
err := validateClaims(claims)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for invalid DID format, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestExtractKeyID(t *testing.T) {
-
// Create a test JWT token with kid in header
-
token := jwt.New(jwt.SigningMethodRS256)
-
token.Header["kid"] = "test-key-id"
-
token.Claims = &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: "https://test-pds.example.com",
-
},
-
}
-
-
// Sign with a dummy RSA key (we just need a valid token structure)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("dummy"))
-
if err == nil {
-
// If it succeeds (shouldn't with wrong key type, but let's handle it)
-
kid, err := ExtractKeyID(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Logf("ExtractKeyID failed (expected if signing fails): %v", err)
-
} else if kid != "test-key-id" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected kid 'test-key-id', got '%s'", kid)
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === HS256 Verification Tests ===
-
-
// mockJWKSFetcher is a mock implementation of JWKSFetcher for testing
-
type mockJWKSFetcher struct {
-
publicKey interface{}
-
err error
-
}
-
-
func (m *mockJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {
-
return m.publicKey, m.err
-
}
-
-
func createHS256Token(t *testing.T, subject, issuer, secret string, expiry time.Duration) string {
-
t.Helper()
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: subject,
-
Issuer: issuer,
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(expiry)),
-
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
-
},
-
Scope: "atproto transition:generic",
-
}
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
-
tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte(secret))
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)
-
}
-
return tokenString
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
// Setup: Configure environment for HS256 verification
-
secret := "test-jwt-secret-key-12345"
-
issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", secret)
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, secret, 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify token
-
claims, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("VerifyJWT failed for valid HS256 token: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if claims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {
-
t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", claims.Subject)
-
}
-
if claims.Issuer != issuer {
-
t.Errorf("Expected issuer '%s', got '%s'", issuer, claims.Issuer)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_WrongSecret(t *testing.T) {
-
// Setup: Configure environment with one secret, sign with another
-
issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "correct-secret")
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
// Create token with wrong secret
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, "wrong-secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify should fail
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error for HS256 token with wrong secret, got nil")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_SecretNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {
-
// Setup: Whitelist issuer but don't configure secret
-
issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "") // Ensure secret is not set (empty = not configured)
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, "any-secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify should fail with descriptive error
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error when PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured, got nil")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === Algorithm Confusion Attack Prevention Tests ===
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_AlgorithmConfusionAttack_HS256WithNonWhitelistedIssuer(t *testing.T) {
-
// SECURITY TEST: This tests the algorithm confusion attack prevention
-
// An attacker tries to use HS256 with an issuer that should use RS256/ES256
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://trusted.example.com") // Different from token issuer
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
// Create HS256 token with non-whitelisted issuer (simulating attack)
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:attacker", "https://victim-pds.example.com", "some-secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify should fail because issuer is not in HS256 whitelist
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: HS256 token accepted for non-whitelisted issuer")
-
}
-
if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "not in HS256_ISSUERS whitelist") {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error about HS256 not allowed for issuer, got: %v", err)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_AlgorithmConfusionAttack_EmptyWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
-
// SECURITY TEST: When no issuers are whitelisted for HS256, all HS256 tokens should be rejected
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "") // Empty whitelist
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://any-pds.example.com", "some-secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
// Verify should fail because no issuers are whitelisted for HS256
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: HS256 token accepted with empty issuer whitelist")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestVerifyJWT_IssuerRequiresHS256ButTokenUsesRS256(t *testing.T) {
-
// Test that issuer whitelisted for HS256 rejects tokens claiming to use RS256
-
issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"
-
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "test-secret")
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
// Create RS256-signed token (can't actually sign without RSA key, but we can test the header check)
-
claims := &Claims{
-
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
-
Subject: "did:plc:test123",
-
Issuer: issuer,
-
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),
-
},
-
}
-
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
-
// This will create an invalid signature but valid header structure
-
// The test should fail at algorithm check, not signature verification
-
tokenString, _ := token.SignedString([]byte("dummy-key"))
-
-
if tokenString != "" {
-
_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Error("Expected error when HS256 issuer receives non-HS256 token")
-
}
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === ParseJWTHeader Tests ===
-
-
func TestParseJWTHeader_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://test.example.com", "secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
header, err := ParseJWTHeader(tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ParseJWTHeader failed: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if header.Alg != AlgorithmHS256 {
-
t.Errorf("Expected alg '%s', got '%s'", AlgorithmHS256, header.Alg)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWTHeader_WithBearerPrefix(t *testing.T) {
-
tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://test.example.com", "secret", 1*time.Hour)
-
-
header, err := ParseJWTHeader("Bearer " + tokenString)
-
if err != nil {
-
t.Fatalf("ParseJWTHeader failed with Bearer prefix: %v", err)
-
}
-
-
if header.Alg != AlgorithmHS256 {
-
t.Errorf("Expected alg '%s', got '%s'", AlgorithmHS256, header.Alg)
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestParseJWTHeader_InvalidFormat(t *testing.T) {
-
testCases := []struct {
-
name string
-
input string
-
}{
-
{"empty string", ""},
-
{"single part", "abc"},
-
{"two parts", "abc.def"},
-
{"too many parts", "a.b.c.d"},
-
}
-
-
for _, tc := range testCases {
-
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-
_, err := ParseJWTHeader(tc.input)
-
if err == nil {
-
t.Errorf("Expected error for invalid JWT format '%s', got nil", tc.input)
-
}
-
})
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === shouldUseHS256 and isHS256IssuerWhitelisted Tests ===
-
-
func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_Whitelisted(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com,https://pds2.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds1.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected pds1 to be whitelisted")
-
}
-
if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds2.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected pds2 to be whitelisted")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_NotWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
if isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://attacker.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected non-whitelisted issuer to return false")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_EmptyWhitelist(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "") // Empty whitelist
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
if isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://any.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected false when whitelist is empty (safe default)")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_WhitespaceHandling(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", " https://pds1.example.com , https://pds2.example.com ")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds1.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Expected whitespace-trimmed issuer to be whitelisted")
-
}
-
}
-
-
// === shouldUseHS256 Tests (kid-based logic) ===
-
-
func TestShouldUseHS256_WithKid_AlwaysFalse(t *testing.T) {
-
// Tokens with kid should NEVER use HS256, regardless of issuer whitelist
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://whitelisted.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
header := &JWTHeader{
-
Alg: AlgorithmHS256,
-
Kid: "some-key-id", // Has kid
-
}
-
-
// Even whitelisted issuer should not use HS256 if token has kid
-
if shouldUseHS256(header, "https://whitelisted.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Tokens with kid should never use HS256 (supports federation)")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestShouldUseHS256_WithoutKid_WhitelistedIssuer(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
header := &JWTHeader{
-
Alg: AlgorithmHS256,
-
Kid: "", // No kid
-
}
-
-
if !shouldUseHS256(header, "https://my-pds.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Token without kid from whitelisted issuer should use HS256")
-
}
-
}
-
-
func TestShouldUseHS256_WithoutKid_NotWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {
-
ResetJWTConfigForTesting()
-
t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")
-
t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)
-
-
header := &JWTHeader{
-
Alg: AlgorithmHS256,
-
Kid: "", // No kid
-
}
-
-
if shouldUseHS256(header, "https://external-pds.example.com") {
-
t.Error("Token without kid from non-whitelisted issuer should NOT use HS256")
-
}
-
}
-
-
// Helper function
-
func contains(s, substr string) bool {
-
return len(s) >= len(substr) && (s == substr || len(s) > 0 && containsHelper(s, substr))
-
}
-
-
func containsHelper(s, substr string) bool {
-
for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ {
-
if s[i:i+len(substr)] == substr {
-
return true
-
}
-
}
-
return false
-
}
···
+1
docker-compose.prod.yml
···
# Instance identity
INSTANCE_DID: did:web:coves.social
INSTANCE_DOMAIN: coves.social
# PDS connection (separate domain!)
PDS_URL: https://coves.me
···
# Instance identity
INSTANCE_DID: did:web:coves.social
INSTANCE_DOMAIN: coves.social
+
APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL: https://coves.social
# PDS connection (separate domain!)
PDS_URL: https://coves.me
+1 -8
Caddyfile
···
file_server
}
-
# Serve OAuth callback page
-
handle /oauth/callback {
-
root * /srv
-
rewrite * /oauth/callback.html
-
file_server
-
}
-
-
# Proxy all other requests to AppView
handle {
reverse_proxy appview:8080 {
# Health check
···
file_server
}
+
# Proxy all requests to AppView
handle {
reverse_proxy appview:8080 {
# Health check
-97
static/oauth/callback.html
···
-
<!DOCTYPE html>
-
<html>
-
<head>
-
<meta charset="utf-8">
-
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
-
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'">
-
<title>Authorization Successful - Coves</title>
-
<style>
-
body {
-
font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;
-
display: flex;
-
align-items: center;
-
justify-content: center;
-
min-height: 100vh;
-
margin: 0;
-
background: #f5f5f5;
-
}
-
.container {
-
text-align: center;
-
padding: 2rem;
-
background: white;
-
border-radius: 8px;
-
box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(0,0,0,0.1);
-
max-width: 400px;
-
}
-
.success { color: #22c55e; font-size: 3rem; margin-bottom: 1rem; }
-
h1 { margin: 0 0 0.5rem; color: #1f2937; font-size: 1.5rem; }
-
p { color: #6b7280; margin: 0.5rem 0; }
-
a {
-
display: inline-block;
-
margin-top: 1rem;
-
padding: 0.75rem 1.5rem;
-
background: #3b82f6;
-
color: white;
-
text-decoration: none;
-
border-radius: 6px;
-
font-weight: 500;
-
}
-
a:hover { background: #2563eb; }
-
</style>
-
</head>
-
<body>
-
<div class="container">
-
<div class="success">โœ“</div>
-
<h1>Authorization Successful!</h1>
-
<p id="status">Returning to Coves...</p>
-
<a href="#" id="manualLink">Open Coves</a>
-
</div>
-
<script>
-
(function() {
-
// Parse and sanitize query params - only allow expected OAuth parameters
-
const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
-
const safeParams = new URLSearchParams();
-
-
// Whitelist only expected OAuth callback parameters
-
const code = urlParams.get('code');
-
const state = urlParams.get('state');
-
const error = urlParams.get('error');
-
const errorDescription = urlParams.get('error_description');
-
const iss = urlParams.get('iss');
-
-
if (code) safeParams.set('code', code);
-
if (state) safeParams.set('state', state);
-
if (error) safeParams.set('error', error);
-
if (errorDescription) safeParams.set('error_description', errorDescription);
-
if (iss) safeParams.set('iss', iss);
-
-
const sanitizedQuery = safeParams.toString() ? '?' + safeParams.toString() : '';
-
-
const userAgent = navigator.userAgent || '';
-
const isAndroid = /Android/i.test(userAgent);
-
-
// Build deep link based on platform
-
let deepLink;
-
if (isAndroid) {
-
// Android: Intent URL format
-
const pathAndQuery = '/oauth/callback' + sanitizedQuery;
-
deepLink = 'intent:/' + pathAndQuery + '#Intent;scheme=social.coves;package=social.coves;end';
-
} else {
-
// iOS: Custom scheme
-
deepLink = 'social.coves:/oauth/callback' + sanitizedQuery;
-
}
-
-
// Update manual link
-
document.getElementById('manualLink').href = deepLink;
-
-
// Attempt automatic redirect
-
window.location.href = deepLink;
-
-
// Update status after 2 seconds if redirect didn't work
-
setTimeout(function() {
-
document.getElementById('status').textContent = 'Click the button above to continue';
-
}, 2000);
-
})();
-
</script>
-
</body>
-
</html>
···
+6 -5
internal/api/routes/oauth.go
···
// Use login limiter since callback completes the authentication flow
r.With(corsMiddleware(allowedOrigins), loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)
-
// Mobile Universal Link callback route
-
// This route is used for iOS Universal Links and Android App Links
-
// Path must match the path in .well-known/apple-app-site-association
-
// Uses the same handler as web callback - the system routes it to the mobile app
-
r.With(loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/app/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)
// Session management - dedicated rate limits
r.With(logoutLimiter.Middleware).Post("/oauth/logout", handler.HandleLogout)
···
// Use login limiter since callback completes the authentication flow
r.With(corsMiddleware(allowedOrigins), loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)
+
// Mobile Universal Link callback route (fallback when app doesn't intercept)
+
// This route exists for iOS Universal Links and Android App Links.
+
// When properly configured, the mobile OS intercepts this URL and opens the app
+
// BEFORE the request reaches the server. If this handler is reached, it means
+
// Universal Links failed to intercept.
+
r.With(loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/app/oauth/callback", handler.HandleMobileDeepLinkFallback)
// Session management - dedicated rate limits
r.With(logoutLimiter.Middleware).Post("/oauth/logout", handler.HandleLogout)
+11
static/.well-known/apple-app-site-association
···
···
+
{
+
"applinks": {
+
"apps": [],
+
"details": [
+
{
+
"appID": "TEAM_ID.social.coves",
+
"paths": ["/app/oauth/callback"]
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
}
+10
static/.well-known/assetlinks.json
···
···
+
[{
+
"relation": ["delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"],
+
"target": {
+
"namespace": "android_app",
+
"package_name": "social.coves",
+
"sha256_cert_fingerprints": [
+
"0B:D8:8C:99:66:25:E5:CD:06:54:80:88:01:6F:B7:38:B9:F4:5B:41:71:F7:95:C8:68:94:87:AD:EA:9F:D9:ED"
+
]
+
}
+
}]
+41
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/feed/vote/delete.json
···
···
+
{
+
"lexicon": 1,
+
"id": "social.coves.feed.vote.delete",
+
"defs": {
+
"main": {
+
"type": "procedure",
+
"description": "Delete a vote on a post or comment",
+
"input": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["subject"],
+
"properties": {
+
"subject": {
+
"type": "ref",
+
"ref": "com.atproto.repo.strongRef",
+
"description": "Strong reference to the post or comment to remove the vote from"
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"output": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"properties": {}
+
}
+
},
+
"errors": [
+
{
+
"name": "VoteNotFound",
+
"description": "No vote found for this subject"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "NotAuthorized",
+
"description": "User is not authorized to delete this vote"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
}
+
}
+115
internal/api/handlers/vote/create_vote.go
···
···
+
package vote
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
)
+
+
// CreateVoteHandler handles vote creation
+
type CreateVoteHandler struct {
+
service votes.Service
+
}
+
+
// NewCreateVoteHandler creates a new create vote handler
+
func NewCreateVoteHandler(service votes.Service) *CreateVoteHandler {
+
return &CreateVoteHandler{
+
service: service,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// CreateVoteInput represents the request body for creating a vote
+
type CreateVoteInput struct {
+
Subject struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
} `json:"subject"`
+
Direction string `json:"direction"`
+
}
+
+
// CreateVoteOutput represents the response body for creating a vote
+
type CreateVoteOutput struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
}
+
+
// HandleCreateVote creates a vote on a post or comment
+
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.vote.create
+
//
+
// Request body: { "subject": { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." }, "direction": "up" }
+
// Response: { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." }
+
//
+
// Behavior:
+
// - If no vote exists: creates new vote with given direction
+
// - If vote exists with same direction: deletes vote (toggle off)
+
// - If vote exists with different direction: updates to new direction
+
func (h *CreateVoteHandler) HandleCreateVote(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Parse request body
+
var input CreateVoteInput
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Validate required fields
+
if input.Subject.URI == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.uri is required")
+
return
+
}
+
if input.Subject.CID == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.cid is required")
+
return
+
}
+
if input.Direction == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "direction is required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Validate direction
+
if input.Direction != "up" && input.Direction != "down" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "direction must be 'up' or 'down'")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)
+
session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if session == nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Create vote request
+
req := votes.CreateVoteRequest{
+
Subject: votes.StrongRef{
+
URI: input.Subject.URI,
+
CID: input.Subject.CID,
+
},
+
Direction: input.Direction,
+
}
+
+
// Call service to create vote
+
response, err := h.service.CreateVote(r.Context(), session, req)
+
if err != nil {
+
handleServiceError(w, err)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Return success response
+
output := CreateVoteOutput{
+
URI: response.URI,
+
CID: response.CID,
+
}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+93
internal/api/handlers/vote/delete_vote.go
···
···
+
package vote
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
)
+
+
// DeleteVoteHandler handles vote deletion
+
type DeleteVoteHandler struct {
+
service votes.Service
+
}
+
+
// NewDeleteVoteHandler creates a new delete vote handler
+
func NewDeleteVoteHandler(service votes.Service) *DeleteVoteHandler {
+
return &DeleteVoteHandler{
+
service: service,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// DeleteVoteInput represents the request body for deleting a vote
+
type DeleteVoteInput struct {
+
Subject struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
} `json:"subject"`
+
}
+
+
// DeleteVoteOutput represents the response body for deleting a vote
+
// Per lexicon: output is an empty object
+
type DeleteVoteOutput struct{}
+
+
// HandleDeleteVote removes a vote from a post or comment
+
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.vote.delete
+
//
+
// Request body: { "subject": { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." } }
+
// Response: { "success": true }
+
func (h *DeleteVoteHandler) HandleDeleteVote(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Parse request body
+
var input DeleteVoteInput
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Validate required fields
+
if input.Subject.URI == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.uri is required")
+
return
+
}
+
if input.Subject.CID == "" {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.cid is required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)
+
session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if session == nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Create delete vote request
+
req := votes.DeleteVoteRequest{
+
Subject: votes.StrongRef{
+
URI: input.Subject.URI,
+
CID: input.Subject.CID,
+
},
+
}
+
+
// Call service to delete vote
+
err := h.service.DeleteVote(r.Context(), session, req)
+
if err != nil {
+
handleServiceError(w, err)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Return success response (empty object per lexicon)
+
output := DeleteVoteOutput{}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+24
internal/api/routes/vote.go
···
···
+
package routes
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/vote"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
+
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
)
+
+
// RegisterVoteRoutes registers vote-related XRPC endpoints on the router
+
// Implements social.coves.feed.vote.* lexicon endpoints
+
func RegisterVoteRoutes(r chi.Router, voteService votes.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware) {
+
// Initialize handlers
+
createHandler := vote.NewCreateVoteHandler(voteService)
+
deleteHandler := vote.NewDeleteVoteHandler(voteService)
+
+
// Procedure endpoints (POST) - require authentication
+
// social.coves.feed.vote.create - create or update a vote on a post/comment
+
r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post("/xrpc/social.coves.feed.vote.create", createHandler.HandleCreateVote)
+
+
// social.coves.feed.vote.delete - delete a vote from a post/comment
+
r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post("/xrpc/social.coves.feed.vote.delete", deleteHandler.HandleDeleteVote)
+
}
+3
.beads/beads.left.jsonl
···
···
+
{"id":"Coves-95q","content_hash":"8ec99d598f067780436b985f9ad57f0fa19632026981038df4f65f192186620b","title":"Add comprehensive API documentation","description":"","status":"open","priority":2,"issue_type":"task","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:34.835721854-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:34.835721854-08:00","source_repo":".","dependencies":[{"issue_id":"Coves-95q","depends_on_id":"Coves-e16","type":"blocks","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:46.273899399-08:00","created_by":"daemon"}]}
+
{"id":"Coves-e16","content_hash":"7c5d0fc8f0e7f626be3dad62af0e8412467330bad01a244e5a7e52ac5afff1c1","title":"Complete post creation and moderation features","description":"","status":"open","priority":1,"issue_type":"feature","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:12.885991306-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:12.885991306-08:00","source_repo":"."}
+
{"id":"Coves-fce","content_hash":"26b3e16b99f827316ee0d741cc959464bd0c813446c95aef8105c7fd1e6b09ff","title":"Implement aggregator feed federation","description":"","status":"open","priority":1,"issue_type":"feature","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:21.453326012-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:21.453326012-08:00","source_repo":"."}
+1
.beads/beads.left.meta.json
···
···
+
{"version":"0.23.1","timestamp":"2025-12-02T18:25:24.009187871-08:00","commit":"00d7d8d"}
-3
internal/api/handlers/vote/errors.go
···
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrVoteNotFound):
// Matches: social.coves.feed.vote.delete#VoteNotFound
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "VoteNotFound", "No vote found for this subject")
-
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrSubjectNotFound):
-
// Matches: social.coves.feed.vote.create#SubjectNotFound
-
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "SubjectNotFound", "The subject post or comment was not found")
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrInvalidDirection):
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Vote direction must be 'up' or 'down'")
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrInvalidSubject):
···
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrVoteNotFound):
// Matches: social.coves.feed.vote.delete#VoteNotFound
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "VoteNotFound", "No vote found for this subject")
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrInvalidDirection):
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Vote direction must be 'up' or 'down'")
case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrInvalidSubject):
-3
internal/core/votes/errors.go
···
// ErrVoteNotFound indicates the requested vote doesn't exist
ErrVoteNotFound = errors.New("vote not found")
-
// ErrSubjectNotFound indicates the post/comment being voted on doesn't exist
-
ErrSubjectNotFound = errors.New("subject not found")
-
// ErrInvalidDirection indicates the vote direction is not "up" or "down"
ErrInvalidDirection = errors.New("invalid vote direction: must be 'up' or 'down'")
···
// ErrVoteNotFound indicates the requested vote doesn't exist
ErrVoteNotFound = errors.New("vote not found")
// ErrInvalidDirection indicates the vote direction is not "up" or "down"
ErrInvalidDirection = errors.New("invalid vote direction: must be 'up' or 'down'")
+3 -2
internal/db/postgres/vote_repo.go
···
return nil
}
-
// GetByURI retrieves a vote by its AT-URI
// Used by Jetstream consumer for DELETE operations
func (r *postgresVoteRepo) GetByURI(ctx context.Context, uri string) (*votes.Vote, error) {
query := `
SELECT
···
subject_uri, subject_cid, direction,
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at
FROM votes
-
WHERE uri = $1
`
var vote votes.Vote
···
return nil
}
+
// GetByURI retrieves an active vote by its AT-URI
// Used by Jetstream consumer for DELETE operations
+
// Returns ErrVoteNotFound for soft-deleted votes
func (r *postgresVoteRepo) GetByURI(ctx context.Context, uri string) (*votes.Vote, error) {
query := `
SELECT
···
subject_uri, subject_cid, direction,
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at
FROM votes
+
WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
`
var vote votes.Vote
+92
.env.dev.example
···
···
+
# Coves Local Development Environment Configuration
+
# Copy this to .env.dev and fill in your values
+
#
+
# Quick Start:
+
# 1. cp .env.dev.example .env.dev
+
# 2. Generate OAuth key: go run cmd/genjwks/main.go (copy output to OAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK)
+
# 3. Generate cookie secret: openssl rand -hex 32
+
# 4. make dev-up # Start Docker services
+
# 5. make run # Start the server (uses -tags dev)
+
+
# =============================================================================
+
# Dev Mode Quick Reference
+
# =============================================================================
+
# REQUIRED for local OAuth to work with local PDS:
+
# IS_DEV_ENV=true # Master switch for dev mode
+
# PDS_URL=http://localhost:3001 # Local PDS for handle resolution
+
# PLC_DIRECTORY_URL=http://localhost:3002 # Local PLC directory
+
# APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8081 # Use IP not localhost (RFC 8252)
+
#
+
# BUILD TAGS:
+
# make run - Runs with -tags dev (includes localhost OAuth resolvers)
+
# make build - Production binary (no dev code)
+
# make build-dev - Dev binary (includes dev code)
+
+
# =============================================================================
+
# PostgreSQL Configuration
+
# =============================================================================
+
POSTGRES_HOST=localhost
+
POSTGRES_PORT=5435
+
POSTGRES_DB=coves_dev
+
POSTGRES_USER=dev_user
+
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=dev_password
+
+
# Test database
+
POSTGRES_TEST_DB=coves_test
+
POSTGRES_TEST_USER=test_user
+
POSTGRES_TEST_PASSWORD=test_password
+
POSTGRES_TEST_PORT=5434
+
+
# =============================================================================
+
# PDS Configuration
+
# =============================================================================
+
PDS_HOSTNAME=localhost
+
PDS_PORT=3001
+
PDS_SERVICE_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:3000
+
PDS_DID_PLC_URL=http://plc-directory:3000
+
PDS_JWT_SECRET=local-dev-jwt-secret-change-in-production
+
PDS_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin
+
PDS_SERVICE_HANDLE_DOMAINS=.local.coves.dev,.community.coves.social
+
PDS_PLC_ROTATION_KEY=<generate-a-random-hex-key>
+
+
# =============================================================================
+
# AppView Configuration
+
# =============================================================================
+
APPVIEW_PORT=8081
+
FIREHOSE_URL=ws://localhost:3001/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos
+
PDS_URL=http://localhost:3001
+
APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8081
+
+
# =============================================================================
+
# Jetstream Configuration
+
# =============================================================================
+
JETSTREAM_URL=ws://localhost:6008/subscribe
+
+
# =============================================================================
+
# Identity Resolution
+
# =============================================================================
+
IDENTITY_CACHE_TTL=24h
+
PLC_DIRECTORY_URL=http://localhost:3002
+
+
# =============================================================================
+
# OAuth Configuration (MUST GENERATE YOUR OWN)
+
# =============================================================================
+
# Generate with: go run cmd/genjwks/main.go
+
OAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK=<generate-your-own-jwk>
+
+
# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
+
OAUTH_COOKIE_SECRET=<generate-your-own-secret>
+
+
# =============================================================================
+
# Development Settings
+
# =============================================================================
+
ENV=development
+
NODE_ENV=development
+
IS_DEV_ENV=true
+
LOG_LEVEL=debug
+
LOG_ENABLED=true
+
+
# Security settings (ONLY for local dev - set to false in production!)
+
SKIP_DID_WEB_VERIFICATION=true
+
AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true
+
HS256_ISSUERS=http://localhost:3001
+25 -3
Makefile
···
-
.PHONY: help dev-up dev-down dev-logs dev-status dev-reset test e2e-test clean
# Default target - show help
.DEFAULT_GOAL := help
···
##@ Build & Run
-
build: ## Build the Coves server
-
@echo "$(GREEN)Building Coves server...$(RESET)"
@go build -o server ./cmd/server
@echo "$(GREEN)โœ“ Build complete: ./server$(RESET)"
run: ## Run the Coves server with dev environment (requires database running)
@./scripts/dev-run.sh
···
@adb reverse --remove-all || echo "$(YELLOW)No device connected$(RESET)"
@echo "$(GREEN)โœ“ Port forwarding removed$(RESET)"
ngrok-up: ## Start ngrok tunnels (for iOS or WiFi testing - requires paid plan for 3 tunnels)
@echo "$(GREEN)Starting ngrok tunnels for mobile testing...$(RESET)"
@./scripts/start-ngrok.sh
···
+
.PHONY: help dev-up dev-down dev-logs dev-status dev-reset test e2e-test clean verify-stack create-test-account mobile-full-setup
# Default target - show help
.DEFAULT_GOAL := help
···
##@ Build & Run
+
build: ## Build the Coves server (production - no dev code)
+
@echo "$(GREEN)Building Coves server (production)...$(RESET)"
@go build -o server ./cmd/server
@echo "$(GREEN)โœ“ Build complete: ./server$(RESET)"
+
build-dev: ## Build the Coves server with dev mode (includes localhost OAuth resolvers)
+
@echo "$(GREEN)Building Coves server (dev mode)...$(RESET)"
+
@go build -tags dev -o server ./cmd/server
+
@echo "$(GREEN)โœ“ Build complete: ./server (with dev tags)$(RESET)"
+
run: ## Run the Coves server with dev environment (requires database running)
@./scripts/dev-run.sh
···
@adb reverse --remove-all || echo "$(YELLOW)No device connected$(RESET)"
@echo "$(GREEN)โœ“ Port forwarding removed$(RESET)"
+
verify-stack: ## Verify local development stack (PLC, PDS, configs)
+
@./scripts/verify-local-stack.sh
+
+
create-test-account: ## Create a test account on local PDS for OAuth testing
+
@./scripts/create-test-account.sh
+
+
mobile-full-setup: verify-stack create-test-account mobile-setup ## Full mobile setup: verify stack, create account, setup ports
+
@echo ""
+
@echo "$(GREEN)โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•$(RESET)"
+
@echo "$(GREEN) Mobile development environment ready! $(RESET)"
+
@echo "$(GREEN)โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•โ•$(RESET)"
+
@echo ""
+
@echo "$(CYAN)Run the Flutter app with:$(RESET)"
+
@echo " $(YELLOW)cd /home/bretton/Code/coves-mobile$(RESET)"
+
@echo " $(YELLOW)flutter run --dart-define=ENVIRONMENT=local$(RESET)"
+
@echo ""
+
ngrok-up: ## Start ngrok tunnels (for iOS or WiFi testing - requires paid plan for 3 tunnels)
@echo "$(GREEN)Starting ngrok tunnels for mobile testing...$(RESET)"
@./scripts/start-ngrok.sh
+5 -1
docker-compose.dev.yml
···
# Bluesky Personal Data Server (PDS)
# Handles user repositories, DIDs, and CAR files
pds:
image: ghcr.io/bluesky-social/pds:latest
container_name: coves-dev-pds
···
PDS_PORT: 3001 # Match external port for correct DID registration
PDS_DATA_DIRECTORY: /pds
PDS_BLOBSTORE_DISK_LOCATION: /pds/blocks
-
PDS_DID_PLC_URL: ${PDS_DID_PLC_URL:-https://plc.directory}
# PDS_CRAWLERS not needed - we're not using a relay for local dev
# Note: PDS uses its own internal SQLite database and CAR file storage
···
# Bluesky Personal Data Server (PDS)
# Handles user repositories, DIDs, and CAR files
+
# NOTE: When using --profile plc, PDS waits for PLC directory to be healthy
pds:
image: ghcr.io/bluesky-social/pds:latest
container_name: coves-dev-pds
···
PDS_PORT: 3001 # Match external port for correct DID registration
PDS_DATA_DIRECTORY: /pds
PDS_BLOBSTORE_DISK_LOCATION: /pds/blocks
+
# IMPORTANT: For local E2E testing, this MUST point to local PLC directory
+
# Default to local PLC (http://plc-directory:3000) for full local stack
+
# The container hostname 'plc-directory' is used for Docker network communication
+
PDS_DID_PLC_URL: ${PDS_DID_PLC_URL:-http://plc-directory:3000}
# PDS_CRAWLERS not needed - we're not using a relay for local dev
# Note: PDS uses its own internal SQLite database and CAR file storage
+13 -2
internal/atproto/oauth/client.go
···
import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"time"
···
PublicURL string
SealSecret string
PLCURL string
Scopes []string
SessionTTL time.Duration
SealedTokenTTL time.Duration
···
// Create indigo client config
var clientConfig oauth.ClientConfig
if config.DevMode {
-
// Dev mode: localhost with HTTP
-
callbackURL := "http://localhost:3000/oauth/callback"
clientConfig = oauth.NewLocalhostConfig(callbackURL, config.Scopes)
} else {
// Production mode: public OAuth client with HTTPS
// client_id must be the URL of the client metadata document per atproto OAuth spec
···
// Use pointer since CacheDirectory methods have pointer receivers
cacheDir := identity.NewCacheDirectory(baseDir, 100_000, time.Hour*24, time.Minute*2, time.Minute*5)
clientApp.Dir = &cacheDir
}
return &OAuthClient{
···
import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
+
"log/slog"
"net/url"
"time"
···
PublicURL string
SealSecret string
PLCURL string
+
PDSURL string // For dev mode: resolve handles via local PDS
Scopes []string
SessionTTL time.Duration
SealedTokenTTL time.Duration
···
// Create indigo client config
var clientConfig oauth.ClientConfig
if config.DevMode {
+
// Dev mode: loopback with HTTP
+
// IMPORTANT: Use 127.0.0.1 instead of localhost per RFC 8252 - PDS rejects localhost
+
// The callback URL must match the APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL from .env.dev
+
callbackURL := config.PublicURL + "/oauth/callback"
clientConfig = oauth.NewLocalhostConfig(callbackURL, config.Scopes)
+
slog.Info("dev mode: OAuth client configured",
+
"callback_url", callbackURL,
+
"client_id", clientConfig.ClientID)
} else {
// Production mode: public OAuth client with HTTPS
// client_id must be the URL of the client metadata document per atproto OAuth spec
···
// Use pointer since CacheDirectory methods have pointer receivers
cacheDir := identity.NewCacheDirectory(baseDir, 100_000, time.Hour*24, time.Minute*2, time.Minute*5)
clientApp.Dir = &cacheDir
+
// Log the PLC URL being used for OAuth directory resolution
+
fmt.Printf("๐Ÿ” OAuth client directory configured with PLC URL: %s (AllowPrivateIPs: %v)\n", config.PLCURL, config.AllowPrivateIPs)
+
} else {
+
fmt.Println("โš ๏ธ OAuth client using DEFAULT PLC directory (production plc.directory)")
}
return &OAuthClient{
+285
internal/atproto/oauth/dev_auth_resolver.go
···
···
+
//go:build dev
+
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"fmt"
+
"log/slog"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/url"
+
"strings"
+
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/identity"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
+
)
+
+
// DevAuthResolver is a custom OAuth resolver that allows HTTP localhost URLs for development.
+
// The standard indigo OAuth resolver requires HTTPS and no port numbers, which breaks local testing.
+
type DevAuthResolver struct {
+
Client *http.Client
+
UserAgent string
+
PDSURL string // For resolving handles via local PDS
+
handleResolver *DevHandleResolver
+
}
+
+
// ProtectedResourceMetadata matches the OAuth protected resource metadata document format
+
type ProtectedResourceMetadata struct {
+
Resource string `json:"resource"`
+
AuthorizationServers []string `json:"authorization_servers"`
+
}
+
+
// NewDevAuthResolver creates a resolver that accepts localhost HTTP URLs
+
func NewDevAuthResolver(pdsURL string, allowPrivateIPs bool) *DevAuthResolver {
+
resolver := &DevAuthResolver{
+
Client: NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(allowPrivateIPs),
+
UserAgent: "Coves/1.0",
+
PDSURL: pdsURL,
+
}
+
// Create handle resolver for resolving handles via local PDS
+
if pdsURL != "" {
+
resolver.handleResolver = NewDevHandleResolver(pdsURL, allowPrivateIPs)
+
}
+
return resolver
+
}
+
+
// ResolveAuthServerURL resolves a PDS URL to an auth server URL.
+
// Unlike indigo's standard resolver, this allows HTTP and ports for localhost.
+
func (r *DevAuthResolver) ResolveAuthServerURL(ctx context.Context, hostURL string) (string, error) {
+
u, err := url.Parse(hostURL)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", err
+
}
+
+
// For localhost, allow HTTP and port numbers
+
isLocalhost := u.Hostname() == "localhost" || u.Hostname() == "127.0.0.1"
+
if !isLocalhost {
+
// For non-localhost, enforce HTTPS and no port (standard rules)
+
if u.Scheme != "https" || u.Port() != "" {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("not a valid public host URL: %s", hostURL)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// Build the protected resource document URL
+
var docURL string
+
if isLocalhost {
+
// For localhost, preserve the port and use HTTP
+
port := u.Port()
+
if port == "" {
+
port = "3001" // Default PDS port
+
}
+
docURL = fmt.Sprintf("http://%s:%s/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", u.Hostname(), port)
+
} else {
+
docURL = fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", u.Hostname())
+
}
+
+
// Fetch the protected resource document
+
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", docURL, nil)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", err
+
}
+
if r.UserAgent != "" {
+
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", r.UserAgent)
+
}
+
+
resp, err := r.Client.Do(req)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("fetching protected resource document: %w", err)
+
}
+
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("HTTP error fetching protected resource document: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
}
+
+
var body ProtectedResourceMetadata
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid protected resource document: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
if len(body.AuthorizationServers) < 1 {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("no auth server URL in protected resource document")
+
}
+
+
authURL := body.AuthorizationServers[0]
+
+
// Validate the auth server URL (with localhost exception)
+
au, err := url.Parse(authURL)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid auth server URL: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
authIsLocalhost := au.Hostname() == "localhost" || au.Hostname() == "127.0.0.1"
+
if !authIsLocalhost {
+
if au.Scheme != "https" || au.Port() != "" {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid auth server URL: %s", authURL)
+
}
+
}
+
+
return authURL, nil
+
}
+
+
// ResolveAuthServerMetadataDev fetches OAuth server metadata from a given auth server URL.
+
// Unlike indigo's resolver, this allows HTTP and ports for localhost.
+
func (r *DevAuthResolver) ResolveAuthServerMetadataDev(ctx context.Context, serverURL string) (*oauthlib.AuthServerMetadata, error) {
+
u, err := url.Parse(serverURL)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, err
+
}
+
+
// Build metadata URL - preserve port for localhost
+
var metaURL string
+
isLocalhost := u.Hostname() == "localhost" || u.Hostname() == "127.0.0.1"
+
if isLocalhost && u.Port() != "" {
+
metaURL = fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s:%s/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", u.Scheme, u.Hostname(), u.Port())
+
} else if isLocalhost {
+
metaURL = fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", u.Scheme, u.Hostname())
+
} else {
+
metaURL = fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", u.Hostname())
+
}
+
+
slog.Debug("dev mode: fetching auth server metadata", "url", metaURL)
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", metaURL, nil)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, err
+
}
+
if r.UserAgent != "" {
+
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", r.UserAgent)
+
}
+
+
resp, err := r.Client.Do(req)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetching auth server metadata: %w", err)
+
}
+
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP error fetching auth server metadata: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
}
+
+
var metadata oauthlib.AuthServerMetadata
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&metadata); err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid auth server metadata: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Skip validation for localhost (indigo's Validate checks HTTPS)
+
if !isLocalhost {
+
if err := metadata.Validate(serverURL); err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid auth server metadata: %w", err)
+
}
+
}
+
+
return &metadata, nil
+
}
+
+
// StartDevAuthFlow performs OAuth flow for localhost development.
+
// This bypasses indigo's HTTPS validation for the auth server URL.
+
// It resolves the identity, gets the PDS endpoint, fetches auth server metadata,
+
// and returns a redirect URL for the user to approve.
+
func (r *DevAuthResolver) StartDevAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, client *OAuthClient, identifier string, dir identity.Directory) (string, error) {
+
var accountDID syntax.DID
+
var pdsEndpoint string
+
+
// Check if identifier is a handle or DID
+
if strings.HasPrefix(identifier, "did:") {
+
// It's a DID - look up via directory (PLC)
+
atid, err := syntax.ParseAtIdentifier(identifier)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("not a valid DID (%s): %w", identifier, err)
+
}
+
ident, err := dir.Lookup(ctx, *atid)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve DID (%s): %w", identifier, err)
+
}
+
accountDID = ident.DID
+
pdsEndpoint = ident.PDSEndpoint()
+
} else {
+
// It's a handle - resolve via local PDS first
+
if r.handleResolver == nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("handle resolution not configured (PDS URL not set)")
+
}
+
+
// Resolve handle to DID via local PDS
+
did, err := r.handleResolver.ResolveHandle(ctx, identifier)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve handle via PDS (%s): %w", identifier, err)
+
}
+
if did == "" {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("handle not found: %s", identifier)
+
}
+
+
slog.Info("dev mode: resolved handle via local PDS", "handle", identifier, "did", did)
+
+
// Parse the DID
+
parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(did)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid DID from PDS (%s): %w", did, err)
+
}
+
accountDID = parsedDID
+
+
// Now look up the DID document via PLC to get PDS endpoint
+
atid, err := syntax.ParseAtIdentifier(did)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("not a valid DID (%s): %w", did, err)
+
}
+
ident, err := dir.Lookup(ctx, *atid)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve DID document (%s): %w", did, err)
+
}
+
pdsEndpoint = ident.PDSEndpoint()
+
}
+
+
if pdsEndpoint == "" {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("identity does not link to an atproto host (PDS)")
+
}
+
+
slog.Debug("dev mode: resolving auth server",
+
"did", accountDID,
+
"pds", pdsEndpoint)
+
+
// Resolve auth server URL (allowing HTTP for localhost)
+
authServerURL, err := r.ResolveAuthServerURL(ctx, pdsEndpoint)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("resolving auth server: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
slog.Info("dev mode: resolved auth server", "url", authServerURL)
+
+
// Fetch auth server metadata using our dev-friendly resolver
+
authMeta, err := r.ResolveAuthServerMetadataDev(ctx, authServerURL)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("fetching auth server metadata: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
slog.Debug("dev mode: got auth server metadata",
+
"issuer", authMeta.Issuer,
+
"authorization_endpoint", authMeta.AuthorizationEndpoint,
+
"token_endpoint", authMeta.TokenEndpoint)
+
+
// Send auth request (PAR) using indigo's method
+
info, err := client.ClientApp.SendAuthRequest(ctx, authMeta, client.Config.Scopes, identifier)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("auth request failed: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Set the account DID
+
info.AccountDID = &accountDID
+
+
// Persist auth request info
+
client.ClientApp.Store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, *info)
+
+
// Build redirect URL
+
params := url.Values{}
+
params.Set("client_id", client.ClientApp.Config.ClientID)
+
params.Set("request_uri", info.RequestURI)
+
+
authEndpoint := authMeta.AuthorizationEndpoint
+
redirectURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s?%s", authEndpoint, params.Encode())
+
+
slog.Info("dev mode: OAuth redirect URL built", "url_prefix", authEndpoint)
+
+
return redirectURL, nil
+
}
+106
internal/atproto/oauth/dev_resolver.go
···
···
+
//go:build dev
+
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"fmt"
+
"log/slog"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/url"
+
"strings"
+
"time"
+
)
+
+
// DevHandleResolver resolves handles via local PDS for development
+
// This is needed because local handles (e.g., user.local.coves.dev) can't be
+
// resolved via standard DNS/HTTP well-known methods - they only exist on the local PDS.
+
type DevHandleResolver struct {
+
pdsURL string
+
httpClient *http.Client
+
}
+
+
// NewDevHandleResolver creates a resolver that queries local PDS for handle resolution
+
func NewDevHandleResolver(pdsURL string, allowPrivateIPs bool) *DevHandleResolver {
+
return &DevHandleResolver{
+
pdsURL: strings.TrimSuffix(pdsURL, "/"),
+
httpClient: NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(allowPrivateIPs),
+
}
+
}
+
+
// ResolveHandle queries the local PDS to resolve a handle to a DID
+
// Returns the DID if successful, or empty string if not found
+
func (r *DevHandleResolver) ResolveHandle(ctx context.Context, handle string) (string, error) {
+
if r.pdsURL == "" {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("PDS URL not configured")
+
}
+
+
// Build the resolve handle URL
+
resolveURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/xrpc/com.atproto.identity.resolveHandle?handle=%s",
+
r.pdsURL, url.QueryEscape(handle))
+
+
// Create request with context and timeout
+
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
+
defer cancel()
+
+
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", resolveURL, nil)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
+
}
+
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "Coves/1.0")
+
+
// Execute request
+
resp, err := r.httpClient.Do(req)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to query PDS: %w", err)
+
}
+
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+
// Check response status
+
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusBadRequest {
+
return "", nil // Handle not found
+
}
+
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("PDS returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
}
+
+
// Parse response
+
var result struct {
+
DID string `json:"did"`
+
}
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse PDS response: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
if result.DID == "" {
+
return "", nil // No DID in response
+
}
+
+
slog.Debug("resolved handle via local PDS",
+
"handle", handle,
+
"did", result.DID,
+
"pds_url", r.pdsURL)
+
+
return result.DID, nil
+
}
+
+
// ResolveIdentifier attempts to resolve a handle to DID, or returns the DID if already provided
+
// This is the main entry point for the handlers
+
func (r *DevHandleResolver) ResolveIdentifier(ctx context.Context, identifier string) (string, error) {
+
// If it's already a DID, return as-is
+
if strings.HasPrefix(identifier, "did:") {
+
return identifier, nil
+
}
+
+
// Try to resolve the handle via local PDS
+
did, err := r.ResolveHandle(ctx, identifier)
+
if err != nil {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve handle via PDS: %w", err)
+
}
+
if did == "" {
+
return "", fmt.Errorf("handle not found on local PDS: %s", identifier)
+
}
+
+
return did, nil
+
}
+41
internal/atproto/oauth/dev_stubs.go
···
···
+
//go:build !dev
+
+
package oauth
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/identity"
+
)
+
+
// DevHandleResolver is a stub for production builds.
+
// The actual implementation is in dev_resolver.go (only compiled with -tags dev).
+
type DevHandleResolver struct{}
+
+
// NewDevHandleResolver returns nil in production builds.
+
// Dev mode features are only available when built with -tags dev.
+
func NewDevHandleResolver(pdsURL string, allowPrivateIPs bool) *DevHandleResolver {
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// ResolveHandle is a stub that should never be called in production.
+
// The nil check in handlers.go prevents this from being reached.
+
func (r *DevHandleResolver) ResolveHandle(ctx context.Context, handle string) (string, error) {
+
panic("dev mode: ResolveHandle called in production build - this should never happen")
+
}
+
+
// DevAuthResolver is a stub for production builds.
+
// The actual implementation is in dev_auth_resolver.go (only compiled with -tags dev).
+
type DevAuthResolver struct{}
+
+
// NewDevAuthResolver returns nil in production builds.
+
// Dev mode features are only available when built with -tags dev.
+
func NewDevAuthResolver(pdsURL string, allowPrivateIPs bool) *DevAuthResolver {
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// StartDevAuthFlow is a stub that should never be called in production.
+
// The nil check in handlers.go prevents this from being reached.
+
func (r *DevAuthResolver) StartDevAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, client *OAuthClient, identifier string, dir identity.Directory) (string, error) {
+
panic("dev mode: StartDevAuthFlow called in production build - this should never happen")
+
}
+5 -1
scripts/dev-run.sh
···
#!/bin/bash
# Development server runner - loads .env.dev before starting
set -a # automatically export all variables
source .env.dev
···
echo " IS_DEV_ENV: $IS_DEV_ENV"
echo " PLC_DIRECTORY_URL: $PLC_DIRECTORY_URL"
echo " JETSTREAM_URL: $JETSTREAM_URL"
echo ""
-
go run ./cmd/server
···
#!/bin/bash
# Development server runner - loads .env.dev before starting
+
# Uses -tags dev to include dev-only code (localhost OAuth resolvers, etc.)
set -a # automatically export all variables
source .env.dev
···
echo " IS_DEV_ENV: $IS_DEV_ENV"
echo " PLC_DIRECTORY_URL: $PLC_DIRECTORY_URL"
echo " JETSTREAM_URL: $JETSTREAM_URL"
+
echo " APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL: $APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL"
+
echo " PDS_URL: $PDS_URL"
+
echo " Build tags: dev"
echo ""
+
go run -tags dev ./cmd/server
+125
internal/atproto/pds/factory.go
···
···
+
package pds
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"fmt"
+
"net/http"
+
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/atclient"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
+
)
+
+
// NewFromOAuthSession creates a PDS client from an OAuth session.
+
// This uses DPoP authentication - the correct method for OAuth tokens.
+
//
+
// The oauthClient is used to resume the session and get a properly configured
+
// APIClient that handles DPoP proof generation and nonce rotation automatically.
+
func NewFromOAuthSession(ctx context.Context, oauthClient *oauth.ClientApp, sessionData *oauth.ClientSessionData) (Client, error) {
+
if oauthClient == nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oauthClient is required")
+
}
+
if sessionData == nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sessionData is required")
+
}
+
+
// ResumeSession reconstructs the OAuth session with DPoP key
+
// and returns a ClientSession that can generate authenticated requests
+
sess, err := oauthClient.ResumeSession(ctx, sessionData.AccountDID, sessionData.SessionID)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resume OAuth session: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// APIClient() returns an *atclient.APIClient configured with DPoP auth
+
apiClient := sess.APIClient()
+
+
return &client{
+
apiClient: apiClient,
+
did: sessionData.AccountDID.String(),
+
host: sessionData.HostURL,
+
}, nil
+
}
+
+
// NewFromPasswordAuth creates a PDS client using password authentication.
+
// This uses Bearer token authentication from com.atproto.server.createSession.
+
//
+
// Primarily used for:
+
// - E2E tests with local PDS
+
// - Development/debugging tools
+
// - Non-OAuth clients
+
//
+
// Note: This establishes a new session with the PDS. For repeated calls,
+
// consider using NewFromAccessToken if you already have a valid access token.
+
func NewFromPasswordAuth(ctx context.Context, host, handle, password string) (Client, error) {
+
if host == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("host is required")
+
}
+
if handle == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("handle is required")
+
}
+
if password == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("password is required")
+
}
+
+
// LoginWithPasswordHost creates a session and returns an authenticated APIClient
+
// This handles the createSession call and Bearer token setup
+
apiClient, err := atclient.LoginWithPasswordHost(ctx, host, handle, password, "", nil)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to login with password: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Get DID from the authenticated client
+
did := ""
+
if apiClient.AccountDID != nil {
+
did = apiClient.AccountDID.String()
+
}
+
+
return &client{
+
apiClient: apiClient,
+
did: did,
+
host: host,
+
}, nil
+
}
+
+
// NewFromAccessToken creates a PDS client from an existing access token.
+
// This is useful when you already have a valid Bearer token (e.g., from createSession)
+
// and don't want to re-authenticate.
+
//
+
// WARNING: This creates a client with Bearer auth only. Do NOT use this with
+
// OAuth access tokens - those require DPoP proofs. Use NewFromOAuthSession instead.
+
func NewFromAccessToken(host, did, accessToken string) (Client, error) {
+
if host == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("host is required")
+
}
+
if did == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("did is required")
+
}
+
if accessToken == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("accessToken is required")
+
}
+
+
// Create APIClient with Bearer auth
+
apiClient := atclient.NewAPIClient(host)
+
apiClient.Auth = &bearerAuth{token: accessToken}
+
+
return &client{
+
apiClient: apiClient,
+
did: did,
+
host: host,
+
}, nil
+
}
+
+
// bearerAuth implements atclient.AuthMethod for simple Bearer token auth.
+
// This is used for password-based sessions where DPoP is not required.
+
type bearerAuth struct {
+
token string
+
}
+
+
// Ensure bearerAuth implements atclient.AuthMethod.
+
var _ atclient.AuthMethod = (*bearerAuth)(nil)
+
+
// DoWithAuth adds the Bearer token to the request and executes it.
+
func (b *bearerAuth) DoWithAuth(c *http.Client, req *http.Request, _ syntax.NSID) (*http.Response, error) {
+
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+b.token)
+
return c.Do(req)
+
}
+18
tests/integration/helpers.go
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
"Coves/internal/core/users"
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
···
e.store.AddSessionWithPDS(did, sessionID, pdsAccessToken, pdsURL)
return token
}
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/pds"
"Coves/internal/core/users"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
···
e.store.AddSessionWithPDS(did, sessionID, pdsAccessToken, pdsURL)
return token
}
+
+
// PasswordAuthPDSClientFactory creates a PDSClientFactory that uses password-based Bearer auth.
+
// This is for E2E tests that use createSession instead of OAuth.
+
// The factory extracts the access token and host URL from the session data.
+
func PasswordAuthPDSClientFactory() votes.PDSClientFactory {
+
return func(ctx context.Context, session *oauthlib.ClientSessionData) (pds.Client, error) {
+
if session.AccessToken == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("session has no access token")
+
}
+
if session.HostURL == "" {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("session has no host URL")
+
}
+
+
return pds.NewFromAccessToken(session.HostURL, session.AccountDID.String(), session.AccessToken)
+
}
+
}
+267
cmd/reindex-votes/main.go
···
···
+
// cmd/reindex-votes/main.go
+
// Quick tool to reindex votes from PDS to AppView database
+
package main
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"database/sql"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"fmt"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
"net/url"
+
"os"
+
"strings"
+
"time"
+
+
_ "github.com/lib/pq"
+
)
+
+
type ListRecordsResponse struct {
+
Records []Record `json:"records"`
+
Cursor string `json:"cursor"`
+
}
+
+
type Record struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
Value map[string]interface{} `json:"value"`
+
}
+
+
func main() {
+
// Get config from env
+
dbURL := os.Getenv("DATABASE_URL")
+
if dbURL == "" {
+
dbURL = "postgres://dev_user:dev_password@localhost:5435/coves_dev?sslmode=disable"
+
}
+
pdsURL := os.Getenv("PDS_URL")
+
if pdsURL == "" {
+
pdsURL = "http://localhost:3001"
+
}
+
+
log.Printf("Connecting to database...")
+
db, err := sql.Open("postgres", dbURL)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to connect to database: %v", err)
+
}
+
defer db.Close()
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
+
// Get all accounts directly from the PDS
+
log.Printf("Fetching accounts from PDS (%s)...", pdsURL)
+
dids, err := fetchAllAccountsFromPDS(pdsURL)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to fetch accounts from PDS: %v", err)
+
}
+
log.Printf("Found %d accounts on PDS to check for votes", len(dids))
+
+
// Reset vote counts first
+
log.Printf("Resetting all vote counts...")
+
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, "DELETE FROM votes"); err != nil {
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to clear votes table: %v", err)
+
}
+
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, "UPDATE posts SET upvote_count = 0, downvote_count = 0, score = 0"); err != nil {
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to reset post vote counts: %v", err)
+
}
+
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, "UPDATE comments SET upvote_count = 0, downvote_count = 0, score = 0"); err != nil {
+
log.Fatalf("Failed to reset comment vote counts: %v", err)
+
}
+
+
// For each user, fetch their votes from PDS
+
totalVotes := 0
+
for _, did := range dids {
+
votes, err := fetchVotesFromPDS(pdsURL, did)
+
if err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Warning: failed to fetch votes for %s: %v", did, err)
+
continue
+
}
+
+
if len(votes) == 0 {
+
continue
+
}
+
+
log.Printf("Found %d votes for %s", len(votes), did)
+
+
// Index each vote
+
for _, vote := range votes {
+
if err := indexVote(ctx, db, did, vote); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Warning: failed to index vote %s: %v", vote.URI, err)
+
continue
+
}
+
totalVotes++
+
}
+
}
+
+
log.Printf("โœ“ Reindexed %d votes from PDS", totalVotes)
+
}
+
+
// fetchAllAccountsFromPDS queries the PDS sync API to get all repo DIDs
+
func fetchAllAccountsFromPDS(pdsURL string) ([]string, error) {
+
// Use com.atproto.sync.listRepos to get all repos on this PDS
+
var allDIDs []string
+
cursor := ""
+
+
for {
+
reqURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.listRepos?limit=100", pdsURL)
+
if cursor != "" {
+
reqURL += "&cursor=" + url.QueryEscape(cursor)
+
}
+
+
resp, err := http.Get(reqURL)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed: %w", err)
+
}
+
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status code: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
}
+
+
var result struct {
+
Repos []struct {
+
DID string `json:"did"`
+
} `json:"repos"`
+
Cursor string `json:"cursor"`
+
}
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode response: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
for _, repo := range result.Repos {
+
allDIDs = append(allDIDs, repo.DID)
+
}
+
+
if result.Cursor == "" {
+
break
+
}
+
cursor = result.Cursor
+
}
+
+
return allDIDs, nil
+
}
+
+
func fetchVotesFromPDS(pdsURL, did string) ([]Record, error) {
+
var allRecords []Record
+
cursor := ""
+
collection := "social.coves.feed.vote"
+
+
for {
+
reqURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.listRecords?repo=%s&collection=%s&limit=100",
+
pdsURL, url.QueryEscape(did), url.QueryEscape(collection))
+
if cursor != "" {
+
reqURL += "&cursor=" + url.QueryEscape(cursor)
+
}
+
+
resp, err := http.Get(reqURL)
+
if err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request failed: %w", err)
+
}
+
defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+
if resp.StatusCode == 400 {
+
// User doesn't exist on this PDS or has no records - that's OK
+
return nil, nil
+
}
+
if resp.StatusCode != 200 {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status code: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+
}
+
+
var result ListRecordsResponse
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode response: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
allRecords = append(allRecords, result.Records...)
+
+
if result.Cursor == "" {
+
break
+
}
+
cursor = result.Cursor
+
}
+
+
return allRecords, nil
+
}
+
+
func indexVote(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, voterDID string, record Record) error {
+
// Extract vote data from record
+
subject, ok := record.Value["subject"].(map[string]interface{})
+
if !ok {
+
return fmt.Errorf("missing subject")
+
}
+
subjectURI, _ := subject["uri"].(string)
+
subjectCID, _ := subject["cid"].(string)
+
direction, _ := record.Value["direction"].(string)
+
createdAtStr, _ := record.Value["createdAt"].(string)
+
+
if subjectURI == "" || direction == "" {
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid vote record: missing required fields")
+
}
+
+
// Parse created_at
+
createdAt, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, createdAtStr)
+
if err != nil {
+
createdAt = time.Now()
+
}
+
+
// Extract rkey from URI (at://did/collection/rkey)
+
parts := strings.Split(record.URI, "/")
+
if len(parts) < 5 {
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URI format: %s", record.URI)
+
}
+
rkey := parts[len(parts)-1]
+
+
// Start transaction
+
tx, err := db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to begin transaction: %w", err)
+
}
+
defer tx.Rollback()
+
+
// Insert vote
+
_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, `
+
INSERT INTO votes (uri, cid, rkey, voter_did, subject_uri, subject_cid, direction, created_at, indexed_at)
+
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, NOW())
+
ON CONFLICT (uri) DO NOTHING
+
`, record.URI, record.CID, rkey, voterDID, subjectURI, subjectCID, direction, createdAt)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to insert vote: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Update post/comment counts
+
collection := extractCollectionFromURI(subjectURI)
+
var updateQuery string
+
+
switch collection {
+
case "social.coves.community.post":
+
if direction == "up" {
+
updateQuery = `UPDATE posts SET upvote_count = upvote_count + 1, score = upvote_count + 1 - downvote_count WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
+
} else {
+
updateQuery = `UPDATE posts SET downvote_count = downvote_count + 1, score = upvote_count - (downvote_count + 1) WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
+
}
+
case "social.coves.community.comment":
+
if direction == "up" {
+
updateQuery = `UPDATE comments SET upvote_count = upvote_count + 1, score = upvote_count + 1 - downvote_count WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
+
} else {
+
updateQuery = `UPDATE comments SET downvote_count = downvote_count + 1, score = upvote_count - (downvote_count + 1) WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
+
}
+
default:
+
// Unknown collection, just index the vote
+
return tx.Commit()
+
}
+
+
if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, updateQuery, subjectURI); err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update vote counts: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
return tx.Commit()
+
}
+
+
func extractCollectionFromURI(uri string) string {
+
// at://did:plc:xxx/social.coves.community.post/rkey
+
parts := strings.Split(uri, "/")
+
if len(parts) >= 4 {
+
return parts[3]
+
}
+
return ""
+
}
+7 -5
internal/api/routes/communityFeed.go
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/communityFeed"
"Coves/internal/core/communityFeeds"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
···
func RegisterCommunityFeedRoutes(
r chi.Router,
feedService communityFeeds.Service,
) {
// Create handlers
-
getCommunityHandler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// GET /xrpc/social.coves.communityFeed.getCommunity
-
// Public endpoint - basic community sorting only for Alpha
-
// TODO(feed-generator): Add OptionalAuth middleware when implementing viewer-specific state
-
// (blocks, upvotes, saves, etc.) in feed generator skeleton
-
r.Get("/xrpc/social.coves.communityFeed.getCommunity", getCommunityHandler.HandleGetCommunity)
}
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/communityFeed"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
"Coves/internal/core/communityFeeds"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
···
func RegisterCommunityFeedRoutes(
r chi.Router,
feedService communityFeeds.Service,
+
voteService votes.Service,
+
authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware,
) {
// Create handlers
+
getCommunityHandler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, voteService)
// GET /xrpc/social.coves.communityFeed.getCommunity
+
// Public endpoint with optional auth for viewer-specific state (vote state)
+
r.With(authMiddleware.OptionalAuth).Get("/xrpc/social.coves.communityFeed.getCommunity", getCommunityHandler.HandleGetCommunity)
}
+221
internal/core/votes/cache.go
···
···
+
package votes
+
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"fmt"
+
"log/slog"
+
"strings"
+
"sync"
+
"time"
+
+
"Coves/internal/atproto/pds"
+
)
+
+
// CachedVote represents a vote stored in the cache
+
type CachedVote struct {
+
Direction string // "up" or "down"
+
URI string // vote record URI (at://did/collection/rkey)
+
RKey string // record key
+
}
+
+
// VoteCache provides an in-memory cache of user votes fetched from their PDS.
+
// This avoids eventual consistency issues with the AppView database.
+
type VoteCache struct {
+
mu sync.RWMutex
+
votes map[string]map[string]*CachedVote // userDID -> subjectURI -> vote
+
expiry map[string]time.Time // userDID -> expiry time
+
ttl time.Duration
+
logger *slog.Logger
+
}
+
+
// NewVoteCache creates a new vote cache with the specified TTL
+
func NewVoteCache(ttl time.Duration, logger *slog.Logger) *VoteCache {
+
if logger == nil {
+
logger = slog.Default()
+
}
+
return &VoteCache{
+
votes: make(map[string]map[string]*CachedVote),
+
expiry: make(map[string]time.Time),
+
ttl: ttl,
+
logger: logger,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// GetVotesForUser returns all cached votes for a user.
+
// Returns nil if cache is empty or expired for this user.
+
func (c *VoteCache) GetVotesForUser(userDID string) map[string]*CachedVote {
+
c.mu.RLock()
+
defer c.mu.RUnlock()
+
+
// Check if cache exists and is not expired
+
expiry, exists := c.expiry[userDID]
+
if !exists || time.Now().After(expiry) {
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
return c.votes[userDID]
+
}
+
+
// GetVote returns the cached vote for a specific subject, or nil if not found/expired
+
func (c *VoteCache) GetVote(userDID, subjectURI string) *CachedVote {
+
votes := c.GetVotesForUser(userDID)
+
if votes == nil {
+
return nil
+
}
+
return votes[subjectURI]
+
}
+
+
// IsCached returns true if the user's votes are cached and not expired
+
func (c *VoteCache) IsCached(userDID string) bool {
+
c.mu.RLock()
+
defer c.mu.RUnlock()
+
+
expiry, exists := c.expiry[userDID]
+
return exists && time.Now().Before(expiry)
+
}
+
+
// SetVotesForUser replaces all cached votes for a user
+
func (c *VoteCache) SetVotesForUser(userDID string, votes map[string]*CachedVote) {
+
c.mu.Lock()
+
defer c.mu.Unlock()
+
+
c.votes[userDID] = votes
+
c.expiry[userDID] = time.Now().Add(c.ttl)
+
+
c.logger.Debug("vote cache updated",
+
"user", userDID,
+
"vote_count", len(votes),
+
"expires_at", c.expiry[userDID])
+
}
+
+
// SetVote adds or updates a single vote in the cache
+
func (c *VoteCache) SetVote(userDID, subjectURI string, vote *CachedVote) {
+
c.mu.Lock()
+
defer c.mu.Unlock()
+
+
if c.votes[userDID] == nil {
+
c.votes[userDID] = make(map[string]*CachedVote)
+
}
+
+
c.votes[userDID][subjectURI] = vote
+
+
// Always extend expiry on vote action - active users keep their cache fresh
+
c.expiry[userDID] = time.Now().Add(c.ttl)
+
+
c.logger.Debug("vote cached",
+
"user", userDID,
+
"subject", subjectURI,
+
"direction", vote.Direction)
+
}
+
+
// RemoveVote removes a vote from the cache (for toggle-off)
+
func (c *VoteCache) RemoveVote(userDID, subjectURI string) {
+
c.mu.Lock()
+
defer c.mu.Unlock()
+
+
if c.votes[userDID] != nil {
+
delete(c.votes[userDID], subjectURI)
+
+
// Extend expiry on vote action - active users keep their cache fresh
+
c.expiry[userDID] = time.Now().Add(c.ttl)
+
+
c.logger.Debug("vote removed from cache",
+
"user", userDID,
+
"subject", subjectURI)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// Invalidate removes all cached votes for a user
+
func (c *VoteCache) Invalidate(userDID string) {
+
c.mu.Lock()
+
defer c.mu.Unlock()
+
+
delete(c.votes, userDID)
+
delete(c.expiry, userDID)
+
+
c.logger.Debug("vote cache invalidated", "user", userDID)
+
}
+
+
// FetchAndCacheFromPDS fetches all votes from the user's PDS and caches them.
+
// This should be called on first authenticated request or when cache is expired.
+
func (c *VoteCache) FetchAndCacheFromPDS(ctx context.Context, pdsClient pds.Client) error {
+
userDID := pdsClient.DID()
+
+
c.logger.Debug("fetching votes from PDS",
+
"user", userDID,
+
"pds", pdsClient.HostURL())
+
+
votes, err := c.fetchAllVotesFromPDS(ctx, pdsClient)
+
if err != nil {
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch votes from PDS: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
c.SetVotesForUser(userDID, votes)
+
+
c.logger.Info("vote cache populated from PDS",
+
"user", userDID,
+
"vote_count", len(votes))
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// fetchAllVotesFromPDS paginates through all vote records on the user's PDS
+
func (c *VoteCache) fetchAllVotesFromPDS(ctx context.Context, pdsClient pds.Client) (map[string]*CachedVote, error) {
+
votes := make(map[string]*CachedVote)
+
cursor := ""
+
const pageSize = 100
+
const collection = "social.coves.feed.vote"
+
+
for {
+
result, err := pdsClient.ListRecords(ctx, collection, pageSize, cursor)
+
if err != nil {
+
if pds.IsAuthError(err) {
+
return nil, ErrNotAuthorized
+
}
+
return nil, fmt.Errorf("listRecords failed: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
for _, rec := range result.Records {
+
// Extract subject from record value
+
subject, ok := rec.Value["subject"].(map[string]any)
+
if !ok {
+
continue
+
}
+
+
subjectURI, ok := subject["uri"].(string)
+
if !ok || subjectURI == "" {
+
continue
+
}
+
+
direction, _ := rec.Value["direction"].(string)
+
if direction == "" {
+
continue
+
}
+
+
// Extract rkey from URI
+
rkey := extractRKeyFromURI(rec.URI)
+
+
votes[subjectURI] = &CachedVote{
+
Direction: direction,
+
URI: rec.URI,
+
RKey: rkey,
+
}
+
}
+
+
if result.Cursor == "" {
+
break
+
}
+
cursor = result.Cursor
+
}
+
+
return votes, nil
+
}
+
+
// extractRKeyFromURI extracts the rkey from an AT-URI (at://did/collection/rkey)
+
func extractRKeyFromURI(uri string) string {
+
parts := strings.Split(uri, "/")
+
if len(parts) >= 5 {
+
return parts[len(parts)-1]
+
}
+
return ""
+
}
+14
internal/core/votes/service.go
···
// - Deletes the user's vote record from their PDS
// - AppView will soft-delete via Jetstream consumer
DeleteVote(ctx context.Context, session *oauthlib.ClientSessionData, req DeleteVoteRequest) error
}
// CreateVoteRequest contains the parameters for creating a vote
···
// - Deletes the user's vote record from their PDS
// - AppView will soft-delete via Jetstream consumer
DeleteVote(ctx context.Context, session *oauthlib.ClientSessionData, req DeleteVoteRequest) error
+
+
// EnsureCachePopulated fetches the user's votes from their PDS if not already cached.
+
// This should be called before rendering feeds to ensure vote state is available.
+
// If cache is already populated and not expired, this is a no-op.
+
EnsureCachePopulated(ctx context.Context, session *oauthlib.ClientSessionData) error
+
+
// GetViewerVote returns the viewer's vote for a specific subject, or nil if not voted.
+
// Returns from cache if available, otherwise returns nil (caller should ensure cache is populated).
+
GetViewerVote(userDID, subjectURI string) *CachedVote
+
+
// GetViewerVotesForSubjects returns the viewer's votes for multiple subjects.
+
// Returns a map of subjectURI -> CachedVote for subjects the user has voted on.
+
// This is efficient for batch lookups when rendering feeds.
+
GetViewerVotesForSubjects(userDID string, subjectURIs []string) map[string]*CachedVote
}
// CreateVoteRequest contains the parameters for creating a vote
+84 -2
internal/core/votes/service_impl.go
···
oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore
logger *slog.Logger
pdsClientFactory PDSClientFactory // Optional, for testing. If nil, uses OAuth.
}
// NewService creates a new vote service instance
-
func NewService(repo Repository, oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient, oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore, logger *slog.Logger) Service {
if logger == nil {
logger = slog.Default()
}
···
repo: repo,
oauthClient: oauthClient,
oauthStore: oauthStore,
logger: logger,
}
}
// NewServiceWithPDSFactory creates a vote service with a custom PDS client factory.
// This is primarily for testing with password-based authentication.
-
func NewServiceWithPDSFactory(repo Repository, logger *slog.Logger, factory PDSClientFactory) Service {
if logger == nil {
logger = slog.Default()
}
return &voteService{
repo: repo,
logger: logger,
pdsClientFactory: factory,
}
···
"subject", req.Subject.URI,
"direction", req.Direction)
// Return empty response to indicate deletion
return &CreateVoteResponse{
URI: "",
···
"uri", uri,
"cid", cid)
return &CreateVoteResponse{
URI: uri,
CID: cid,
···
"subject", req.Subject.URI,
"uri", existing.URI)
return nil
}
···
// No vote found for this subject after checking all pages
return nil, nil
}
···
oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore
logger *slog.Logger
pdsClientFactory PDSClientFactory // Optional, for testing. If nil, uses OAuth.
+
cache *VoteCache // In-memory cache of user votes from PDS
}
// NewService creates a new vote service instance
+
func NewService(repo Repository, oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient, oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore, cache *VoteCache, logger *slog.Logger) Service {
if logger == nil {
logger = slog.Default()
}
···
repo: repo,
oauthClient: oauthClient,
oauthStore: oauthStore,
+
cache: cache,
logger: logger,
}
}
// NewServiceWithPDSFactory creates a vote service with a custom PDS client factory.
// This is primarily for testing with password-based authentication.
+
func NewServiceWithPDSFactory(repo Repository, cache *VoteCache, logger *slog.Logger, factory PDSClientFactory) Service {
if logger == nil {
logger = slog.Default()
}
return &voteService{
repo: repo,
+
cache: cache,
logger: logger,
pdsClientFactory: factory,
}
···
"subject", req.Subject.URI,
"direction", req.Direction)
+
// Update cache - remove the vote
+
if s.cache != nil {
+
s.cache.RemoveVote(session.AccountDID.String(), req.Subject.URI)
+
}
+
// Return empty response to indicate deletion
return &CreateVoteResponse{
URI: "",
···
"uri", uri,
"cid", cid)
+
// Update cache - add the new vote
+
if s.cache != nil {
+
s.cache.SetVote(session.AccountDID.String(), req.Subject.URI, &CachedVote{
+
Direction: req.Direction,
+
URI: uri,
+
RKey: extractRKeyFromURI(uri),
+
})
+
}
+
return &CreateVoteResponse{
URI: uri,
CID: cid,
···
"subject", req.Subject.URI,
"uri", existing.URI)
+
// Update cache - remove the vote
+
if s.cache != nil {
+
s.cache.RemoveVote(session.AccountDID.String(), req.Subject.URI)
+
}
+
return nil
}
···
// No vote found for this subject after checking all pages
return nil, nil
}
+
+
// EnsureCachePopulated fetches the user's votes from their PDS if not already cached.
+
func (s *voteService) EnsureCachePopulated(ctx context.Context, session *oauth.ClientSessionData) error {
+
if s.cache == nil {
+
return nil // No cache configured
+
}
+
+
// Check if already cached
+
if s.cache.IsCached(session.AccountDID.String()) {
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// Create PDS client for this session
+
pdsClient, err := s.getPDSClient(ctx, session)
+
if err != nil {
+
s.logger.Error("failed to create PDS client for cache population",
+
"error", err,
+
"user", session.AccountDID)
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create PDS client: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Fetch and cache votes from PDS
+
if err := s.cache.FetchAndCacheFromPDS(ctx, pdsClient); err != nil {
+
s.logger.Error("failed to populate vote cache from PDS",
+
"error", err,
+
"user", session.AccountDID)
+
return fmt.Errorf("failed to populate vote cache: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
// GetViewerVote returns the viewer's vote for a specific subject, or nil if not voted.
+
func (s *voteService) GetViewerVote(userDID, subjectURI string) *CachedVote {
+
if s.cache == nil {
+
return nil
+
}
+
return s.cache.GetVote(userDID, subjectURI)
+
}
+
+
// GetViewerVotesForSubjects returns the viewer's votes for multiple subjects.
+
func (s *voteService) GetViewerVotesForSubjects(userDID string, subjectURIs []string) map[string]*CachedVote {
+
result := make(map[string]*CachedVote)
+
if s.cache == nil {
+
return result
+
}
+
+
allVotes := s.cache.GetVotesForUser(userDID)
+
if allVotes == nil {
+
return result
+
}
+
+
for _, uri := range subjectURIs {
+
if vote, exists := allVotes[uri]; exists {
+
result[uri] = vote
+
}
+
}
+
+
return result
+
}
+76 -16
internal/atproto/jetstream/vote_consumer.go
···
}
// Atomically: Index vote + Update post counts
-
if err := c.indexVoteAndUpdateCounts(ctx, vote); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to index vote and update counts: %w", err)
}
-
log.Printf("โœ“ Indexed vote: %s (%s on %s)", uri, vote.Direction, vote.SubjectURI)
return nil
}
···
}
// indexVoteAndUpdateCounts atomically indexes a vote and updates post vote counts
-
func (c *VoteEventConsumer) indexVoteAndUpdateCounts(ctx context.Context, vote *votes.Vote) error {
tx, err := c.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to begin transaction: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if rollbackErr := tx.Rollback(); rollbackErr != nil && rollbackErr != sql.ErrTxDone {
···
}
}()
-
// 1. Index the vote (idempotent with ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING)
query := `
INSERT INTO votes (
uri, cid, rkey, voter_did,
···
// If no rows returned, vote already exists (idempotent - OK for Jetstream replays)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
-
log.Printf("Vote already indexed: %s (idempotent)", vote.URI)
if commitErr := tx.Commit(); commitErr != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", commitErr)
}
-
return nil
}
if err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to insert vote: %w", err)
}
-
// 2. Update vote counts on the subject (post or comment)
// Parse collection from subject URI to determine target table
collection := utils.ExtractCollectionFromURI(vote.SubjectURI)
···
// Vote is still indexed in votes table, we just don't update denormalized counts
log.Printf("Vote subject has unsupported collection: %s (vote indexed, counts not updated)", collection)
if commitErr := tx.Commit(); commitErr != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", commitErr)
}
-
return nil
}
result, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, updateQuery, vote.SubjectURI)
if err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update vote counts: %w", err)
}
rowsAffected, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check update result: %w", err)
}
// If subject doesn't exist or is deleted, that's OK (vote still indexed)
···
// Commit transaction
if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
-
return fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", err)
}
-
return nil
}
// deleteVoteAndUpdateCounts atomically soft-deletes a vote and updates post vote counts
···
}
// Atomically: Index vote + Update post counts
+
wasNew, err := c.indexVoteAndUpdateCounts(ctx, vote)
+
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to index vote and update counts: %w", err)
}
+
if wasNew {
+
log.Printf("โœ“ Indexed vote: %s (%s on %s)", uri, vote.Direction, vote.SubjectURI)
+
}
return nil
}
···
}
// indexVoteAndUpdateCounts atomically indexes a vote and updates post vote counts
+
// Returns (true, nil) if vote was newly inserted, (false, nil) if already existed (idempotent)
+
func (c *VoteEventConsumer) indexVoteAndUpdateCounts(ctx context.Context, vote *votes.Vote) (bool, error) {
tx, err := c.db.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to begin transaction: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if rollbackErr := tx.Rollback(); rollbackErr != nil && rollbackErr != sql.ErrTxDone {
···
}
}()
+
// 1. Check for existing active vote with different URI (stale record)
+
// This handles cases where:
+
// - User voted on another client and we missed the delete event
+
// - Vote was reindexed but user created a new vote with different rkey
+
// - Any other state mismatch between PDS and AppView
+
var existingDirection sql.NullString
+
checkQuery := `
+
SELECT direction FROM votes
+
WHERE voter_did = $1
+
AND subject_uri = $2
+
AND deleted_at IS NULL
+
AND uri != $3
+
LIMIT 1
+
`
+
if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, checkQuery, vote.VoterDID, vote.SubjectURI, vote.URI).Scan(&existingDirection); err != nil && err != sql.ErrNoRows {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to check existing vote: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// If there's a stale vote, soft-delete it and adjust counts
+
if existingDirection.Valid {
+
softDeleteQuery := `
+
UPDATE votes
+
SET deleted_at = NOW()
+
WHERE voter_did = $1
+
AND subject_uri = $2
+
AND deleted_at IS NULL
+
AND uri != $3
+
`
+
if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, softDeleteQuery, vote.VoterDID, vote.SubjectURI, vote.URI); err != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to soft-delete existing votes: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
// Decrement the old vote's count (will be re-incremented below if same direction)
+
collection := utils.ExtractCollectionFromURI(vote.SubjectURI)
+
var decrementQuery string
+
if existingDirection.String == "up" {
+
if collection == "social.coves.community.post" {
+
decrementQuery = `UPDATE posts SET upvote_count = GREATEST(0, upvote_count - 1), score = upvote_count - 1 - downvote_count WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
+
} else if collection == "social.coves.community.comment" {
+
decrementQuery = `UPDATE comments SET upvote_count = GREATEST(0, upvote_count - 1), score = upvote_count - 1 - downvote_count WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
+
}
+
} else {
+
if collection == "social.coves.community.post" {
+
decrementQuery = `UPDATE posts SET downvote_count = GREATEST(0, downvote_count - 1), score = upvote_count - (downvote_count - 1) WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
+
} else if collection == "social.coves.community.comment" {
+
decrementQuery = `UPDATE comments SET downvote_count = GREATEST(0, downvote_count - 1), score = upvote_count - (downvote_count - 1) WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`
+
}
+
}
+
if decrementQuery != "" {
+
if _, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, decrementQuery, vote.SubjectURI); err != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrement old vote count: %w", err)
+
}
+
}
+
log.Printf("Cleaned up stale vote for %s on %s (was %s)", vote.VoterDID, vote.SubjectURI, existingDirection.String)
+
}
+
+
// 2. Index the vote (idempotent with ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING)
query := `
INSERT INTO votes (
uri, cid, rkey, voter_did,
···
// If no rows returned, vote already exists (idempotent - OK for Jetstream replays)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+
// Silently handle idempotent case - no log needed for replayed events
if commitErr := tx.Commit(); commitErr != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", commitErr)
}
+
return false, nil // Vote already existed
}
if err != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to insert vote: %w", err)
}
+
// 3. Update vote counts on the subject (post or comment)
// Parse collection from subject URI to determine target table
collection := utils.ExtractCollectionFromURI(vote.SubjectURI)
···
// Vote is still indexed in votes table, we just don't update denormalized counts
log.Printf("Vote subject has unsupported collection: %s (vote indexed, counts not updated)", collection)
if commitErr := tx.Commit(); commitErr != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", commitErr)
}
+
return true, nil // Vote was newly indexed
}
result, err := tx.ExecContext(ctx, updateQuery, vote.SubjectURI)
if err != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to update vote counts: %w", err)
}
rowsAffected, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to check update result: %w", err)
}
// If subject doesn't exist or is deleted, that's OK (vote still indexed)
···
// Commit transaction
if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
+
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", err)
}
+
return true, nil // Vote was newly indexed
}
// deleteVoteAndUpdateCounts atomically soft-deletes a vote and updates post vote counts
+109
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/community/comment/create.json
···
···
+
{
+
"lexicon": 1,
+
"id": "social.coves.community.comment.create",
+
"defs": {
+
"main": {
+
"type": "procedure",
+
"description": "Create a comment on a post or another comment. Comments support nested threading, rich text, embeds, and self-labeling.",
+
"input": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["reply", "content"],
+
"properties": {
+
"reply": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"description": "References for maintaining thread structure. Root always points to the original post, parent points to the immediate parent (post or comment).",
+
"required": ["root", "parent"],
+
"properties": {
+
"root": {
+
"type": "ref",
+
"ref": "com.atproto.repo.strongRef",
+
"description": "Strong reference to the original post that started the thread"
+
},
+
"parent": {
+
"type": "ref",
+
"ref": "com.atproto.repo.strongRef",
+
"description": "Strong reference to the immediate parent (post or comment) being replied to"
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"content": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"maxGraphemes": 10000,
+
"maxLength": 100000,
+
"description": "Comment text content"
+
},
+
"facets": {
+
"type": "array",
+
"description": "Annotations for rich text (mentions, links, etc.)",
+
"items": {
+
"type": "ref",
+
"ref": "social.coves.richtext.facet"
+
}
+
},
+
"embed": {
+
"type": "union",
+
"description": "Embedded media or quoted posts",
+
"refs": [
+
"social.coves.embed.images",
+
"social.coves.embed.post"
+
]
+
},
+
"langs": {
+
"type": "array",
+
"description": "Languages used in the comment content (ISO 639-1)",
+
"maxLength": 3,
+
"items": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "language"
+
}
+
},
+
"labels": {
+
"type": "ref",
+
"ref": "com.atproto.label.defs#selfLabels",
+
"description": "Self-applied content labels"
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"output": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["uri", "cid"],
+
"properties": {
+
"uri": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "at-uri",
+
"description": "AT-URI of the created comment"
+
},
+
"cid": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "cid",
+
"description": "CID of the created comment record"
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"errors": [
+
{
+
"name": "InvalidReply",
+
"description": "The reply reference is invalid, malformed, or refers to non-existent content"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "ContentTooLong",
+
"description": "Comment content exceeds maximum length constraints"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "ContentEmpty",
+
"description": "Comment content is empty or contains only whitespace"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "NotAuthorized",
+
"description": "User is not authorized to create comments on this content"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
}
+
}
+41
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/community/comment/delete.json
···
···
+
{
+
"lexicon": 1,
+
"id": "social.coves.community.comment.delete",
+
"defs": {
+
"main": {
+
"type": "procedure",
+
"description": "Delete a comment. Only the comment author can delete their own comments.",
+
"input": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["uri"],
+
"properties": {
+
"uri": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "at-uri",
+
"description": "AT-URI of the comment to delete"
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"output": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"properties": {}
+
}
+
},
+
"errors": [
+
{
+
"name": "CommentNotFound",
+
"description": "Comment with the specified URI does not exist"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "NotAuthorized",
+
"description": "User is not authorized to delete this comment (not the author)"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
}
+
}
+97
internal/atproto/lexicon/social/coves/community/comment/update.json
···
···
+
{
+
"lexicon": 1,
+
"id": "social.coves.community.comment.update",
+
"defs": {
+
"main": {
+
"type": "procedure",
+
"description": "Update an existing comment's content, facets, embed, languages, or labels. Threading references (reply.root and reply.parent) are immutable and cannot be changed.",
+
"input": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["uri", "content"],
+
"properties": {
+
"uri": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "at-uri",
+
"description": "AT-URI of the comment to update"
+
},
+
"content": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"maxGraphemes": 10000,
+
"maxLength": 100000,
+
"description": "Updated comment text content"
+
},
+
"facets": {
+
"type": "array",
+
"description": "Updated annotations for rich text (mentions, links, etc.)",
+
"items": {
+
"type": "ref",
+
"ref": "social.coves.richtext.facet"
+
}
+
},
+
"embed": {
+
"type": "union",
+
"description": "Updated embedded media or quoted posts",
+
"refs": [
+
"social.coves.embed.images",
+
"social.coves.embed.post"
+
]
+
},
+
"langs": {
+
"type": "array",
+
"description": "Updated languages used in the comment content (ISO 639-1)",
+
"maxLength": 3,
+
"items": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "language"
+
}
+
},
+
"labels": {
+
"type": "ref",
+
"ref": "com.atproto.label.defs#selfLabels",
+
"description": "Updated self-applied content labels"
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"output": {
+
"encoding": "application/json",
+
"schema": {
+
"type": "object",
+
"required": ["uri", "cid"],
+
"properties": {
+
"uri": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "at-uri",
+
"description": "AT-URI of the updated comment (unchanged from input)"
+
},
+
"cid": {
+
"type": "string",
+
"format": "cid",
+
"description": "New CID of the updated comment record"
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
},
+
"errors": [
+
{
+
"name": "CommentNotFound",
+
"description": "Comment with the specified URI does not exist"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "ContentTooLong",
+
"description": "Updated comment content exceeds maximum length constraints"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "ContentEmpty",
+
"description": "Updated comment content is empty or contains only whitespace"
+
},
+
{
+
"name": "NotAuthorized",
+
"description": "User is not authorized to update this comment (not the author)"
+
}
+
]
+
}
+
}
+
}
+38
internal/core/comments/types.go
···
···
+
package comments
+
+
// CreateCommentRequest contains parameters for creating a comment
+
type CreateCommentRequest struct {
+
Reply ReplyRef `json:"reply"`
+
Content string `json:"content"`
+
Facets []interface{} `json:"facets,omitempty"`
+
Embed interface{} `json:"embed,omitempty"`
+
Langs []string `json:"langs,omitempty"`
+
Labels *SelfLabels `json:"labels,omitempty"`
+
}
+
+
// CreateCommentResponse contains the result of creating a comment
+
type CreateCommentResponse struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
}
+
+
// UpdateCommentRequest contains parameters for updating a comment
+
type UpdateCommentRequest struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
Content string `json:"content"`
+
Facets []interface{} `json:"facets,omitempty"`
+
Embed interface{} `json:"embed,omitempty"`
+
Langs []string `json:"langs,omitempty"`
+
Labels *SelfLabels `json:"labels,omitempty"`
+
}
+
+
// UpdateCommentResponse contains the result of updating a comment
+
type UpdateCommentResponse struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
}
+
+
// DeleteCommentRequest contains parameters for deleting a comment
+
type DeleteCommentRequest struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
}
+130
internal/api/handlers/comments/create_comment.go
···
···
+
package comments
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
)
+
+
// CreateCommentHandler handles comment creation requests
+
type CreateCommentHandler struct {
+
service comments.Service
+
}
+
+
// NewCreateCommentHandler creates a new handler for creating comments
+
func NewCreateCommentHandler(service comments.Service) *CreateCommentHandler {
+
return &CreateCommentHandler{
+
service: service,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// CreateCommentInput matches the lexicon input schema for social.coves.community.comment.create
+
type CreateCommentInput struct {
+
Reply struct {
+
Root struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
} `json:"root"`
+
Parent struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
} `json:"parent"`
+
} `json:"reply"`
+
Content string `json:"content"`
+
Facets []interface{} `json:"facets,omitempty"`
+
Embed interface{} `json:"embed,omitempty"`
+
Langs []string `json:"langs,omitempty"`
+
Labels interface{} `json:"labels,omitempty"`
+
}
+
+
// CreateCommentOutput matches the lexicon output schema
+
type CreateCommentOutput struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
}
+
+
// HandleCreate handles comment creation requests
+
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.comment.create
+
//
+
// Request body: { "reply": { "root": {...}, "parent": {...} }, "content": "..." }
+
// Response: { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." }
+
func (h *CreateCommentHandler) HandleCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// 1. Check method is POST
+
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 2. Limit request body size to prevent DoS attacks (100KB should be plenty for comments)
+
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 100*1024)
+
+
// 3. Parse JSON body into CreateCommentInput
+
var input CreateCommentInput
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 4. Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)
+
session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if session == nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 5. Convert labels interface{} to *comments.SelfLabels if provided
+
var labels *comments.SelfLabels
+
if input.Labels != nil {
+
labelsJSON, err := json.Marshal(input.Labels)
+
if err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidLabels", "Invalid labels format")
+
return
+
}
+
var selfLabels comments.SelfLabels
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(labelsJSON, &selfLabels); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidLabels", "Invalid labels structure")
+
return
+
}
+
labels = &selfLabels
+
}
+
+
// 6. Convert input to CreateCommentRequest
+
req := comments.CreateCommentRequest{
+
Reply: comments.ReplyRef{
+
Root: comments.StrongRef{
+
URI: input.Reply.Root.URI,
+
CID: input.Reply.Root.CID,
+
},
+
Parent: comments.StrongRef{
+
URI: input.Reply.Parent.URI,
+
CID: input.Reply.Parent.CID,
+
},
+
},
+
Content: input.Content,
+
Facets: input.Facets,
+
Embed: input.Embed,
+
Langs: input.Langs,
+
Labels: labels,
+
}
+
+
// 7. Call service to create comment
+
response, err := h.service.CreateComment(r.Context(), session, req)
+
if err != nil {
+
handleServiceError(w, err)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 8. Return JSON response with URI and CID
+
output := CreateCommentOutput{
+
URI: response.URI,
+
CID: response.CID,
+
}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+80
internal/api/handlers/comments/delete_comment.go
···
···
+
package comments
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
)
+
+
// DeleteCommentHandler handles comment deletion requests
+
type DeleteCommentHandler struct {
+
service comments.Service
+
}
+
+
// NewDeleteCommentHandler creates a new handler for deleting comments
+
func NewDeleteCommentHandler(service comments.Service) *DeleteCommentHandler {
+
return &DeleteCommentHandler{
+
service: service,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// DeleteCommentInput matches the lexicon input schema for social.coves.community.comment.delete
+
type DeleteCommentInput struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
}
+
+
// DeleteCommentOutput is empty per lexicon specification
+
type DeleteCommentOutput struct{}
+
+
// HandleDelete handles comment deletion requests
+
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.comment.delete
+
//
+
// Request body: { "uri": "at://..." }
+
// Response: {}
+
func (h *DeleteCommentHandler) HandleDelete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// 1. Check method is POST
+
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 2. Limit request body size to prevent DoS attacks (100KB should be plenty for comments)
+
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 100*1024)
+
+
// 3. Parse JSON body into DeleteCommentInput
+
var input DeleteCommentInput
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 4. Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)
+
session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if session == nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 5. Convert input to DeleteCommentRequest
+
req := comments.DeleteCommentRequest{
+
URI: input.URI,
+
}
+
+
// 6. Call service to delete comment
+
err := h.service.DeleteComment(r.Context(), session, req)
+
if err != nil {
+
handleServiceError(w, err)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 7. Return empty JSON object per lexicon specification
+
output := DeleteCommentOutput{}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+34 -2
internal/api/handlers/comments/errors.go
···
import (
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
)
···
func handleServiceError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
case comments.IsNotFound(err):
-
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "NotFound", err.Error())
case comments.IsValidationError(err):
-
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", err.Error())
default:
// Don't leak internal error details to clients
···
import (
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
"encoding/json"
+
"errors"
"log"
"net/http"
)
···
func handleServiceError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
case comments.IsNotFound(err):
+
// Map specific not found errors to appropriate messages
+
switch {
+
case errors.Is(err, comments.ErrCommentNotFound):
+
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "CommentNotFound", "Comment not found")
+
case errors.Is(err, comments.ErrParentNotFound):
+
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "ParentNotFound", "Parent post or comment not found")
+
case errors.Is(err, comments.ErrRootNotFound):
+
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "RootNotFound", "Root post not found")
+
default:
+
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "NotFound", err.Error())
+
}
case comments.IsValidationError(err):
+
// Map specific validation errors to appropriate messages
+
switch {
+
case errors.Is(err, comments.ErrInvalidReply):
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidReply", "The reply reference is invalid or malformed")
+
case errors.Is(err, comments.ErrContentTooLong):
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "ContentTooLong", "Comment content exceeds 10000 graphemes")
+
case errors.Is(err, comments.ErrContentEmpty):
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "ContentEmpty", "Comment content is required")
+
default:
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", err.Error())
+
}
+
+
case errors.Is(err, comments.ErrNotAuthorized):
+
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "NotAuthorized", "User is not authorized to perform this action")
+
+
case errors.Is(err, comments.ErrBanned):
+
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Banned", "User is banned from this community")
+
+
// NOTE: IsConflict case removed - the PDS handles duplicate detection via CreateRecord,
+
// so ErrCommentAlreadyExists is never returned from the service layer. If the PDS rejects
+
// a duplicate record, it returns an auth/validation error which is handled by other cases.
+
// Keeping this code would be dead code that never executes.
default:
// Don't leak internal error details to clients
+112
internal/api/handlers/comments/update_comment.go
···
···
+
package comments
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/comments"
+
"encoding/json"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
)
+
+
// UpdateCommentHandler handles comment update requests
+
type UpdateCommentHandler struct {
+
service comments.Service
+
}
+
+
// NewUpdateCommentHandler creates a new handler for updating comments
+
func NewUpdateCommentHandler(service comments.Service) *UpdateCommentHandler {
+
return &UpdateCommentHandler{
+
service: service,
+
}
+
}
+
+
// UpdateCommentInput matches the lexicon input schema for social.coves.community.comment.update
+
type UpdateCommentInput struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
Content string `json:"content"`
+
Facets []interface{} `json:"facets,omitempty"`
+
Embed interface{} `json:"embed,omitempty"`
+
Langs []string `json:"langs,omitempty"`
+
Labels interface{} `json:"labels,omitempty"`
+
}
+
+
// UpdateCommentOutput matches the lexicon output schema
+
type UpdateCommentOutput struct {
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
}
+
+
// HandleUpdate handles comment update requests
+
// POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.comment.update
+
//
+
// Request body: { "uri": "at://...", "content": "..." }
+
// Response: { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." }
+
func (h *UpdateCommentHandler) HandleUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+
// 1. Check method is POST
+
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 2. Limit request body size to prevent DoS attacks (100KB should be plenty for comments)
+
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 100*1024)
+
+
// 3. Parse JSON body into UpdateCommentInput
+
var input UpdateCommentInput
+
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 4. Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)
+
session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if session == nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 5. Convert labels interface{} to *comments.SelfLabels if provided
+
var labels *comments.SelfLabels
+
if input.Labels != nil {
+
labelsJSON, err := json.Marshal(input.Labels)
+
if err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidLabels", "Invalid labels format")
+
return
+
}
+
var selfLabels comments.SelfLabels
+
if err := json.Unmarshal(labelsJSON, &selfLabels); err != nil {
+
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidLabels", "Invalid labels structure")
+
return
+
}
+
labels = &selfLabels
+
}
+
+
// 6. Convert input to UpdateCommentRequest
+
req := comments.UpdateCommentRequest{
+
URI: input.URI,
+
Content: input.Content,
+
Facets: input.Facets,
+
Embed: input.Embed,
+
Langs: input.Langs,
+
Labels: labels,
+
}
+
+
// 7. Call service to update comment
+
response, err := h.service.UpdateComment(r.Context(), session, req)
+
if err != nil {
+
handleServiceError(w, err)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// 8. Return JSON response with URI and CID
+
output := UpdateCommentOutput{
+
URI: response.URI,
+
CID: response.CID,
+
}
+
+
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)
+
}
+
}
+35
internal/api/routes/comment.go
···
···
+
package routes
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/comments"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
commentsCore "Coves/internal/core/comments"
+
+
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+
)
+
+
// RegisterCommentRoutes registers comment-related XRPC endpoints on the router
+
// Implements social.coves.community.comment.* lexicon endpoints
+
// All write operations (create, update, delete) require authentication
+
func RegisterCommentRoutes(r chi.Router, service commentsCore.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware) {
+
// Initialize handlers
+
createHandler := comments.NewCreateCommentHandler(service)
+
updateHandler := comments.NewUpdateCommentHandler(service)
+
deleteHandler := comments.NewDeleteCommentHandler(service)
+
+
// Procedure endpoints (POST) - require authentication
+
// social.coves.community.comment.create - create a new comment on a post or another comment
+
r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post(
+
"/xrpc/social.coves.community.comment.create",
+
createHandler.HandleCreate)
+
+
// social.coves.community.comment.update - update an existing comment's content
+
r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post(
+
"/xrpc/social.coves.community.comment.update",
+
updateHandler.HandleUpdate)
+
+
// social.coves.community.comment.delete - soft delete a comment
+
r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post(
+
"/xrpc/social.coves.community.comment.delete",
+
deleteHandler.HandleDelete)
+
}
+4 -2
tests/integration/comment_query_test.go
···
postRepo := postgres.NewPostRepository(db)
userRepo := postgres.NewUserRepository(db)
communityRepo := postgres.NewCommunityRepository(db)
-
return comments.NewCommentService(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo)
}
// Helper: createTestCommentWithScore creates a comment with specific vote counts
···
postRepo := postgres.NewPostRepository(db)
userRepo := postgres.NewUserRepository(db)
communityRepo := postgres.NewCommunityRepository(db)
-
service := comments.NewCommentService(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo)
return &testCommentServiceAdapter{service: service}
}
···
postRepo := postgres.NewPostRepository(db)
userRepo := postgres.NewUserRepository(db)
communityRepo := postgres.NewCommunityRepository(db)
+
// Use factory constructor with nil factory - these tests only use the read path (GetComments)
+
return comments.NewCommentServiceWithPDSFactory(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo, nil, nil)
}
// Helper: createTestCommentWithScore creates a comment with specific vote counts
···
postRepo := postgres.NewPostRepository(db)
userRepo := postgres.NewUserRepository(db)
communityRepo := postgres.NewCommunityRepository(db)
+
// Use factory constructor with nil factory - these tests only use the read path (GetComments)
+
service := comments.NewCommentServiceWithPDSFactory(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo, nil, nil)
return &testCommentServiceAdapter{service: service}
}
+6 -3
tests/integration/comment_vote_test.go
···
}
// Query comments with viewer authentication
-
commentService := comments.NewCommentService(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo)
response, err := commentService.GetComments(ctx, &comments.GetCommentsRequest{
PostURI: testPostURI,
Sort: "new",
···
}
// Query with authentication but no vote
-
commentService := comments.NewCommentService(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo)
response, err := commentService.GetComments(ctx, &comments.GetCommentsRequest{
PostURI: testPostURI,
Sort: "new",
···
t.Run("Unauthenticated request has no viewer state", func(t *testing.T) {
// Query without authentication
-
commentService := comments.NewCommentService(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo)
response, err := commentService.GetComments(ctx, &comments.GetCommentsRequest{
PostURI: testPostURI,
Sort: "new",
···
}
// Query comments with viewer authentication
+
// Use factory constructor with nil factory - this test only uses the read path (GetComments)
+
commentService := comments.NewCommentServiceWithPDSFactory(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo, nil, nil)
response, err := commentService.GetComments(ctx, &comments.GetCommentsRequest{
PostURI: testPostURI,
Sort: "new",
···
}
// Query with authentication but no vote
+
// Use factory constructor with nil factory - this test only uses the read path (GetComments)
+
commentService := comments.NewCommentServiceWithPDSFactory(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo, nil, nil)
response, err := commentService.GetComments(ctx, &comments.GetCommentsRequest{
PostURI: testPostURI,
Sort: "new",
···
t.Run("Unauthenticated request has no viewer state", func(t *testing.T) {
// Query without authentication
+
// Use factory constructor with nil factory - this test only uses the read path (GetComments)
+
commentService := comments.NewCommentServiceWithPDSFactory(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo, nil, nil)
response, err := commentService.GetComments(ctx, &comments.GetCommentsRequest{
PostURI: testPostURI,
Sort: "new",
+2 -1
tests/integration/concurrent_scenarios_test.go
···
}
// Verify all comments are retrievable via service
-
commentService := comments.NewCommentService(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo)
response, err := commentService.GetComments(ctx, &comments.GetCommentsRequest{
PostURI: postURI,
Sort: "new",
···
}
// Verify all comments are retrievable via service
+
// Use factory constructor with nil factory - this test only uses the read path (GetComments)
+
commentService := comments.NewCommentServiceWithPDSFactory(commentRepo, userRepo, postRepo, communityRepo, nil, nil)
response, err := commentService.GetComments(ctx, &comments.GetCommentsRequest{
PostURI: postURI,
Sort: "new",
+66
internal/db/migrations/021_add_comment_deletion_metadata.sql
···
···
+
-- +goose Up
+
-- Add deletion reason tracking to preserve thread structure while respecting privacy
+
-- When comments are deleted, we blank content but keep the record for threading
+
+
-- Create enum type for deletion reasons
+
CREATE TYPE deletion_reason AS ENUM ('author', 'moderator');
+
+
-- Add new columns to comments table
+
ALTER TABLE comments ADD COLUMN deletion_reason deletion_reason;
+
ALTER TABLE comments ADD COLUMN deleted_by TEXT;
+
+
-- Add comments for new columns
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN comments.deletion_reason IS 'Reason for deletion: author (user deleted), moderator (community mod removed)';
+
COMMENT ON COLUMN comments.deleted_by IS 'DID of the actor who performed the deletion';
+
+
-- Backfill existing deleted comments as author-deleted
+
-- This handles existing soft-deleted comments gracefully
+
UPDATE comments
+
SET deletion_reason = 'author',
+
deleted_by = commenter_did
+
WHERE deleted_at IS NOT NULL AND deletion_reason IS NULL;
+
+
-- Modify existing indexes to NOT filter deleted_at IS NULL
+
-- This allows deleted comments to appear in thread queries for structure preservation
+
-- Note: We drop and recreate to change the partial index condition
+
+
-- Drop old partial indexes that exclude deleted comments
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_root;
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_parent;
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_parent_score;
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_uri_active;
+
+
-- Recreate indexes without the deleted_at filter (include all comments for threading)
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_root ON comments(root_uri, created_at DESC);
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_parent ON comments(parent_uri, created_at DESC);
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_parent_score ON comments(parent_uri, score DESC, created_at DESC);
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_uri_lookup ON comments(uri);
+
+
-- Add index for querying by deletion_reason (for moderation dashboard)
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_deleted_reason ON comments(deletion_reason, deleted_at DESC)
+
WHERE deleted_at IS NOT NULL;
+
+
-- Add index for querying by deleted_by (for moderation audit/filtering)
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_deleted_by ON comments(deleted_by, deleted_at DESC)
+
WHERE deleted_at IS NOT NULL;
+
+
-- +goose Down
+
-- Remove deletion metadata columns and restore original indexes
+
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_deleted_by;
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_deleted_reason;
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_uri_lookup;
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_parent_score;
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_parent;
+
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_comments_root;
+
+
-- Restore original partial indexes (excluding deleted comments)
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_root ON comments(root_uri, created_at DESC) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL;
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_parent ON comments(parent_uri, created_at DESC) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL;
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_parent_score ON comments(parent_uri, score DESC, created_at DESC) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL;
+
CREATE INDEX idx_comments_uri_active ON comments(uri) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL;
+
+
ALTER TABLE comments DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS deleted_by;
+
ALTER TABLE comments DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS deletion_reason;
+
+
DROP TYPE IF EXISTS deletion_reason;
+17 -13
internal/core/comments/view_models.go
···
// CommentView represents the full view of a comment with all metadata
// Matches social.coves.community.comment.getComments#commentView lexicon
// Used in thread views and get endpoints
type CommentView struct {
-
Embed interface{} `json:"embed,omitempty"`
-
Record interface{} `json:"record"`
-
Viewer *CommentViewerState `json:"viewer,omitempty"`
-
Author *posts.AuthorView `json:"author"`
-
Post *CommentRef `json:"post"`
-
Parent *CommentRef `json:"parent,omitempty"`
-
Stats *CommentStats `json:"stats"`
-
Content string `json:"content"`
-
CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt"`
-
IndexedAt string `json:"indexedAt"`
-
URI string `json:"uri"`
-
CID string `json:"cid"`
-
ContentFacets []interface{} `json:"contentFacets,omitempty"`
}
// ThreadViewComment represents a comment with its nested replies
···
// CommentView represents the full view of a comment with all metadata
// Matches social.coves.community.comment.getComments#commentView lexicon
// Used in thread views and get endpoints
+
// For deleted comments, IsDeleted=true and content-related fields are empty/nil
type CommentView struct {
+
Embed interface{} `json:"embed,omitempty"`
+
Record interface{} `json:"record"`
+
Viewer *CommentViewerState `json:"viewer,omitempty"`
+
Author *posts.AuthorView `json:"author"`
+
Post *CommentRef `json:"post"`
+
Parent *CommentRef `json:"parent,omitempty"`
+
Stats *CommentStats `json:"stats"`
+
Content string `json:"content"`
+
CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt"`
+
IndexedAt string `json:"indexedAt"`
+
URI string `json:"uri"`
+
CID string `json:"cid"`
+
ContentFacets []interface{} `json:"contentFacets,omitempty"`
+
IsDeleted bool `json:"isDeleted,omitempty"`
+
DeletionReason *string `json:"deletionReason,omitempty"`
+
DeletedAt *string `json:"deletedAt,omitempty"`
}
// ThreadViewComment represents a comment with its nested replies
+23 -1
internal/core/comments/interfaces.go
···
package comments
-
import "context"
// Repository defines the data access interface for comments
// Used by Jetstream consumer to index comments from firehose
···
// Delete soft-deletes a comment (sets deleted_at)
// Called by Jetstream consumer after comment is deleted from PDS
Delete(ctx context.Context, uri string) error
// ListByRoot retrieves all comments in a thread (flat)
// Used for fetching entire comment threads on posts
ListByRoot(ctx context.Context, rootURI string, limit, offset int) ([]*Comment, error)
···
limitPerParent int,
) (map[string][]*Comment, error)
}
···
package comments
+
import (
+
"context"
+
"database/sql"
+
)
// Repository defines the data access interface for comments
// Used by Jetstream consumer to index comments from firehose
···
// Delete soft-deletes a comment (sets deleted_at)
// Called by Jetstream consumer after comment is deleted from PDS
+
// Deprecated: Use SoftDeleteWithReason for new code to preserve thread structure
Delete(ctx context.Context, uri string) error
+
// SoftDeleteWithReason performs a soft delete that blanks content but preserves thread structure
+
// This allows deleted comments to appear as "[deleted]" placeholders in thread views
+
// reason: "author" (user deleted) or "moderator" (mod removed)
+
// deletedByDID: DID of the actor who performed the deletion
+
SoftDeleteWithReason(ctx context.Context, uri, reason, deletedByDID string) error
+
// ListByRoot retrieves all comments in a thread (flat)
// Used for fetching entire comment threads on posts
ListByRoot(ctx context.Context, rootURI string, limit, offset int) ([]*Comment, error)
···
limitPerParent int,
) (map[string][]*Comment, error)
}
+
+
// RepositoryTx provides transaction-aware operations for consumers that need atomicity
+
// Used by Jetstream consumer to perform atomic delete + count updates
+
// Implementations that support transactions should also implement this interface
+
type RepositoryTx interface {
+
// SoftDeleteWithReasonTx performs a soft delete within a transaction
+
// If tx is nil, executes directly against the database
+
// Returns rows affected count for callers that need to check idempotency
+
// reason: must be DeletionReasonAuthor or DeletionReasonModerator
+
// deletedByDID: DID of the actor who performed the deletion
+
SoftDeleteWithReasonTx(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, uri, reason, deletedByDID string) (int64, error)
+
}
+87 -27
internal/db/postgres/comment_repo.go
···
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
-
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count
FROM comments
WHERE uri = $1
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
-
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
)
···
// Delete soft-deletes a comment (sets deleted_at)
// Called by Jetstream consumer after comment is deleted from PDS
// Idempotent: Returns success if comment already deleted
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) Delete(ctx context.Context, uri string) error {
query := `
UPDATE comments
···
return nil
}
-
// ListByRoot retrieves all active comments in a thread (flat)
// Used for fetching entire comment threads on posts
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) ListByRoot(ctx context.Context, rootURI string, limit, offset int) ([]*comments.Comment, error) {
query := `
SELECT
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
-
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count
FROM comments
-
WHERE root_uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
ORDER BY created_at ASC
LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3
`
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
-
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
)
if err != nil {
···
return result, nil
}
-
// ListByParent retrieves direct replies to a post or comment
// Used for building nested/threaded comment views
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) ListByParent(ctx context.Context, parentURI string, limit, offset int) ([]*comments.Comment, error) {
query := `
SELECT
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
-
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count
FROM comments
-
WHERE parent_uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
ORDER BY created_at ASC
LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3
`
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
-
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
)
if err != nil {
···
}
// ListByCommenter retrieves all active comments by a specific user
-
// Future: Used for user comment history
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) ListByCommenter(ctx context.Context, commenterDID string, limit, offset int) ([]*comments.Comment, error) {
query := `
SELECT
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
-
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count
FROM comments
WHERE commenter_did = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
-
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
)
if err != nil {
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
-
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
log(greatest(2, c.score + 2)) / power(((EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (NOW() - c.created_at)) / 3600) + 2), 1.8) as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
-
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
NULL::numeric as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle
···
// Build complete query with JOINs and filters
// LEFT JOIN prevents data loss when user record hasn't been indexed yet (out-of-order Jetstream events)
query := fmt.Sprintf(`
%s
LEFT JOIN users u ON c.commenter_did = u.did
-
WHERE c.parent_uri = $1 AND c.deleted_at IS NULL
%s
%s
ORDER BY %s
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
-
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
&hotRank, &authorHandle,
)
···
// GetByURIsBatch retrieves multiple comments by their AT-URIs in a single query
// Returns map[uri]*Comment for efficient lookups without N+1 queries
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) GetByURIsBatch(ctx context.Context, uris []string) (map[string]*comments.Comment, error) {
if len(uris) == 0 {
return make(map[string]*comments.Comment), nil
···
// LEFT JOIN prevents data loss when user record hasn't been indexed yet (out-of-order Jetstream events)
// COALESCE falls back to DID when handle is NULL (user not yet in users table)
query := `
SELECT
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
-
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle
FROM comments c
LEFT JOIN users u ON c.commenter_did = u.did
-
WHERE c.uri = ANY($1) AND c.deleted_at IS NULL
`
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, pq.Array(uris))
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
-
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
&authorHandle,
)
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
-
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
log(greatest(2, c.score + 2)) / power(((EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (NOW() - c.created_at)) / 3600) + 2), 1.8) as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle`
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
-
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
NULL::numeric as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle`
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
-
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
NULL::numeric as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle`
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
-
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
log(greatest(2, c.score + 2)) / power(((EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (NOW() - c.created_at)) / 3600) + 2), 1.8) as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle`
···
// Use window function to limit results per parent
// This is more efficient than LIMIT in a subquery per parent
// LEFT JOIN prevents data loss when user record hasn't been indexed yet (out-of-order Jetstream events)
query := fmt.Sprintf(`
WITH ranked_comments AS (
SELECT
···
) as rn
FROM comments c
LEFT JOIN users u ON c.commenter_did = u.did
-
WHERE c.parent_uri = ANY($1) AND c.deleted_at IS NULL
)
SELECT
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
-
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count,
hot_rank, author_handle
FROM ranked_comments
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
-
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
&hotRank, &authorHandle,
)
···
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
+
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at, deletion_reason, deleted_by,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count
FROM comments
WHERE uri = $1
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
+
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt, &comment.DeletionReason, &comment.DeletedBy,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
)
···
// Delete soft-deletes a comment (sets deleted_at)
// Called by Jetstream consumer after comment is deleted from PDS
// Idempotent: Returns success if comment already deleted
+
// Deprecated: Use SoftDeleteWithReason for new code to preserve thread structure
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) Delete(ctx context.Context, uri string) error {
query := `
UPDATE comments
···
return nil
}
+
// SoftDeleteWithReason performs a soft delete that blanks content but preserves thread structure
+
// This allows deleted comments to appear as "[deleted]" placeholders in thread views
+
// Idempotent: Returns success if comment already deleted
+
// Validates that reason is a known deletion reason constant
+
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) SoftDeleteWithReason(ctx context.Context, uri, reason, deletedByDID string) error {
+
// Validate deletion reason
+
if reason != comments.DeletionReasonAuthor && reason != comments.DeletionReasonModerator {
+
return fmt.Errorf("invalid deletion reason: %s", reason)
+
}
+
+
_, err := r.SoftDeleteWithReasonTx(ctx, nil, uri, reason, deletedByDID)
+
return err
+
}
+
+
// SoftDeleteWithReasonTx performs a soft delete within an optional transaction
+
// If tx is nil, executes directly against the database
+
// Returns rows affected count for callers that need to check idempotency
+
// This method is used by both the repository and the Jetstream consumer
+
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) SoftDeleteWithReasonTx(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, uri, reason, deletedByDID string) (int64, error) {
+
query := `
+
UPDATE comments
+
SET
+
content = '',
+
content_facets = NULL,
+
embed = NULL,
+
content_labels = NULL,
+
deleted_at = NOW(),
+
deletion_reason = $2,
+
deleted_by = $3
+
WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
+
`
+
+
var result sql.Result
+
var err error
+
+
if tx != nil {
+
result, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, query, uri, reason, deletedByDID)
+
} else {
+
result, err = r.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, uri, reason, deletedByDID)
+
}
+
+
if err != nil {
+
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to soft delete comment: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
rowsAffected, err := result.RowsAffected()
+
if err != nil {
+
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to check delete result: %w", err)
+
}
+
+
return rowsAffected, nil
+
}
+
+
// ListByRoot retrieves all comments in a thread (flat), including deleted ones
// Used for fetching entire comment threads on posts
+
// Includes deleted comments to preserve thread structure (shown as "[deleted]" placeholders)
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) ListByRoot(ctx context.Context, rootURI string, limit, offset int) ([]*comments.Comment, error) {
query := `
SELECT
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
+
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at, deletion_reason, deleted_by,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count
FROM comments
+
WHERE root_uri = $1
ORDER BY created_at ASC
LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3
`
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
+
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt, &comment.DeletionReason, &comment.DeletedBy,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
)
if err != nil {
···
return result, nil
}
+
// ListByParent retrieves direct replies to a post or comment, including deleted ones
// Used for building nested/threaded comment views
+
// Includes deleted comments to preserve thread structure (shown as "[deleted]" placeholders)
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) ListByParent(ctx context.Context, parentURI string, limit, offset int) ([]*comments.Comment, error) {
query := `
SELECT
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
+
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at, deletion_reason, deleted_by,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count
FROM comments
+
WHERE parent_uri = $1
ORDER BY created_at ASC
LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3
`
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
+
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt, &comment.DeletionReason, &comment.DeletedBy,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
)
if err != nil {
···
}
// ListByCommenter retrieves all active comments by a specific user
+
// Used for user comment history - filters out deleted comments
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) ListByCommenter(ctx context.Context, commenterDID string, limit, offset int) ([]*comments.Comment, error) {
query := `
SELECT
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
+
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at, deletion_reason, deleted_by,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count
FROM comments
WHERE commenter_did = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
+
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt, &comment.DeletionReason, &comment.DeletedBy,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
)
if err != nil {
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
+
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at, c.deletion_reason, c.deleted_by,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
log(greatest(2, c.score + 2)) / power(((EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (NOW() - c.created_at)) / 3600) + 2), 1.8) as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
+
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at, c.deletion_reason, c.deleted_by,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
NULL::numeric as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle
···
// Build complete query with JOINs and filters
// LEFT JOIN prevents data loss when user record hasn't been indexed yet (out-of-order Jetstream events)
+
// Includes deleted comments to preserve thread structure (shown as "[deleted]" placeholders)
query := fmt.Sprintf(`
%s
LEFT JOIN users u ON c.commenter_did = u.did
+
WHERE c.parent_uri = $1
%s
%s
ORDER BY %s
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
+
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt, &comment.DeletionReason, &comment.DeletedBy,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
&hotRank, &authorHandle,
)
···
// GetByURIsBatch retrieves multiple comments by their AT-URIs in a single query
// Returns map[uri]*Comment for efficient lookups without N+1 queries
+
// Includes deleted comments to preserve thread structure
func (r *postgresCommentRepo) GetByURIsBatch(ctx context.Context, uris []string) (map[string]*comments.Comment, error) {
if len(uris) == 0 {
return make(map[string]*comments.Comment), nil
···
// LEFT JOIN prevents data loss when user record hasn't been indexed yet (out-of-order Jetstream events)
// COALESCE falls back to DID when handle is NULL (user not yet in users table)
+
// Includes deleted comments to preserve thread structure (shown as "[deleted]" placeholders)
query := `
SELECT
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
+
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at, c.deletion_reason, c.deleted_by,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle
FROM comments c
LEFT JOIN users u ON c.commenter_did = u.did
+
WHERE c.uri = ANY($1)
`
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, pq.Array(uris))
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
+
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt, &comment.DeletionReason, &comment.DeletedBy,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
&authorHandle,
)
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
+
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at, c.deletion_reason, c.deleted_by,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
log(greatest(2, c.score + 2)) / power(((EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (NOW() - c.created_at)) / 3600) + 2), 1.8) as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle`
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
+
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at, c.deletion_reason, c.deleted_by,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
NULL::numeric as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle`
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
+
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at, c.deletion_reason, c.deleted_by,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
NULL::numeric as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle`
···
c.id, c.uri, c.cid, c.rkey, c.commenter_did,
c.root_uri, c.root_cid, c.parent_uri, c.parent_cid,
c.content, c.content_facets, c.embed, c.content_labels, c.langs,
+
c.created_at, c.indexed_at, c.deleted_at, c.deletion_reason, c.deleted_by,
c.upvote_count, c.downvote_count, c.score, c.reply_count,
log(greatest(2, c.score + 2)) / power(((EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (NOW() - c.created_at)) / 3600) + 2), 1.8) as hot_rank,
COALESCE(u.handle, c.commenter_did) as author_handle`
···
// Use window function to limit results per parent
// This is more efficient than LIMIT in a subquery per parent
// LEFT JOIN prevents data loss when user record hasn't been indexed yet (out-of-order Jetstream events)
+
// Includes deleted comments to preserve thread structure (shown as "[deleted]" placeholders)
query := fmt.Sprintf(`
WITH ranked_comments AS (
SELECT
···
) as rn
FROM comments c
LEFT JOIN users u ON c.commenter_did = u.did
+
WHERE c.parent_uri = ANY($1)
)
SELECT
id, uri, cid, rkey, commenter_did,
root_uri, root_cid, parent_uri, parent_cid,
content, content_facets, embed, content_labels, langs,
+
created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at, deletion_reason, deleted_by,
upvote_count, downvote_count, score, reply_count,
hot_rank, author_handle
FROM ranked_comments
···
&comment.ID, &comment.URI, &comment.CID, &comment.RKey, &comment.CommenterDID,
&comment.RootURI, &comment.RootCID, &comment.ParentURI, &comment.ParentCID,
&comment.Content, &comment.ContentFacets, &comment.Embed, &comment.ContentLabels, &langs,
+
&comment.CreatedAt, &comment.IndexedAt, &comment.DeletedAt, &comment.DeletionReason, &comment.DeletedBy,
&comment.UpvoteCount, &comment.DownvoteCount, &comment.Score, &comment.ReplyCount,
&hotRank, &authorHandle,
)
+5 -6
internal/core/comments/comment_service.go
···
CreatedAt: createdAt, // Preserve original timestamp
}
-
// Update the record on PDS (putRecord)
-
// Note: This creates a new CID even though the URI stays the same
-
// TODO: Use PutRecord instead of CreateRecord for proper update semantics with optimistic locking.
-
// PutRecord should accept the existing CID (existingRecord.CID) to ensure concurrent updates are detected.
-
// However, PutRecord is not yet implemented in internal/atproto/pds/client.go.
-
uri, cid, err := pdsClient.CreateRecord(ctx, commentCollection, rkey, updatedRecord)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to update comment on PDS",
"error", err,
···
if pds.IsAuthError(err) {
return nil, ErrNotAuthorized
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update comment: %w", err)
}
···
CreatedAt: createdAt, // Preserve original timestamp
}
+
// Update the record on PDS with optimistic locking via swapRecord CID
+
uri, cid, err := pdsClient.PutRecord(ctx, commentCollection, rkey, updatedRecord, existingRecord.CID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to update comment on PDS",
"error", err,
···
if pds.IsAuthError(err) {
return nil, ErrNotAuthorized
}
+
if errors.Is(err, pds.ErrConflict) {
+
return nil, ErrConcurrentModification
+
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update comment: %w", err)
}
+2 -2
cmd/server/main.go
···
routes.RegisterTimelineRoutes(r, timelineService, voteService, authMiddleware)
log.Println("Timeline XRPC endpoints registered (requires authentication, includes viewer vote state)")
-
routes.RegisterDiscoverRoutes(r, discoverService)
-
log.Println("Discover XRPC endpoints registered (public, no auth required)")
routes.RegisterAggregatorRoutes(r, aggregatorService, userService, identityResolver)
log.Println("Aggregator XRPC endpoints registered (query endpoints public, registration endpoint public)")
···
routes.RegisterTimelineRoutes(r, timelineService, voteService, authMiddleware)
log.Println("Timeline XRPC endpoints registered (requires authentication, includes viewer vote state)")
+
routes.RegisterDiscoverRoutes(r, discoverService, voteService, authMiddleware)
+
log.Println("Discover XRPC endpoints registered (public with optional auth for viewer vote state)")
routes.RegisterAggregatorRoutes(r, aggregatorService, userService, identityResolver)
log.Println("Aggregator XRPC endpoints registered (query endpoints public, registration endpoint public)")
+73
internal/api/handlers/common/viewer_state.go
···
···
+
package common
+
+
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
+
"context"
+
"log"
+
"net/http"
+
)
+
+
// FeedPostProvider is implemented by any feed post wrapper that contains a PostView.
+
// This allows the helper to work with different feed post types (discover, timeline, communityFeed).
+
type FeedPostProvider interface {
+
GetPost() *posts.PostView
+
}
+
+
// PopulateViewerVoteState enriches feed posts with the authenticated user's vote state.
+
// This is a no-op if voteService is nil or the request is unauthenticated.
+
//
+
// Parameters:
+
// - ctx: Request context for PDS calls
+
// - r: HTTP request (used to extract OAuth session)
+
// - voteService: Vote service for cache lookup (may be nil)
+
// - feedPosts: Posts to enrich with viewer state (must implement FeedPostProvider)
+
//
+
// The function logs but does not fail on errors - viewer state is optional enrichment.
+
func PopulateViewerVoteState[T FeedPostProvider](
+
ctx context.Context,
+
r *http.Request,
+
voteService votes.Service,
+
feedPosts []T,
+
) {
+
if voteService == nil {
+
return
+
}
+
+
session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)
+
if session == nil {
+
return
+
}
+
+
userDID := middleware.GetUserDID(r)
+
+
// Ensure vote cache is populated from PDS
+
if err := voteService.EnsureCachePopulated(ctx, session); err != nil {
+
log.Printf("Warning: failed to populate vote cache: %v", err)
+
return
+
}
+
+
// Collect post URIs to batch lookup
+
postURIs := make([]string, 0, len(feedPosts))
+
for _, feedPost := range feedPosts {
+
if post := feedPost.GetPost(); post != nil {
+
postURIs = append(postURIs, post.URI)
+
}
+
}
+
+
// Get viewer votes for all posts
+
viewerVotes := voteService.GetViewerVotesForSubjects(userDID, postURIs)
+
+
// Populate viewer state on each post
+
for _, feedPost := range feedPosts {
+
if post := feedPost.GetPost(); post != nil {
+
if vote, exists := viewerVotes[post.URI]; exists {
+
post.Viewer = &posts.ViewerState{
+
Vote: &vote.Direction,
+
VoteURI: &vote.URI,
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
}
+
}
+11 -4
internal/api/handlers/discover/get_discover.go
···
package discover
import (
"Coves/internal/core/discover"
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
···
// GetDiscoverHandler handles discover feed retrieval
type GetDiscoverHandler struct {
-
service discover.Service
}
// NewGetDiscoverHandler creates a new discover handler
-
func NewGetDiscoverHandler(service discover.Service) *GetDiscoverHandler {
return &GetDiscoverHandler{
-
service: service,
}
}
// HandleGetDiscover retrieves posts from all communities (public feed)
// GET /xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover?sort=hot&limit=15&cursor=...
-
// Public endpoint - no authentication required
func (h *GetDiscoverHandler) HandleGetDiscover(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
···
return
}
// Transform blob refs to URLs for all posts
for _, feedPost := range response.Feed {
if feedPost.Post != nil {
···
package discover
import (
+
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/common"
"Coves/internal/core/discover"
"Coves/internal/core/posts"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
···
// GetDiscoverHandler handles discover feed retrieval
type GetDiscoverHandler struct {
+
service discover.Service
+
voteService votes.Service
}
// NewGetDiscoverHandler creates a new discover handler
+
func NewGetDiscoverHandler(service discover.Service, voteService votes.Service) *GetDiscoverHandler {
return &GetDiscoverHandler{
+
service: service,
+
voteService: voteService,
}
}
// HandleGetDiscover retrieves posts from all communities (public feed)
// GET /xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover?sort=hot&limit=15&cursor=...
+
// Public endpoint with optional auth - if authenticated, includes viewer vote state
func (h *GetDiscoverHandler) HandleGetDiscover(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
···
return
}
+
// Populate viewer vote state if authenticated
+
common.PopulateViewerVoteState(r.Context(), r, h.voteService, response.Feed)
+
// Transform blob refs to URLs for all posts
for _, feedPost := range response.Feed {
if feedPost.Post != nil {
+9 -4
internal/api/routes/discover.go
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/discover"
discoverCore "Coves/internal/core/discover"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
···
// RegisterDiscoverRoutes registers discover-related XRPC endpoints
//
// SECURITY & RATE LIMITING:
-
// - Discover feed is PUBLIC (no authentication required)
// - Protected by global rate limiter: 100 requests/minute per IP (main.go:84)
// - Query timeout enforced via context (prevents long-running queries)
// - Result limit capped at 50 posts per request (validated in service layer)
···
func RegisterDiscoverRoutes(
r chi.Router,
discoverService discoverCore.Service,
) {
// Create handlers
-
getDiscoverHandler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService)
// GET /xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover
-
// Public endpoint - no authentication required
// Shows posts from ALL communities (not personalized)
// Rate limited: 100 req/min per IP via global middleware
-
r.Get("/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover", getDiscoverHandler.HandleGetDiscover)
}
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/discover"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
discoverCore "Coves/internal/core/discover"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
···
// RegisterDiscoverRoutes registers discover-related XRPC endpoints
//
// SECURITY & RATE LIMITING:
+
// - Discover feed is PUBLIC (works without authentication)
+
// - Optional auth: if authenticated, includes viewer vote state on posts
// - Protected by global rate limiter: 100 requests/minute per IP (main.go:84)
// - Query timeout enforced via context (prevents long-running queries)
// - Result limit capped at 50 posts per request (validated in service layer)
···
func RegisterDiscoverRoutes(
r chi.Router,
discoverService discoverCore.Service,
+
voteService votes.Service,
+
authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware,
) {
// Create handlers
+
getDiscoverHandler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService, voteService)
// GET /xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover
+
// Public endpoint with optional auth for viewer-specific state (vote state)
// Shows posts from ALL communities (not personalized)
// Rate limited: 100 req/min per IP via global middleware
+
r.With(authMiddleware.OptionalAuth).Get("/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover", getDiscoverHandler.HandleGetDiscover)
}
+5
internal/core/communityFeeds/types.go
···
Reply *ReplyRef `json:"reply,omitempty"` // Reply context
}
// FeedReason is a union type for feed context
// Can be reasonRepost or reasonPin
type FeedReason struct {
···
Reply *ReplyRef `json:"reply,omitempty"` // Reply context
}
+
// GetPost returns the underlying PostView for viewer state enrichment
+
func (f *FeedViewPost) GetPost() *posts.PostView {
+
return f.Post
+
}
+
// FeedReason is a union type for feed context
// Can be reasonRepost or reasonPin
type FeedReason struct {
+5
internal/core/discover/types.go
···
Reply *ReplyRef `json:"reply,omitempty"`
}
// FeedReason is a union type for feed context
type FeedReason struct {
Repost *ReasonRepost `json:"-"`
···
Reply *ReplyRef `json:"reply,omitempty"`
}
+
// GetPost returns the underlying PostView for viewer state enrichment
+
func (f *FeedViewPost) GetPost() *posts.PostView {
+
return f.Post
+
}
+
// FeedReason is a union type for feed context
type FeedReason struct {
Repost *ReasonRepost `json:"-"`
+5
internal/core/timeline/types.go
···
Reply *ReplyRef `json:"reply,omitempty"` // Reply context
}
// FeedReason is a union type for feed context
// Future: Can be reasonRepost or reasonCommunity
type FeedReason struct {
···
Reply *ReplyRef `json:"reply,omitempty"` // Reply context
}
+
// GetPost returns the underlying PostView for viewer state enrichment
+
func (f *FeedViewPost) GetPost() *posts.PostView {
+
return f.Post
+
}
+
// FeedReason is a union type for feed context
// Future: Can be reasonRepost or reasonCommunity
type FeedReason struct {
+193 -5
tests/integration/discover_test.go
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/discover"
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"context"
"encoding/json"
···
discoverCore "Coves/internal/core/discover"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestGetDiscover_ShowsAllCommunities tests discover feed shows posts from ALL communities
func TestGetDiscover_ShowsAllCommunities(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
-
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
-
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
-
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
-
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
-
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService)
t.Run("Limit exceeds maximum", func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover?sort=new&limit=100", nil)
···
assert.Contains(t, errorResp["message"], "limit")
})
}
···
import (
"Coves/internal/api/handlers/discover"
+
"Coves/internal/api/middleware"
+
"Coves/internal/core/votes"
"Coves/internal/db/postgres"
"context"
"encoding/json"
···
discoverCore "Coves/internal/core/discover"
+
oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"
+
"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+
// mockVoteService implements votes.Service for testing viewer vote state
+
type mockVoteService struct {
+
cachedVotes map[string]*votes.CachedVote // userDID:subjectURI -> vote
+
}
+
+
func newMockVoteService() *mockVoteService {
+
return &mockVoteService{
+
cachedVotes: make(map[string]*votes.CachedVote),
+
}
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockVoteService) AddVote(userDID, subjectURI, direction, voteURI string) {
+
key := userDID + ":" + subjectURI
+
m.cachedVotes[key] = &votes.CachedVote{
+
Direction: direction,
+
URI: voteURI,
+
}
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockVoteService) CreateVote(_ context.Context, _ *oauthlib.ClientSessionData, _ votes.CreateVoteRequest) (*votes.CreateVoteResponse, error) {
+
return &votes.CreateVoteResponse{}, nil
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockVoteService) DeleteVote(_ context.Context, _ *oauthlib.ClientSessionData, _ votes.DeleteVoteRequest) error {
+
return nil
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockVoteService) EnsureCachePopulated(_ context.Context, _ *oauthlib.ClientSessionData) error {
+
return nil // Mock always succeeds - votes pre-populated via AddVote
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockVoteService) GetViewerVote(userDID, subjectURI string) *votes.CachedVote {
+
key := userDID + ":" + subjectURI
+
return m.cachedVotes[key]
+
}
+
+
func (m *mockVoteService) GetViewerVotesForSubjects(userDID string, subjectURIs []string) map[string]*votes.CachedVote {
+
result := make(map[string]*votes.CachedVote)
+
for _, uri := range subjectURIs {
+
key := userDID + ":" + uri
+
if vote, exists := m.cachedVotes[key]; exists {
+
result[uri] = vote
+
}
+
}
+
return result
+
}
+
// TestGetDiscover_ShowsAllCommunities tests discover feed shows posts from ALL communities
func TestGetDiscover_ShowsAllCommunities(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
+
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService, nil) // nil vote service - tests don't need vote state
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
+
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService, nil) // nil vote service - tests don't need vote state
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
+
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService, nil)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
+
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService, nil)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
+
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService, nil)
t.Run("Limit exceeds maximum", func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover?sort=new&limit=100", nil)
···
assert.Contains(t, errorResp["message"], "limit")
})
}
+
+
// TestGetDiscover_ViewerVoteState tests that authenticated users see their vote state on posts
+
func TestGetDiscover_ViewerVoteState(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping integration test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
+
+
// Create community and posts
+
communityDID, err := createFeedTestCommunity(db, ctx, fmt.Sprintf("votes-%d", testID), fmt.Sprintf("alice-%d.test", testID))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
post1URI := createTestPost(t, db, communityDID, "did:plc:author1", "Post with upvote", 10, time.Now().Add(-1*time.Hour))
+
post2URI := createTestPost(t, db, communityDID, "did:plc:author2", "Post with downvote", 5, time.Now().Add(-2*time.Hour))
+
_ = createTestPost(t, db, communityDID, "did:plc:author3", "Post without vote", 3, time.Now().Add(-3*time.Hour))
+
+
// Setup mock vote service with pre-populated votes
+
viewerDID := "did:plc:viewer123"
+
mockVotes := newMockVoteService()
+
mockVotes.AddVote(viewerDID, post1URI, "up", "at://"+viewerDID+"/social.coves.vote/vote1")
+
mockVotes.AddVote(viewerDID, post2URI, "down", "at://"+viewerDID+"/social.coves.vote/vote2")
+
+
// Setup handler with mock vote service
+
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
+
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
+
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService, mockVotes)
+
+
// Create request with authenticated user context
+
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover?sort=new&limit=50", nil)
+
+
// Inject OAuth session into context (simulates OptionalAuth middleware)
+
did, _ := syntax.ParseDID(viewerDID)
+
session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{
+
AccountDID: did,
+
AccessToken: "test_token",
+
}
+
reqCtx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), middleware.UserDIDKey, viewerDID)
+
reqCtx = context.WithValue(reqCtx, middleware.OAuthSessionKey, session)
+
req = req.WithContext(reqCtx)
+
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.HandleGetDiscover(rec, req)
+
+
// Assertions
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+
+
var response discoverCore.DiscoverResponse
+
err = json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Find our test posts and verify vote state
+
var foundPost1, foundPost2, foundPost3 bool
+
for _, feedPost := range response.Feed {
+
switch feedPost.Post.URI {
+
case post1URI:
+
foundPost1 = true
+
require.NotNil(t, feedPost.Post.Viewer, "Post1 should have viewer state")
+
require.NotNil(t, feedPost.Post.Viewer.Vote, "Post1 should have vote direction")
+
assert.Equal(t, "up", *feedPost.Post.Viewer.Vote, "Post1 should show upvote")
+
require.NotNil(t, feedPost.Post.Viewer.VoteURI, "Post1 should have vote URI")
+
assert.Contains(t, *feedPost.Post.Viewer.VoteURI, "vote1", "Post1 should have correct vote URI")
+
+
case post2URI:
+
foundPost2 = true
+
require.NotNil(t, feedPost.Post.Viewer, "Post2 should have viewer state")
+
require.NotNil(t, feedPost.Post.Viewer.Vote, "Post2 should have vote direction")
+
assert.Equal(t, "down", *feedPost.Post.Viewer.Vote, "Post2 should show downvote")
+
require.NotNil(t, feedPost.Post.Viewer.VoteURI, "Post2 should have vote URI")
+
+
default:
+
// Posts without votes should have nil Viewer or nil Vote
+
if feedPost.Post.Viewer != nil && feedPost.Post.Viewer.Vote != nil {
+
// This post has a vote from our viewer - it's not post3
+
continue
+
}
+
foundPost3 = true
+
}
+
}
+
+
assert.True(t, foundPost1, "Should find post1 with upvote")
+
assert.True(t, foundPost2, "Should find post2 with downvote")
+
assert.True(t, foundPost3, "Should find post3 without vote")
+
}
+
+
// TestGetDiscover_NoViewerStateWithoutAuth tests that unauthenticated users don't get viewer state
+
func TestGetDiscover_NoViewerStateWithoutAuth(t *testing.T) {
+
if testing.Short() {
+
t.Skip("Skipping integration test in short mode")
+
}
+
+
db := setupTestDB(t)
+
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+
+
ctx := context.Background()
+
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
+
+
// Create community and post
+
communityDID, err := createFeedTestCommunity(db, ctx, fmt.Sprintf("noauth-%d", testID), fmt.Sprintf("alice-%d.test", testID))
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
postURI := createTestPost(t, db, communityDID, "did:plc:author", "Some post", 10, time.Now())
+
+
// Setup mock vote service with a vote (but request will be unauthenticated)
+
mockVotes := newMockVoteService()
+
mockVotes.AddVote("did:plc:someuser", postURI, "up", "at://did:plc:someuser/social.coves.vote/vote1")
+
+
// Setup handler with mock vote service
+
discoverRepo := postgres.NewDiscoverRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
+
discoverService := discoverCore.NewDiscoverService(discoverRepo)
+
handler := discover.NewGetDiscoverHandler(discoverService, mockVotes)
+
+
// Create request WITHOUT auth context
+
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getDiscover?sort=new&limit=50", nil)
+
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
handler.HandleGetDiscover(rec, req)
+
+
// Should succeed
+
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+
+
var response discoverCore.DiscoverResponse
+
err = json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response)
+
require.NoError(t, err)
+
+
// Find our post and verify NO viewer state (unauthenticated)
+
for _, feedPost := range response.Feed {
+
if feedPost.Post.URI == postURI {
+
assert.Nil(t, feedPost.Post.Viewer, "Unauthenticated request should not have viewer state")
+
return
+
}
+
}
+
t.Fatal("Test post not found in response")
+
}
+11 -11
tests/integration/feed_test.go
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test data: community, users, and posts
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test data with many posts
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Request feed for non-existent community
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/xrpc/social.coves.communityFeed.getCommunity?community=did:plc:nonexistent&sort=hot&limit=10", nil)
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test community
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Create community with no posts
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test community
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
-
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test data: community, users, and posts
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test data with many posts
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Request feed for non-existent community
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/xrpc/social.coves.communityFeed.getCommunity?community=did:plc:nonexistent&sort=hot&limit=10", nil)
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test community
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Create community with no posts
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test community
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
···
nil,
)
feedService := communityFeeds.NewCommunityFeedService(feedRepo, communityService)
+
handler := communityFeed.NewGetCommunityHandler(feedService, nil)
// Setup test data
ctx := context.Background()
+7 -7
tests/integration/timeline_test.go
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
-
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
-
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
-
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
-
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
-
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)
// Request timeline WITHOUT auth context
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getTimeline?sort=new&limit=10", nil)
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
-
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
-
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
+
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService, nil)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
+
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService, nil)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
+
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService, nil)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
+
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService, nil)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
+
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService, nil)
// Request timeline WITHOUT auth context
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getTimeline?sort=new&limit=10", nil)
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
+
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService, nil)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()
···
// Setup services
timelineRepo := postgres.NewTimelineRepository(db, "test-cursor-secret")
timelineService := timelineCore.NewTimelineService(timelineRepo)
+
handler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService, nil)
ctx := context.Background()
testID := time.Now().UnixNano()