comparing 7a31beb265206718c14904dd71364eccd1dc5985 and feat/vote-xrpc-endpoints on bretton.dev/coves

+477

internal/atproto/oauth/handlers_security_test.go

···

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       package oauth

     

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       import (

     

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       	"net/http"

     

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       	"net/http/httptest"

     

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       	"testing"

     

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       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"

     

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       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

     

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       )

     

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       // TestIsAllowedMobileRedirectURI tests the mobile redirect URI allowlist with EXACT URI matching

     

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       // Only Universal Links (HTTPS) are allowed - custom schemes are blocked for security

     

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       func TestIsAllowedMobileRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {

     

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       	tests := []struct {

     

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       		name     string

     

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       		uri      string

     

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       		expected bool

     

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       	}{

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "allowed - Universal Link",

     

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       			uri:      "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",

     

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       			expected: true,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "rejected - custom scheme coves-app (vulnerable to interception)",

     

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       			uri:      "coves-app://oauth/callback",

     

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       			expected: false,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "rejected - custom scheme coves (vulnerable to interception)",

     

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       			uri:      "coves://oauth/callback",

     

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       			expected: false,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "rejected - evil scheme",

     

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       			uri:      "evil://callback",

     

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       			expected: false,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "rejected - http (not secure)",

     

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       			uri:      "http://example.com/callback",

     

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       			expected: false,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "rejected - https different domain",

     

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       			uri:      "https://example.com/callback",

     

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       			expected: false,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "rejected - https coves.social wrong path",

     

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       			uri:      "https://coves.social/wrong/path",

     

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       			expected: false,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "rejected - invalid URI",

     

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       			uri:      "not a uri",

     

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       			expected: false,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "rejected - empty string",

     

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       			uri:      "",

     

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       			expected: false,

     

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       		},

     

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       	}

     

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       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

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       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

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       			result := isAllowedMobileRedirectURI(tt.uri)

     

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       			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result,

     

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       				"isAllowedMobileRedirectURI(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.uri, result, tt.expected)

     

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       		})

     

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       	}

     

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       }

     

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       // TestExtractScheme tests the scheme extraction function

     

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       func TestExtractScheme(t *testing.T) {

     

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       	tests := []struct {

     

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       		name     string

     

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       		uri      string

     

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       		expected string

     

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       	}{

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "https scheme",

     

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       			uri:      "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",

     

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       			expected: "https",

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "custom scheme",

     

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       			uri:      "coves-app://callback",

     

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       			expected: "coves-app",

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:     "invalid URI",

     

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       			uri:      "not a uri",

     

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       			expected: "invalid",

     

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       		},

     

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       	}

     

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       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

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       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

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       			result := extractScheme(tt.uri)

     

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       			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result)

     

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       		})

     

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       	}

     

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       }

     

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       // TestGenerateCSRFToken tests CSRF token generation

     

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       func TestGenerateCSRFToken(t *testing.T) {

     

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       	// Generate two tokens and verify they are different (randomness check)

     

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       	token1, err1 := generateCSRFToken()

     

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       	require.NoError(t, err1)

     

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       	require.NotEmpty(t, token1)

     

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       	token2, err2 := generateCSRFToken()

     

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       	require.NoError(t, err2)

     

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       	require.NotEmpty(t, token2)

     

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       	assert.NotEqual(t, token1, token2, "CSRF tokens should be unique")

     

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       	// Verify token is base64 encoded (should decode without error)

     

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       	assert.Greater(t, len(token1), 40, "CSRF token should be reasonably long (32 bytes base64 encoded)")

     

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       }

     

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       // TestHandleMobileLogin_RedirectURIValidation tests that HandleMobileLogin validates redirect URIs

     

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       func TestHandleMobileLogin_RedirectURIValidation(t *testing.T) {

     

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       	// Note: This is a unit test for the validation logic only.

     

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       	// Full integration tests with OAuth flow are in tests/integration/oauth_e2e_test.go

     

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       	tests := []struct {

     

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       		name           string

     

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       		redirectURI    string

     

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       		expectedLog    string

     

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       		expectedStatus int

     

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       	}{

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:           "allowed - Universal Link",

     

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       			redirectURI:    "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",

     

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       			expectedStatus: http.StatusBadRequest, // Will fail at StartAuthFlow (no OAuth client setup)

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:           "rejected - custom scheme coves-app (insecure)",

     

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       			redirectURI:    "coves-app://oauth/callback",

     

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       			expectedStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,

     

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       			expectedLog:    "rejected unauthorized mobile redirect URI",

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:           "rejected evil scheme",

     

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       			redirectURI:    "evil://callback",

     

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       			expectedStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,

     

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       			expectedLog:    "rejected unauthorized mobile redirect URI",

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:           "rejected http",

     

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       			redirectURI:    "http://evil.com/callback",

     

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       			expectedStatus: http.StatusBadRequest,

     

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       			expectedLog:    "scheme not allowed",

     

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       		},

     

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       	}

     

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       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

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       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

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       			// Test the validation function directly

     

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       			result := isAllowedMobileRedirectURI(tt.redirectURI)

     

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       			if tt.expectedLog != "" {

     

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       				assert.False(t, result, "Should reject %s", tt.redirectURI)

     

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       			}

     

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       		})

     

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       	}

     

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       }

     

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       // TestHandleCallback_CSRFValidation tests that HandleCallback validates CSRF tokens for mobile flow

     

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       func TestHandleCallback_CSRFValidation(t *testing.T) {

     

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       	// This is a conceptual test structure. Full implementation would require:

     

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       	// 1. Mock OAuthClient

     

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       	// 2. Mock OAuth store

     

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       	// 3. Simulated OAuth callback with cookies

     

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       	t.Run("mobile callback requires CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {

     

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       		// Setup: Create request with mobile_redirect_uri cookie but NO oauth_csrf cookie

     

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       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test", nil)

     

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       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

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       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_uri",

     

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       			Value: "https%3A%2F%2Fcoves.social%2Fapp%2Foauth%2Fcallback",

     

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       		})

     

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       		// Missing: oauth_csrf cookie

     

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       		// This would be rejected with 403 Forbidden in the actual handler

     

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       		// (Full test in integration tests with real OAuth flow)

     

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       		assert.NotNil(t, req) // Placeholder assertion

     

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       	})

     

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       	t.Run("mobile callback with valid CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {

     

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       		// Setup: Create request with both cookies

     

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       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test", nil)

     

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       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

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       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_uri",

     

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       			Value: "https%3A%2F%2Fcoves.social%2Fapp%2Foauth%2Fcallback",

     

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       		})

     

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       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

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       			Name:  "oauth_csrf",

     

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       			Value: "valid-csrf-token",

     

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       		})

     

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       		// This would be accepted (assuming valid OAuth code/state)

     

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       		// (Full test in integration tests with real OAuth flow)

     

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       		assert.NotNil(t, req) // Placeholder assertion

     

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       	})

     

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       }

     

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       // TestHandleMobileCallback_RevalidatesRedirectURI tests that handleMobileCallback re-validates the redirect URI

     

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       func TestHandleMobileCallback_RevalidatesRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {

     

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       	// This is a critical security test: even if an attacker somehow bypasses the initial check,

     

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       	// the callback handler should re-validate the redirect URI before redirecting.

     

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       +
       

     

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       	tests := []struct {

     

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       		name        string

     

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       		redirectURI string

     

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       		shouldPass  bool

     

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       	}{

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:        "allowed - Universal Link",

     

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       			redirectURI: "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",

     

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       			shouldPass:  true,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:        "blocked - custom scheme (insecure)",

     

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       			redirectURI: "coves-app://oauth/callback",

     

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       			shouldPass:  false,

     

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       		},

     

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       		{

     

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       			name:        "blocked - evil scheme",

     

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       			redirectURI: "evil://callback",

     

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       			shouldPass:  false,

     

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       +
       		},

     

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       +
       	}

     

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       +
       

     

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       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

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       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

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       			result := isAllowedMobileRedirectURI(tt.redirectURI)

     

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       			assert.Equal(t, tt.shouldPass, result)

     

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       +
       		})

     

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       +
       	}

     

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       +
       }

     

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       +
       

     

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       +
       // TestGenerateMobileRedirectBinding tests the binding token generation

     

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       // The binding now includes the CSRF token for proper double-submit validation

     

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       func TestGenerateMobileRedirectBinding(t *testing.T) {

     

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       	csrfToken := "test-csrf-token-12345"

     

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       	tests := []struct {

     

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       +
       		name        string

     

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       +
       		redirectURI string

     

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       +
       	}{

     

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       +
       		{

     

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       +
       			name:        "Universal Link",

     

       258
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       +
       			redirectURI: "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback",

     

       259
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       +
       		},

     

       260
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       +
       		{

     

       261
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       +
       			name:        "different path",

     

       262
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       +
       			redirectURI: "https://coves.social/different/path",

     

       263
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       +
       		},

     

       264
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       +
       	}

     

       265
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       +
       

     

       266
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       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       267
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       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       268
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       +
       			binding1 := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, tt.redirectURI)

     

       269
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       +
       			binding2 := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, tt.redirectURI)

     

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       +
       

     

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       +
       			// Same CSRF token + URI should produce same binding (deterministic)

     

       272
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       +
       			assert.Equal(t, binding1, binding2, "binding should be deterministic for same inputs")

     

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       +
       

     

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       			// Binding should not be empty

     

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       +
       			assert.NotEmpty(t, binding1, "binding should not be empty")

     

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       +
       

     

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       +
       			// Binding should be base64 encoded (should decode without error)

     

       278
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       +
       			assert.Greater(t, len(binding1), 20, "binding should be reasonably long")

     

       279
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       +
       		})

     

       280
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       +
       	}

     

       281
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       +
       

     

       282
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       +
       	// Different URIs should produce different bindings

     

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       +
       	binding1 := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback")

     

       284
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       +
       	binding2 := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, "https://coves.social/different/path")

     

       285
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       +
       	assert.NotEqual(t, binding1, binding2, "different URIs should produce different bindings")

     

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       +
       

     

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       +
       	// Different CSRF tokens should produce different bindings

     

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       +
       	binding3 := generateMobileRedirectBinding("different-csrf-token", "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback")

     

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       +
       	assert.NotEqual(t, binding1, binding3, "different CSRF tokens should produce different bindings")

     

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       +
       }

     

       291
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       +
       

     

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       +
       // TestValidateMobileRedirectBinding tests the binding validation

     

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       +
       // Now validates both CSRF token and redirect URI together (double-submit pattern)

     

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       +
       func TestValidateMobileRedirectBinding(t *testing.T) {

     

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       +
       	csrfToken := "test-csrf-token-for-validation"

     

       296
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       +
       	redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"

     

       297
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       +
       	validBinding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(csrfToken, redirectURI)

     

       298
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       +
       

     

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       +
       	tests := []struct {

     

       300
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       +
       		name        string

     

       301
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       +
       		csrfToken   string

     

       302
       302
       +
       		redirectURI string

     

       303
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       +
       		binding     string

     

       304
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       +
       		shouldPass  bool

     

       305
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       +
       	}{

     

       306
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       +
       		{

     

       307
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       +
       			name:        "valid - correct CSRF token and redirect URI",

     

       308
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       +
       			csrfToken:   csrfToken,

     

       309
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       +
       			redirectURI: redirectURI,

     

       310
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       +
       			binding:     validBinding,

     

       311
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       +
       			shouldPass:  true,

     

       312
       312
       +
       		},

     

       313
       313
       +
       		{

     

       314
       314
       +
       			name:        "invalid - wrong redirect URI",

     

       315
       315
       +
       			csrfToken:   csrfToken,

     

       316
       316
       +
       			redirectURI: "https://coves.social/different/path",

     

       317
       317
       +
       			binding:     validBinding,

     

       318
       318
       +
       			shouldPass:  false,

     

       319
       319
       +
       		},

     

       320
       320
       +
       		{

     

       321
       321
       +
       			name:        "invalid - wrong CSRF token",

     

       322
       322
       +
       			csrfToken:   "wrong-csrf-token",

     

       323
       323
       +
       			redirectURI: redirectURI,

     

       324
       324
       +
       			binding:     validBinding,

     

       325
       325
       +
       			shouldPass:  false,

     

       326
       326
       +
       		},

     

       327
       327
       +
       		{

     

       328
       328
       +
       			name:        "invalid - random binding",

     

       329
       329
       +
       			csrfToken:   csrfToken,

     

       330
       330
       +
       			redirectURI: redirectURI,

     

       331
       331
       +
       			binding:     "random-invalid-binding",

     

       332
       332
       +
       			shouldPass:  false,

     

       333
       333
       +
       		},

     

       334
       334
       +
       		{

     

       335
       335
       +
       			name:        "invalid - empty binding",

     

       336
       336
       +
       			csrfToken:   csrfToken,

     

       337
       337
       +
       			redirectURI: redirectURI,

     

       338
       338
       +
       			binding:     "",

     

       339
       339
       +
       			shouldPass:  false,

     

       340
       340
       +
       		},

     

       341
       341
       +
       		{

     

       342
       342
       +
       			name:        "invalid - empty CSRF token",

     

       343
       343
       +
       			csrfToken:   "",

     

       344
       344
       +
       			redirectURI: redirectURI,

     

       345
       345
       +
       			binding:     validBinding,

     

       346
       346
       +
       			shouldPass:  false,

     

       347
       347
       +
       		},

     

       348
       348
       +
       	}

     

       349
       349
       +
       

     

       350
       350
       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       351
       351
       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       352
       352
       +
       			result := validateMobileRedirectBinding(tt.csrfToken, tt.redirectURI, tt.binding)

     

       353
       353
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, tt.shouldPass, result)

     

       354
       354
       +
       		})

     

       355
       355
       +
       	}

     

       356
       356
       +
       }

     

       357
       357
       +
       

     

       358
       358
       +
       // TestSessionFixationAttackPrevention tests that the binding prevents session fixation

     

       359
       359
       +
       func TestSessionFixationAttackPrevention(t *testing.T) {

     

       360
       360
       +
       	// Simulate attack scenario:

     

       361
       361
       +
       	// 1. Attacker plants a cookie for evil://steal with binding for evil://steal

     

       362
       362
       +
       	// 2. User does a web login (no mobile_redirect_binding cookie)

     

       363
       363
       +
       	// 3. Callback should NOT redirect to evil://steal

     

       364
       364
       +
       

     

       365
       365
       +
       	attackerCSRF := "attacker-csrf-token"

     

       366
       366
       +
       	attackerRedirectURI := "evil://steal"

     

       367
       367
       +
       	attackerBinding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(attackerCSRF, attackerRedirectURI)

     

       368
       368
       +
       

     

       369
       369
       +
       	// Later, user's legitimate mobile login

     

       370
       370
       +
       	userCSRF := "user-csrf-token"

     

       371
       371
       +
       	userRedirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"

     

       372
       372
       +
       	userBinding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(userCSRF, userRedirectURI)

     

       373
       373
       +
       

     

       374
       374
       +
       	// The attacker's binding should NOT validate for the user's redirect URI

     

       375
       375
       +
       	assert.False(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(userCSRF, userRedirectURI, attackerBinding),

     

       376
       376
       +
       		"attacker's binding should not validate for user's CSRF token and redirect URI")

     

       377
       377
       +
       

     

       378
       378
       +
       	// The user's binding should validate for the user's CSRF token and redirect URI

     

       379
       379
       +
       	assert.True(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(userCSRF, userRedirectURI, userBinding),

     

       380
       380
       +
       		"user's binding should validate for user's CSRF token and redirect URI")

     

       381
       381
       +
       

     

       382
       382
       +
       	// Cross-validation should fail

     

       383
       383
       +
       	assert.False(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(attackerCSRF, attackerRedirectURI, userBinding),

     

       384
       384
       +
       		"user's binding should not validate for attacker's CSRF token and redirect URI")

     

       385
       385
       +
       }

     

       386
       386
       +
       

     

       387
       387
       +
       // TestCSRFTokenValidation tests that CSRF token VALUE is validated, not just presence

     

       388
       388
       +
       func TestCSRFTokenValidation(t *testing.T) {

     

       389
       389
       +
       	// This test verifies the fix for the P1 security issue:

     

       390
       390
       +
       	// "The callback never validates the token... the csrfToken argument is ignored entirely"

     

       391
       391
       +
       	//

     

       392
       392
       +
       	// The fix ensures that the CSRF token VALUE is cryptographically bound to the

     

       393
       393
       +
       	// binding token, so changing the CSRF token will invalidate the binding.

     

       394
       394
       +
       

     

       395
       395
       +
       	t.Run("CSRF token value must match", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       396
       396
       +
       		originalCSRF := "original-csrf-token-from-login"

     

       397
       397
       +
       		redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"

     

       398
       398
       +
       		binding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(originalCSRF, redirectURI)

     

       399
       399
       +
       

     

       400
       400
       +
       		// Original CSRF token should validate

     

       401
       401
       +
       		assert.True(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(originalCSRF, redirectURI, binding),

     

       402
       402
       +
       			"original CSRF token should validate")

     

       403
       403
       +
       

     

       404
       404
       +
       		// Different CSRF token should NOT validate (this is the key security fix)

     

       405
       405
       +
       		differentCSRF := "attacker-forged-csrf-token"

     

       406
       406
       +
       		assert.False(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(differentCSRF, redirectURI, binding),

     

       407
       407
       +
       			"different CSRF token should NOT validate - this is the security fix")

     

       408
       408
       +
       	})

     

       409
       409
       +
       

     

       410
       410
       +
       	t.Run("attacker cannot forge binding without CSRF token", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       411
       411
       +
       		// Attacker knows the redirect URI but not the CSRF token

     

       412
       412
       +
       		redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"

     

       413
       413
       +
       		victimCSRF := "victim-secret-csrf-token"

     

       414
       414
       +
       		victimBinding := generateMobileRedirectBinding(victimCSRF, redirectURI)

     

       415
       415
       +
       

     

       416
       416
       +
       		// Attacker tries various CSRF tokens to forge the binding

     

       417
       417
       +
       		attackerGuesses := []string{

     

       418
       418
       +
       			"",

     

       419
       419
       +
       			"guess1",

     

       420
       420
       +
       			"attacker-csrf",

     

       421
       421
       +
       			redirectURI, // trying the redirect URI as CSRF

     

       422
       422
       +
       		}

     

       423
       423
       +
       

     

       424
       424
       +
       		for _, guess := range attackerGuesses {

     

       425
       425
       +
       			assert.False(t, validateMobileRedirectBinding(guess, redirectURI, victimBinding),

     

       426
       426
       +
       				"attacker's CSRF guess %q should not validate", guess)

     

       427
       427
       +
       		}

     

       428
       428
       +
       	})

     

       429
       429
       +
       }

     

       430
       430
       +
       

     

       431
       431
       +
       // TestConstantTimeCompare tests the timing-safe comparison function

     

       432
       432
       +
       func TestConstantTimeCompare(t *testing.T) {

     

       433
       433
       +
       	tests := []struct {

     

       434
       434
       +
       		name     string

     

       435
       435
       +
       		a        string

     

       436
       436
       +
       		b        string

     

       437
       437
       +
       		expected bool

     

       438
       438
       +
       	}{

     

       439
       439
       +
       		{

     

       440
       440
       +
       			name:     "equal strings",

     

       441
       441
       +
       			a:        "abc123",

     

       442
       442
       +
       			b:        "abc123",

     

       443
       443
       +
       			expected: true,

     

       444
       444
       +
       		},

     

       445
       445
       +
       		{

     

       446
       446
       +
       			name:     "different strings same length",

     

       447
       447
       +
       			a:        "abc123",

     

       448
       448
       +
       			b:        "xyz789",

     

       449
       449
       +
       			expected: false,

     

       450
       450
       +
       		},

     

       451
       451
       +
       		{

     

       452
       452
       +
       			name:     "different lengths",

     

       453
       453
       +
       			a:        "short",

     

       454
       454
       +
       			b:        "longer",

     

       455
       455
       +
       			expected: false,

     

       456
       456
       +
       		},

     

       457
       457
       +
       		{

     

       458
       458
       +
       			name:     "empty strings",

     

       459
       459
       +
       			a:        "",

     

       460
       460
       +
       			b:        "",

     

       461
       461
       +
       			expected: true,

     

       462
       462
       +
       		},

     

       463
       463
       +
       		{

     

       464
       464
       +
       			name:     "one empty",

     

       465
       465
       +
       			a:        "abc",

     

       466
       466
       +
       			b:        "",

     

       467
       467
       +
       			expected: false,

     

       468
       468
       +
       		},

     

       469
       469
       +
       	}

     

       470
       470
       +
       

     

       471
       471
       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       472
       472
       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       473
       473
       +
       			result := constantTimeCompare(tt.a, tt.b)

     

       474
       474
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result)

     

       475
       475
       +
       		})

     

       476
       476
       +
       	}

     

       477
       477
       +
       }

+152

internal/atproto/oauth/seal.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package oauth

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"crypto/aes"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"crypto/cipher"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"crypto/rand"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"encoding/base64"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"encoding/json"

     

       9
       9
       +
       	"fmt"

     

       10
       10
       +
       	"time"

     

       11
       11
       +
       )

     

       12
       12
       +
       

     

       13
       13
       +
       // SealedSession represents the data sealed in a mobile session token

     

       14
       14
       +
       type SealedSession struct {

     

       15
       15
       +
       	DID       string `json:"did"` // User's DID

     

       16
       16
       +
       	SessionID string `json:"sid"` // Session identifier

     

       17
       17
       +
       	ExpiresAt int64  `json:"exp"` // Unix timestamp when token expires

     

       18
       18
       +
       }

     

       19
       19
       +
       

     

       20
       20
       +
       // SealSession creates an encrypted token containing session information.

     

       21
       21
       +
       // The token is encrypted using AES-256-GCM and encoded as base64url.

     

       22
       22
       +
       //

     

       23
       23
       +
       // Token format: base64url(nonce || ciphertext || tag)

     

       24
       24
       +
       // - nonce: 12 bytes (GCM standard nonce size)

     

       25
       25
       +
       // - ciphertext: encrypted JSON payload

     

       26
       26
       +
       // - tag: 16 bytes (GCM authentication tag)

     

       27
       27
       +
       //

     

       28
       28
       +
       // The sealed token can be safely given to mobile clients and used as

     

       29
       29
       +
       // a reference to the server-side session without exposing sensitive data.

     

       30
       30
       +
       func (c *OAuthClient) SealSession(did, sessionID string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {

     

       31
       31
       +
       	if len(c.SealSecret) == 0 {

     

       32
       32
       +
       		return "", fmt.Errorf("seal secret not configured")

     

       33
       33
       +
       	}

     

       34
       34
       +
       

     

       35
       35
       +
       	if did == "" {

     

       36
       36
       +
       		return "", fmt.Errorf("DID is required")

     

       37
       37
       +
       	}

     

       38
       38
       +
       

     

       39
       39
       +
       	if sessionID == "" {

     

       40
       40
       +
       		return "", fmt.Errorf("session ID is required")

     

       41
       41
       +
       	}

     

       42
       42
       +
       

     

       43
       43
       +
       	// Create the session data

     

       44
       44
       +
       	expiresAt := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()

     

       45
       45
       +
       	session := SealedSession{

     

       46
       46
       +
       		DID:       did,

     

       47
       47
       +
       		SessionID: sessionID,

     

       48
       48
       +
       		ExpiresAt: expiresAt,

     

       49
       49
       +
       	}

     

       50
       50
       +
       

     

       51
       51
       +
       	// Marshal to JSON

     

       52
       52
       +
       	plaintext, err := json.Marshal(session)

     

       53
       53
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       54
       54
       +
       		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal session: %w", err)

     

       55
       55
       +
       	}

     

       56
       56
       +
       

     

       57
       57
       +
       	// Create AES cipher

     

       58
       58
       +
       	block, err := aes.NewCipher(c.SealSecret)

     

       59
       59
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       60
       60
       +
       		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create cipher: %w", err)

     

       61
       61
       +
       	}

     

       62
       62
       +
       

     

       63
       63
       +
       	// Create GCM mode

     

       64
       64
       +
       	gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)

     

       65
       65
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       66
       66
       +
       		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create GCM: %w", err)

     

       67
       67
       +
       	}

     

       68
       68
       +
       

     

       69
       69
       +
       	// Generate random nonce

     

       70
       70
       +
       	nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())

     

       71
       71
       +
       	if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {

     

       72
       72
       +
       		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate nonce: %w", err)

     

       73
       73
       +
       	}

     

       74
       74
       +
       

     

       75
       75
       +
       	// Encrypt and authenticate

     

       76
       76
       +
       	// GCM.Seal appends the ciphertext and tag to the nonce

     

       77
       77
       +
       	ciphertext := gcm.Seal(nonce, nonce, plaintext, nil)

     

       78
       78
       +
       

     

       79
       79
       +
       	// Encode as base64url (no padding)

     

       80
       80
       +
       	token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(ciphertext)

     

       81
       81
       +
       

     

       82
       82
       +
       	return token, nil

     

       83
       83
       +
       }

     

       84
       84
       +
       

     

       85
       85
       +
       // UnsealSession decrypts and validates a sealed session token.

     

       86
       86
       +
       // Returns the session information if the token is valid and not expired.

     

       87
       87
       +
       func (c *OAuthClient) UnsealSession(token string) (*SealedSession, error) {

     

       88
       88
       +
       	if len(c.SealSecret) == 0 {

     

       89
       89
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("seal secret not configured")

     

       90
       90
       +
       	}

     

       91
       91
       +
       

     

       92
       92
       +
       	if token == "" {

     

       93
       93
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token is required")

     

       94
       94
       +
       	}

     

       95
       95
       +
       

     

       96
       96
       +
       	// Decode from base64url

     

       97
       97
       +
       	ciphertext, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)

     

       98
       98
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       99
       99
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token encoding: %w", err)

     

       100
       100
       +
       	}

     

       101
       101
       +
       

     

       102
       102
       +
       	// Create AES cipher

     

       103
       103
       +
       	block, err := aes.NewCipher(c.SealSecret)

     

       104
       104
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       105
       105
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create cipher: %w", err)

     

       106
       106
       +
       	}

     

       107
       107
       +
       

     

       108
       108
       +
       	// Create GCM mode

     

       109
       109
       +
       	gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)

     

       110
       110
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       111
       111
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create GCM: %w", err)

     

       112
       112
       +
       	}

     

       113
       113
       +
       

     

       114
       114
       +
       	// Verify minimum size (nonce + tag)

     

       115
       115
       +
       	nonceSize := gcm.NonceSize()

     

       116
       116
       +
       	if len(ciphertext) < nonceSize {

     

       117
       117
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token: too short")

     

       118
       118
       +
       	}

     

       119
       119
       +
       

     

       120
       120
       +
       	// Extract nonce and ciphertext

     

       121
       121
       +
       	nonce := ciphertext[:nonceSize]

     

       122
       122
       +
       	ciphertextData := ciphertext[nonceSize:]

     

       123
       123
       +
       

     

       124
       124
       +
       	// Decrypt and authenticate

     

       125
       125
       +
       	plaintext, err := gcm.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertextData, nil)

     

       126
       126
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       127
       127
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt token: %w", err)

     

       128
       128
       +
       	}

     

       129
       129
       +
       

     

       130
       130
       +
       	// Unmarshal JSON

     

       131
       131
       +
       	var session SealedSession

     

       132
       132
       +
       	if err := json.Unmarshal(plaintext, &session); err != nil {

     

       133
       133
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal session: %w", err)

     

       134
       134
       +
       	}

     

       135
       135
       +
       

     

       136
       136
       +
       	// Validate required fields

     

       137
       137
       +
       	if session.DID == "" {

     

       138
       138
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid session: missing DID")

     

       139
       139
       +
       	}

     

       140
       140
       +
       

     

       141
       141
       +
       	if session.SessionID == "" {

     

       142
       142
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid session: missing session ID")

     

       143
       143
       +
       	}

     

       144
       144
       +
       

     

       145
       145
       +
       	// Check expiration

     

       146
       146
       +
       	now := time.Now().Unix()

     

       147
       147
       +
       	if session.ExpiresAt <= now {

     

       148
       148
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token expired at %v", time.Unix(session.ExpiresAt, 0))

     

       149
       149
       +
       	}

     

       150
       150
       +
       

     

       151
       151
       +
       	return &session, nil

     

       152
       152
       +
       }

+331

internal/atproto/oauth/seal_test.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package oauth

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"crypto/rand"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"encoding/base64"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"strings"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"testing"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"time"

     

       9
       9
       +
       

     

       10
       10
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"

     

       11
       11
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

     

       12
       12
       +
       )

     

       13
       13
       +
       

     

       14
       14
       +
       // generateSealSecret generates a random 32-byte seal secret for testing

     

       15
       15
       +
       func generateSealSecret() []byte {

     

       16
       16
       +
       	secret := make([]byte, 32)

     

       17
       17
       +
       	if _, err := rand.Read(secret); err != nil {

     

       18
       18
       +
       		panic(err)

     

       19
       19
       +
       	}

     

       20
       20
       +
       	return secret

     

       21
       21
       +
       }

     

       22
       22
       +
       

     

       23
       23
       +
       func TestSealSession_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {

     

       24
       24
       +
       	// Create client with seal secret

     

       25
       25
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       26
       26
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       27
       27
       +
       	}

     

       28
       28
       +
       

     

       29
       29
       +
       	did := "did:plc:abc123"

     

       30
       30
       +
       	sessionID := "session-xyz"

     

       31
       31
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       32
       32
       +
       

     

       33
       33
       +
       	// Seal the session

     

       34
       34
       +
       	token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       35
       35
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       36
       36
       +
       	require.NotEmpty(t, token)

     

       37
       37
       +
       

     

       38
       38
       +
       	// Token should be base64url encoded

     

       39
       39
       +
       	_, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)

     

       40
       40
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "token should be valid base64url")

     

       41
       41
       +
       

     

       42
       42
       +
       	// Unseal the session

     

       43
       43
       +
       	session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)

     

       44
       44
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       45
       45
       +
       	require.NotNil(t, session)

     

       46
       46
       +
       

     

       47
       47
       +
       	// Verify data

     

       48
       48
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)

     

       49
       49
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, sessionID, session.SessionID)

     

       50
       50
       +
       

     

       51
       51
       +
       	// Verify expiration is approximately correct (within 1 second)

     

       52
       52
       +
       	expectedExpiry := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()

     

       53
       53
       +
       	assert.InDelta(t, expectedExpiry, session.ExpiresAt, 1.0)

     

       54
       54
       +
       }

     

       55
       55
       +
       

     

       56
       56
       +
       func TestSealSession_ExpirationValidation(t *testing.T) {

     

       57
       57
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       58
       58
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       59
       59
       +
       	}

     

       60
       60
       +
       

     

       61
       61
       +
       	did := "did:plc:abc123"

     

       62
       62
       +
       	sessionID := "session-xyz"

     

       63
       63
       +
       	ttl := 2 * time.Second // Short TTL (must be >= 1 second due to Unix timestamp granularity)

     

       64
       64
       +
       

     

       65
       65
       +
       	// Seal the session

     

       66
       66
       +
       	token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       67
       67
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       68
       68
       +
       

     

       69
       69
       +
       	// Should work immediately

     

       70
       70
       +
       	session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)

     

       71
       71
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       72
       72
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)

     

       73
       73
       +
       

     

       74
       74
       +
       	// Wait well past expiration

     

       75
       75
       +
       	time.Sleep(2500 * time.Millisecond)

     

       76
       76
       +
       

     

       77
       77
       +
       	// Should fail after expiration

     

       78
       78
       +
       	session, err = client.UnsealSession(token)

     

       79
       79
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err)

     

       80
       80
       +
       	assert.Nil(t, session)

     

       81
       81
       +
       	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "token expired")

     

       82
       82
       +
       }

     

       83
       83
       +
       

     

       84
       84
       +
       func TestSealSession_TamperedTokenDetection(t *testing.T) {

     

       85
       85
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       86
       86
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       87
       87
       +
       	}

     

       88
       88
       +
       

     

       89
       89
       +
       	did := "did:plc:abc123"

     

       90
       90
       +
       	sessionID := "session-xyz"

     

       91
       91
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       92
       92
       +
       

     

       93
       93
       +
       	// Seal the session

     

       94
       94
       +
       	token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       95
       95
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       96
       96
       +
       

     

       97
       97
       +
       	// Tamper with the token by modifying one character

     

       98
       98
       +
       	tampered := token[:len(token)-5] + "XXXX" + token[len(token)-1:]

     

       99
       99
       +
       

     

       100
       100
       +
       	// Should fail to unseal tampered token

     

       101
       101
       +
       	session, err := client.UnsealSession(tampered)

     

       102
       102
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err)

     

       103
       103
       +
       	assert.Nil(t, session)

     

       104
       104
       +
       	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed to decrypt token")

     

       105
       105
       +
       }

     

       106
       106
       +
       

     

       107
       107
       +
       func TestSealSession_InvalidTokenFormats(t *testing.T) {

     

       108
       108
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       109
       109
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       110
       110
       +
       	}

     

       111
       111
       +
       

     

       112
       112
       +
       	tests := []struct {

     

       113
       113
       +
       		name  string

     

       114
       114
       +
       		token string

     

       115
       115
       +
       	}{

     

       116
       116
       +
       		{

     

       117
       117
       +
       			name:  "empty token",

     

       118
       118
       +
       			token: "",

     

       119
       119
       +
       		},

     

       120
       120
       +
       		{

     

       121
       121
       +
       			name:  "invalid base64",

     

       122
       122
       +
       			token: "not-valid-base64!@#$",

     

       123
       123
       +
       		},

     

       124
       124
       +
       		{

     

       125
       125
       +
       			name:  "too short",

     

       126
       126
       +
       			token: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("short")),

     

       127
       127
       +
       		},

     

       128
       128
       +
       		{

     

       129
       129
       +
       			name:  "random bytes",

     

       130
       130
       +
       			token: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, 50)),

     

       131
       131
       +
       		},

     

       132
       132
       +
       	}

     

       133
       133
       +
       

     

       134
       134
       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       135
       135
       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       136
       136
       +
       			session, err := client.UnsealSession(tt.token)

     

       137
       137
       +
       			assert.Error(t, err)

     

       138
       138
       +
       			assert.Nil(t, session)

     

       139
       139
       +
       		})

     

       140
       140
       +
       	}

     

       141
       141
       +
       }

     

       142
       142
       +
       

     

       143
       143
       +
       func TestSealSession_DifferentSecrets(t *testing.T) {

     

       144
       144
       +
       	// Create two clients with different secrets

     

       145
       145
       +
       	client1 := &OAuthClient{

     

       146
       146
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       147
       147
       +
       	}

     

       148
       148
       +
       	client2 := &OAuthClient{

     

       149
       149
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       150
       150
       +
       	}

     

       151
       151
       +
       

     

       152
       152
       +
       	did := "did:plc:abc123"

     

       153
       153
       +
       	sessionID := "session-xyz"

     

       154
       154
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       155
       155
       +
       

     

       156
       156
       +
       	// Seal with client1

     

       157
       157
       +
       	token, err := client1.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       158
       158
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       159
       159
       +
       

     

       160
       160
       +
       	// Try to unseal with client2 (different secret)

     

       161
       161
       +
       	session, err := client2.UnsealSession(token)

     

       162
       162
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err)

     

       163
       163
       +
       	assert.Nil(t, session)

     

       164
       164
       +
       	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed to decrypt token")

     

       165
       165
       +
       }

     

       166
       166
       +
       

     

       167
       167
       +
       func TestSealSession_NoSecretConfigured(t *testing.T) {

     

       168
       168
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       169
       169
       +
       		SealSecret: nil,

     

       170
       170
       +
       	}

     

       171
       171
       +
       

     

       172
       172
       +
       	did := "did:plc:abc123"

     

       173
       173
       +
       	sessionID := "session-xyz"

     

       174
       174
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       175
       175
       +
       

     

       176
       176
       +
       	// Should fail to seal without secret

     

       177
       177
       +
       	token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       178
       178
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err)

     

       179
       179
       +
       	assert.Empty(t, token)

     

       180
       180
       +
       	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "seal secret not configured")

     

       181
       181
       +
       

     

       182
       182
       +
       	// Should fail to unseal without secret

     

       183
       183
       +
       	session, err := client.UnsealSession("dummy-token")

     

       184
       184
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err)

     

       185
       185
       +
       	assert.Nil(t, session)

     

       186
       186
       +
       	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "seal secret not configured")

     

       187
       187
       +
       }

     

       188
       188
       +
       

     

       189
       189
       +
       func TestSealSession_MissingRequiredFields(t *testing.T) {

     

       190
       190
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       191
       191
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       192
       192
       +
       	}

     

       193
       193
       +
       

     

       194
       194
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       195
       195
       +
       

     

       196
       196
       +
       	tests := []struct {

     

       197
       197
       +
       		name      string

     

       198
       198
       +
       		did       string

     

       199
       199
       +
       		sessionID string

     

       200
       200
       +
       		errorMsg  string

     

       201
       201
       +
       	}{

     

       202
       202
       +
       		{

     

       203
       203
       +
       			name:      "missing DID",

     

       204
       204
       +
       			did:       "",

     

       205
       205
       +
       			sessionID: "session-123",

     

       206
       206
       +
       			errorMsg:  "DID is required",

     

       207
       207
       +
       		},

     

       208
       208
       +
       		{

     

       209
       209
       +
       			name:      "missing session ID",

     

       210
       210
       +
       			did:       "did:plc:abc123",

     

       211
       211
       +
       			sessionID: "",

     

       212
       212
       +
       			errorMsg:  "session ID is required",

     

       213
       213
       +
       		},

     

       214
       214
       +
       	}

     

       215
       215
       +
       

     

       216
       216
       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       217
       217
       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       218
       218
       +
       			token, err := client.SealSession(tt.did, tt.sessionID, ttl)

     

       219
       219
       +
       			assert.Error(t, err)

     

       220
       220
       +
       			assert.Empty(t, token)

     

       221
       221
       +
       			assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.errorMsg)

     

       222
       222
       +
       		})

     

       223
       223
       +
       	}

     

       224
       224
       +
       }

     

       225
       225
       +
       

     

       226
       226
       +
       func TestSealSession_UniquenessPerCall(t *testing.T) {

     

       227
       227
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       228
       228
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       229
       229
       +
       	}

     

       230
       230
       +
       

     

       231
       231
       +
       	did := "did:plc:abc123"

     

       232
       232
       +
       	sessionID := "session-xyz"

     

       233
       233
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       234
       234
       +
       

     

       235
       235
       +
       	// Seal the same session twice

     

       236
       236
       +
       	token1, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       237
       237
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       238
       238
       +
       

     

       239
       239
       +
       	token2, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       240
       240
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       241
       241
       +
       

     

       242
       242
       +
       	// Tokens should be different (different nonces)

     

       243
       243
       +
       	assert.NotEqual(t, token1, token2, "tokens should be unique due to different nonces")

     

       244
       244
       +
       

     

       245
       245
       +
       	// But both should unseal to the same session data

     

       246
       246
       +
       	session1, err := client.UnsealSession(token1)

     

       247
       247
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       248
       248
       +
       

     

       249
       249
       +
       	session2, err := client.UnsealSession(token2)

     

       250
       250
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       251
       251
       +
       

     

       252
       252
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session1.DID, session2.DID)

     

       253
       253
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session1.SessionID, session2.SessionID)

     

       254
       254
       +
       }

     

       255
       255
       +
       

     

       256
       256
       +
       func TestSealSession_LongDIDAndSessionID(t *testing.T) {

     

       257
       257
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       258
       258
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       259
       259
       +
       	}

     

       260
       260
       +
       

     

       261
       261
       +
       	// Test with very long DID and session ID

     

       262
       262
       +
       	did := "did:plc:" + strings.Repeat("a", 200)

     

       263
       263
       +
       	sessionID := "session-" + strings.Repeat("x", 200)

     

       264
       264
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       265
       265
       +
       

     

       266
       266
       +
       	// Should work with long values

     

       267
       267
       +
       	token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       268
       268
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       269
       269
       +
       

     

       270
       270
       +
       	session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)

     

       271
       271
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       272
       272
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)

     

       273
       273
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, sessionID, session.SessionID)

     

       274
       274
       +
       }

     

       275
       275
       +
       

     

       276
       276
       +
       func TestSealSession_URLSafeEncoding(t *testing.T) {

     

       277
       277
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       278
       278
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       279
       279
       +
       	}

     

       280
       280
       +
       

     

       281
       281
       +
       	did := "did:plc:abc123"

     

       282
       282
       +
       	sessionID := "session-xyz"

     

       283
       283
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       284
       284
       +
       

     

       285
       285
       +
       	// Seal multiple times to get different nonces

     

       286
       286
       +
       	for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {

     

       287
       287
       +
       		token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       288
       288
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       289
       289
       +
       

     

       290
       290
       +
       		// Token should not contain URL-unsafe characters

     

       291
       291
       +
       		assert.NotContains(t, token, "+", "token should not contain '+'")

     

       292
       292
       +
       		assert.NotContains(t, token, "/", "token should not contain '/'")

     

       293
       293
       +
       		assert.NotContains(t, token, "=", "token should not contain '='")

     

       294
       294
       +
       

     

       295
       295
       +
       		// Should unseal successfully

     

       296
       296
       +
       		session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)

     

       297
       297
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       298
       298
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)

     

       299
       299
       +
       	}

     

       300
       300
       +
       }

     

       301
       301
       +
       

     

       302
       302
       +
       func TestSealSession_ConcurrentAccess(t *testing.T) {

     

       303
       303
       +
       	client := &OAuthClient{

     

       304
       304
       +
       		SealSecret: generateSealSecret(),

     

       305
       305
       +
       	}

     

       306
       306
       +
       

     

       307
       307
       +
       	did := "did:plc:abc123"

     

       308
       308
       +
       	sessionID := "session-xyz"

     

       309
       309
       +
       	ttl := 1 * time.Hour

     

       310
       310
       +
       

     

       311
       311
       +
       	// Run concurrent seal/unseal operations

     

       312
       312
       +
       	done := make(chan bool)

     

       313
       313
       +
       	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {

     

       314
       314
       +
       		go func() {

     

       315
       315
       +
       			for j := 0; j < 100; j++ {

     

       316
       316
       +
       				token, err := client.SealSession(did, sessionID, ttl)

     

       317
       317
       +
       				require.NoError(t, err)

     

       318
       318
       +
       

     

       319
       319
       +
       				session, err := client.UnsealSession(token)

     

       320
       320
       +
       				require.NoError(t, err)

     

       321
       321
       +
       				assert.Equal(t, did, session.DID)

     

       322
       322
       +
       			}

     

       323
       323
       +
       			done <- true

     

       324
       324
       +
       		}()

     

       325
       325
       +
       	}

     

       326
       326
       +
       

     

       327
       327
       +
       	// Wait for all goroutines

     

       328
       328
       +
       	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {

     

       329
       329
       +
       		<-done

     

       330
       330
       +
       	}

     

       331
       331
       +
       }

+614

internal/atproto/oauth/store.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package oauth

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"context"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"database/sql"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"errors"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"fmt"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"log/slog"

     

       9
       9
       +
       	"net/url"

     

       10
       10
       +
       	"strings"

     

       11
       11
       +
       	"time"

     

       12
       12
       +
       

     

       13
       13
       +
       	"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"

     

       14
       14
       +
       	"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"

     

       15
       15
       +
       	"github.com/lib/pq"

     

       16
       16
       +
       )

     

       17
       17
       +
       

     

       18
       18
       +
       var (

     

       19
       19
       +
       	ErrSessionNotFound     = errors.New("oauth session not found")

     

       20
       20
       +
       	ErrAuthRequestNotFound = errors.New("oauth auth request not found")

     

       21
       21
       +
       )

     

       22
       22
       +
       

     

       23
       23
       +
       // PostgresOAuthStore implements oauth.ClientAuthStore interface using PostgreSQL

     

       24
       24
       +
       type PostgresOAuthStore struct {

     

       25
       25
       +
       	db         *sql.DB

     

       26
       26
       +
       	sessionTTL time.Duration

     

       27
       27
       +
       }

     

       28
       28
       +
       

     

       29
       29
       +
       // NewPostgresOAuthStore creates a new PostgreSQL-backed OAuth store

     

       30
       30
       +
       func NewPostgresOAuthStore(db *sql.DB, sessionTTL time.Duration) oauth.ClientAuthStore {

     

       31
       31
       +
       	if sessionTTL == 0 {

     

       32
       32
       +
       		sessionTTL = 7 * 24 * time.Hour // Default to 7 days

     

       33
       33
       +
       	}

     

       34
       34
       +
       	return &PostgresOAuthStore{

     

       35
       35
       +
       		db:         db,

     

       36
       36
       +
       		sessionTTL: sessionTTL,

     

       37
       37
       +
       	}

     

       38
       38
       +
       }

     

       39
       39
       +
       

     

       40
       40
       +
       // GetSession retrieves a session by DID and session ID

     

       41
       41
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) GetSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) (*oauth.ClientSessionData, error) {

     

       42
       42
       +
       	query := `

     

       43
       43
       +
       		SELECT

     

       44
       44
       +
       			did, session_id, host_url, auth_server_iss,

     

       45
       45
       +
       			auth_server_token_endpoint, auth_server_revocation_endpoint,

     

       46
       46
       +
       			scopes, access_token, refresh_token,

     

       47
       47
       +
       			dpop_authserver_nonce, dpop_pds_nonce, dpop_private_key_multibase

     

       48
       48
       +
       		FROM oauth_sessions

     

       49
       49
       +
       		WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2 AND expires_at > NOW()

     

       50
       50
       +
       	`

     

       51
       51
       +
       

     

       52
       52
       +
       	var session oauth.ClientSessionData

     

       53
       53
       +
       	var authServerIss, authServerTokenEndpoint, authServerRevocationEndpoint sql.NullString

     

       54
       54
       +
       	var hostURL, dpopPrivateKeyMultibase sql.NullString

     

       55
       55
       +
       	var scopes pq.StringArray

     

       56
       56
       +
       	var dpopAuthServerNonce, dpopHostNonce sql.NullString

     

       57
       57
       +
       

     

       58
       58
       +
       	err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, did.String(), sessionID).Scan(

     

       59
       59
       +
       		&session.AccountDID,

     

       60
       60
       +
       		&session.SessionID,

     

       61
       61
       +
       		&hostURL,

     

       62
       62
       +
       		&authServerIss,

     

       63
       63
       +
       		&authServerTokenEndpoint,

     

       64
       64
       +
       		&authServerRevocationEndpoint,

     

       65
       65
       +
       		&scopes,

     

       66
       66
       +
       		&session.AccessToken,

     

       67
       67
       +
       		&session.RefreshToken,

     

       68
       68
       +
       		&dpopAuthServerNonce,

     

       69
       69
       +
       		&dpopHostNonce,

     

       70
       70
       +
       		&dpopPrivateKeyMultibase,

     

       71
       71
       +
       	)

     

       72
       72
       +
       

     

       73
       73
       +
       	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {

     

       74
       74
       +
       		return nil, ErrSessionNotFound

     

       75
       75
       +
       	}

     

       76
       76
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       77
       77
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get session: %w", err)

     

       78
       78
       +
       	}

     

       79
       79
       +
       

     

       80
       80
       +
       	// Convert nullable fields

     

       81
       81
       +
       	if hostURL.Valid {

     

       82
       82
       +
       		session.HostURL = hostURL.String

     

       83
       83
       +
       	}

     

       84
       84
       +
       	if authServerIss.Valid {

     

       85
       85
       +
       		session.AuthServerURL = authServerIss.String

     

       86
       86
       +
       	}

     

       87
       87
       +
       	if authServerTokenEndpoint.Valid {

     

       88
       88
       +
       		session.AuthServerTokenEndpoint = authServerTokenEndpoint.String

     

       89
       89
       +
       	}

     

       90
       90
       +
       	if authServerRevocationEndpoint.Valid {

     

       91
       91
       +
       		session.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint = authServerRevocationEndpoint.String

     

       92
       92
       +
       	}

     

       93
       93
       +
       	if dpopAuthServerNonce.Valid {

     

       94
       94
       +
       		session.DPoPAuthServerNonce = dpopAuthServerNonce.String

     

       95
       95
       +
       	}

     

       96
       96
       +
       	if dpopHostNonce.Valid {

     

       97
       97
       +
       		session.DPoPHostNonce = dpopHostNonce.String

     

       98
       98
       +
       	}

     

       99
       99
       +
       	if dpopPrivateKeyMultibase.Valid {

     

       100
       100
       +
       		session.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase = dpopPrivateKeyMultibase.String

     

       101
       101
       +
       	}

     

       102
       102
       +
       	session.Scopes = scopes

     

       103
       103
       +
       

     

       104
       104
       +
       	return &session, nil

     

       105
       105
       +
       }

     

       106
       106
       +
       

     

       107
       107
       +
       // SaveSession saves or updates a session (upsert operation)

     

       108
       108
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) SaveSession(ctx context.Context, sess oauth.ClientSessionData) error {

     

       109
       109
       +
       	// Input validation per atProto OAuth security requirements

     

       110
       110
       +
       

     

       111
       111
       +
       	// Validate DID format

     

       112
       112
       +
       	if _, err := syntax.ParseDID(sess.AccountDID.String()); err != nil {

     

       113
       113
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("invalid DID format: %w", err)

     

       114
       114
       +
       	}

     

       115
       115
       +
       

     

       116
       116
       +
       	// Validate token lengths (max 10000 chars to prevent memory issues)

     

       117
       117
       +
       	const maxTokenLength = 10000

     

       118
       118
       +
       	if len(sess.AccessToken) > maxTokenLength {

     

       119
       119
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("access_token exceeds maximum length of %d characters", maxTokenLength)

     

       120
       120
       +
       	}

     

       121
       121
       +
       	if len(sess.RefreshToken) > maxTokenLength {

     

       122
       122
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("refresh_token exceeds maximum length of %d characters", maxTokenLength)

     

       123
       123
       +
       	}

     

       124
       124
       +
       

     

       125
       125
       +
       	// Validate session ID is not empty

     

       126
       126
       +
       	if sess.SessionID == "" {

     

       127
       127
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("session_id cannot be empty")

     

       128
       128
       +
       	}

     

       129
       129
       +
       

     

       130
       130
       +
       	// Validate URLs if provided

     

       131
       131
       +
       	if sess.HostURL != "" {

     

       132
       132
       +
       		if _, err := url.Parse(sess.HostURL); err != nil {

     

       133
       133
       +
       			return fmt.Errorf("invalid host_url: %w", err)

     

       134
       134
       +
       		}

     

       135
       135
       +
       	}

     

       136
       136
       +
       	if sess.AuthServerURL != "" {

     

       137
       137
       +
       		if _, err := url.Parse(sess.AuthServerURL); err != nil {

     

       138
       138
       +
       			return fmt.Errorf("invalid auth_server URL: %w", err)

     

       139
       139
       +
       		}

     

       140
       140
       +
       	}

     

       141
       141
       +
       	if sess.AuthServerTokenEndpoint != "" {

     

       142
       142
       +
       		if _, err := url.Parse(sess.AuthServerTokenEndpoint); err != nil {

     

       143
       143
       +
       			return fmt.Errorf("invalid auth_server_token_endpoint: %w", err)

     

       144
       144
       +
       		}

     

       145
       145
       +
       	}

     

       146
       146
       +
       	if sess.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint != "" {

     

       147
       147
       +
       		if _, err := url.Parse(sess.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint); err != nil {

     

       148
       148
       +
       			return fmt.Errorf("invalid auth_server_revocation_endpoint: %w", err)

     

       149
       149
       +
       		}

     

       150
       150
       +
       	}

     

       151
       151
       +
       

     

       152
       152
       +
       	query := `

     

       153
       153
       +
       		INSERT INTO oauth_sessions (

     

       154
       154
       +
       			did, session_id, handle, pds_url, host_url,

     

       155
       155
       +
       			access_token, refresh_token,

     

       156
       156
       +
       			dpop_private_jwk, dpop_private_key_multibase,

     

       157
       157
       +
       			dpop_authserver_nonce, dpop_pds_nonce,

     

       158
       158
       +
       			auth_server_iss, auth_server_token_endpoint, auth_server_revocation_endpoint,

     

       159
       159
       +
       			scopes, expires_at, created_at, updated_at

     

       160
       160
       +
       		) VALUES (

     

       161
       161
       +
       			$1, $2, $3, $4, $5,

     

       162
       162
       +
       			$6, $7,

     

       163
       163
       +
       			NULL, $8,

     

       164
       164
       +
       			$9, $10,

     

       165
       165
       +
       			$11, $12, $13,

     

       166
       166
       +
       			$14, $15, NOW(), NOW()

     

       167
       167
       +
       		)

     

       168
       168
       +
       		ON CONFLICT (did, session_id) DO UPDATE SET

     

       169
       169
       +
       			handle = EXCLUDED.handle,

     

       170
       170
       +
       			pds_url = EXCLUDED.pds_url,

     

       171
       171
       +
       			host_url = EXCLUDED.host_url,

     

       172
       172
       +
       			access_token = EXCLUDED.access_token,

     

       173
       173
       +
       			refresh_token = EXCLUDED.refresh_token,

     

       174
       174
       +
       			dpop_private_key_multibase = EXCLUDED.dpop_private_key_multibase,

     

       175
       175
       +
       			dpop_authserver_nonce = EXCLUDED.dpop_authserver_nonce,

     

       176
       176
       +
       			dpop_pds_nonce = EXCLUDED.dpop_pds_nonce,

     

       177
       177
       +
       			auth_server_iss = EXCLUDED.auth_server_iss,

     

       178
       178
       +
       			auth_server_token_endpoint = EXCLUDED.auth_server_token_endpoint,

     

       179
       179
       +
       			auth_server_revocation_endpoint = EXCLUDED.auth_server_revocation_endpoint,

     

       180
       180
       +
       			scopes = EXCLUDED.scopes,

     

       181
       181
       +
       			expires_at = EXCLUDED.expires_at,

     

       182
       182
       +
       			updated_at = NOW()

     

       183
       183
       +
       	`

     

       184
       184
       +
       

     

       185
       185
       +
       	// Calculate token expiration using configured TTL

     

       186
       186
       +
       	expiresAt := time.Now().Add(s.sessionTTL)

     

       187
       187
       +
       

     

       188
       188
       +
       	// Convert empty strings to NULL for optional fields

     

       189
       189
       +
       	var authServerRevocationEndpoint sql.NullString

     

       190
       190
       +
       	if sess.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint != "" {

     

       191
       191
       +
       		authServerRevocationEndpoint.String = sess.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint

     

       192
       192
       +
       		authServerRevocationEndpoint.Valid = true

     

       193
       193
       +
       	}

     

       194
       194
       +
       

     

       195
       195
       +
       	// Extract handle from DID (placeholder - in real implementation, resolve from identity)

     

       196
       196
       +
       	// For now, use DID as handle since we don't have the handle in ClientSessionData

     

       197
       197
       +
       	handle := sess.AccountDID.String()

     

       198
       198
       +
       

     

       199
       199
       +
       	// Use HostURL as PDS URL

     

       200
       200
       +
       	pdsURL := sess.HostURL

     

       201
       201
       +
       	if pdsURL == "" {

     

       202
       202
       +
       		pdsURL = sess.AuthServerURL // Fallback to auth server URL

     

       203
       203
       +
       	}

     

       204
       204
       +
       

     

       205
       205
       +
       	_, err := s.db.ExecContext(

     

       206
       206
       +
       		ctx, query,

     

       207
       207
       +
       		sess.AccountDID.String(),

     

       208
       208
       +
       		sess.SessionID,

     

       209
       209
       +
       		handle,

     

       210
       210
       +
       		pdsURL,

     

       211
       211
       +
       		sess.HostURL,

     

       212
       212
       +
       		sess.AccessToken,

     

       213
       213
       +
       		sess.RefreshToken,

     

       214
       214
       +
       		sess.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase,

     

       215
       215
       +
       		sess.DPoPAuthServerNonce,

     

       216
       216
       +
       		sess.DPoPHostNonce,

     

       217
       217
       +
       		sess.AuthServerURL,

     

       218
       218
       +
       		sess.AuthServerTokenEndpoint,

     

       219
       219
       +
       		authServerRevocationEndpoint,

     

       220
       220
       +
       		pq.Array(sess.Scopes),

     

       221
       221
       +
       		expiresAt,

     

       222
       222
       +
       	)

     

       223
       223
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       224
       224
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save session: %w", err)

     

       225
       225
       +
       	}

     

       226
       226
       +
       

     

       227
       227
       +
       	return nil

     

       228
       228
       +
       }

     

       229
       229
       +
       

     

       230
       230
       +
       // DeleteSession deletes a session by DID and session ID

     

       231
       231
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) DeleteSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) error {

     

       232
       232
       +
       	query := `DELETE FROM oauth_sessions WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2`

     

       233
       233
       +
       

     

       234
       234
       +
       	result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, did.String(), sessionID)

     

       235
       235
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       236
       236
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete session: %w", err)

     

       237
       237
       +
       	}

     

       238
       238
       +
       

     

       239
       239
       +
       	rows, err := result.RowsAffected()

     

       240
       240
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       241
       241
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)

     

       242
       242
       +
       	}

     

       243
       243
       +
       

     

       244
       244
       +
       	if rows == 0 {

     

       245
       245
       +
       		return ErrSessionNotFound

     

       246
       246
       +
       	}

     

       247
       247
       +
       

     

       248
       248
       +
       	return nil

     

       249
       249
       +
       }

     

       250
       250
       +
       

     

       251
       251
       +
       // GetAuthRequestInfo retrieves auth request information by state

     

       252
       252
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) (*oauth.AuthRequestData, error) {

     

       253
       253
       +
       	query := `

     

       254
       254
       +
       		SELECT

     

       255
       255
       +
       			state, did, handle, pds_url, pkce_verifier,

     

       256
       256
       +
       			dpop_private_key_multibase, dpop_authserver_nonce,

     

       257
       257
       +
       			auth_server_iss, request_uri,

     

       258
       258
       +
       			auth_server_token_endpoint, auth_server_revocation_endpoint,

     

       259
       259
       +
       			scopes, created_at

     

       260
       260
       +
       		FROM oauth_requests

     

       261
       261
       +
       		WHERE state = $1

     

       262
       262
       +
       	`

     

       263
       263
       +
       

     

       264
       264
       +
       	var info oauth.AuthRequestData

     

       265
       265
       +
       	var did, handle, pdsURL sql.NullString

     

       266
       266
       +
       	var dpopPrivateKeyMultibase, dpopAuthServerNonce sql.NullString

     

       267
       267
       +
       	var requestURI, authServerTokenEndpoint, authServerRevocationEndpoint sql.NullString

     

       268
       268
       +
       	var scopes pq.StringArray

     

       269
       269
       +
       	var createdAt time.Time

     

       270
       270
       +
       

     

       271
       271
       +
       	err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, state).Scan(

     

       272
       272
       +
       		&info.State,

     

       273
       273
       +
       		&did,

     

       274
       274
       +
       		&handle,

     

       275
       275
       +
       		&pdsURL,

     

       276
       276
       +
       		&info.PKCEVerifier,

     

       277
       277
       +
       		&dpopPrivateKeyMultibase,

     

       278
       278
       +
       		&dpopAuthServerNonce,

     

       279
       279
       +
       		&info.AuthServerURL,

     

       280
       280
       +
       		&requestURI,

     

       281
       281
       +
       		&authServerTokenEndpoint,

     

       282
       282
       +
       		&authServerRevocationEndpoint,

     

       283
       283
       +
       		&scopes,

     

       284
       284
       +
       		&createdAt,

     

       285
       285
       +
       	)

     

       286
       286
       +
       

     

       287
       287
       +
       	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {

     

       288
       288
       +
       		return nil, ErrAuthRequestNotFound

     

       289
       289
       +
       	}

     

       290
       290
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       291
       291
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get auth request info: %w", err)

     

       292
       292
       +
       	}

     

       293
       293
       +
       

     

       294
       294
       +
       	// Parse DID if present

     

       295
       295
       +
       	if did.Valid && did.String != "" {

     

       296
       296
       +
       		parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(did.String)

     

       297
       297
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       298
       298
       +
       			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse DID: %w", err)

     

       299
       299
       +
       		}

     

       300
       300
       +
       		info.AccountDID = &parsedDID

     

       301
       301
       +
       	}

     

       302
       302
       +
       

     

       303
       303
       +
       	// Convert nullable fields

     

       304
       304
       +
       	if dpopPrivateKeyMultibase.Valid {

     

       305
       305
       +
       		info.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase = dpopPrivateKeyMultibase.String

     

       306
       306
       +
       	}

     

       307
       307
       +
       	if dpopAuthServerNonce.Valid {

     

       308
       308
       +
       		info.DPoPAuthServerNonce = dpopAuthServerNonce.String

     

       309
       309
       +
       	}

     

       310
       310
       +
       	if requestURI.Valid {

     

       311
       311
       +
       		info.RequestURI = requestURI.String

     

       312
       312
       +
       	}

     

       313
       313
       +
       	if authServerTokenEndpoint.Valid {

     

       314
       314
       +
       		info.AuthServerTokenEndpoint = authServerTokenEndpoint.String

     

       315
       315
       +
       	}

     

       316
       316
       +
       	if authServerRevocationEndpoint.Valid {

     

       317
       317
       +
       		info.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint = authServerRevocationEndpoint.String

     

       318
       318
       +
       	}

     

       319
       319
       +
       	info.Scopes = scopes

     

       320
       320
       +
       

     

       321
       321
       +
       	return &info, nil

     

       322
       322
       +
       }

     

       323
       323
       +
       

     

       324
       324
       +
       // SaveAuthRequestInfo saves auth request information (create only, not upsert)

     

       325
       325
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, info oauth.AuthRequestData) error {

     

       326
       326
       +
       	query := `

     

       327
       327
       +
       		INSERT INTO oauth_requests (

     

       328
       328
       +
       			state, did, handle, pds_url, pkce_verifier,

     

       329
       329
       +
       			dpop_private_key_multibase, dpop_authserver_nonce,

     

       330
       330
       +
       			auth_server_iss, request_uri,

     

       331
       331
       +
       			auth_server_token_endpoint, auth_server_revocation_endpoint,

     

       332
       332
       +
       			scopes, return_url, created_at

     

       333
       333
       +
       		) VALUES (

     

       334
       334
       +
       			$1, $2, $3, $4, $5,

     

       335
       335
       +
       			$6, $7,

     

       336
       336
       +
       			$8, $9,

     

       337
       337
       +
       			$10, $11,

     

       338
       338
       +
       			$12, NULL, NOW()

     

       339
       339
       +
       		)

     

       340
       340
       +
       	`

     

       341
       341
       +
       

     

       342
       342
       +
       	// Extract DID string if present

     

       343
       343
       +
       	var didStr sql.NullString

     

       344
       344
       +
       	if info.AccountDID != nil {

     

       345
       345
       +
       		didStr.String = info.AccountDID.String()

     

       346
       346
       +
       		didStr.Valid = true

     

       347
       347
       +
       	}

     

       348
       348
       +
       

     

       349
       349
       +
       	// Convert empty strings to NULL for optional fields

     

       350
       350
       +
       	var authServerRevocationEndpoint sql.NullString

     

       351
       351
       +
       	if info.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint != "" {

     

       352
       352
       +
       		authServerRevocationEndpoint.String = info.AuthServerRevocationEndpoint

     

       353
       353
       +
       		authServerRevocationEndpoint.Valid = true

     

       354
       354
       +
       	}

     

       355
       355
       +
       

     

       356
       356
       +
       	// Placeholder values for handle and pds_url (not in AuthRequestData)

     

       357
       357
       +
       	// In production, these would be resolved during the auth flow

     

       358
       358
       +
       	handle := ""

     

       359
       359
       +
       	pdsURL := ""

     

       360
       360
       +
       	if info.AccountDID != nil {

     

       361
       361
       +
       		handle = info.AccountDID.String() // Temporary placeholder

     

       362
       362
       +
       		pdsURL = info.AuthServerURL       // Temporary placeholder

     

       363
       363
       +
       	}

     

       364
       364
       +
       

     

       365
       365
       +
       	_, err := s.db.ExecContext(

     

       366
       366
       +
       		ctx, query,

     

       367
       367
       +
       		info.State,

     

       368
       368
       +
       		didStr,

     

       369
       369
       +
       		handle,

     

       370
       370
       +
       		pdsURL,

     

       371
       371
       +
       		info.PKCEVerifier,

     

       372
       372
       +
       		info.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase,

     

       373
       373
       +
       		info.DPoPAuthServerNonce,

     

       374
       374
       +
       		info.AuthServerURL,

     

       375
       375
       +
       		info.RequestURI,

     

       376
       376
       +
       		info.AuthServerTokenEndpoint,

     

       377
       377
       +
       		authServerRevocationEndpoint,

     

       378
       378
       +
       		pq.Array(info.Scopes),

     

       379
       379
       +
       	)

     

       380
       380
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       381
       381
       +
       		// Check for duplicate state

     

       382
       382
       +
       		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "duplicate key") && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "oauth_requests_state_key") {

     

       383
       383
       +
       			return fmt.Errorf("auth request with state already exists: %s", info.State)

     

       384
       384
       +
       		}

     

       385
       385
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save auth request info: %w", err)

     

       386
       386
       +
       	}

     

       387
       387
       +
       

     

       388
       388
       +
       	return nil

     

       389
       389
       +
       }

     

       390
       390
       +
       

     

       391
       391
       +
       // DeleteAuthRequestInfo deletes auth request information by state

     

       392
       392
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) error {

     

       393
       393
       +
       	query := `DELETE FROM oauth_requests WHERE state = $1`

     

       394
       394
       +
       

     

       395
       395
       +
       	result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, state)

     

       396
       396
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       397
       397
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete auth request info: %w", err)

     

       398
       398
       +
       	}

     

       399
       399
       +
       

     

       400
       400
       +
       	rows, err := result.RowsAffected()

     

       401
       401
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       402
       402
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)

     

       403
       403
       +
       	}

     

       404
       404
       +
       

     

       405
       405
       +
       	if rows == 0 {

     

       406
       406
       +
       		return ErrAuthRequestNotFound

     

       407
       407
       +
       	}

     

       408
       408
       +
       

     

       409
       409
       +
       	return nil

     

       410
       410
       +
       }

     

       411
       411
       +
       

     

       412
       412
       +
       // CleanupExpiredSessions removes sessions that have expired

     

       413
       413
       +
       // Should be called periodically (e.g., via cron job)

     

       414
       414
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {

     

       415
       415
       +
       	query := `DELETE FROM oauth_sessions WHERE expires_at < NOW()`

     

       416
       416
       +
       

     

       417
       417
       +
       	result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query)

     

       418
       418
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       419
       419
       +
       		return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to cleanup expired sessions: %w", err)

     

       420
       420
       +
       	}

     

       421
       421
       +
       

     

       422
       422
       +
       	rows, err := result.RowsAffected()

     

       423
       423
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       424
       424
       +
       		return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)

     

       425
       425
       +
       	}

     

       426
       426
       +
       

     

       427
       427
       +
       	return rows, nil

     

       428
       428
       +
       }

     

       429
       429
       +
       

     

       430
       430
       +
       // CleanupExpiredAuthRequests removes auth requests older than 30 minutes

     

       431
       431
       +
       // Should be called periodically (e.g., via cron job)

     

       432
       432
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {

     

       433
       433
       +
       	query := `DELETE FROM oauth_requests WHERE created_at < NOW() - INTERVAL '30 minutes'`

     

       434
       434
       +
       

     

       435
       435
       +
       	result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query)

     

       436
       436
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       437
       437
       +
       		return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to cleanup expired auth requests: %w", err)

     

       438
       438
       +
       	}

     

       439
       439
       +
       

     

       440
       440
       +
       	rows, err := result.RowsAffected()

     

       441
       441
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       442
       442
       +
       		return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)

     

       443
       443
       +
       	}

     

       444
       444
       +
       

     

       445
       445
       +
       	return rows, nil

     

       446
       446
       +
       }

     

       447
       447
       +
       

     

       448
       448
       +
       // MobileOAuthData holds mobile-specific OAuth flow data

     

       449
       449
       +
       type MobileOAuthData struct {

     

       450
       450
       +
       	CSRFToken   string

     

       451
       451
       +
       	RedirectURI string

     

       452
       452
       +
       }

     

       453
       453
       +
       

     

       454
       454
       +
       // mobileFlowContextKey is the context key for mobile flow data

     

       455
       455
       +
       type mobileFlowContextKey struct{}

     

       456
       456
       +
       

     

       457
       457
       +
       // ContextWithMobileFlowData adds mobile flow data to a context.

     

       458
       458
       +
       // This is used by HandleMobileLogin to pass mobile data to the store wrapper,

     

       459
       459
       +
       // which will save it when SaveAuthRequestInfo is called by indigo.

     

       460
       460
       +
       func ContextWithMobileFlowData(ctx context.Context, data MobileOAuthData) context.Context {

     

       461
       461
       +
       	return context.WithValue(ctx, mobileFlowContextKey{}, data)

     

       462
       462
       +
       }

     

       463
       463
       +
       

     

       464
       464
       +
       // getMobileFlowDataFromContext retrieves mobile flow data from context, if present

     

       465
       465
       +
       func getMobileFlowDataFromContext(ctx context.Context) (MobileOAuthData, bool) {

     

       466
       466
       +
       	data, ok := ctx.Value(mobileFlowContextKey{}).(MobileOAuthData)

     

       467
       467
       +
       	return data, ok

     

       468
       468
       +
       }

     

       469
       469
       +
       

     

       470
       470
       +
       // MobileAwareClientStore is a marker interface that indicates a store is properly

     

       471
       471
       +
       // configured for mobile OAuth flows. Only stores that intercept SaveAuthRequestInfo

     

       472
       472
       +
       // to save mobile CSRF data should implement this interface.

     

       473
       473
       +
       // This prevents silent mobile OAuth breakage when a plain PostgresOAuthStore is used.

     

       474
       474
       +
       type MobileAwareClientStore interface {

     

       475
       475
       +
       	IsMobileAware() bool

     

       476
       476
       +
       }

     

       477
       477
       +
       

     

       478
       478
       +
       // MobileAwareStoreWrapper wraps a ClientAuthStore to automatically save mobile

     

       479
       479
       +
       // CSRF data when SaveAuthRequestInfo is called during a mobile OAuth flow.

     

       480
       480
       +
       // This is necessary because indigo's StartAuthFlow doesn't expose the OAuth state,

     

       481
       481
       +
       // so we intercept the SaveAuthRequestInfo call to capture it.

     

       482
       482
       +
       type MobileAwareStoreWrapper struct {

     

       483
       483
       +
       	oauth.ClientAuthStore

     

       484
       484
       +
       	mobileStore MobileOAuthStore

     

       485
       485
       +
       }

     

       486
       486
       +
       

     

       487
       487
       +
       // IsMobileAware implements MobileAwareClientStore, indicating this store

     

       488
       488
       +
       // properly saves mobile CSRF data during OAuth flow initiation.

     

       489
       489
       +
       func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) IsMobileAware() bool {

     

       490
       490
       +
       	return true

     

       491
       491
       +
       }

     

       492
       492
       +
       

     

       493
       493
       +
       // NewMobileAwareStoreWrapper creates a wrapper that intercepts SaveAuthRequestInfo

     

       494
       494
       +
       // to also save mobile CSRF data when present in context.

     

       495
       495
       +
       func NewMobileAwareStoreWrapper(store oauth.ClientAuthStore) *MobileAwareStoreWrapper {

     

       496
       496
       +
       	wrapper := &MobileAwareStoreWrapper{

     

       497
       497
       +
       		ClientAuthStore: store,

     

       498
       498
       +
       	}

     

       499
       499
       +
       	// Check if the underlying store implements MobileOAuthStore

     

       500
       500
       +
       	if ms, ok := store.(MobileOAuthStore); ok {

     

       501
       501
       +
       		wrapper.mobileStore = ms

     

       502
       502
       +
       	}

     

       503
       503
       +
       	return wrapper

     

       504
       504
       +
       }

     

       505
       505
       +
       

     

       506
       506
       +
       // SaveAuthRequestInfo saves the auth request and also saves mobile CSRF data

     

       507
       507
       +
       // if mobile flow data is present in the context.

     

       508
       508
       +
       func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, info oauth.AuthRequestData) error {

     

       509
       509
       +
       	// First, save the auth request to the underlying store

     

       510
       510
       +
       	if err := w.ClientAuthStore.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, info); err != nil {

     

       511
       511
       +
       		return err

     

       512
       512
       +
       	}

     

       513
       513
       +
       

     

       514
       514
       +
       	// Check if this is a mobile flow (mobile data in context)

     

       515
       515
       +
       	if mobileData, ok := getMobileFlowDataFromContext(ctx); ok && w.mobileStore != nil {

     

       516
       516
       +
       		// Save mobile CSRF data tied to this OAuth state

     

       517
       517
       +
       		// IMPORTANT: If this fails, we MUST propagate the error. Otherwise:

     

       518
       518
       +
       		// 1. No server-side CSRF record is stored

     

       519
       519
       +
       		// 2. Every mobile callback will "fail closed" to web flow

     

       520
       520
       +
       		// 3. Mobile sign-in silently breaks with no indication

     

       521
       521
       +
       		// Failing loudly here lets the user retry rather than being confused

     

       522
       522
       +
       		// about why they're getting a web flow instead of mobile.

     

       523
       523
       +
       		if err := w.mobileStore.SaveMobileOAuthData(ctx, info.State, mobileData); err != nil {

     

       524
       524
       +
       			slog.Error("failed to save mobile CSRF data - mobile login will fail",

     

       525
       525
       +
       				"state", info.State, "error", err)

     

       526
       526
       +
       			return fmt.Errorf("failed to save mobile OAuth data: %w", err)

     

       527
       527
       +
       		}

     

       528
       528
       +
       	}

     

       529
       529
       +
       

     

       530
       530
       +
       	return nil

     

       531
       531
       +
       }

     

       532
       532
       +
       

     

       533
       533
       +
       // GetMobileOAuthData implements MobileOAuthStore interface by delegating to underlying store

     

       534
       534
       +
       func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) GetMobileOAuthData(ctx context.Context, state string) (*MobileOAuthData, error) {

     

       535
       535
       +
       	if w.mobileStore != nil {

     

       536
       536
       +
       		return w.mobileStore.GetMobileOAuthData(ctx, state)

     

       537
       537
       +
       	}

     

       538
       538
       +
       	return nil, nil

     

       539
       539
       +
       }

     

       540
       540
       +
       

     

       541
       541
       +
       // SaveMobileOAuthData implements MobileOAuthStore interface by delegating to underlying store

     

       542
       542
       +
       func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) SaveMobileOAuthData(ctx context.Context, state string, data MobileOAuthData) error {

     

       543
       543
       +
       	if w.mobileStore != nil {

     

       544
       544
       +
       		return w.mobileStore.SaveMobileOAuthData(ctx, state, data)

     

       545
       545
       +
       	}

     

       546
       546
       +
       	return nil

     

       547
       547
       +
       }

     

       548
       548
       +
       

     

       549
       549
       +
       // UnwrapPostgresStore returns the underlying PostgresOAuthStore if present.

     

       550
       550
       +
       // This is useful for accessing cleanup methods that aren't part of the interface.

     

       551
       551
       +
       func (w *MobileAwareStoreWrapper) UnwrapPostgresStore() *PostgresOAuthStore {

     

       552
       552
       +
       	if ps, ok := w.ClientAuthStore.(*PostgresOAuthStore); ok {

     

       553
       553
       +
       		return ps

     

       554
       554
       +
       	}

     

       555
       555
       +
       	return nil

     

       556
       556
       +
       }

     

       557
       557
       +
       

     

       558
       558
       +
       // SaveMobileOAuthData stores mobile CSRF data tied to an OAuth state

     

       559
       559
       +
       // This ties the CSRF token to the OAuth flow via the state parameter,

     

       560
       560
       +
       // which comes back through the OAuth response for server-side validation.

     

       561
       561
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) SaveMobileOAuthData(ctx context.Context, state string, data MobileOAuthData) error {

     

       562
       562
       +
       	query := `

     

       563
       563
       +
       		UPDATE oauth_requests

     

       564
       564
       +
       		SET mobile_csrf_token = $2, mobile_redirect_uri = $3

     

       565
       565
       +
       		WHERE state = $1

     

       566
       566
       +
       	`

     

       567
       567
       +
       

     

       568
       568
       +
       	result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, state, data.CSRFToken, data.RedirectURI)

     

       569
       569
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       570
       570
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save mobile OAuth data: %w", err)

     

       571
       571
       +
       	}

     

       572
       572
       +
       

     

       573
       573
       +
       	rows, err := result.RowsAffected()

     

       574
       574
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       575
       575
       +
       		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)

     

       576
       576
       +
       	}

     

       577
       577
       +
       

     

       578
       578
       +
       	if rows == 0 {

     

       579
       579
       +
       		return ErrAuthRequestNotFound

     

       580
       580
       +
       	}

     

       581
       581
       +
       

     

       582
       582
       +
       	return nil

     

       583
       583
       +
       }

     

       584
       584
       +
       

     

       585
       585
       +
       // GetMobileOAuthData retrieves mobile CSRF data by OAuth state

     

       586
       586
       +
       // This is called during callback to compare the server-side CSRF token

     

       587
       587
       +
       // (retrieved by state from the OAuth response) against the cookie CSRF.

     

       588
       588
       +
       func (s *PostgresOAuthStore) GetMobileOAuthData(ctx context.Context, state string) (*MobileOAuthData, error) {

     

       589
       589
       +
       	query := `

     

       590
       590
       +
       		SELECT mobile_csrf_token, mobile_redirect_uri

     

       591
       591
       +
       		FROM oauth_requests

     

       592
       592
       +
       		WHERE state = $1

     

       593
       593
       +
       	`

     

       594
       594
       +
       

     

       595
       595
       +
       	var csrfToken, redirectURI sql.NullString

     

       596
       596
       +
       	err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, state).Scan(&csrfToken, &redirectURI)

     

       597
       597
       +
       

     

       598
       598
       +
       	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {

     

       599
       599
       +
       		return nil, ErrAuthRequestNotFound

     

       600
       600
       +
       	}

     

       601
       601
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       602
       602
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get mobile OAuth data: %w", err)

     

       603
       603
       +
       	}

     

       604
       604
       +
       

     

       605
       605
       +
       	// Return nil if no mobile data was stored (this was a web flow)

     

       606
       606
       +
       	if !csrfToken.Valid {

     

       607
       607
       +
       		return nil, nil

     

       608
       608
       +
       	}

     

       609
       609
       +
       

     

       610
       610
       +
       	return &MobileOAuthData{

     

       611
       611
       +
       		CSRFToken:   csrfToken.String,

     

       612
       612
       +
       		RedirectURI: redirectURI.String,

     

       613
       613
       +
       	}, nil

     

       614
       614
       +
       }

+522

internal/atproto/oauth/store_test.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package oauth

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"context"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"database/sql"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"os"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"testing"

     

       8
       8
       +
       

     

       9
       9
       +
       	"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"

     

       10
       10
       +
       	"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"

     

       11
       11
       +
       	_ "github.com/lib/pq"

     

       12
       12
       +
       	"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"

     

       13
       13
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"

     

       14
       14
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

     

       15
       15
       +
       )

     

       16
       16
       +
       

     

       17
       17
       +
       // setupTestDB creates a test database connection and runs migrations

     

       18
       18
       +
       func setupTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {

     

       19
       19
       +
       	dsn := os.Getenv("TEST_DATABASE_URL")

     

       20
       20
       +
       	if dsn == "" {

     

       21
       21
       +
       		dsn = "postgres://test_user:test_password@localhost:5434/coves_test?sslmode=disable"

     

       22
       22
       +
       	}

     

       23
       23
       +
       

     

       24
       24
       +
       	db, err := sql.Open("postgres", dsn)

     

       25
       25
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to connect to test database")

     

       26
       26
       +
       

     

       27
       27
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       28
       28
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../db/migrations"), "Failed to run migrations")

     

       29
       29
       +
       

     

       30
       30
       +
       	return db

     

       31
       31
       +
       }

     

       32
       32
       +
       

     

       33
       33
       +
       // cleanupOAuth removes all test OAuth data from the database

     

       34
       34
       +
       func cleanupOAuth(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB) {

     

       35
       35
       +
       	_, err := db.Exec("DELETE FROM oauth_sessions WHERE did LIKE 'did:plc:test%'")

     

       36
       36
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to cleanup oauth_sessions")

     

       37
       37
       +
       

     

       38
       38
       +
       	_, err = db.Exec("DELETE FROM oauth_requests WHERE state LIKE 'test%'")

     

       39
       39
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to cleanup oauth_requests")

     

       40
       40
       +
       }

     

       41
       41
       +
       

     

       42
       42
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_SaveAndGetSession(t *testing.T) {

     

       43
       43
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       44
       44
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       45
       45
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       46
       46
       +
       

     

       47
       47
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       48
       48
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       49
       49
       +
       

     

       50
       50
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:test123abc")

     

       51
       51
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       52
       52
       +
       

     

       53
       53
       +
       	session := oauth.ClientSessionData{

     

       54
       54
       +
       		AccountDID:                   did,

     

       55
       55
       +
       		SessionID:                    "session123",

     

       56
       56
       +
       		HostURL:                      "https://pds.example.com",

     

       57
       57
       +
       		AuthServerURL:                "https://auth.example.com",

     

       58
       58
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint:      "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       59
       59
       +
       		AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/revoke",

     

       60
       60
       +
       		Scopes:                       []string{"atproto"},

     

       61
       61
       +
       		AccessToken:                  "at_test_token_abc123",

     

       62
       62
       +
       		RefreshToken:                 "rt_test_token_xyz789",

     

       63
       63
       +
       		DPoPAuthServerNonce:          "nonce_auth_123",

     

       64
       64
       +
       		DPoPHostNonce:                "nonce_host_456",

     

       65
       65
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase:      "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       66
       66
       +
       	}

     

       67
       67
       +
       

     

       68
       68
       +
       	// Save session

     

       69
       69
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session)

     

       70
       70
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       71
       71
       +
       

     

       72
       72
       +
       	// Retrieve session

     

       73
       73
       +
       	retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, "session123")

     

       74
       74
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       75
       75
       +
       	assert.NotNil(t, retrieved)

     

       76
       76
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.AccountDID.String(), retrieved.AccountDID.String())

     

       77
       77
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID)

     

       78
       78
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.HostURL, retrieved.HostURL)

     

       79
       79
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.AuthServerURL, retrieved.AuthServerURL)

     

       80
       80
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.AuthServerTokenEndpoint, retrieved.AuthServerTokenEndpoint)

     

       81
       81
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.AccessToken, retrieved.AccessToken)

     

       82
       82
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.RefreshToken, retrieved.RefreshToken)

     

       83
       83
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.DPoPAuthServerNonce, retrieved.DPoPAuthServerNonce)

     

       84
       84
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.DPoPHostNonce, retrieved.DPoPHostNonce)

     

       85
       85
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase, retrieved.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase)

     

       86
       86
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, session.Scopes, retrieved.Scopes)

     

       87
       87
       +
       }

     

       88
       88
       +
       

     

       89
       89
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_SaveSession_Upsert(t *testing.T) {

     

       90
       90
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       91
       91
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       92
       92
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       93
       93
       +
       

     

       94
       94
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       95
       95
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       96
       96
       +
       

     

       97
       97
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testupsert")

     

       98
       98
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       99
       99
       +
       

     

       100
       100
       +
       	// Initial session

     

       101
       101
       +
       	session1 := oauth.ClientSessionData{

     

       102
       102
       +
       		AccountDID:              did,

     

       103
       103
       +
       		SessionID:               "session_upsert",

     

       104
       104
       +
       		HostURL:                 "https://pds1.example.com",

     

       105
       105
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth1.example.com",

     

       106
       106
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth1.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       107
       107
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       108
       108
       +
       		AccessToken:             "old_access_token",

     

       109
       109
       +
       		RefreshToken:            "old_refresh_token",

     

       110
       110
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       111
       111
       +
       	}

     

       112
       112
       +
       

     

       113
       113
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session1)

     

       114
       114
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       115
       115
       +
       

     

       116
       116
       +
       	// Updated session (same DID and session ID)

     

       117
       117
       +
       	session2 := oauth.ClientSessionData{

     

       118
       118
       +
       		AccountDID:              did,

     

       119
       119
       +
       		SessionID:               "session_upsert",

     

       120
       120
       +
       		HostURL:                 "https://pds2.example.com",

     

       121
       121
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth2.example.com",

     

       122
       122
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth2.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       123
       123
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},

     

       124
       124
       +
       		AccessToken:             "new_access_token",

     

       125
       125
       +
       		RefreshToken:            "new_refresh_token",

     

       126
       126
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktX",

     

       127
       127
       +
       	}

     

       128
       128
       +
       

     

       129
       129
       +
       	// Save again - should update

     

       130
       130
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session2)

     

       131
       131
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       132
       132
       +
       

     

       133
       133
       +
       	// Retrieve should get updated values

     

       134
       134
       +
       	retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, "session_upsert")

     

       135
       135
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       136
       136
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "new_access_token", retrieved.AccessToken)

     

       137
       137
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "new_refresh_token", retrieved.RefreshToken)

     

       138
       138
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "https://pds2.example.com", retrieved.HostURL)

     

       139
       139
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"}, retrieved.Scopes)

     

       140
       140
       +
       }

     

       141
       141
       +
       

     

       142
       142
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_GetSession_NotFound(t *testing.T) {

     

       143
       143
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       144
       144
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       145
       145
       +
       

     

       146
       146
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       147
       147
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       148
       148
       +
       

     

       149
       149
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:nonexistent")

     

       150
       150
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       151
       151
       +
       

     

       152
       152
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, "nonexistent_session")

     

       153
       153
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)

     

       154
       154
       +
       }

     

       155
       155
       +
       

     

       156
       156
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_DeleteSession(t *testing.T) {

     

       157
       157
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       158
       158
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       159
       159
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       160
       160
       +
       

     

       161
       161
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       162
       162
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       163
       163
       +
       

     

       164
       164
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testdelete")

     

       165
       165
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       166
       166
       +
       

     

       167
       167
       +
       	session := oauth.ClientSessionData{

     

       168
       168
       +
       		AccountDID:              did,

     

       169
       169
       +
       		SessionID:               "session_delete",

     

       170
       170
       +
       		HostURL:                 "https://pds.example.com",

     

       171
       171
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth.example.com",

     

       172
       172
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       173
       173
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       174
       174
       +
       		AccessToken:             "test_token",

     

       175
       175
       +
       		RefreshToken:            "test_refresh",

     

       176
       176
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       177
       177
       +
       	}

     

       178
       178
       +
       

     

       179
       179
       +
       	// Save session

     

       180
       180
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session)

     

       181
       181
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       182
       182
       +
       

     

       183
       183
       +
       	// Delete session

     

       184
       184
       +
       	err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, "session_delete")

     

       185
       185
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       186
       186
       +
       

     

       187
       187
       +
       	// Verify session is gone

     

       188
       188
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, "session_delete")

     

       189
       189
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)

     

       190
       190
       +
       }

     

       191
       191
       +
       

     

       192
       192
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_DeleteSession_NotFound(t *testing.T) {

     

       193
       193
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       194
       194
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       195
       195
       +
       

     

       196
       196
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       197
       197
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       198
       198
       +
       

     

       199
       199
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:nonexistent")

     

       200
       200
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       201
       201
       +
       

     

       202
       202
       +
       	err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, "nonexistent_session")

     

       203
       203
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)

     

       204
       204
       +
       }

     

       205
       205
       +
       

     

       206
       206
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_SaveAndGetAuthRequestInfo(t *testing.T) {

     

       207
       207
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       208
       208
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       209
       209
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       210
       210
       +
       

     

       211
       211
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       212
       212
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       213
       213
       +
       

     

       214
       214
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testrequest")

     

       215
       215
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       216
       216
       +
       

     

       217
       217
       +
       	info := oauth.AuthRequestData{

     

       218
       218
       +
       		State:                        "test_state_abc123",

     

       219
       219
       +
       		AuthServerURL:                "https://auth.example.com",

     

       220
       220
       +
       		AccountDID:                   &did,

     

       221
       221
       +
       		Scopes:                       []string{"atproto"},

     

       222
       222
       +
       		RequestURI:                   "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:abc123",

     

       223
       223
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint:      "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       224
       224
       +
       		AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/revoke",

     

       225
       225
       +
       		PKCEVerifier:                 "verifier_xyz789",

     

       226
       226
       +
       		DPoPAuthServerNonce:          "nonce_abc",

     

       227
       227
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase:      "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       228
       228
       +
       	}

     

       229
       229
       +
       

     

       230
       230
       +
       	// Save auth request info

     

       231
       231
       +
       	err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, info)

     

       232
       232
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       233
       233
       +
       

     

       234
       234
       +
       	// Retrieve auth request info

     

       235
       235
       +
       	retrieved, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_state_abc123")

     

       236
       236
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       237
       237
       +
       	assert.NotNil(t, retrieved)

     

       238
       238
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.State, retrieved.State)

     

       239
       239
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.AuthServerURL, retrieved.AuthServerURL)

     

       240
       240
       +
       	assert.NotNil(t, retrieved.AccountDID)

     

       241
       241
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.AccountDID.String(), retrieved.AccountDID.String())

     

       242
       242
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.Scopes, retrieved.Scopes)

     

       243
       243
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.RequestURI, retrieved.RequestURI)

     

       244
       244
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.AuthServerTokenEndpoint, retrieved.AuthServerTokenEndpoint)

     

       245
       245
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.PKCEVerifier, retrieved.PKCEVerifier)

     

       246
       246
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.DPoPAuthServerNonce, retrieved.DPoPAuthServerNonce)

     

       247
       247
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase, retrieved.DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase)

     

       248
       248
       +
       }

     

       249
       249
       +
       

     

       250
       250
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_SaveAuthRequestInfo_NoDID(t *testing.T) {

     

       251
       251
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       252
       252
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       253
       253
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       254
       254
       +
       

     

       255
       255
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       256
       256
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       257
       257
       +
       

     

       258
       258
       +
       	info := oauth.AuthRequestData{

     

       259
       259
       +
       		State:                   "test_state_nodid",

     

       260
       260
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth.example.com",

     

       261
       261
       +
       		AccountDID:              nil, // No DID provided

     

       262
       262
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       263
       263
       +
       		RequestURI:              "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:nodid",

     

       264
       264
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       265
       265
       +
       		PKCEVerifier:            "verifier_nodid",

     

       266
       266
       +
       		DPoPAuthServerNonce:     "nonce_nodid",

     

       267
       267
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       268
       268
       +
       	}

     

       269
       269
       +
       

     

       270
       270
       +
       	// Save auth request info without DID

     

       271
       271
       +
       	err := store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, info)

     

       272
       272
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       273
       273
       +
       

     

       274
       274
       +
       	// Retrieve and verify DID is nil

     

       275
       275
       +
       	retrieved, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_state_nodid")

     

       276
       276
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       277
       277
       +
       	assert.Nil(t, retrieved.AccountDID)

     

       278
       278
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, info.State, retrieved.State)

     

       279
       279
       +
       }

     

       280
       280
       +
       

     

       281
       281
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_GetAuthRequestInfo_NotFound(t *testing.T) {

     

       282
       282
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       283
       283
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       284
       284
       +
       

     

       285
       285
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       286
       286
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       287
       287
       +
       

     

       288
       288
       +
       	_, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "nonexistent_state")

     

       289
       289
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthRequestNotFound)

     

       290
       290
       +
       }

     

       291
       291
       +
       

     

       292
       292
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_DeleteAuthRequestInfo(t *testing.T) {

     

       293
       293
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       294
       294
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       295
       295
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       296
       296
       +
       

     

       297
       297
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       298
       298
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       299
       299
       +
       

     

       300
       300
       +
       	info := oauth.AuthRequestData{

     

       301
       301
       +
       		State:                   "test_state_delete",

     

       302
       302
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth.example.com",

     

       303
       303
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       304
       304
       +
       		RequestURI:              "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:delete",

     

       305
       305
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       306
       306
       +
       		PKCEVerifier:            "verifier_delete",

     

       307
       307
       +
       		DPoPAuthServerNonce:     "nonce_delete",

     

       308
       308
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       309
       309
       +
       	}

     

       310
       310
       +
       

     

       311
       311
       +
       	// Save auth request info

     

       312
       312
       +
       	err := store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, info)

     

       313
       313
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       314
       314
       +
       

     

       315
       315
       +
       	// Delete auth request info

     

       316
       316
       +
       	err = store.DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_state_delete")

     

       317
       317
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       318
       318
       +
       

     

       319
       319
       +
       	// Verify it's gone

     

       320
       320
       +
       	_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_state_delete")

     

       321
       321
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthRequestNotFound)

     

       322
       322
       +
       }

     

       323
       323
       +
       

     

       324
       324
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_DeleteAuthRequestInfo_NotFound(t *testing.T) {

     

       325
       325
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       326
       326
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       327
       327
       +
       

     

       328
       328
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       329
       329
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       330
       330
       +
       

     

       331
       331
       +
       	err := store.DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "nonexistent_state")

     

       332
       332
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthRequestNotFound)

     

       333
       333
       +
       }

     

       334
       334
       +
       

     

       335
       335
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_CleanupExpiredSessions(t *testing.T) {

     

       336
       336
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       337
       337
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       338
       338
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       339
       339
       +
       

     

       340
       340
       +
       	storeInterface := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       341
       341
       +
       	store, ok := storeInterface.(*PostgresOAuthStore)

     

       342
       342
       +
       	require.True(t, ok, "store should be *PostgresOAuthStore")

     

       343
       343
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       344
       344
       +
       

     

       345
       345
       +
       	did1, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testexpired1")

     

       346
       346
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       347
       347
       +
       	did2, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testexpired2")

     

       348
       348
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       349
       349
       +
       

     

       350
       350
       +
       	// Create an expired session (manually insert with past expiration)

     

       351
       351
       +
       	_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `

     

       352
       352
       +
       		INSERT INTO oauth_sessions (

     

       353
       353
       +
       			did, session_id, handle, pds_url, host_url,

     

       354
       354
       +
       			access_token, refresh_token,

     

       355
       355
       +
       			dpop_private_key_multibase, auth_server_iss,

     

       356
       356
       +
       			auth_server_token_endpoint, scopes,

     

       357
       357
       +
       			expires_at, created_at

     

       358
       358
       +
       		) VALUES (

     

       359
       359
       +
       			$1, $2, $3, $4, $5,

     

       360
       360
       +
       			$6, $7,

     

       361
       361
       +
       			$8, $9,

     

       362
       362
       +
       			$10, $11,

     

       363
       363
       +
       			NOW() - INTERVAL '1 day', NOW()

     

       364
       364
       +
       		)

     

       365
       365
       +
       	`, did1.String(), "expired_session", "test.handle", "https://pds.example.com", "https://pds.example.com",

     

       366
       366
       +
       		"expired_token", "expired_refresh",

     

       367
       367
       +
       		"z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH", "https://auth.example.com",

     

       368
       368
       +
       		"https://auth.example.com/oauth/token", `{"atproto"}`)

     

       369
       369
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       370
       370
       +
       

     

       371
       371
       +
       	// Create a valid session

     

       372
       372
       +
       	validSession := oauth.ClientSessionData{

     

       373
       373
       +
       		AccountDID:              did2,

     

       374
       374
       +
       		SessionID:               "valid_session",

     

       375
       375
       +
       		HostURL:                 "https://pds.example.com",

     

       376
       376
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth.example.com",

     

       377
       377
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       378
       378
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       379
       379
       +
       		AccessToken:             "valid_token",

     

       380
       380
       +
       		RefreshToken:            "valid_refresh",

     

       381
       381
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       382
       382
       +
       	}

     

       383
       383
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, validSession)

     

       384
       384
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       385
       385
       +
       

     

       386
       386
       +
       	// Cleanup expired sessions

     

       387
       387
       +
       	count, err := store.CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx)

     

       388
       388
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       389
       389
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count, "Should delete 1 expired session")

     

       390
       390
       +
       

     

       391
       391
       +
       	// Verify expired session is gone

     

       392
       392
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did1, "expired_session")

     

       393
       393
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)

     

       394
       394
       +
       

     

       395
       395
       +
       	// Verify valid session still exists

     

       396
       396
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did2, "valid_session")

     

       397
       397
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       398
       398
       +
       }

     

       399
       399
       +
       

     

       400
       400
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(t *testing.T) {

     

       401
       401
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       402
       402
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       403
       403
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       404
       404
       +
       

     

       405
       405
       +
       	storeInterface := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0)

     

       406
       406
       +
       	pgStore, ok := storeInterface.(*PostgresOAuthStore)

     

       407
       407
       +
       	require.True(t, ok, "store should be *PostgresOAuthStore")

     

       408
       408
       +
       	store := oauth.ClientAuthStore(pgStore)

     

       409
       409
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       410
       410
       +
       

     

       411
       411
       +
       	// Create an old auth request (manually insert with old timestamp)

     

       412
       412
       +
       	_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `

     

       413
       413
       +
       		INSERT INTO oauth_requests (

     

       414
       414
       +
       			state, did, handle, pds_url, pkce_verifier,

     

       415
       415
       +
       			dpop_private_key_multibase, dpop_authserver_nonce,

     

       416
       416
       +
       			auth_server_iss, request_uri,

     

       417
       417
       +
       			auth_server_token_endpoint, scopes,

     

       418
       418
       +
       			created_at

     

       419
       419
       +
       		) VALUES (

     

       420
       420
       +
       			$1, $2, $3, $4, $5,

     

       421
       421
       +
       			$6, $7,

     

       422
       422
       +
       			$8, $9,

     

       423
       423
       +
       			$10, $11,

     

       424
       424
       +
       			NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour'

     

       425
       425
       +
       		)

     

       426
       426
       +
       	`, "test_old_state", "did:plc:testold", "test.handle", "https://pds.example.com",

     

       427
       427
       +
       		"old_verifier", "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       428
       428
       +
       		"nonce_old", "https://auth.example.com", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:old",

     

       429
       429
       +
       		"https://auth.example.com/oauth/token", `{"atproto"}`)

     

       430
       430
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       431
       431
       +
       

     

       432
       432
       +
       	// Create a recent auth request

     

       433
       433
       +
       	recentInfo := oauth.AuthRequestData{

     

       434
       434
       +
       		State:                   "test_recent_state",

     

       435
       435
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth.example.com",

     

       436
       436
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       437
       437
       +
       		RequestURI:              "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:recent",

     

       438
       438
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       439
       439
       +
       		PKCEVerifier:            "recent_verifier",

     

       440
       440
       +
       		DPoPAuthServerNonce:     "nonce_recent",

     

       441
       441
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       442
       442
       +
       	}

     

       443
       443
       +
       	err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, recentInfo)

     

       444
       444
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       445
       445
       +
       

     

       446
       446
       +
       	// Cleanup expired auth requests (older than 30 minutes)

     

       447
       447
       +
       	count, err := pgStore.CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(ctx)

     

       448
       448
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       449
       449
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, int64(1), count, "Should delete 1 expired auth request")

     

       450
       450
       +
       

     

       451
       451
       +
       	// Verify old request is gone

     

       452
       452
       +
       	_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_old_state")

     

       453
       453
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAuthRequestNotFound)

     

       454
       454
       +
       

     

       455
       455
       +
       	// Verify recent request still exists

     

       456
       456
       +
       	_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, "test_recent_state")

     

       457
       457
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       458
       458
       +
       }

     

       459
       459
       +
       

     

       460
       460
       +
       func TestPostgresOAuthStore_MultipleSessions(t *testing.T) {

     

       461
       461
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       462
       462
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       463
       463
       +
       	defer cleanupOAuth(t, db)

     

       464
       464
       +
       

     

       465
       465
       +
       	store := NewPostgresOAuthStore(db, 0) // Use default TTL

     

       466
       466
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       467
       467
       +
       

     

       468
       468
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:testmulti")

     

       469
       469
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       470
       470
       +
       

     

       471
       471
       +
       	// Create multiple sessions for the same DID

     

       472
       472
       +
       	session1 := oauth.ClientSessionData{

     

       473
       473
       +
       		AccountDID:              did,

     

       474
       474
       +
       		SessionID:               "browser1",

     

       475
       475
       +
       		HostURL:                 "https://pds.example.com",

     

       476
       476
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth.example.com",

     

       477
       477
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       478
       478
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       479
       479
       +
       		AccessToken:             "token_browser1",

     

       480
       480
       +
       		RefreshToken:            "refresh_browser1",

     

       481
       481
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH",

     

       482
       482
       +
       	}

     

       483
       483
       +
       

     

       484
       484
       +
       	session2 := oauth.ClientSessionData{

     

       485
       485
       +
       		AccountDID:              did,

     

       486
       486
       +
       		SessionID:               "mobile_app",

     

       487
       487
       +
       		HostURL:                 "https://pds.example.com",

     

       488
       488
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "https://auth.example.com",

     

       489
       489
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/oauth/token",

     

       490
       490
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       491
       491
       +
       		AccessToken:             "token_mobile",

     

       492
       492
       +
       		RefreshToken:            "refresh_mobile",

     

       493
       493
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktX",

     

       494
       494
       +
       	}

     

       495
       495
       +
       

     

       496
       496
       +
       	// Save both sessions

     

       497
       497
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session1)

     

       498
       498
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       499
       499
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session2)

     

       500
       500
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       501
       501
       +
       

     

       502
       502
       +
       	// Retrieve both sessions

     

       503
       503
       +
       	retrieved1, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, "browser1")

     

       504
       504
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       505
       505
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "token_browser1", retrieved1.AccessToken)

     

       506
       506
       +
       

     

       507
       507
       +
       	retrieved2, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, "mobile_app")

     

       508
       508
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       509
       509
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "token_mobile", retrieved2.AccessToken)

     

       510
       510
       +
       

     

       511
       511
       +
       	// Delete one session

     

       512
       512
       +
       	err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, "browser1")

     

       513
       513
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       514
       514
       +
       

     

       515
       515
       +
       	// Verify only browser1 is deleted

     

       516
       516
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, "browser1")

     

       517
       517
       +
       	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionNotFound)

     

       518
       518
       +
       

     

       519
       519
       +
       	// mobile_app should still exist

     

       520
       520
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, "mobile_app")

     

       521
       521
       +
       	assert.NoError(t, err)

     

       522
       522
       +
       }

+99

internal/atproto/oauth/transport.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package oauth

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"fmt"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"net"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"time"

     

       8
       8
       +
       )

     

       9
       9
       +
       

     

       10
       10
       +
       // ssrfSafeTransport wraps http.Transport to prevent SSRF attacks

     

       11
       11
       +
       type ssrfSafeTransport struct {

     

       12
       12
       +
       	base         *http.Transport

     

       13
       13
       +
       	allowPrivate bool // For dev/testing only

     

       14
       14
       +
       }

     

       15
       15
       +
       

     

       16
       16
       +
       // isPrivateIP checks if an IP is in a private/reserved range

     

       17
       17
       +
       func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {

     

       18
       18
       +
       	if ip == nil {

     

       19
       19
       +
       		return false

     

       20
       20
       +
       	}

     

       21
       21
       +
       

     

       22
       22
       +
       	// Check for loopback

     

       23
       23
       +
       	if ip.IsLoopback() {

     

       24
       24
       +
       		return true

     

       25
       25
       +
       	}

     

       26
       26
       +
       

     

       27
       27
       +
       	// Check for link-local

     

       28
       28
       +
       	if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {

     

       29
       29
       +
       		return true

     

       30
       30
       +
       	}

     

       31
       31
       +
       

     

       32
       32
       +
       	// Check for private ranges

     

       33
       33
       +
       	privateRanges := []string{

     

       34
       34
       +
       		"10.0.0.0/8",

     

       35
       35
       +
       		"172.16.0.0/12",

     

       36
       36
       +
       		"192.168.0.0/16",

     

       37
       37
       +
       		"169.254.0.0/16",

     

       38
       38
       +
       		"::1/128",

     

       39
       39
       +
       		"fc00::/7",

     

       40
       40
       +
       		"fe80::/10",

     

       41
       41
       +
       	}

     

       42
       42
       +
       

     

       43
       43
       +
       	for _, cidr := range privateRanges {

     

       44
       44
       +
       		_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)

     

       45
       45
       +
       		if err == nil && network.Contains(ip) {

     

       46
       46
       +
       			return true

     

       47
       47
       +
       		}

     

       48
       48
       +
       	}

     

       49
       49
       +
       

     

       50
       50
       +
       	return false

     

       51
       51
       +
       }

     

       52
       52
       +
       

     

       53
       53
       +
       func (t *ssrfSafeTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {

     

       54
       54
       +
       	host := req.URL.Hostname()

     

       55
       55
       +
       

     

       56
       56
       +
       	// Resolve hostname to IP

     

       57
       57
       +
       	ips, err := net.LookupIP(host)

     

       58
       58
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       59
       59
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve host: %w", err)

     

       60
       60
       +
       	}

     

       61
       61
       +
       

     

       62
       62
       +
       	// Check all resolved IPs

     

       63
       63
       +
       	if !t.allowPrivate {

     

       64
       64
       +
       		for _, ip := range ips {

     

       65
       65
       +
       			if isPrivateIP(ip) {

     

       66
       66
       +
       				return nil, fmt.Errorf("SSRF blocked: %s resolves to private IP %s", host, ip)

     

       67
       67
       +
       			}

     

       68
       68
       +
       		}

     

       69
       69
       +
       	}

     

       70
       70
       +
       

     

       71
       71
       +
       	return t.base.RoundTrip(req)

     

       72
       72
       +
       }

     

       73
       73
       +
       

     

       74
       74
       +
       // NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient creates an HTTP client with SSRF protections

     

       75
       75
       +
       func NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(allowPrivate bool) *http.Client {

     

       76
       76
       +
       	transport := &ssrfSafeTransport{

     

       77
       77
       +
       		base: &http.Transport{

     

       78
       78
       +
       			DialContext: (&net.Dialer{

     

       79
       79
       +
       				Timeout:   10 * time.Second,

     

       80
       80
       +
       				KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,

     

       81
       81
       +
       			}).DialContext,

     

       82
       82
       +
       			MaxIdleConns:        100,

     

       83
       83
       +
       			IdleConnTimeout:     90 * time.Second,

     

       84
       84
       +
       			TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,

     

       85
       85
       +
       		},

     

       86
       86
       +
       		allowPrivate: allowPrivate,

     

       87
       87
       +
       	}

     

       88
       88
       +
       

     

       89
       89
       +
       	return &http.Client{

     

       90
       90
       +
       		Timeout:   15 * time.Second,

     

       91
       91
       +
       		Transport: transport,

     

       92
       92
       +
       		CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {

     

       93
       93
       +
       			if len(via) >= 5 {

     

       94
       94
       +
       				return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")

     

       95
       95
       +
       			}

     

       96
       96
       +
       			return nil

     

       97
       97
       +
       		},

     

       98
       98
       +
       	}

     

       99
       99
       +
       }

+132

internal/atproto/oauth/transport_test.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package oauth

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"net"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"testing"

     

       7
       7
       +
       )

     

       8
       8
       +
       

     

       9
       9
       +
       func TestIsPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {

     

       10
       10
       +
       	tests := []struct {

     

       11
       11
       +
       		name     string

     

       12
       12
       +
       		ip       string

     

       13
       13
       +
       		expected bool

     

       14
       14
       +
       	}{

     

       15
       15
       +
       		// Loopback addresses

     

       16
       16
       +
       		{"IPv4 loopback", "127.0.0.1", true},

     

       17
       17
       +
       		{"IPv6 loopback", "::1", true},

     

       18
       18
       +
       

     

       19
       19
       +
       		// Private IPv4 ranges

     

       20
       20
       +
       		{"Private 10.x.x.x", "10.0.0.1", true},

     

       21
       21
       +
       		{"Private 10.x.x.x edge", "10.255.255.255", true},

     

       22
       22
       +
       		{"Private 172.16.x.x", "172.16.0.1", true},

     

       23
       23
       +
       		{"Private 172.31.x.x edge", "172.31.255.255", true},

     

       24
       24
       +
       		{"Private 192.168.x.x", "192.168.1.1", true},

     

       25
       25
       +
       		{"Private 192.168.x.x edge", "192.168.255.255", true},

     

       26
       26
       +
       

     

       27
       27
       +
       		// Link-local addresses

     

       28
       28
       +
       		{"Link-local IPv4", "169.254.1.1", true},

     

       29
       29
       +
       		{"Link-local IPv6", "fe80::1", true},

     

       30
       30
       +
       

     

       31
       31
       +
       		// IPv6 private ranges

     

       32
       32
       +
       		{"IPv6 unique local fc00", "fc00::1", true},

     

       33
       33
       +
       		{"IPv6 unique local fd00", "fd00::1", true},

     

       34
       34
       +
       

     

       35
       35
       +
       		// Public addresses

     

       36
       36
       +
       		{"Public IP 1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},

     

       37
       37
       +
       		{"Public IP 8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},

     

       38
       38
       +
       		{"Public IP 172.15.0.1", "172.15.0.1", false},  // Just before 172.16/12

     

       39
       39
       +
       		{"Public IP 172.32.0.1", "172.32.0.1", false},  // Just after 172.31/12

     

       40
       40
       +
       		{"Public IP 11.0.0.1", "11.0.0.1", false},      // Just after 10/8

     

       41
       41
       +
       		{"Public IPv6", "2001:4860:4860::8888", false}, // Google DNS

     

       42
       42
       +
       	}

     

       43
       43
       +
       

     

       44
       44
       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       45
       45
       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       46
       46
       +
       			ip := net.ParseIP(tt.ip)

     

       47
       47
       +
       			if ip == nil {

     

       48
       48
       +
       				t.Fatalf("Failed to parse IP: %s", tt.ip)

     

       49
       49
       +
       			}

     

       50
       50
       +
       

     

       51
       51
       +
       			result := isPrivateIP(ip)

     

       52
       52
       +
       			if result != tt.expected {

     

       53
       53
       +
       				t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(%s) = %v, expected %v", tt.ip, result, tt.expected)

     

       54
       54
       +
       			}

     

       55
       55
       +
       		})

     

       56
       56
       +
       	}

     

       57
       57
       +
       }

     

       58
       58
       +
       

     

       59
       59
       +
       func TestIsPrivateIP_NilIP(t *testing.T) {

     

       60
       60
       +
       	result := isPrivateIP(nil)

     

       61
       61
       +
       	if result != false {

     

       62
       62
       +
       		t.Errorf("isPrivateIP(nil) = %v, expected false", result)

     

       63
       63
       +
       	}

     

       64
       64
       +
       }

     

       65
       65
       +
       

     

       66
       66
       +
       func TestNewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(t *testing.T) {

     

       67
       67
       +
       	tests := []struct {

     

       68
       68
       +
       		name         string

     

       69
       69
       +
       		allowPrivate bool

     

       70
       70
       +
       	}{

     

       71
       71
       +
       		{"Production client (no private IPs)", false},

     

       72
       72
       +
       		{"Development client (allow private IPs)", true},

     

       73
       73
       +
       	}

     

       74
       74
       +
       

     

       75
       75
       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       76
       76
       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       77
       77
       +
       			client := NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(tt.allowPrivate)

     

       78
       78
       +
       

     

       79
       79
       +
       			if client == nil {

     

       80
       80
       +
       				t.Fatal("NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient returned nil")

     

       81
       81
       +
       			}

     

       82
       82
       +
       

     

       83
       83
       +
       			if client.Timeout == 0 {

     

       84
       84
       +
       				t.Error("Expected timeout to be set")

     

       85
       85
       +
       			}

     

       86
       86
       +
       

     

       87
       87
       +
       			if client.Transport == nil {

     

       88
       88
       +
       				t.Error("Expected transport to be set")

     

       89
       89
       +
       			}

     

       90
       90
       +
       

     

       91
       91
       +
       			transport, ok := client.Transport.(*ssrfSafeTransport)

     

       92
       92
       +
       			if !ok {

     

       93
       93
       +
       				t.Error("Expected ssrfSafeTransport")

     

       94
       94
       +
       			}

     

       95
       95
       +
       

     

       96
       96
       +
       			if transport.allowPrivate != tt.allowPrivate {

     

       97
       97
       +
       				t.Errorf("Expected allowPrivate=%v, got %v", tt.allowPrivate, transport.allowPrivate)

     

       98
       98
       +
       			}

     

       99
       99
       +
       		})

     

       100
       100
       +
       	}

     

       101
       101
       +
       }

     

       102
       102
       +
       

     

       103
       103
       +
       func TestSSRFSafeHTTPClient_RedirectLimit(t *testing.T) {

     

       104
       104
       +
       	client := NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient(false)

     

       105
       105
       +
       

     

       106
       106
       +
       	// Simulate checking redirect limit

     

       107
       107
       +
       	if client.CheckRedirect == nil {

     

       108
       108
       +
       		t.Fatal("Expected CheckRedirect to be set")

     

       109
       109
       +
       	}

     

       110
       110
       +
       

     

       111
       111
       +
       	// Test redirect limit (5 redirects)

     

       112
       112
       +
       	var via []*http.Request

     

       113
       113
       +
       	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {

     

       114
       114
       +
       		req := &http.Request{}

     

       115
       115
       +
       		via = append(via, req)

     

       116
       116
       +
       	}

     

       117
       117
       +
       

     

       118
       118
       +
       	err := client.CheckRedirect(nil, via)

     

       119
       119
       +
       	if err == nil {

     

       120
       120
       +
       		t.Error("Expected error for too many redirects")

     

       121
       121
       +
       	}

     

       122
       122
       +
       	if err.Error() != "too many redirects" {

     

       123
       123
       +
       		t.Errorf("Expected 'too many redirects' error, got: %v", err)

     

       124
       124
       +
       	}

     

       125
       125
       +
       

     

       126
       126
       +
       	// Test within limit (4 redirects)

     

       127
       127
       +
       	via = via[:4]

     

       128
       128
       +
       	err = client.CheckRedirect(nil, via)

     

       129
       129
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       130
       130
       +
       		t.Errorf("Expected no error for 4 redirects, got: %v", err)

     

       131
       131
       +
       	}

     

       132
       132
       +
       }

+124

internal/db/migrations/019_update_oauth_for_indigo.sql

···

       1
       1
       +
       -- +goose Up

     

       2
       2
       +
       -- Update OAuth tables to match indigo's ClientAuthStore interface requirements

     

       3
       3
       +
       -- This migration adds columns needed for OAuth client sessions and auth requests

     

       4
       4
       +
       

     

       5
       5
       +
       -- Update oauth_requests table

     

       6
       6
       +
       -- Add columns for request URI, auth server endpoints, scopes, and DPoP key

     

       7
       7
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests

     

       8
       8
       +
           ADD COLUMN request_uri TEXT,

     

       9
       9
       +
           ADD COLUMN auth_server_token_endpoint TEXT,

     

       10
       10
       +
           ADD COLUMN auth_server_revocation_endpoint TEXT,

     

       11
       11
       +
           ADD COLUMN scopes TEXT[],

     

       12
       12
       +
           ADD COLUMN dpop_private_key_multibase TEXT;

     

       13
       13
       +
       

     

       14
       14
       +
       -- Make original dpop_private_jwk nullable (we now use dpop_private_key_multibase)

     

       15
       15
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests ALTER COLUMN dpop_private_jwk DROP NOT NULL;

     

       16
       16
       +
       

     

       17
       17
       +
       -- Make did nullable (indigo's AuthRequestData.AccountDID is a pointer - optional)

     

       18
       18
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests ALTER COLUMN did DROP NOT NULL;

     

       19
       19
       +
       

     

       20
       20
       +
       -- Make handle and pds_url nullable too (derived from DID resolution, not always available at auth request time)

     

       21
       21
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests ALTER COLUMN handle DROP NOT NULL;

     

       22
       22
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests ALTER COLUMN pds_url DROP NOT NULL;

     

       23
       23
       +
       

     

       24
       24
       +
       -- Update existing oauth_requests data

     

       25
       25
       +
       -- Convert dpop_private_jwk (JSONB) to multibase format if needed

     

       26
       26
       +
       -- Note: This will leave the multibase column NULL for now since conversion requires crypto logic

     

       27
       27
       +
       -- The application will need to handle NULL values or regenerate keys on next auth flow

     

       28
       28
       +
       UPDATE oauth_requests

     

       29
       29
       +
       SET

     

       30
       30
       +
           auth_server_token_endpoint = auth_server_iss || '/oauth/token',

     

       31
       31
       +
           scopes = ARRAY['atproto']::TEXT[]

     

       32
       32
       +
       WHERE auth_server_token_endpoint IS NULL;

     

       33
       33
       +
       

     

       34
       34
       +
       -- Add indexes for new columns

     

       35
       35
       +
       CREATE INDEX idx_oauth_requests_request_uri ON oauth_requests(request_uri) WHERE request_uri IS NOT NULL;

     

       36
       36
       +
       

     

       37
       37
       +
       -- Update oauth_sessions table

     

       38
       38
       +
       -- Add session_id column (will become part of composite key)

     

       39
       39
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions

     

       40
       40
       +
           ADD COLUMN session_id TEXT,

     

       41
       41
       +
           ADD COLUMN host_url TEXT,

     

       42
       42
       +
           ADD COLUMN auth_server_token_endpoint TEXT,

     

       43
       43
       +
           ADD COLUMN auth_server_revocation_endpoint TEXT,

     

       44
       44
       +
           ADD COLUMN scopes TEXT[],

     

       45
       45
       +
           ADD COLUMN dpop_private_key_multibase TEXT;

     

       46
       46
       +
       

     

       47
       47
       +
       -- Make original dpop_private_jwk nullable (we now use dpop_private_key_multibase)

     

       48
       48
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions ALTER COLUMN dpop_private_jwk DROP NOT NULL;

     

       49
       49
       +
       

     

       50
       50
       +
       -- Populate session_id for existing sessions (use DID as default for single-session per account)

     

       51
       51
       +
       -- In production, you may want to generate unique session IDs

     

       52
       52
       +
       UPDATE oauth_sessions

     

       53
       53
       +
       SET

     

       54
       54
       +
           session_id = 'default',

     

       55
       55
       +
           host_url = pds_url,

     

       56
       56
       +
           auth_server_token_endpoint = auth_server_iss || '/oauth/token',

     

       57
       57
       +
           scopes = ARRAY['atproto']::TEXT[]

     

       58
       58
       +
       WHERE session_id IS NULL;

     

       59
       59
       +
       

     

       60
       60
       +
       -- Make session_id NOT NULL after populating existing data

     

       61
       61
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions

     

       62
       62
       +
           ALTER COLUMN session_id SET NOT NULL;

     

       63
       63
       +
       

     

       64
       64
       +
       -- Drop old unique constraint on did only

     

       65
       65
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions

     

       66
       66
       +
           DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS oauth_sessions_did_key;

     

       67
       67
       +
       

     

       68
       68
       +
       -- Create new composite unique constraint for (did, session_id)

     

       69
       69
       +
       -- This allows multiple sessions per account

     

       70
       70
       +
       -- Note: UNIQUE constraint automatically creates an index, so no separate index needed

     

       71
       71
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions

     

       72
       72
       +
           ADD CONSTRAINT oauth_sessions_did_session_id_key UNIQUE (did, session_id);

     

       73
       73
       +
       

     

       74
       74
       +
       -- Add comment explaining the schema change

     

       75
       75
       +
       COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth_sessions.session_id IS 'Session identifier to support multiple concurrent sessions per account';

     

       76
       76
       +
       COMMENT ON CONSTRAINT oauth_sessions_did_session_id_key ON oauth_sessions IS 'Composite key allowing multiple sessions per DID';

     

       77
       77
       +
       

     

       78
       78
       +
       -- +goose Down

     

       79
       79
       +
       -- Rollback: Remove added columns and restore original unique constraint

     

       80
       80
       +
       

     

       81
       81
       +
       -- oauth_sessions rollback

     

       82
       82
       +
       -- Drop composite unique constraint (this also drops the associated index)

     

       83
       83
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions

     

       84
       84
       +
           DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS oauth_sessions_did_session_id_key;

     

       85
       85
       +
       

     

       86
       86
       +
       -- Delete all but the most recent session per DID before restoring unique constraint

     

       87
       87
       +
       -- This ensures the UNIQUE (did) constraint can be added without conflicts

     

       88
       88
       +
       DELETE FROM oauth_sessions a

     

       89
       89
       +
       USING oauth_sessions b

     

       90
       90
       +
       WHERE a.did = b.did

     

       91
       91
       +
         AND a.created_at < b.created_at;

     

       92
       92
       +
       

     

       93
       93
       +
       -- Restore old unique constraint

     

       94
       94
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions

     

       95
       95
       +
           ADD CONSTRAINT oauth_sessions_did_key UNIQUE (did);

     

       96
       96
       +
       

     

       97
       97
       +
       -- Restore NOT NULL constraint on dpop_private_jwk

     

       98
       98
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions

     

       99
       99
       +
           ALTER COLUMN dpop_private_jwk SET NOT NULL;

     

       100
       100
       +
       

     

       101
       101
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_sessions

     

       102
       102
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS dpop_private_key_multibase,

     

       103
       103
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS scopes,

     

       104
       104
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auth_server_revocation_endpoint,

     

       105
       105
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auth_server_token_endpoint,

     

       106
       106
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS host_url,

     

       107
       107
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS session_id;

     

       108
       108
       +
       

     

       109
       109
       +
       -- oauth_requests rollback

     

       110
       110
       +
       DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_oauth_requests_request_uri;

     

       111
       111
       +
       

     

       112
       112
       +
       -- Restore NOT NULL constraints

     

       113
       113
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests

     

       114
       114
       +
           ALTER COLUMN dpop_private_jwk SET NOT NULL,

     

       115
       115
       +
           ALTER COLUMN did SET NOT NULL,

     

       116
       116
       +
           ALTER COLUMN handle SET NOT NULL,

     

       117
       117
       +
           ALTER COLUMN pds_url SET NOT NULL;

     

       118
       118
       +
       

     

       119
       119
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests

     

       120
       120
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS dpop_private_key_multibase,

     

       121
       121
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS scopes,

     

       122
       122
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auth_server_revocation_endpoint,

     

       123
       123
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auth_server_token_endpoint,

     

       124
       124
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS request_uri;

+23

internal/db/migrations/020_add_mobile_oauth_csrf.sql

···

       1
       1
       +
       -- +goose Up

     

       2
       2
       +
       -- Add columns for mobile OAuth CSRF protection with server-side state

     

       3
       3
       +
       -- This ties the CSRF token to the OAuth state, allowing validation against

     

       4
       4
       +
       -- a value that comes back through the OAuth response (the state parameter)

     

       5
       5
       +
       -- rather than only validating cookies against each other.

     

       6
       6
       +
       

     

       7
       7
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests

     

       8
       8
       +
           ADD COLUMN mobile_csrf_token TEXT,

     

       9
       9
       +
           ADD COLUMN mobile_redirect_uri TEXT;

     

       10
       10
       +
       

     

       11
       11
       +
       -- Index for quick lookup of mobile data when callback is received

     

       12
       12
       +
       CREATE INDEX idx_oauth_requests_mobile_csrf ON oauth_requests(state)

     

       13
       13
       +
           WHERE mobile_csrf_token IS NOT NULL;

     

       14
       14
       +
       

     

       15
       15
       +
       COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth_requests.mobile_csrf_token IS 'CSRF token for mobile OAuth flows, validated against cookie on callback';

     

       16
       16
       +
       COMMENT ON COLUMN oauth_requests.mobile_redirect_uri IS 'Mobile redirect URI (Universal Link) for this OAuth flow';

     

       17
       17
       +
       

     

       18
       18
       +
       -- +goose Down

     

       19
       19
       +
       DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_oauth_requests_mobile_csrf;

     

       20
       20
       +
       

     

       21
       21
       +
       ALTER TABLE oauth_requests

     

       22
       22
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS mobile_redirect_uri,

     

       23
       23
       +
           DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS mobile_csrf_token;

+137

internal/api/handlers/wellknown/universal_links.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package wellknown

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"encoding/json"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"log/slog"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"os"

     

       8
       8
       +
       )

     

       9
       9
       +
       

     

       10
       10
       +
       // HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation serves the iOS Universal Links configuration

     

       11
       11
       +
       // GET /.well-known/apple-app-site-association

     

       12
       12
       +
       //

     

       13
       13
       +
       // Universal Links provide cryptographic binding between the app and domain:

     

       14
       14
       +
       // - Requires apple-app-site-association file served over HTTPS

     

       15
       15
       +
       // - App must have Associated Domains capability configured

     

       16
       16
       +
       // - System verifies domain ownership before routing deep links

     

       17
       17
       +
       // - Prevents malicious apps from intercepting deep links

     

       18
       18
       +
       //

     

       19
       19
       +
       // Spec: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/supporting-universal-links-in-your-app

     

       20
       20
       +
       func HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       21
       21
       +
       	// Get Apple App ID from environment (format: <Team ID>.<Bundle ID>)

     

       22
       22
       +
       	// Example: "ABCD1234.social.coves.app"

     

       23
       23
       +
       	// Find Team ID in Apple Developer Portal -> Membership

     

       24
       24
       +
       	// Bundle ID is configured in Xcode project

     

       25
       25
       +
       	appleAppID := os.Getenv("APPLE_APP_ID")

     

       26
       26
       +
       	if appleAppID == "" {

     

       27
       27
       +
       		// Development fallback - allows testing without real Team ID

     

       28
       28
       +
       		// IMPORTANT: This MUST be set in production for Universal Links to work

     

       29
       29
       +
       		appleAppID = "DEVELOPMENT.social.coves.app"

     

       30
       30
       +
       		slog.Warn("APPLE_APP_ID not set, using development placeholder",

     

       31
       31
       +
       			"app_id", appleAppID,

     

       32
       32
       +
       			"note", "Set APPLE_APP_ID env var for production Universal Links")

     

       33
       33
       +
       	}

     

       34
       34
       +
       

     

       35
       35
       +
       	// Apple requires application/json content type (no charset)

     

       36
       36
       +
       	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       37
       37
       +
       

     

       38
       38
       +
       	// Construct the response per Apple's spec

     

       39
       39
       +
       	// See: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/applinks

     

       40
       40
       +
       	response := map[string]interface{}{

     

       41
       41
       +
       		"applinks": map[string]interface{}{

     

       42
       42
       +
       			"apps": []string{}, // Must be empty array per Apple spec

     

       43
       43
       +
       			"details": []map[string]interface{}{

     

       44
       44
       +
       				{

     

       45
       45
       +
       					"appID": appleAppID,

     

       46
       46
       +
       					// Paths that trigger Universal Links when opened in Safari/other apps

     

       47
       47
       +
       					// These URLs will open the app instead of the browser

     

       48
       48
       +
       					"paths": []string{

     

       49
       49
       +
       						"/app/oauth/callback",   // Primary Universal Link OAuth callback

     

       50
       50
       +
       						"/app/oauth/callback/*", // Catch-all for query params

     

       51
       51
       +
       					},

     

       52
       52
       +
       				},

     

       53
       53
       +
       			},

     

       54
       54
       +
       		},

     

       55
       55
       +
       	}

     

       56
       56
       +
       

     

       57
       57
       +
       	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {

     

       58
       58
       +
       		slog.Error("failed to encode apple-app-site-association", "error", err)

     

       59
       59
       +
       		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)

     

       60
       60
       +
       		return

     

       61
       61
       +
       	}

     

       62
       62
       +
       

     

       63
       63
       +
       	slog.Debug("served apple-app-site-association", "app_id", appleAppID)

     

       64
       64
       +
       }

     

       65
       65
       +
       

     

       66
       66
       +
       // HandleAssetLinks serves the Android App Links configuration

     

       67
       67
       +
       // GET /.well-known/assetlinks.json

     

       68
       68
       +
       //

     

       69
       69
       +
       // App Links provide cryptographic binding between the app and domain:

     

       70
       70
       +
       // - Requires assetlinks.json file served over HTTPS

     

       71
       71
       +
       // - App must have intent-filter with android:autoVerify="true"

     

       72
       72
       +
       // - System verifies domain ownership via SHA-256 certificate fingerprint

     

       73
       73
       +
       // - Prevents malicious apps from intercepting deep links

     

       74
       74
       +
       //

     

       75
       75
       +
       // Spec: https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/verify-android-applinks

     

       76
       76
       +
       func HandleAssetLinks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       77
       77
       +
       	// Get Android package name from environment

     

       78
       78
       +
       	// Example: "social.coves.app"

     

       79
       79
       +
       	androidPackage := os.Getenv("ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME")

     

       80
       80
       +
       	if androidPackage == "" {

     

       81
       81
       +
       		androidPackage = "social.coves.app" // Default for development

     

       82
       82
       +
       		slog.Warn("ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME not set, using default",

     

       83
       83
       +
       			"package", androidPackage,

     

       84
       84
       +
       			"note", "Set ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME env var for production App Links")

     

       85
       85
       +
       	}

     

       86
       86
       +
       

     

       87
       87
       +
       	// Get SHA-256 fingerprint from environment

     

       88
       88
       +
       	// This is the SHA-256 fingerprint of the app's signing certificate

     

       89
       89
       +
       	//

     

       90
       90
       +
       	// To get the fingerprint:

     

       91
       91
       +
       	// Production: keytool -list -v -keystore release.jks -alias release

     

       92
       92
       +
       	// Debug: keytool -list -v -keystore ~/.android/debug.keystore -alias androiddebugkey -storepass android -keypass android

     

       93
       93
       +
       	//

     

       94
       94
       +
       	// Look for "SHA256:" in the output

     

       95
       95
       +
       	// Format: AA:BB:CC:DD:...:FF (64 hex characters separated by colons)

     

       96
       96
       +
       	androidFingerprint := os.Getenv("ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT")

     

       97
       97
       +
       	if androidFingerprint == "" {

     

       98
       98
       +
       		// Development fallback - this won't work for real App Links verification

     

       99
       99
       +
       		// IMPORTANT: This MUST be set in production for App Links to work

     

       100
       100
       +
       		androidFingerprint = "00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00"

     

       101
       101
       +
       		slog.Warn("ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT not set, using development placeholder",

     

       102
       102
       +
       			"fingerprint", androidFingerprint,

     

       103
       103
       +
       			"note", "Set ANDROID_SHA256_FINGERPRINT env var for production App Links")

     

       104
       104
       +
       	}

     

       105
       105
       +
       

     

       106
       106
       +
       	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       107
       107
       +
       

     

       108
       108
       +
       	// Construct the response per Google's Digital Asset Links spec

     

       109
       109
       +
       	// See: https://developers.google.com/digital-asset-links/v1/getting-started

     

       110
       110
       +
       	response := []map[string]interface{}{

     

       111
       111
       +
       		{

     

       112
       112
       +
       			// delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls grants the app permission

     

       113
       113
       +
       			// to handle URLs for this domain

     

       114
       114
       +
       			"relation": []string{"delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"},

     

       115
       115
       +
       			"target": map[string]interface{}{

     

       116
       116
       +
       				"namespace":    "android_app",

     

       117
       117
       +
       				"package_name": androidPackage,

     

       118
       118
       +
       				// List of certificate fingerprints that can sign the app

     

       119
       119
       +
       				// Multiple fingerprints can be provided for different signing keys

     

       120
       120
       +
       				// (e.g., debug + release)

     

       121
       121
       +
       				"sha256_cert_fingerprints": []string{

     

       122
       122
       +
       					androidFingerprint,

     

       123
       123
       +
       				},

     

       124
       124
       +
       			},

     

       125
       125
       +
       		},

     

       126
       126
       +
       	}

     

       127
       127
       +
       

     

       128
       128
       +
       	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response); err != nil {

     

       129
       129
       +
       		slog.Error("failed to encode assetlinks.json", "error", err)

     

       130
       130
       +
       		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)

     

       131
       131
       +
       		return

     

       132
       132
       +
       	}

     

       133
       133
       +
       

     

       134
       134
       +
       	slog.Debug("served assetlinks.json",

     

       135
       135
       +
       		"package", androidPackage,

     

       136
       136
       +
       		"fingerprint", androidFingerprint)

     

       137
       137
       +
       }

+25

internal/api/routes/wellknown.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package routes

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/api/handlers/wellknown"

     

       5
       5
       +
       

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"

     

       7
       7
       +
       )

     

       8
       8
       +
       

     

       9
       9
       +
       // RegisterWellKnownRoutes registers RFC 8615 well-known URI endpoints

     

       10
       10
       +
       // These endpoints are used for service discovery and mobile app deep linking

     

       11
       11
       +
       //

     

       12
       12
       +
       // Spec: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615.html

     

       13
       13
       +
       func RegisterWellKnownRoutes(r chi.Router) {

     

       14
       14
       +
       	// iOS Universal Links configuration

     

       15
       15
       +
       	// Required for cryptographically-bound deep linking on iOS

     

       16
       16
       +
       	// Must be served at exact path /.well-known/apple-app-site-association

     

       17
       17
       +
       	// Content-Type: application/json (no redirects allowed)

     

       18
       18
       +
       	r.Get("/.well-known/apple-app-site-association", wellknown.HandleAppleAppSiteAssociation)

     

       19
       19
       +
       

     

       20
       20
       +
       	// Android App Links configuration

     

       21
       21
       +
       	// Required for cryptographically-bound deep linking on Android

     

       22
       22
       +
       	// Must be served at exact path /.well-known/assetlinks.json

     

       23
       23
       +
       	// Content-Type: application/json (no redirects allowed)

     

       24
       24
       +
       	r.Get("/.well-known/assetlinks.json", wellknown.HandleAssetLinks)

     

       25
       25
       +
       }

+1 -1

internal/api/handlers/comments/middleware.go

···

       17
       17
        
       // The middleware extracts the viewer DID from the Authorization header if present and valid,

     

       18
       18
        
       // making it available via middleware.GetUserDID(r) in the handler.

     

       19
       19
        
       // If no valid token is present, the request continues as anonymous (empty DID).

     

       20
       20
       -
       func OptionalAuthMiddleware(authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware, next http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {

     

       20
       20
       +
       func OptionalAuthMiddleware(authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware, next http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {

     

       21
       21
        
       	return authMiddleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(next))

     

       22
       22
        
       }

+164 -312

internal/api/middleware/auth.go

···

       1
       1
        
       package middleware

     

       2
       2
        
       

     

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"

     

       5
       5
        
       	"context"

     

       6
       6
       -
       	"fmt"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"encoding/json"

     

       7
       7
        
       	"log"

     

       8
       8
        
       	"net/http"

     

       9
       9
        
       	"strings"

     

       10
       10
       +
       

     

       11
       11
       +
       	oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"

     

       12
       12
       +
       	"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"

     

       10
       13
        
       )

     

       11
       14
        
       

     

       12
       15
        
       // Context keys for storing user information

     
···

       14
       17
        
       

     

       15
       18
        
       const (

     

       16
       19
        
       	UserDIDKey      contextKey = "user_did"

     

       17
       17
       -
       	JWTClaimsKey    contextKey = "jwt_claims"

     

       18
       18
       -
       	UserAccessToken contextKey = "user_access_token"

     

       19
       19
       -
       	DPoPProofKey    contextKey = "dpop_proof"

     

       20
       20
       +
       	OAuthSessionKey contextKey = "oauth_session"

     

       21
       21
       +
       	UserAccessToken contextKey = "user_access_token" // Kept for backward compatibility

     

       20
       22
        
       )

     

       21
       23
        
       

     

       22
       22
       -
       // AtProtoAuthMiddleware enforces atProto OAuth authentication for protected routes

     

       23
       23
       -
       // Validates JWT Bearer tokens from the Authorization header

     

       24
       24
       -
       // Supports DPoP (RFC 9449) for token binding verification

     

       25
       25
       -
       type AtProtoAuthMiddleware struct {

     

       26
       26
       -
       	jwksFetcher  auth.JWKSFetcher

     

       27
       27
       -
       	dpopVerifier *auth.DPoPVerifier

     

       28
       28
       -
       	skipVerify   bool // For Phase 1 testing only

     

       24
       24
       +
       // SessionUnsealer is an interface for unsealing session tokens

     

       25
       25
       +
       // This allows for mocking in tests

     

       26
       26
       +
       type SessionUnsealer interface {

     

       27
       27
       +
       	UnsealSession(token string) (*oauth.SealedSession, error)

     

       29
       28
        
       }

     

       30
       29
        
       

     

       31
       31
       -
       // NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware creates a new atProto auth middleware

     

       32
       32
       -
       // skipVerify: if true, only parses JWT without signature verification (Phase 1)

     

       33
       33
       -
       //

     

       34
       34
       -
       //	if false, performs full signature verification (Phase 2)

     

       35
       35
       -
       //

     

       36
       36
       -
       // IMPORTANT: Call Stop() when shutting down to clean up background goroutines.

     

       37
       37
       -
       func NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher auth.JWKSFetcher, skipVerify bool) *AtProtoAuthMiddleware {

     

       38
       38
       -
       	return &AtProtoAuthMiddleware{

     

       39
       39
       -
       		jwksFetcher:  jwksFetcher,

     

       40
       40
       -
       		dpopVerifier: auth.NewDPoPVerifier(),

     

       41
       41
       -
       		skipVerify:   skipVerify,

     

       42
       42
       -
       	}

     

       30
       30
       +
       // OAuthAuthMiddleware enforces OAuth authentication using sealed session tokens.

     

       31
       31
       +
       type OAuthAuthMiddleware struct {

     

       32
       32
       +
       	unsealer SessionUnsealer

     

       33
       33
       +
       	store    oauthlib.ClientAuthStore

     

       43
       34
        
       }

     

       44
       35
        
       

     

       45
       45
       -
       // Stop stops background goroutines. Call this when shutting down the server.

     

       46
       46
       -
       // This prevents goroutine leaks from the DPoP verifier's replay protection cache.

     

       47
       47
       -
       func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) Stop() {

     

       48
       48
       -
       	if m.dpopVerifier != nil {

     

       49
       49
       -
       		m.dpopVerifier.Stop()

     

       36
       36
       +
       // NewOAuthAuthMiddleware creates a new OAuth auth middleware using sealed session tokens.

     

       37
       37
       +
       func NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(unsealer SessionUnsealer, store oauthlib.ClientAuthStore) *OAuthAuthMiddleware {

     

       38
       38
       +
       	return &OAuthAuthMiddleware{

     

       39
       39
       +
       		unsealer: unsealer,

     

       40
       40
       +
       		store:    store,

     

       50
       41
        
       	}

     

       51
       42
        
       }

     

       52
       43
        
       

     

       53
       53
       -
       // RequireAuth middleware ensures the user is authenticated with a valid JWT

     

       54
       54
       -
       // If not authenticated, returns 401

     

       55
       55
       -
       // If authenticated, injects user DID and JWT claims into context

     

       44
       44
       +
       // RequireAuth middleware ensures the user is authenticated.

     

       45
       45
       +
       // Supports sealed session tokens via:

     

       46
       46
       +
       //   - Authorization: Bearer <sealed_token>

     

       47
       47
       +
       //   - Cookie: coves_session=<sealed_token>

     

       56
       48
        
       //

     

       57
       57
       -
       // Only accepts DPoP authorization scheme per RFC 9449:

     

       58
       58
       -
       // - Authorization: DPoP <token> (DPoP-bound tokens)

     

       59
       59
       -
       func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {

     

       49
       49
       +
       // If not authenticated, returns 401.

     

       50
       50
       +
       // If authenticated, injects user DID into context.

     

       51
       51
       +
       func (m *OAuthAuthMiddleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {

     

       60
       52
        
       	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       61
       61
       -
       		// Extract Authorization header

     

       53
       53
       +
       		var token string

     

       54
       54
       +
       

     

       55
       55
       +
       		// Try Authorization header first (for mobile/API clients)

     

       62
       56
        
       		authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")

     

       63
       63
       -
       		if authHeader == "" {

     

       64
       64
       -
       			writeAuthError(w, "Missing Authorization header")

     

       65
       65
       -
       			return

     

       57
       57
       +
       		if authHeader != "" {

     

       58
       58
       +
       			var ok bool

     

       59
       59
       +
       			token, ok = extractBearerToken(authHeader)

     

       60
       60
       +
       			if !ok {

     

       61
       61
       +
       				writeAuthError(w, "Invalid Authorization header format. Expected: Bearer <token>")

     

       62
       62
       +
       				return

     

       63
       63
       +
       			}

     

       64
       64
       +
       		}

     

       65
       65
       +
       

     

       66
       66
       +
       		// If no header, try session cookie (for web clients)

     

       67
       67
       +
       		if token == "" {

     

       68
       68
       +
       			if cookie, err := r.Cookie("coves_session"); err == nil {

     

       69
       69
       +
       				token = cookie.Value

     

       70
       70
       +
       			}

     

       66
       71
        
       		}

     

       67
       72
        
       

     

       68
       68
       -
       		// Only accept DPoP scheme per RFC 9449

     

       69
       69
       -
       		// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235

     

       70
       70
       -
       		token, ok := extractDPoPToken(authHeader)

     

       71
       71
       -
       		if !ok {

     

       72
       72
       -
       			writeAuthError(w, "Invalid Authorization header format. Expected: DPoP <token>")

     

       73
       73
       +
       		// Must have authentication from either source

     

       74
       74
       +
       		if token == "" {

     

       75
       75
       +
       			writeAuthError(w, "Missing authentication")

     

       73
       76
        
       			return

     

       74
       77
        
       		}

     

       75
       78
        
       

     

       76
       76
       -
       		var claims *auth.Claims

     

       77
       77
       -
       		var err error

     

       79
       79
       +
       		// Authenticate using sealed token

     

       80
       80
       +
       		sealedSession, err := m.unsealer.UnsealSession(token)

     

       81
       81
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       82
       82
       +
       			log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=unseal_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",

     

       83
       83
       +
       				r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)

     

       84
       84
       +
       			writeAuthError(w, "Invalid or expired token")

     

       85
       85
       +
       			return

     

       86
       86
       +
       		}

     

       78
       87
        
       

     

       79
       79
       -
       		if m.skipVerify {

     

       80
       80
       -
       			// Phase 1: Parse only (no signature verification)

     

       81
       81
       -
       			claims, err = auth.ParseJWT(token)

     

       82
       82
       -
       			if err != nil {

     

       83
       83
       -
       				log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=parse_error ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",

     

       84
       84
       -
       					r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)

     

       85
       85
       -
       				writeAuthError(w, "Invalid token")

     

       86
       86
       -
       				return

     

       87
       87
       -
       			}

     

       88
       88
       -
       		} else {

     

       89
       89
       -
       			// Phase 2: Full verification with signature check

     

       90
       90
       -
       			//

     

       91
       91
       -
       			// SECURITY: The access token MUST be verified before trusting any claims.

     

       92
       92
       -
       			// DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, not a replacement for signature verification.

     

       93
       93
       -
       			claims, err = auth.VerifyJWT(r.Context(), token, m.jwksFetcher)

     

       94
       94
       -
       			if err != nil {

     

       95
       95
       -
       				// Token verification failed - REJECT

     

       96
       96
       -
       				// DO NOT fall back to DPoP-only verification, as that would trust unverified claims

     

       97
       97
       -
       				issuer := "unknown"

     

       98
       98
       -
       				if parsedClaims, parseErr := auth.ParseJWT(token); parseErr == nil {

     

       99
       99
       -
       					issuer = parsedClaims.Issuer

     

       100
       100
       -
       				}

     

       101
       101
       -
       				log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=verification_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s issuer=%s error=%v",

     

       102
       102
       -
       					r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, issuer, err)

     

       103
       103
       -
       				writeAuthError(w, "Invalid or expired token")

     

       104
       104
       -
       				return

     

       105
       105
       -
       			}

     

       88
       88
       +
       		// Parse DID

     

       89
       89
       +
       		did, err := syntax.ParseDID(sealedSession.DID)

     

       90
       90
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       91
       91
       +
       			log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=invalid_did ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s error=%v",

     

       92
       92
       +
       				r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, err)

     

       93
       93
       +
       			writeAuthError(w, "Invalid DID in token")

     

       94
       94
       +
       			return

     

       95
       95
       +
       		}

     

       106
       96
        
       

     

       107
       107
       -
       			// Token signature verified - now check if DPoP binding is required

     

       108
       108
       -
       			// If the token has a cnf.jkt claim, DPoP proof is REQUIRED

     

       109
       109
       -
       			dpopHeader := r.Header.Get("DPoP")

     

       110
       110
       -
       			hasCnfJkt := claims.Confirmation != nil && claims.Confirmation["jkt"] != nil

     

       111
       111
       -
       

     

       112
       112
       -
       			if hasCnfJkt {

     

       113
       113
       -
       				// Token has DPoP binding - REQUIRE valid DPoP proof

     

       114
       114
       -
       				if dpopHeader == "" {

     

       115
       115
       -
       					log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=missing_dpop ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header",

     

       116
       116
       -
       						r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path)

     

       117
       117
       -
       					writeAuthError(w, "DPoP proof required")

     

       118
       118
       -
       					return

     

       119
       119
       -
       				}

     

       120
       120
       -
       

     

       121
       121
       -
       				proof, err := m.verifyDPoPBinding(r, claims, dpopHeader, token)

     

       122
       122
       -
       				if err != nil {

     

       123
       123
       -
       					log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=dpop_verification_failed ip=%s method=%s path=%s error=%v",

     

       124
       124
       -
       						r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)

     

       125
       125
       -
       					writeAuthError(w, "Invalid DPoP proof")

     

       126
       126
       -
       					return

     

       127
       127
       -
       				}

     

       128
       128
       -
       

     

       129
       129
       -
       				// Store verified DPoP proof in context

     

       130
       130
       -
       				ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), DPoPProofKey, proof)

     

       131
       131
       -
       				r = r.WithContext(ctx)

     

       132
       132
       -
       			} else if dpopHeader != "" {

     

       133
       133
       -
       				// DPoP header present but token doesn't have cnf.jkt - this is suspicious

     

       134
       134
       -
       				// Log warning but don't reject (could be a misconfigured client)

     

       135
       135
       -
       				log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] type=unexpected_dpop ip=%s method=%s path=%s warning=DPoP header present but token has no cnf.jkt",

     

       136
       136
       -
       					r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path)

     

       137
       137
       -
       			}

     

       97
       97
       +
       		// Load full OAuth session from database

     

       98
       98
       +
       		session, err := m.store.GetSession(r.Context(), did, sealedSession.SessionID)

     

       99
       99
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       100
       100
       +
       			log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=session_not_found ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s session_id=%s error=%v",

     

       101
       101
       +
       				r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, sealedSession.SessionID, err)

     

       102
       102
       +
       			writeAuthError(w, "Session not found or expired")

     

       103
       103
       +
       			return

     

       138
       104
        
       		}

     

       139
       105
        
       

     

       140
       140
       -
       		// Extract user DID from 'sub' claim

     

       141
       141
       -
       		userDID := claims.Subject

     

       142
       142
       -
       		if userDID == "" {

     

       143
       143
       -
       			writeAuthError(w, "Missing user DID in token")

     

       106
       106
       +
       		// Verify session DID matches token DID

     

       107
       107
       +
       		if session.AccountDID.String() != sealedSession.DID {

     

       108
       108
       +
       			log.Printf("[AUTH_FAILURE] type=did_mismatch ip=%s method=%s path=%s token_did=%s session_did=%s",

     

       109
       109
       +
       				r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, session.AccountDID.String())

     

       110
       110
       +
       			writeAuthError(w, "Session DID mismatch")

     

       144
       111
        
       			return

     

       145
       112
        
       		}

     

       146
       113
        
       

     

       147
       147
       -
       		// Inject user info and access token into context

     

       148
       148
       -
       		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, userDID)

     

       149
       149
       -
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)

     

       150
       150
       -
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)

     

       114
       114
       +
       		log.Printf("[AUTH_SUCCESS] ip=%s method=%s path=%s did=%s session_id=%s",

     

       115
       115
       +
       			r.RemoteAddr, r.Method, r.URL.Path, sealedSession.DID, sealedSession.SessionID)

     

       116
       116
       +
       

     

       117
       117
       +
       		// Inject user info and session into context

     

       118
       118
       +
       		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, sealedSession.DID)

     

       119
       119
       +
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, OAuthSessionKey, session)

     

       120
       120
       +
       		// Store access token for backward compatibility

     

       121
       121
       +
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, session.AccessToken)

     

       151
       122
        
       

     

       152
       123
        
       		// Call next handler

     

       153
       124
        
       		next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))

     

       154
       125
        
       	})

     

       155
       126
        
       }

     

       156
       127
        
       

     

       157
       157
       -
       // OptionalAuth middleware loads user info if authenticated, but doesn't require it

     

       158
       158
       -
       // Useful for endpoints that work for both authenticated and anonymous users

     

       128
       128
       +
       // OptionalAuth middleware loads user info if authenticated, but doesn't require it.

     

       129
       129
       +
       // Useful for endpoints that work for both authenticated and anonymous users.

     

       130
       130
       +
       //

     

       131
       131
       +
       // Supports sealed session tokens via:

     

       132
       132
       +
       //   - Authorization: Bearer <sealed_token>

     

       133
       133
       +
       //   - Cookie: coves_session=<sealed_token>

     

       159
       134
        
       //

     

       160
       160
       -
       // Only accepts DPoP authorization scheme per RFC 9449:

     

       161
       161
       -
       // - Authorization: DPoP <token> (DPoP-bound tokens)

     

       162
       162
       -
       func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) OptionalAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {

     

       135
       135
       +
       // If authentication fails, continues without user context (does not return error).

     

       136
       136
       +
       func (m *OAuthAuthMiddleware) OptionalAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {

     

       163
       137
        
       	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       164
       164
       -
       		// Extract Authorization header

     

       138
       138
       +
       		var token string

     

       139
       139
       +
       

     

       140
       140
       +
       		// Try Authorization header first (for mobile/API clients)

     

       165
       141
        
       		authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")

     

       142
       142
       +
       		if authHeader != "" {

     

       143
       143
       +
       			var ok bool

     

       144
       144
       +
       			token, ok = extractBearerToken(authHeader)

     

       145
       145
       +
       			if !ok {

     

       146
       146
       +
       				// Invalid format - continue without user context

     

       147
       147
       +
       				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       148
       148
       +
       				return

     

       149
       149
       +
       			}

     

       150
       150
       +
       		}

     

       151
       151
       +
       

     

       152
       152
       +
       		// If no header, try session cookie (for web clients)

     

       153
       153
       +
       		if token == "" {

     

       154
       154
       +
       			if cookie, err := r.Cookie("coves_session"); err == nil {

     

       155
       155
       +
       				token = cookie.Value

     

       156
       156
       +
       			}

     

       157
       157
       +
       		}

     

       166
       158
        
       

     

       167
       167
       -
       		// Only accept DPoP scheme per RFC 9449

     

       168
       168
       -
       		// HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235

     

       169
       169
       -
       		token, ok := extractDPoPToken(authHeader)

     

       170
       170
       -
       		if !ok {

     

       171
       171
       -
       			// Not authenticated or invalid format - continue without user context

     

       159
       159
       +
       		// If still no token, continue without authentication

     

       160
       160
       +
       		if token == "" {

     

       172
       161
        
       			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       173
       162
        
       			return

     

       174
       163
        
       		}

     

       175
       164
        
       

     

       176
       176
       -
       		var claims *auth.Claims

     

       177
       177
       -
       		var err error

     

       165
       165
       +
       		// Try to authenticate (don't write errors, just continue without user context on failure)

     

       166
       166
       +
       		sealedSession, err := m.unsealer.UnsealSession(token)

     

       167
       167
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       168
       168
       +
       			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       169
       169
       +
       			return

     

       170
       170
       +
       		}

     

       178
       171
        
       

     

       179
       179
       -
       		if m.skipVerify {

     

       180
       180
       -
       			// Phase 1: Parse only

     

       181
       181
       -
       			claims, err = auth.ParseJWT(token)

     

       182
       182
       -
       		} else {

     

       183
       183
       -
       			// Phase 2: Full verification

     

       184
       184
       -
       			// SECURITY: Token MUST be verified before trusting claims

     

       185
       185
       -
       			claims, err = auth.VerifyJWT(r.Context(), token, m.jwksFetcher)

     

       172
       172
       +
       		// Parse DID

     

       173
       173
       +
       		did, err := syntax.ParseDID(sealedSession.DID)

     

       174
       174
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       175
       175
       +
       			log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: invalid DID: %v", err)

     

       176
       176
       +
       			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       177
       177
       +
       			return

     

       186
       178
        
       		}

     

       187
       179
        
       

     

       180
       180
       +
       		// Load full OAuth session from database

     

       181
       181
       +
       		session, err := m.store.GetSession(r.Context(), did, sealedSession.SessionID)

     

       188
       182
        
       		if err != nil {

     

       189
       189
       -
       			// Invalid token - continue without user context

     

       190
       190
       -
       			log.Printf("Optional auth failed: %v", err)

     

       183
       183
       +
       			log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: session not found: %v", err)

     

       191
       184
        
       			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       192
       185
        
       			return

     

       193
       186
        
       		}

     

       194
       187
        
       

     

       195
       195
       -
       		// Check DPoP binding if token has cnf.jkt (after successful verification)

     

       196
       196
       -
       		// SECURITY: If token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header, we cannot trust it

     

       197
       197
       -
       		// (could be a stolen token). Continue as unauthenticated.

     

       198
       198
       -
       		if !m.skipVerify {

     

       199
       199
       -
       			dpopHeader := r.Header.Get("DPoP")

     

       200
       200
       -
       			hasCnfJkt := claims.Confirmation != nil && claims.Confirmation["jkt"] != nil

     

       201
       201
       -
       

     

       202
       202
       -
       			if hasCnfJkt {

     

       203
       203
       -
       				if dpopHeader == "" {

     

       204
       204
       -
       					// Token requires DPoP binding but no proof provided

     

       205
       205
       -
       					// Cannot trust this token - continue without auth

     

       206
       206
       -
       					log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: token has cnf.jkt but no DPoP header - treating as unauthenticated (potential token theft)")

     

       207
       207
       -
       					next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       208
       208
       -
       					return

     

       209
       209
       -
       				}

     

       210
       210
       -
       

     

       211
       211
       -
       				proof, err := m.verifyDPoPBinding(r, claims, dpopHeader, token)

     

       212
       212
       -
       				if err != nil {

     

       213
       213
       -
       					// DPoP verification failed - cannot trust this token

     

       214
       214
       -
       					log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: DPoP verification failed - treating as unauthenticated: %v", err)

     

       215
       215
       -
       					next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       216
       216
       -
       					return

     

       217
       217
       -
       				}

     

       218
       218
       -
       

     

       219
       219
       -
       				// DPoP verified - inject proof into context

     

       220
       220
       -
       				ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, claims.Subject)

     

       221
       221
       -
       				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)

     

       222
       222
       -
       				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)

     

       223
       223
       -
       				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, DPoPProofKey, proof)

     

       224
       224
       -
       				next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))

     

       225
       225
       -
       				return

     

       226
       226
       -
       			}

     

       188
       188
       +
       		// Verify session DID matches token DID

     

       189
       189
       +
       		if session.AccountDID.String() != sealedSession.DID {

     

       190
       190
       +
       			log.Printf("[AUTH_WARNING] Optional auth: DID mismatch")

     

       191
       191
       +
       			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)

     

       192
       192
       +
       			return

     

       227
       193
        
       		}

     

       228
       194
        
       

     

       229
       229
       -
       		// No DPoP binding required - inject user info and access token into context

     

       230
       230
       -
       		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, claims.Subject)

     

       231
       231
       -
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, JWTClaimsKey, claims)

     

       232
       232
       -
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, token)

     

       195
       195
       +
       		// Build authenticated context

     

       196
       196
       +
       		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserDIDKey, sealedSession.DID)

     

       197
       197
       +
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, OAuthSessionKey, session)

     

       198
       198
       +
       		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserAccessToken, session.AccessToken)

     

       233
       199
        
       

     

       234
       234
       -
       		// Call next handler

     

       235
       200
        
       		next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))

     

       236
       201
        
       	})

     

       237
       202
        
       }

     
···

       251
       216
        
       	return did

     

       252
       217
        
       }

     

       253
       218
        
       

     

       254
       254
       -
       // GetJWTClaims extracts the JWT claims from the request context

     

       219
       219
       +
       // GetOAuthSession extracts the OAuth session from the request context

     

       255
       220
        
       // Returns nil if not authenticated

     

       256
       256
       -
       func GetJWTClaims(r *http.Request) *auth.Claims {

     

       257
       257
       -
       	claims, _ := r.Context().Value(JWTClaimsKey).(*auth.Claims)

     

       258
       258
       -
       	return claims

     

       259
       259
       -
       }

     

       260
       260
       -
       

     

       261
       261
       -
       // SetTestUserDID sets the user DID in the context for testing purposes

     

       262
       262
       -
       // This function should ONLY be used in tests to mock authenticated users

     

       263
       263
       -
       func SetTestUserDID(ctx context.Context, userDID string) context.Context {

     

       264
       264
       -
       	return context.WithValue(ctx, UserDIDKey, userDID)

     

       221
       221
       +
       // Handlers can use this to make authenticated PDS calls

     

       222
       222
       +
       func GetOAuthSession(r *http.Request) *oauthlib.ClientSessionData {

     

       223
       223
       +
       	session, _ := r.Context().Value(OAuthSessionKey).(*oauthlib.ClientSessionData)

     

       224
       224
       +
       	return session

     

       265
       225
        
       }

     

       266
       226
        
       

     

       267
       227
        
       // GetUserAccessToken extracts the user's access token from the request context

     
···

       271
       231
        
       	return token

     

       272
       232
        
       }

     

       273
       233
        
       

     

       274
       274
       -
       // GetDPoPProof extracts the DPoP proof from the request context

     

       275
       275
       -
       // Returns nil if no DPoP proof was verified

     

       276
       276
       -
       func GetDPoPProof(r *http.Request) *auth.DPoPProof {

     

       277
       277
       -
       	proof, _ := r.Context().Value(DPoPProofKey).(*auth.DPoPProof)

     

       278
       278
       -
       	return proof

     

       279
       279
       -
       }

     

       280
       280
       -
       

     

       281
       281
       -
       // verifyDPoPBinding verifies DPoP proof binding for an ALREADY VERIFIED token.

     

       282
       282
       -
       //

     

       283
       283
       -
       // SECURITY: This function ONLY verifies the DPoP proof and its binding to the token.

     

       284
       284
       -
       // The access token MUST be signature-verified BEFORE calling this function.

     

       285
       285
       -
       // DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, not a replacement for signature verification.

     

       286
       286
       -
       //

     

       287
       287
       -
       // This prevents token theft attacks by proving the client possesses the private key

     

       288
       288
       -
       // corresponding to the public key thumbprint in the token's cnf.jkt claim.

     

       289
       289
       -
       func (m *AtProtoAuthMiddleware) verifyDPoPBinding(r *http.Request, claims *auth.Claims, dpopProofHeader, accessToken string) (*auth.DPoPProof, error) {

     

       290
       290
       -
       	// Extract the cnf.jkt claim from the already-verified token

     

       291
       291
       -
       	jkt, err := auth.ExtractCnfJkt(claims)

     

       292
       292
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       293
       293
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token requires DPoP but missing cnf.jkt: %w", err)

     

       294
       294
       -
       	}

     

       295
       295
       -
       

     

       296
       296
       -
       	// Build the HTTP URI for DPoP verification

     

       297
       297
       -
       	// Use the full URL including scheme and host, respecting proxy headers

     

       298
       298
       -
       	scheme, host := extractSchemeAndHost(r)

     

       299
       299
       -
       

     

       300
       300
       -
       	// Use EscapedPath to preserve percent-encoding (P3 fix)

     

       301
       301
       -
       	// r.URL.Path is decoded, but DPoP proofs contain the raw encoded path

     

       302
       302
       -
       	path := r.URL.EscapedPath()

     

       303
       303
       -
       	if path == "" {

     

       304
       304
       -
       		path = r.URL.Path // Fallback if EscapedPath returns empty

     

       305
       305
       -
       	}

     

       306
       306
       -
       

     

       307
       307
       -
       	httpURI := scheme + "://" + host + path

     

       308
       308
       -
       

     

       309
       309
       -
       	// Verify the DPoP proof

     

       310
       310
       -
       	proof, err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyDPoPProof(dpopProofHeader, r.Method, httpURI)

     

       311
       311
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       312
       312
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP proof verification failed: %w", err)

     

       313
       313
       -
       	}

     

       314
       314
       -
       

     

       315
       315
       -
       	// Verify the binding between the proof and the token (cnf.jkt)

     

       316
       316
       -
       	if err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyTokenBinding(proof, jkt); err != nil {

     

       317
       317
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP binding verification failed: %w", err)

     

       318
       318
       -
       	}

     

       319
       319
       -
       

     

       320
       320
       -
       	// Verify the access token hash (ath) if present in the proof

     

       321
       321
       -
       	// Per RFC 9449 section 4.2, if ath is present, it MUST match the access token

     

       322
       322
       -
       	if err := m.dpopVerifier.VerifyAccessTokenHash(proof, accessToken); err != nil {

     

       323
       323
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("DPoP ath verification failed: %w", err)

     

       324
       324
       -
       	}

     

       325
       325
       -
       

     

       326
       326
       -
       	return proof, nil

     

       327
       327
       -
       }

     

       328
       328
       -
       

     

       329
       329
       -
       // extractSchemeAndHost extracts the scheme and host from the request,

     

       330
       330
       -
       // respecting proxy headers (X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Host, Forwarded).

     

       331
       331
       -
       // This is critical for DPoP verification when behind TLS-terminating proxies.

     

       332
       332
       -
       func extractSchemeAndHost(r *http.Request) (scheme, host string) {

     

       333
       333
       -
       	// Start with request defaults

     

       334
       334
       -
       	scheme = r.URL.Scheme

     

       335
       335
       -
       	host = r.Host

     

       336
       336
       -
       

     

       337
       337
       -
       	// Check X-Forwarded-Proto for scheme (most common)

     

       338
       338
       -
       	if forwardedProto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); forwardedProto != "" {

     

       339
       339
       -
       		parts := strings.Split(forwardedProto, ",")

     

       340
       340
       -
       		if len(parts) > 0 && strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) != "" {

     

       341
       341
       -
       			scheme = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]))

     

       342
       342
       -
       		}

     

       343
       343
       -
       	}

     

       344
       344
       -
       

     

       345
       345
       -
       	// Check X-Forwarded-Host for host (common with nginx/traefik)

     

       346
       346
       -
       	if forwardedHost := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"); forwardedHost != "" {

     

       347
       347
       -
       		parts := strings.Split(forwardedHost, ",")

     

       348
       348
       -
       		if len(parts) > 0 && strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]) != "" {

     

       349
       349
       -
       			host = strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])

     

       350
       350
       -
       		}

     

       351
       351
       -
       	}

     

       352
       352
       -
       

     

       353
       353
       -
       	// Check standard Forwarded header (RFC 7239) - takes precedence if present

     

       354
       354
       -
       	// Format: Forwarded: for=192.0.2.60;proto=http;by=203.0.113.43;host=example.com

     

       355
       355
       -
       	// RFC 7239 allows: mixed-case keys (Proto, PROTO), quoted values (host="example.com")

     

       356
       356
       -
       	if forwarded := r.Header.Get("Forwarded"); forwarded != "" {

     

       357
       357
       -
       		// Parse the first entry (comma-separated list)

     

       358
       358
       -
       		firstEntry := strings.Split(forwarded, ",")[0]

     

       359
       359
       -
       		for _, part := range strings.Split(firstEntry, ";") {

     

       360
       360
       -
       			part = strings.TrimSpace(part)

     

       361
       361
       -
       			// Split on first '=' to properly handle key=value pairs

     

       362
       362
       -
       			if idx := strings.Index(part, "="); idx != -1 {

     

       363
       363
       -
       				key := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(part[:idx]))

     

       364
       364
       -
       				value := strings.TrimSpace(part[idx+1:])

     

       365
       365
       -
       				// Strip optional quotes per RFC 7239 section 4

     

       366
       366
       -
       				value = strings.Trim(value, "\"")

     

       367
       367
       -
       

     

       368
       368
       -
       				switch key {

     

       369
       369
       -
       				case "proto":

     

       370
       370
       -
       					scheme = strings.ToLower(value)

     

       371
       371
       -
       				case "host":

     

       372
       372
       -
       					host = value

     

       373
       373
       -
       				}

     

       374
       374
       -
       			}

     

       375
       375
       -
       		}

     

       376
       376
       -
       	}

     

       377
       377
       -
       

     

       378
       378
       -
       	// Fallback scheme detection from TLS

     

       379
       379
       -
       	if scheme == "" {

     

       380
       380
       -
       		if r.TLS != nil {

     

       381
       381
       -
       			scheme = "https"

     

       382
       382
       -
       		} else {

     

       383
       383
       -
       			scheme = "http"

     

       384
       384
       -
       		}

     

       385
       385
       -
       	}

     

       386
       386
       -
       

     

       387
       387
       -
       	return strings.ToLower(scheme), host

     

       388
       388
       -
       }

     

       389
       389
       -
       

     

       390
       390
       -
       // writeAuthError writes a JSON error response for authentication failures

     

       391
       391
       -
       func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {

     

       392
       392
       -
       	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       393
       393
       -
       	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)

     

       394
       394
       -
       	// Simple error response matching XRPC error format

     

       395
       395
       -
       	response := `{"error":"AuthenticationRequired","message":"` + message + `"}`

     

       396
       396
       -
       	if _, err := w.Write([]byte(response)); err != nil {

     

       397
       397
       -
       		log.Printf("Failed to write auth error response: %v", err)

     

       398
       398
       -
       	}

     

       234
       234
       +
       // SetTestUserDID sets the user DID in the context for testing purposes

     

       235
       235
       +
       // This function should ONLY be used in tests to mock authenticated users

     

       236
       236
       +
       func SetTestUserDID(ctx context.Context, userDID string) context.Context {

     

       237
       237
       +
       	return context.WithValue(ctx, UserDIDKey, userDID)

     

       399
       238
        
       }

     

       400
       239
        
       

     

       401
       401
       -
       // extractDPoPToken extracts the token from a DPoP Authorization header.

     

       402
       402
       -
       // HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235, so "DPoP", "dpop", "DPOP" are all valid.

     

       403
       403
       -
       // Returns the token and true if valid DPoP scheme, empty string and false otherwise.

     

       404
       404
       -
       func extractDPoPToken(authHeader string) (string, bool) {

     

       240
       240
       +
       // extractBearerToken extracts the token from a Bearer Authorization header.

     

       241
       241
       +
       // HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive per RFC 7235, so "Bearer", "bearer", "BEARER" are all valid.

     

       242
       242
       +
       // Returns the token and true if valid Bearer scheme, empty string and false otherwise.

     

       243
       243
       +
       func extractBearerToken(authHeader string) (string, bool) {

     

       405
       244
        
       	if authHeader == "" {

     

       406
       245
        
       		return "", false

     

       407
       246
        
       	}

     

       408
       247
        
       

     

       409
       409
       -
       	// Split on first space: "DPoP <token>" -> ["DPoP", "<token>"]

     

       248
       248
       +
       	// Split on first space: "Bearer <token>" -> ["Bearer", "<token>"]

     

       410
       249
        
       	parts := strings.SplitN(authHeader, " ", 2)

     

       411
       250
        
       	if len(parts) != 2 {

     

       412
       251
        
       		return "", false

     

       413
       252
        
       	}

     

       414
       253
        
       

     

       415
       254
        
       	// Case-insensitive scheme comparison per RFC 7235

     

       416
       416
       -
       	if !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "DPoP") {

     

       255
       255
       +
       	if !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") {

     

       417
       256
        
       		return "", false

     

       418
       257
        
       	}

     

       419
       258
        
       

     
···

       424
       263
        
       

     

       425
       264
        
       	return token, true

     

       426
       265
        
       }

     

       266
       266
       +
       

     

       267
       267
       +
       // writeAuthError writes a JSON error response for authentication failures

     

       268
       268
       +
       func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, message string) {

     

       269
       269
       +
       	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       270
       270
       +
       	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)

     

       271
       271
       +
       	// Use json.NewEncoder to properly escape the message and prevent injection

     

       272
       272
       +
       	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{

     

       273
       273
       +
       		"error":   "AuthenticationRequired",

     

       274
       274
       +
       		"message": message,

     

       275
       275
       +
       	}); err != nil {

     

       276
       276
       +
       		log.Printf("Failed to write auth error response: %v", err)

     

       277
       277
       +
       	}

     

       278
       278
       +
       }

+511 -728

internal/api/middleware/auth_test.go

···

       1
       1
        
       package middleware

     

       2
       2
        
       

     

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"

     

       5
       5
        
       	"context"

     

       6
       6
       -
       	"crypto/ecdsa"

     

       7
       7
       -
       	"crypto/elliptic"

     

       8
       8
       -
       	"crypto/rand"

     

       9
       9
       -
       	"crypto/sha256"

     

       10
       6
        
       	"encoding/base64"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"encoding/json"

     

       11
       8
        
       	"fmt"

     

       12
       9
        
       	"net/http"

     

       13
       10
        
       	"net/http/httptest"

     
···

       15
       12
        
       	"testing"

     

       16
       13
        
       	"time"

     

       17
       14
        
       

     

       18
       18
       -
       	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"

     

       19
       19
       -
       	"github.com/google/uuid"

     

       15
       15
       +
       	oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"

     

       16
       16
       +
       	"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"

     

       20
       17
        
       )

     

       21
       18
        
       

     

       22
       22
       -
       // mockJWKSFetcher is a test double for JWKSFetcher

     

       23
       23
       -
       type mockJWKSFetcher struct {

     

       24
       24
       -
       	shouldFail bool

     

       19
       19
       +
       // mockOAuthClient is a test double for OAuthClient

     

       20
       20
       +
       type mockOAuthClient struct {

     

       21
       21
       +
       	sealSecret     []byte

     

       22
       22
       +
       	shouldFailSeal bool

     

       25
       23
        
       }

     

       26
       24
        
       

     

       27
       27
       -
       func (m *mockJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {

     

       28
       28
       -
       	if m.shouldFail {

     

       29
       29
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mock fetch failure")

     

       25
       25
       +
       func newMockOAuthClient() *mockOAuthClient {

     

       26
       26
       +
       	// Create a 32-byte seal secret for testing

     

       27
       27
       +
       	secret := []byte("test-secret-key-32-bytes-long!!")

     

       28
       28
       +
       	return &mockOAuthClient{

     

       29
       29
       +
       		sealSecret: secret,

     

       30
       30
        
       	}

     

       31
       31
       -
       	// Return nil - we won't actually verify signatures in Phase 1 tests

     

       32
       32
       -
       	return nil, nil

     

       33
       31
        
       }

     

       34
       32
        
       

     

       35
       35
       -
       // createTestToken creates a test JWT with the given DID

     

       36
       36
       -
       func createTestToken(did string) string {

     

       37
       37
       -
       	claims := jwt.MapClaims{

     

       38
       38
       -
       		"sub":   did,

     

       39
       39
       -
       		"iss":   "https://test.pds.local",

     

       40
       40
       -
       		"scope": "atproto",

     

       41
       41
       -
       		"exp":   time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),

     

       42
       42
       -
       		"iat":   time.Now().Unix(),

     

       33
       33
       +
       func (m *mockOAuthClient) UnsealSession(token string) (*oauth.SealedSession, error) {

     

       34
       34
       +
       	if m.shouldFailSeal {

     

       35
       35
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mock unseal failure")

     

       43
       36
        
       	}

     

       44
       37
        
       

     

       45
       45
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       46
       46
       -
       	tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       47
       47
       -
       	return tokenString

     

       38
       38
       +
       	// For testing, we'll decode a simple format: base64(did|sessionID|expiresAt)

     

       39
       39
       +
       	// In production this would be AES-GCM encrypted

     

       40
       40
       +
       	// Using pipe separator to avoid conflicts with colon in DIDs

     

       41
       41
       +
       	decoded, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)

     

       42
       42
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       43
       43
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token encoding: %w", err)

     

       44
       44
       +
       	}

     

       45
       45
       +
       

     

       46
       46
       +
       	parts := strings.Split(string(decoded), "|")

     

       47
       47
       +
       	if len(parts) != 3 {

     

       48
       48
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token format")

     

       49
       49
       +
       	}

     

       50
       50
       +
       

     

       51
       51
       +
       	var expiresAt int64

     

       52
       52
       +
       	_, _ = fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "%d", &expiresAt)

     

       53
       53
       +
       

     

       54
       54
       +
       	// Check expiration

     

       55
       55
       +
       	if expiresAt <= time.Now().Unix() {

     

       56
       56
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token expired")

     

       57
       57
       +
       	}

     

       58
       58
       +
       

     

       59
       59
       +
       	return &oauth.SealedSession{

     

       60
       60
       +
       		DID:       parts[0],

     

       61
       61
       +
       		SessionID: parts[1],

     

       62
       62
       +
       		ExpiresAt: expiresAt,

     

       63
       63
       +
       	}, nil

     

       64
       64
       +
       }

     

       65
       65
       +
       

     

       66
       66
       +
       // Helper to create a test sealed token

     

       67
       67
       +
       func (m *mockOAuthClient) createTestToken(did, sessionID string, ttl time.Duration) string {

     

       68
       68
       +
       	expiresAt := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()

     

       69
       69
       +
       	payload := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s|%d", did, sessionID, expiresAt)

     

       70
       70
       +
       	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(payload))

     

       71
       71
       +
       }

     

       72
       72
       +
       

     

       73
       73
       +
       // mockOAuthStore is a test double for ClientAuthStore

     

       74
       74
       +
       type mockOAuthStore struct {

     

       75
       75
       +
       	sessions map[string]*oauthlib.ClientSessionData

     

       76
       76
       +
       }

     

       77
       77
       +
       

     

       78
       78
       +
       func newMockOAuthStore() *mockOAuthStore {

     

       79
       79
       +
       	return &mockOAuthStore{

     

       80
       80
       +
       		sessions: make(map[string]*oauthlib.ClientSessionData),

     

       81
       81
       +
       	}

     

       82
       82
       +
       }

     

       83
       83
       +
       

     

       84
       84
       +
       func (m *mockOAuthStore) GetSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) (*oauthlib.ClientSessionData, error) {

     

       85
       85
       +
       	key := did.String() + ":" + sessionID

     

       86
       86
       +
       	session, ok := m.sessions[key]

     

       87
       87
       +
       	if !ok {

     

       88
       88
       +
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("session not found")

     

       89
       89
       +
       	}

     

       90
       90
       +
       	return session, nil

     

       48
       91
        
       }

     

       49
       92
        
       

     

       50
       50
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_ValidToken tests that valid tokens are accepted with DPoP scheme (Phase 1)

     

       93
       93
       +
       func (m *mockOAuthStore) SaveSession(ctx context.Context, session oauthlib.ClientSessionData) error {

     

       94
       94
       +
       	key := session.AccountDID.String() + ":" + session.SessionID

     

       95
       95
       +
       	m.sessions[key] = &session

     

       96
       96
       +
       	return nil

     

       97
       97
       +
       }

     

       98
       98
       +
       

     

       99
       99
       +
       func (m *mockOAuthStore) DeleteSession(ctx context.Context, did syntax.DID, sessionID string) error {

     

       100
       100
       +
       	key := did.String() + ":" + sessionID

     

       101
       101
       +
       	delete(m.sessions, key)

     

       102
       102
       +
       	return nil

     

       103
       103
       +
       }

     

       104
       104
       +
       

     

       105
       105
       +
       func (m *mockOAuthStore) GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) (*oauthlib.AuthRequestData, error) {

     

       106
       106
       +
       	return nil, fmt.Errorf("not implemented")

     

       107
       107
       +
       }

     

       108
       108
       +
       

     

       109
       109
       +
       func (m *mockOAuthStore) SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, info oauthlib.AuthRequestData) error {

     

       110
       110
       +
       	return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")

     

       111
       111
       +
       }

     

       112
       112
       +
       

     

       113
       113
       +
       func (m *mockOAuthStore) DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx context.Context, state string) error {

     

       114
       114
       +
       	return fmt.Errorf("not implemented")

     

       115
       115
       +
       }

     

       116
       116
       +
       

     

       117
       117
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_ValidToken tests that valid sealed tokens are accepted

     

       51
       118
        
       func TestRequireAuth_ValidToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       52
       52
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       53
       53
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true) // skipVerify=true

     

       119
       119
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       120
       120
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       121
       121
       +
       

     

       122
       122
       +
       	// Create a test session

     

       123
       123
       +
       	did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")

     

       124
       124
       +
       	sessionID := "session123"

     

       125
       125
       +
       	session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       126
       126
       +
       		AccountDID:  did,

     

       127
       127
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       128
       128
       +
       		AccessToken: "test_access_token",

     

       129
       129
       +
       		HostURL:     "https://pds.example.com",

     

       130
       130
       +
       	}

     

       131
       131
       +
       	_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)

     

       132
       132
       +
       

     

       133
       133
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       54
       134
        
       

     

       55
       135
        
       	handlerCalled := false

     

       56
       136
        
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       57
       137
        
       		handlerCalled = true

     

       58
       138
        
       

     

       59
       139
        
       		// Verify DID was extracted and injected into context

     

       60
       60
       -
       		did := GetUserDID(r)

     

       61
       61
       -
       		if did != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       62
       62
       -
       			t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", did)

     

       140
       140
       +
       		extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)

     

       141
       141
       +
       		if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       142
       142
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)

     

       63
       143
        
       		}

     

       64
       144
        
       

     

       65
       65
       -
       		// Verify claims were injected

     

       66
       66
       -
       		claims := GetJWTClaims(r)

     

       67
       67
       -
       		if claims == nil {

     

       68
       68
       -
       			t.Error("expected claims to be non-nil")

     

       145
       145
       +
       		// Verify OAuth session was injected

     

       146
       146
       +
       		oauthSession := GetOAuthSession(r)

     

       147
       147
       +
       		if oauthSession == nil {

     

       148
       148
       +
       			t.Error("expected OAuth session to be non-nil")

     

       69
       149
        
       			return

     

       70
       150
        
       		}

     

       71
       71
       -
       		if claims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       72
       72
       -
       			t.Errorf("expected claims.Subject 'did:plc:test123', got %s", claims.Subject)

     

       151
       151
       +
       		if oauthSession.SessionID != sessionID {

     

       152
       152
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected session ID '%s', got %s", sessionID, oauthSession.SessionID)

     

       153
       153
       +
       		}

     

       154
       154
       +
       

     

       155
       155
       +
       		// Verify access token is available

     

       156
       156
       +
       		accessToken := GetUserAccessToken(r)

     

       157
       157
       +
       		if accessToken != "test_access_token" {

     

       158
       158
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected access token 'test_access_token', got %s", accessToken)

     

       73
       159
        
       		}

     

       74
       160
        
       

     

       75
       161
        
       		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       76
       162
        
       	}))

     

       77
       163
        
       

     

       78
       78
       -
       	token := createTestToken("did:plc:test123")

     

       164
       164
       +
       	token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)

     

       79
       165
        
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       80
       80
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+token)

     

       166
       166
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       81
       167
        
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       82
       168
        
       

     

       83
       169
        
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     
···

       93
       179
        
       

     

       94
       180
        
       // TestRequireAuth_MissingAuthHeader tests that missing Authorization header is rejected

     

       95
       181
        
       func TestRequireAuth_MissingAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {

     

       96
       96
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       97
       97
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       182
       182
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       183
       183
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       184
       184
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       98
       185
        
       

     

       99
       186
        
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       100
       187
        
       		t.Error("handler should not be called")

     
···

       111
       198
        
       	}

     

       112
       199
        
       }

     

       113
       200
        
       

     

       114
       114
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat tests that non-DPoP tokens are rejected (including Bearer)

     

       201
       201
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat tests that non-Bearer tokens are rejected

     

       115
       202
        
       func TestRequireAuth_InvalidAuthHeaderFormat(t *testing.T) {

     

       116
       116
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       117
       117
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       203
       203
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       204
       204
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       205
       205
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       118
       206
        
       

     

       119
       207
        
       	tests := []struct {

     

       120
       208
        
       		name   string

     

       121
       209
        
       		header string

     

       122
       210
        
       	}{

     

       123
       211
        
       		{"Basic auth", "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"},

     

       124
       124
       -
       		{"Bearer scheme", "Bearer some-token"},

     

       212
       212
       +
       		{"DPoP scheme", "DPoP some-token"},

     

       125
       213
        
       		{"Invalid format", "InvalidFormat"},

     

       126
       214
        
       	}

     

       127
       215
        
       

     
···

       144
       232
        
       	}

     

       145
       233
        
       }

     

       146
       234
        
       

     

       147
       147
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_BearerRejectionErrorMessage verifies that Bearer tokens are rejected

     

       148
       148
       -
       // with a helpful error message guiding users to use DPoP scheme

     

       149
       149
       -
       func TestRequireAuth_BearerRejectionErrorMessage(t *testing.T) {

     

       150
       150
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       151
       151
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       152
       152
       -
       

     

       153
       153
       -
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       154
       154
       -
       		t.Error("handler should not be called")

     

       155
       155
       -
       	}))

     

       156
       156
       -
       

     

       157
       157
       -
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       158
       158
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer some-token")

     

       159
       159
       -
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       160
       160
       -
       

     

       161
       161
       -
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       162
       162
       -
       

     

       163
       163
       -
       	if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       164
       164
       -
       		t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)

     

       165
       165
       -
       	}

     

       235
       235
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme verifies that Bearer scheme matching is case-insensitive

     

       236
       236
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme(t *testing.T) {

     

       237
       237
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       238
       238
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       166
       239
        
       

     

       167
       167
       -
       	// Verify error message guides user to use DPoP

     

       168
       168
       -
       	body := w.Body.String()

     

       169
       169
       -
       	if !strings.Contains(body, "Expected: DPoP") {

     

       170
       170
       -
       		t.Errorf("error message should guide user to use DPoP, got: %s", body)

     

       240
       240
       +
       	// Create a test session

     

       241
       241
       +
       	did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")

     

       242
       242
       +
       	sessionID := "session123"

     

       243
       243
       +
       	session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       244
       244
       +
       		AccountDID:  did,

     

       245
       245
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       246
       246
       +
       		AccessToken: "test_access_token",

     

       171
       247
        
       	}

     

       172
       172
       -
       }

     

       173
       173
       -
       

     

       174
       174
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme verifies that DPoP scheme matching is case-insensitive

     

       175
       175
       -
       // per RFC 7235 which states HTTP auth schemes are case-insensitive

     

       176
       176
       -
       func TestRequireAuth_CaseInsensitiveScheme(t *testing.T) {

     

       177
       177
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       178
       178
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       248
       248
       +
       	_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)

     

       179
       249
        
       

     

       180
       180
       -
       	// Create a valid JWT for testing

     

       181
       181
       -
       	validToken := createValidJWT(t, "did:plc:test123", time.Hour)

     

       250
       250
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       251
       251
       +
       	token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)

     

       182
       252
        
       

     

       183
       253
        
       	testCases := []struct {

     

       184
       254
        
       		name   string

     

       185
       255
        
       		scheme string

     

       186
       256
        
       	}{

     

       187
       187
       -
       		{"lowercase", "dpop"},

     

       188
       188
       -
       		{"uppercase", "DPOP"},

     

       189
       189
       -
       		{"mixed_case", "DpOp"},

     

       190
       190
       -
       		{"standard", "DPoP"},

     

       257
       257
       +
       		{"lowercase", "bearer"},

     

       258
       258
       +
       		{"uppercase", "BEARER"},

     

       259
       259
       +
       		{"mixed_case", "BeArEr"},

     

       260
       260
       +
       		{"standard", "Bearer"},

     

       191
       261
        
       	}

     

       192
       262
        
       

     

       193
       263
        
       	for _, tc := range testCases {

     
···

       199
       269
        
       			}))

     

       200
       270
        
       

     

       201
       271
        
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       202
       202
       -
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.scheme+" "+validToken)

     

       272
       272
       +
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.scheme+" "+token)

     

       203
       273
        
       			w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       204
       274
        
       

     

       205
       275
        
       			handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     
···

       212
       282
        
       	}

     

       213
       283
        
       }

     

       214
       284
        
       

     

       215
       215
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_MalformedToken tests that malformed JWTs are rejected

     

       216
       216
       -
       func TestRequireAuth_MalformedToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       217
       217
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       218
       218
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       285
       285
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_InvalidToken tests that malformed sealed tokens are rejected

     

       286
       286
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       287
       287
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       288
       288
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       289
       289
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       219
       290
        
       

     

       220
       291
        
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       221
       292
        
       		t.Error("handler should not be called")

     

       222
       293
        
       	}))

     

       223
       294
        
       

     

       224
       295
        
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       225
       225
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP not-a-valid-jwt")

     

       296
       296
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-valid-sealed-token")

     

       226
       297
        
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       227
       298
        
       

     

       228
       299
        
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     
···

       232
       303
        
       	}

     

       233
       304
        
       }

     

       234
       305
        
       

     

       235
       235
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken tests that expired tokens are rejected

     

       306
       306
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken tests that expired sealed tokens are rejected

     

       236
       307
        
       func TestRequireAuth_ExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       237
       237
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       238
       238
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       308
       308
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       309
       309
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       310
       310
       +
       

     

       311
       311
       +
       	// Create a test session

     

       312
       312
       +
       	did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")

     

       313
       313
       +
       	sessionID := "session123"

     

       314
       314
       +
       	session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       315
       315
       +
       		AccountDID:  did,

     

       316
       316
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       317
       317
       +
       		AccessToken: "test_access_token",

     

       318
       318
       +
       	}

     

       319
       319
       +
       	_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)

     

       320
       320
       +
       

     

       321
       321
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       239
       322
        
       

     

       240
       323
        
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       241
       324
        
       		t.Error("handler should not be called for expired token")

     

       242
       325
        
       	}))

     

       243
       326
        
       

     

       244
       244
       -
       	// Create expired token

     

       245
       245
       -
       	claims := jwt.MapClaims{

     

       246
       246
       -
       		"sub":   "did:plc:test123",

     

       247
       247
       -
       		"iss":   "https://test.pds.local",

     

       248
       248
       -
       		"scope": "atproto",

     

       249
       249
       -
       		"exp":   time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour).Unix(), // Expired 1 hour ago

     

       250
       250
       -
       		"iat":   time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour).Unix(),

     

       251
       251
       -
       	}

     

       252
       252
       -
       

     

       253
       253
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       254
       254
       -
       	tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       327
       327
       +
       	// Create expired token (expired 1 hour ago)

     

       328
       328
       +
       	token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, -time.Hour)

     

       255
       329
        
       

     

       256
       330
        
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       257
       257
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)

     

       331
       331
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       258
       332
        
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       259
       333
        
       

     

       260
       334
        
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     
···

       264
       338
        
       	}

     

       265
       339
        
       }

     

       266
       340
        
       

     

       267
       267
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_MissingDID tests that tokens without DID are rejected

     

       268
       268
       -
       func TestRequireAuth_MissingDID(t *testing.T) {

     

       269
       269
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       270
       270
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       341
       341
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_SessionNotFound tests that tokens with non-existent sessions are rejected

     

       342
       342
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_SessionNotFound(t *testing.T) {

     

       343
       343
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       344
       344
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       345
       345
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       271
       346
        
       

     

       272
       347
        
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       273
       348
        
       		t.Error("handler should not be called")

     

       274
       349
        
       	}))

     

       275
       350
        
       

     

       276
       276
       -
       	// Create token without sub claim

     

       277
       277
       -
       	claims := jwt.MapClaims{

     

       278
       278
       -
       		// "sub" missing

     

       279
       279
       -
       		"iss":   "https://test.pds.local",

     

       280
       280
       -
       		"scope": "atproto",

     

       281
       281
       -
       		"exp":   time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),

     

       282
       282
       -
       		"iat":   time.Now().Unix(),

     

       351
       351
       +
       	// Create token for session that doesn't exist in store

     

       352
       352
       +
       	token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:nonexistent", "session999", time.Hour)

     

       353
       353
       +
       

     

       354
       354
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       355
       355
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       356
       356
       +
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       357
       357
       +
       

     

       358
       358
       +
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       359
       359
       +
       

     

       360
       360
       +
       	if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       361
       361
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)

     

       362
       362
       +
       	}

     

       363
       363
       +
       }

     

       364
       364
       +
       

     

       365
       365
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_DIDMismatch tests that session DID must match token DID

     

       366
       366
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_DIDMismatch(t *testing.T) {

     

       367
       367
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       368
       368
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       369
       369
       +
       

     

       370
       370
       +
       	// Create a session with different DID than token

     

       371
       371
       +
       	did := syntax.DID("did:plc:different")

     

       372
       372
       +
       	sessionID := "session123"

     

       373
       373
       +
       	session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       374
       374
       +
       		AccountDID:  did,

     

       375
       375
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       376
       376
       +
       		AccessToken: "test_access_token",

     

       283
       377
        
       	}

     

       378
       378
       +
       	// Store with key that matches token DID

     

       379
       379
       +
       	key := "did:plc:test123:" + sessionID

     

       380
       380
       +
       	store.sessions[key] = session

     

       284
       381
        
       

     

       285
       285
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       286
       286
       -
       	tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       382
       382
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       383
       383
       +
       

     

       384
       384
       +
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       385
       385
       +
       		t.Error("handler should not be called when DID mismatches")

     

       386
       386
       +
       	}))

     

       387
       387
       +
       

     

       388
       388
       +
       	token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)

     

       287
       389
        
       

     

       288
       390
        
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       289
       289
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)

     

       391
       391
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       290
       392
        
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       291
       393
        
       

     

       292
       394
        
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     
···

       296
       398
        
       	}

     

       297
       399
        
       }

     

       298
       400
        
       

     

       299
       299
       -
       // TestOptionalAuth_WithToken tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid DPoP tokens

     

       401
       401
       +
       // TestOptionalAuth_WithToken tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid Bearer tokens

     

       300
       402
        
       func TestOptionalAuth_WithToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       301
       301
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       302
       302
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       403
       403
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       404
       404
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       405
       405
       +
       

     

       406
       406
       +
       	// Create a test session

     

       407
       407
       +
       	did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")

     

       408
       408
       +
       	sessionID := "session123"

     

       409
       409
       +
       	session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       410
       410
       +
       		AccountDID:  did,

     

       411
       411
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       412
       412
       +
       		AccessToken: "test_access_token",

     

       413
       413
       +
       	}

     

       414
       414
       +
       	_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)

     

       415
       415
       +
       

     

       416
       416
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       303
       417
        
       

     

       304
       418
        
       	handlerCalled := false

     

       305
       419
        
       	handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       306
       420
        
       		handlerCalled = true

     

       307
       421
        
       

     

       308
       422
        
       		// Verify DID was extracted

     

       309
       309
       -
       		did := GetUserDID(r)

     

       310
       310
       -
       		if did != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       311
       311
       -
       			t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", did)

     

       423
       423
       +
       		extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)

     

       424
       424
       +
       		if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       425
       425
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)

     

       312
       426
        
       		}

     

       313
       427
        
       

     

       314
       428
        
       		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       315
       429
        
       	}))

     

       316
       430
        
       

     

       317
       317
       -
       	token := createTestToken("did:plc:test123")

     

       431
       431
       +
       	token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)

     

       318
       432
        
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       319
       319
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+token)

     

       433
       433
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       320
       434
        
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       321
       435
        
       

     

       322
       436
        
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     
···

       332
       446
        
       

     

       333
       447
        
       // TestOptionalAuth_WithoutToken tests that OptionalAuth allows requests without tokens

     

       334
       448
        
       func TestOptionalAuth_WithoutToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       335
       335
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       336
       336
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       449
       449
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       450
       450
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       451
       451
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       337
       452
        
       

     

       338
       453
        
       	handlerCalled := false

     

       339
       454
        
       	handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     
···

       365
       480
        
       

     

       366
       481
        
       // TestOptionalAuth_InvalidToken tests that OptionalAuth continues without auth on invalid token

     

       367
       482
        
       func TestOptionalAuth_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       368
       368
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       369
       369
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       483
       483
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       484
       484
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       485
       485
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       370
       486
        
       

     

       371
       487
        
       	handlerCalled := false

     

       372
       488
        
       	handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     
···

       382
       498
        
       	}))

     

       383
       499
        
       

     

       384
       500
        
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       385
       385
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP not-a-valid-jwt")

     

       501
       501
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-valid-sealed-token")

     

       386
       502
        
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       387
       503
        
       

     

       388
       504
        
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     
···

       406
       522
        
       	}

     

       407
       523
        
       }

     

       408
       524
        
       

     

       409
       409
       -
       // TestGetJWTClaims_NotAuthenticated tests that GetJWTClaims returns nil when not authenticated

     

       410
       410
       -
       func TestGetJWTClaims_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {

     

       525
       525
       +
       // TestGetOAuthSession_NotAuthenticated tests that GetOAuthSession returns nil when not authenticated

     

       526
       526
       +
       func TestGetOAuthSession_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {

     

       411
       527
        
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       412
       412
       -
       	claims := GetJWTClaims(req)

     

       528
       528
       +
       	session := GetOAuthSession(req)

     

       413
       529
        
       

     

       414
       414
       -
       	if claims != nil {

     

       415
       415
       -
       		t.Errorf("expected nil claims, got %+v", claims)

     

       530
       530
       +
       	if session != nil {

     

       531
       531
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected nil session, got %+v", session)

     

       416
       532
        
       	}

     

       417
       533
        
       }

     

       418
       534
        
       

     

       419
       419
       -
       // TestGetDPoPProof_NotAuthenticated tests that GetDPoPProof returns nil when no DPoP was verified

     

       420
       420
       -
       func TestGetDPoPProof_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {

     

       535
       535
       +
       // TestGetUserAccessToken_NotAuthenticated tests that GetUserAccessToken returns empty when not authenticated

     

       536
       536
       +
       func TestGetUserAccessToken_NotAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {

     

       421
       537
        
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       422
       422
       -
       	proof := GetDPoPProof(req)

     

       538
       538
       +
       	token := GetUserAccessToken(req)

     

       423
       539
        
       

     

       424
       424
       -
       	if proof != nil {

     

       425
       425
       -
       		t.Errorf("expected nil proof, got %+v", proof)

     

       540
       540
       +
       	if token != "" {

     

       541
       541
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected empty token, got %s", token)

     

       426
       542
        
       	}

     

       427
       543
        
       }

     

       428
       544
        
       

     

       429
       429
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_WithDPoP_SecurityModel tests the correct DPoP security model:

     

       430
       430
       -
       // Token MUST be verified first, then DPoP is checked as an additional layer.

     

       431
       431
       -
       // DPoP is NOT a fallback for failed token verification.

     

       432
       432
       -
       func TestRequireAuth_WithDPoP_SecurityModel(t *testing.T) {

     

       433
       433
       -
       	// Generate an ECDSA key pair for DPoP

     

       434
       434
       -
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       435
       435
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       436
       436
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)

     

       437
       437
       -
       	}

     

       545
       545
       +
       // TestSetTestUserDID tests the testing helper function

     

       546
       546
       +
       func TestSetTestUserDID(t *testing.T) {

     

       547
       547
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       548
       548
       +
       	ctx = SetTestUserDID(ctx, "did:plc:testuser")

     

       438
       549
        
       

     

       439
       439
       -
       	// Calculate JWK thumbprint for cnf.jkt

     

       440
       440
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       441
       441
       -
       	thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       442
       442
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       443
       443
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)

     

       550
       550
       +
       	did, ok := ctx.Value(UserDIDKey).(string)

     

       551
       551
       +
       	if !ok {

     

       552
       552
       +
       		t.Error("DID not found in context")

     

       444
       553
        
       	}

     

       554
       554
       +
       	if did != "did:plc:testuser" {

     

       555
       555
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected 'did:plc:testuser', got %s", did)

     

       556
       556
       +
       	}

     

       557
       557
       +
       }

     

       445
       558
        
       

     

       446
       446
       -
       	t.Run("DPoP_is_NOT_fallback_for_failed_verification", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       447
       447
       -
       		// SECURITY TEST: When token verification fails, DPoP should NOT be used as fallback

     

       448
       448
       -
       		// This prevents an attacker from forging a token with their own cnf.jkt

     

       449
       449
       -
       

     

       450
       450
       -
       		// Create a DPoP-bound access token (unsigned - will fail verification)

     

       451
       451
       -
       		claims := auth.Claims{

     

       452
       452
       -
       			RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       453
       453
       -
       				Subject:   "did:plc:attacker",

     

       454
       454
       -
       				Issuer:    "https://external.pds.local",

     

       455
       455
       -
       				ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       456
       456
       -
       				IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       457
       457
       -
       			},

     

       458
       458
       -
       			Scope: "atproto",

     

       459
       459
       -
       			Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       460
       460
       -
       				"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       461
       461
       -
       			},

     

       462
       462
       -
       		}

     

       463
       463
       -
       

     

       464
       464
       -
       		token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       465
       465
       -
       		tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       559
       559
       +
       // TestExtractBearerToken tests the Bearer token extraction logic

     

       560
       560
       +
       func TestExtractBearerToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       561
       561
       +
       	tests := []struct {

     

       562
       562
       +
       		name        string

     

       563
       563
       +
       		authHeader  string

     

       564
       564
       +
       		expectToken string

     

       565
       565
       +
       		expectOK    bool

     

       566
       566
       +
       	}{

     

       567
       567
       +
       		{"valid bearer", "Bearer token123", "token123", true},

     

       568
       568
       +
       		{"lowercase bearer", "bearer token123", "token123", true},

     

       569
       569
       +
       		{"uppercase bearer", "BEARER token123", "token123", true},

     

       570
       570
       +
       		{"mixed case", "BeArEr token123", "token123", true},

     

       571
       571
       +
       		{"empty header", "", "", false},

     

       572
       572
       +
       		{"wrong scheme", "DPoP token123", "", false},

     

       573
       573
       +
       		{"no token", "Bearer", "", false},

     

       574
       574
       +
       		{"no space", "Bearertoken123", "", false},

     

       575
       575
       +
       		{"extra spaces", "Bearer  token123  ", "token123", true},

     

       576
       576
       +
       	}

     

       466
       577
        
       

     

       467
       467
       -
       		// Create valid DPoP proof (attacker has the private key)

     

       468
       468
       -
       		dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint")

     

       578
       578
       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       579
       579
       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       580
       580
       +
       			token, ok := extractBearerToken(tt.authHeader)

     

       581
       581
       +
       			if ok != tt.expectOK {

     

       582
       582
       +
       				t.Errorf("expected ok=%v, got %v", tt.expectOK, ok)

     

       583
       583
       +
       			}

     

       584
       584
       +
       			if token != tt.expectToken {

     

       585
       585
       +
       				t.Errorf("expected token '%s', got '%s'", tt.expectToken, token)

     

       586
       586
       +
       			}

     

       587
       587
       +
       		})

     

       588
       588
       +
       	}

     

       589
       589
       +
       }

     

       469
       590
        
       

     

       470
       470
       -
       		// Mock fetcher that fails (simulating external PDS without JWKS)

     

       471
       471
       -
       		fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}

     

       472
       472
       -
       		middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false) // skipVerify=false

     

       591
       591
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_ValidCookie tests that valid session cookies are accepted

     

       592
       592
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_ValidCookie(t *testing.T) {

     

       593
       593
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       594
       594
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       473
       595
        
       

     

       474
       474
       -
       		handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       475
       475
       -
       			t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: handler was called despite token verification failure")

     

       476
       476
       -
       		}))

     

       596
       596
       +
       	// Create a test session

     

       597
       597
       +
       	did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")

     

       598
       598
       +
       	sessionID := "session123"

     

       599
       599
       +
       	session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       600
       600
       +
       		AccountDID:  did,

     

       601
       601
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       602
       602
       +
       		AccessToken: "test_access_token",

     

       603
       603
       +
       		HostURL:     "https://pds.example.com",

     

       604
       604
       +
       	}

     

       605
       605
       +
       	_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)

     

       477
       606
        
       

     

       478
       478
       -
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint", nil)

     

       479
       479
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)

     

       480
       480
       -
       		req.Header.Set("DPoP", dpopProof)

     

       481
       481
       -
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       607
       607
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       482
       608
        
       

     

       483
       483
       -
       		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       609
       609
       +
       	handlerCalled := false

     

       610
       610
       +
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       611
       611
       +
       		handlerCalled = true

     

       484
       612
        
       

     

       485
       485
       -
       		// MUST reject - token verification failed, DPoP cannot substitute for signature verification

     

       486
       486
       -
       		if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       487
       487
       -
       			t.Errorf("SECURITY: expected 401 for unverified token, got %d", w.Code)

     

       613
       613
       +
       		// Verify DID was extracted and injected into context

     

       614
       614
       +
       		extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)

     

       615
       615
       +
       		if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       616
       616
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)

     

       488
       617
        
       		}

     

       489
       489
       -
       	})

     

       490
       618
        
       

     

       491
       491
       -
       	t.Run("DPoP_required_when_cnf_jkt_present_in_verified_token", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       492
       492
       -
       		// When token has cnf.jkt, DPoP header MUST be present

     

       493
       493
       -
       		// This test uses skipVerify=true to simulate a verified token

     

       494
       494
       -
       

     

       495
       495
       -
       		claims := auth.Claims{

     

       496
       496
       -
       			RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       497
       497
       -
       				Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       498
       498
       -
       				Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       499
       499
       -
       				ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       500
       500
       -
       				IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       501
       501
       -
       			},

     

       502
       502
       -
       			Scope: "atproto",

     

       503
       503
       -
       			Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       504
       504
       -
       				"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       505
       505
       -
       			},

     

       619
       619
       +
       		// Verify OAuth session was injected

     

       620
       620
       +
       		oauthSession := GetOAuthSession(r)

     

       621
       621
       +
       		if oauthSession == nil {

     

       622
       622
       +
       			t.Error("expected OAuth session to be non-nil")

     

       623
       623
       +
       			return

     

       506
       624
        
       		}

     

       507
       507
       -
       

     

       508
       508
       -
       		token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       509
       509
       -
       		tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       510
       510
       -
       

     

       511
       511
       -
       		// NO DPoP header - should fail when skipVerify is false

     

       512
       512
       -
       		// Note: with skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked

     

       513
       513
       -
       		fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       514
       514
       -
       		middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true) // skipVerify=true for parsing

     

       515
       515
       -
       

     

       516
       516
       -
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       517
       517
       -
       		handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       518
       518
       -
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       519
       519
       -
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       520
       520
       -
       		}))

     

       521
       521
       -
       

     

       522
       522
       -
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://test.local/api/endpoint", nil)

     

       523
       523
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)

     

       524
       524
       -
       		// No DPoP header

     

       525
       525
       -
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       526
       526
       -
       

     

       527
       527
       -
       		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       528
       528
       -
       

     

       529
       529
       -
       		// With skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked, so this should succeed

     

       530
       530
       -
       		if !handlerCalled {

     

       531
       531
       -
       			t.Error("handler should be called when skipVerify=true")

     

       625
       625
       +
       		if oauthSession.SessionID != sessionID {

     

       626
       626
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected session ID '%s', got %s", sessionID, oauthSession.SessionID)

     

       532
       627
        
       		}

     

       533
       533
       -
       	})

     

       534
       534
       -
       }

     

       535
       535
       -
       

     

       536
       536
       -
       // TestRequireAuth_TokenVerificationFails_DPoPNotUsedAsFallback is the key security test.

     

       537
       537
       -
       // It ensures that DPoP cannot be used as a fallback when token signature verification fails.

     

       538
       538
       -
       func TestRequireAuth_TokenVerificationFails_DPoPNotUsedAsFallback(t *testing.T) {

     

       539
       539
       -
       	// Generate a key pair (attacker's key)

     

       540
       540
       -
       	attackerKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       541
       541
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&attackerKey.PublicKey)

     

       542
       542
       -
       	thumbprint, _ := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       543
       543
       -
       

     

       544
       544
       -
       	// Create a FORGED token claiming to be the victim

     

       545
       545
       -
       	claims := auth.Claims{

     

       546
       546
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       547
       547
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:victim_user", // Attacker claims to be victim

     

       548
       548
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://untrusted.pds",

     

       549
       549
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       550
       550
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       551
       551
       -
       		},

     

       552
       552
       -
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       553
       553
       -
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       554
       554
       -
       			"jkt": thumbprint, // Attacker uses their own key

     

       555
       555
       -
       		},

     

       556
       556
       -
       	}

     

       557
       557
       -
       

     

       558
       558
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       559
       559
       -
       	tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       560
       560
       -
       

     

       561
       561
       -
       	// Attacker creates a valid DPoP proof with their key

     

       562
       562
       -
       	dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, attackerKey, "POST", "https://api.example.com/protected")

     

       563
       628
        
       

     

       564
       564
       -
       	// Fetcher fails (external PDS without JWKS)

     

       565
       565
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}

     

       566
       566
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false) // skipVerify=false - REAL verification

     

       567
       567
       -
       

     

       568
       568
       -
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       569
       569
       -
       		t.Fatalf("CRITICAL SECURITY FAILURE: Request authenticated as %s despite forged token!",

     

       570
       570
       -
       			GetUserDID(r))

     

       629
       629
       +
       		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       571
       630
        
       	}))

     

       572
       631
        
       

     

       573
       573
       -
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://api.example.com/protected", nil)

     

       574
       574
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)

     

       575
       575
       -
       	req.Header.Set("DPoP", dpopProof)

     

       632
       632
       +
       	token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)

     

       633
       633
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       634
       634
       +
       	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       635
       635
       +
       		Name:  "coves_session",

     

       636
       636
       +
       		Value: token,

     

       637
       637
       +
       	})

     

       576
       638
        
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       577
       639
        
       

     

       578
       640
        
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       579
       641
        
       

     

       580
       580
       -
       	// MUST reject - the token signature was never verified

     

       581
       581
       -
       	if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       582
       582
       -
       		t.Errorf("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: Expected 401, got %d. Token was not properly verified!", w.Code)

     

       642
       642
       +
       	if !handlerCalled {

     

       643
       643
       +
       		t.Error("handler was not called")

     

       583
       644
        
       	}

     

       584
       584
       -
       }

     

       585
       645
        
       

     

       586
       586
       -
       // TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedProto ensures we honor the external HTTPS

     

       587
       587
       -
       // scheme when TLS is terminated upstream and X-Forwarded-Proto is present.

     

       588
       588
       -
       func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedProto(t *testing.T) {

     

       589
       589
       -
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       590
       590
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       591
       591
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)

     

       646
       646
       +
       	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {

     

       647
       647
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())

     

       592
       648
        
       	}

     

       649
       649
       +
       }

     

       593
       650
        
       

     

       594
       594
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       595
       595
       -
       	thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       596
       596
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       597
       597
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)

     

       598
       598
       -
       	}

     

       651
       651
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_HeaderPrecedenceOverCookie tests that Authorization header takes precedence over cookie

     

       652
       652
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_HeaderPrecedenceOverCookie(t *testing.T) {

     

       653
       653
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       654
       654
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       599
       655
        
       

     

       600
       600
       -
       	claims := &auth.Claims{

     

       601
       601
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       602
       602
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       603
       603
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       604
       604
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       605
       605
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       606
       606
       -
       		},

     

       607
       607
       -
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       608
       608
       -
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       609
       609
       -
       			"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       610
       610
       -
       		},

     

       656
       656
       +
       	// Create two test sessions

     

       657
       657
       +
       	did1 := syntax.DID("did:plc:header")

     

       658
       658
       +
       	sessionID1 := "session_header"

     

       659
       659
       +
       	session1 := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       660
       660
       +
       		AccountDID:  did1,

     

       661
       661
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID1,

     

       662
       662
       +
       		AccessToken: "header_token",

     

       663
       663
       +
       		HostURL:     "https://pds.example.com",

     

       611
       664
        
       	}

     

       665
       665
       +
       	_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session1)

     

       612
       666
        
       

     

       613
       613
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)

     

       614
       614
       -
       	defer middleware.Stop()

     

       615
       615
       -
       

     

       616
       616
       -
       	externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"

     

       617
       617
       -
       	dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)

     

       618
       618
       -
       

     

       619
       619
       -
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)

     

       620
       620
       -
       	req.Host = "api.example.com"

     

       621
       621
       -
       	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")

     

       622
       622
       -
       

     

       623
       623
       -
       	// Pass a fake access token - ath verification will pass since we don't include ath in the DPoP proof

     

       624
       624
       -
       	fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"

     

       625
       625
       -
       	proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)

     

       626
       626
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       627
       627
       -
       		t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with forwarded proto, got %v", err)

     

       667
       667
       +
       	did2 := syntax.DID("did:plc:cookie")

     

       668
       668
       +
       	sessionID2 := "session_cookie"

     

       669
       669
       +
       	session2 := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       670
       670
       +
       		AccountDID:  did2,

     

       671
       671
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID2,

     

       672
       672
       +
       		AccessToken: "cookie_token",

     

       673
       673
       +
       		HostURL:     "https://pds.example.com",

     

       628
       674
        
       	}

     

       675
       675
       +
       	_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session2)

     

       629
       676
        
       

     

       630
       630
       -
       	if proof == nil || proof.Claims == nil {

     

       631
       631
       -
       		t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")

     

       632
       632
       -
       	}

     

       633
       633
       -
       }

     

       677
       677
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       634
       678
        
       

     

       635
       635
       -
       // TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedHost ensures we honor X-Forwarded-Host header

     

       636
       636
       -
       // when behind a TLS-terminating proxy that rewrites the Host header.

     

       637
       637
       -
       func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesForwardedHost(t *testing.T) {

     

       638
       638
       -
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       639
       639
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       640
       640
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)

     

       641
       641
       -
       	}

     

       679
       679
       +
       	handlerCalled := false

     

       680
       680
       +
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       681
       681
       +
       		handlerCalled = true

     

       642
       682
        
       

     

       643
       643
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       644
       644
       -
       	thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       645
       645
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       646
       646
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)

     

       647
       647
       -
       	}

     

       683
       683
       +
       		// Should get header DID, not cookie DID

     

       684
       684
       +
       		extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)

     

       685
       685
       +
       		if extractedDID != "did:plc:header" {

     

       686
       686
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected header DID 'did:plc:header', got %s", extractedDID)

     

       687
       687
       +
       		}

     

       648
       688
        
       

     

       649
       649
       -
       	claims := &auth.Claims{

     

       650
       650
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       651
       651
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       652
       652
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       653
       653
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       654
       654
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       655
       655
       -
       		},

     

       656
       656
       -
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       657
       657
       -
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       658
       658
       -
       			"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       659
       659
       -
       		},

     

       660
       660
       -
       	}

     

       689
       689
       +
       		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       690
       690
       +
       	}))

     

       661
       691
        
       

     

       662
       662
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)

     

       663
       663
       -
       	defer middleware.Stop()

     

       692
       692
       +
       	headerToken := client.createTestToken("did:plc:header", sessionID1, time.Hour)

     

       693
       693
       +
       	cookieToken := client.createTestToken("did:plc:cookie", sessionID2, time.Hour)

     

       664
       694
        
       

     

       665
       665
       -
       	// External URI that the client uses

     

       666
       666
       -
       	externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"

     

       667
       667
       -
       	dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)

     

       695
       695
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       696
       696
       +
       	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+headerToken)

     

       697
       697
       +
       	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       698
       698
       +
       		Name:  "coves_session",

     

       699
       699
       +
       		Value: cookieToken,

     

       700
       700
       +
       	})

     

       701
       701
       +
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       668
       702
        
       

     

       669
       669
       -
       	// Request hits internal service with internal hostname, but X-Forwarded-Host has public hostname

     

       670
       670
       -
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service:8080/protected/resource", nil)

     

       671
       671
       -
       	req.Host = "internal-service:8080" // Internal host after proxy

     

       672
       672
       -
       	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")

     

       673
       673
       -
       	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "api.example.com") // Original public host

     

       703
       703
       +
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       674
       704
        
       

     

       675
       675
       -
       	fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"

     

       676
       676
       -
       	proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)

     

       677
       677
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       678
       678
       -
       		t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with X-Forwarded-Host, got %v", err)

     

       705
       705
       +
       	if !handlerCalled {

     

       706
       706
       +
       		t.Error("handler was not called")

     

       679
       707
        
       	}

     

       680
       708
        
       

     

       681
       681
       -
       	if proof == nil || proof.Claims == nil {

     

       682
       682
       -
       		t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")

     

       709
       709
       +
       	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {

     

       710
       710
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)

     

       683
       711
        
       	}

     

       684
       712
        
       }

     

       685
       713
        
       

     

       686
       686
       -
       // TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesStandardForwardedHeader tests RFC 7239 Forwarded header parsing

     

       687
       687
       -
       func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_UsesStandardForwardedHeader(t *testing.T) {

     

       688
       688
       -
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       689
       689
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       690
       690
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)

     

       691
       691
       -
       	}

     

       692
       692
       -
       

     

       693
       693
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       694
       694
       -
       	thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       695
       695
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       696
       696
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)

     

       697
       697
       -
       	}

     

       714
       714
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_MissingBothHeaderAndCookie tests that missing both auth methods is rejected

     

       715
       715
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_MissingBothHeaderAndCookie(t *testing.T) {

     

       716
       716
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       717
       717
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       718
       718
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       698
       719
        
       

     

       699
       699
       -
       	claims := &auth.Claims{

     

       700
       700
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       701
       701
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       702
       702
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       703
       703
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       704
       704
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       705
       705
       -
       		},

     

       706
       706
       -
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       707
       707
       -
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       708
       708
       -
       			"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       709
       709
       -
       		},

     

       710
       710
       -
       	}

     

       711
       711
       -
       

     

       712
       712
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)

     

       713
       713
       -
       	defer middleware.Stop()

     

       714
       714
       -
       

     

       715
       715
       -
       	// External URI

     

       716
       716
       -
       	externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"

     

       717
       717
       -
       	dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)

     

       720
       720
       +
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       721
       721
       +
       		t.Error("handler should not be called")

     

       722
       722
       +
       	}))

     

       718
       723
        
       

     

       719
       719
       -
       	// Request with standard Forwarded header (RFC 7239)

     

       720
       720
       -
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)

     

       721
       721
       -
       	req.Host = "internal-service"

     

       722
       722
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Forwarded", "for=192.0.2.60;proto=https;host=api.example.com")

     

       724
       724
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       725
       725
       +
       	// No Authorization header and no cookie

     

       726
       726
       +
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       723
       727
        
       

     

       724
       724
       -
       	fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"

     

       725
       725
       -
       	proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)

     

       726
       726
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       727
       727
       -
       		t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with Forwarded header, got %v", err)

     

       728
       728
       -
       	}

     

       728
       728
       +
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       729
       729
        
       

     

       730
       730
       -
       	if proof == nil {

     

       731
       731
       -
       		t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")

     

       730
       730
       +
       	if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       731
       731
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)

     

       732
       732
        
       	}

     

       733
       733
        
       }

     

       734
       734
        
       

     

       735
       735
       -
       // TestVerifyDPoPBinding_ForwardedMixedCaseAndQuotes tests RFC 7239 edge cases:

     

       736
       736
       -
       // mixed-case keys (Proto vs proto) and quoted values (host="example.com")

     

       737
       737
       -
       func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_ForwardedMixedCaseAndQuotes(t *testing.T) {

     

       738
       738
       -
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       739
       739
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       740
       740
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)

     

       741
       741
       -
       	}

     

       742
       742
       -
       

     

       743
       743
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       744
       744
       -
       	thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       745
       745
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       746
       746
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)

     

       747
       747
       -
       	}

     

       735
       735
       +
       // TestRequireAuth_InvalidCookie tests that malformed cookie tokens are rejected

     

       736
       736
       +
       func TestRequireAuth_InvalidCookie(t *testing.T) {

     

       737
       737
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       738
       738
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       739
       739
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       748
       740
        
       

     

       749
       749
       -
       	claims := &auth.Claims{

     

       750
       750
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       751
       751
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       752
       752
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       753
       753
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       754
       754
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       755
       755
       -
       		},

     

       756
       756
       -
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       757
       757
       -
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       758
       758
       -
       			"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       759
       759
       -
       		},

     

       760
       760
       -
       	}

     

       761
       761
       -
       

     

       762
       762
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)

     

       763
       763
       -
       	defer middleware.Stop()

     

       764
       764
       -
       

     

       765
       765
       -
       	// External URI that the client uses

     

       766
       766
       -
       	externalURI := "https://api.example.com/protected/resource"

     

       767
       767
       -
       	dpopProof := createDPoPProof(t, privateKey, "GET", externalURI)

     

       741
       741
       +
       	handler := middleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       742
       742
       +
       		t.Error("handler should not be called")

     

       743
       743
       +
       	}))

     

       768
       744
        
       

     

       769
       769
       -
       	// Request with RFC 7239 Forwarded header using:

     

       770
       770
       -
       	// - Mixed-case keys: "Proto" instead of "proto", "Host" instead of "host"

     

       771
       771
       -
       	// - Quoted value: Host="api.example.com" (legal per RFC 7239 section 4)

     

       772
       772
       -
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "http://internal-service/protected/resource", nil)

     

       773
       773
       -
       	req.Host = "internal-service"

     

       774
       774
       -
       	req.Header.Set("Forwarded", `for=192.0.2.60;Proto=https;Host="api.example.com"`)

     

       745
       745
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       746
       746
       +
       	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       747
       747
       +
       		Name:  "coves_session",

     

       748
       748
       +
       		Value: "not-a-valid-sealed-token",

     

       749
       749
       +
       	})

     

       750
       750
       +
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       775
       751
        
       

     

       776
       776
       -
       	fakeAccessToken := "fake-access-token-for-testing"

     

       777
       777
       -
       	proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, fakeAccessToken)

     

       778
       778
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       779
       779
       -
       		t.Fatalf("expected DPoP verification to succeed with mixed-case/quoted Forwarded header, got %v", err)

     

       780
       780
       -
       	}

     

       752
       752
       +
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       781
       753
        
       

     

       782
       782
       -
       	if proof == nil {

     

       783
       783
       -
       		t.Fatal("expected DPoP proof to be returned")

     

       754
       754
       +
       	if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       755
       755
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)

     

       784
       756
        
       	}

     

       785
       757
        
       }

     

       786
       758
        
       

     

       787
       787
       -
       // TestVerifyDPoPBinding_AthValidation tests access token hash (ath) claim validation

     

       788
       788
       -
       func TestVerifyDPoPBinding_AthValidation(t *testing.T) {

     

       789
       789
       -
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       790
       790
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       791
       791
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to generate key: %v", err)

     

       792
       792
       -
       	}

     

       759
       759
       +
       // TestOptionalAuth_WithCookie tests that OptionalAuth accepts valid session cookies

     

       760
       760
       +
       func TestOptionalAuth_WithCookie(t *testing.T) {

     

       761
       761
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       762
       762
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       793
       763
        
       

     

       794
       794
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       795
       795
       -
       	thumbprint, err := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       796
       796
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       797
       797
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to calculate thumbprint: %v", err)

     

       764
       764
       +
       	// Create a test session

     

       765
       765
       +
       	did := syntax.DID("did:plc:test123")

     

       766
       766
       +
       	sessionID := "session123"

     

       767
       767
       +
       	session := &oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       768
       768
       +
       		AccountDID:  did,

     

       769
       769
       +
       		SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       770
       770
       +
       		AccessToken: "test_access_token",

     

       798
       771
        
       	}

     

       772
       772
       +
       	_ = store.SaveSession(context.Background(), *session)

     

       799
       773
        
       

     

       800
       800
       -
       	claims := &auth.Claims{

     

       801
       801
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       802
       802
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       803
       803
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       804
       804
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       805
       805
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       806
       806
       -
       		},

     

       807
       807
       -
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       808
       808
       -
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       809
       809
       -
       			"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       810
       810
       -
       		},

     

       811
       811
       -
       	}

     

       812
       812
       -
       

     

       813
       813
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(&mockJWKSFetcher{}, false)

     

       814
       814
       -
       	defer middleware.Stop()

     

       815
       815
       -
       

     

       816
       816
       -
       	accessToken := "real-access-token-12345"

     

       817
       817
       -
       

     

       818
       818
       -
       	t.Run("ath_matches_access_token", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       819
       819
       -
       		// Create DPoP proof with ath claim matching the access token

     

       820
       820
       -
       		dpopProof := createDPoPProofWithAth(t, privateKey, "GET", "https://api.example.com/resource", accessToken)

     

       774
       774
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       821
       775
        
       

     

       822
       822
       -
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "https://api.example.com/resource", nil)

     

       823
       823
       -
       		req.Host = "api.example.com"

     

       776
       776
       +
       	handlerCalled := false

     

       777
       777
       +
       	handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       778
       778
       +
       		handlerCalled = true

     

       824
       779
        
       

     

       825
       825
       -
       		proof, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, accessToken)

     

       826
       826
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       827
       827
       -
       			t.Fatalf("expected verification to succeed with matching ath, got %v", err)

     

       828
       828
       -
       		}

     

       829
       829
       -
       		if proof == nil {

     

       830
       830
       -
       			t.Fatal("expected proof to be returned")

     

       780
       780
       +
       		// Verify DID was extracted

     

       781
       781
       +
       		extractedDID := GetUserDID(r)

     

       782
       782
       +
       		if extractedDID != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       783
       783
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected DID 'did:plc:test123', got %s", extractedDID)

     

       831
       784
        
       		}

     

       832
       832
       -
       	})

     

       833
       785
        
       

     

       834
       834
       -
       	t.Run("ath_mismatch_rejected", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       835
       835
       -
       		// Create DPoP proof with ath for a DIFFERENT token

     

       836
       836
       -
       		differentToken := "different-token-67890"

     

       837
       837
       -
       		dpopProof := createDPoPProofWithAth(t, privateKey, "POST", "https://api.example.com/resource", differentToken)

     

       838
       838
       -
       

     

       839
       839
       -
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://api.example.com/resource", nil)

     

       840
       840
       -
       		req.Host = "api.example.com"

     

       786
       786
       +
       		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       787
       787
       +
       	}))

     

       841
       788
        
       

     

       842
       842
       -
       		// Try to use with the original access token - should fail

     

       843
       843
       -
       		_, err := middleware.verifyDPoPBinding(req, claims, dpopProof, accessToken)

     

       844
       844
       -
       		if err == nil {

     

       845
       845
       -
       			t.Fatal("SECURITY: expected verification to fail when ath doesn't match access token")

     

       846
       846
       -
       		}

     

       847
       847
       -
       		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ath") {

     

       848
       848
       -
       			t.Errorf("error should mention ath mismatch, got: %v", err)

     

       849
       849
       -
       		}

     

       789
       789
       +
       	token := client.createTestToken("did:plc:test123", sessionID, time.Hour)

     

       790
       790
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       791
       791
       +
       	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       792
       792
       +
       		Name:  "coves_session",

     

       793
       793
       +
       		Value: token,

     

       850
       794
        
       	})

     

       851
       851
       -
       }

     

       795
       795
       +
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       852
       796
        
       

     

       853
       853
       -
       // TestMiddlewareStop tests that the middleware can be stopped properly

     

       854
       854
       -
       func TestMiddlewareStop(t *testing.T) {

     

       855
       855
       -
       	fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       856
       856
       -
       	middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false)

     

       797
       797
       +
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       857
       798
        
       

     

       858
       858
       -
       	// Stop should not panic and should clean up resources

     

       859
       859
       -
       	middleware.Stop()

     

       799
       799
       +
       	if !handlerCalled {

     

       800
       800
       +
       		t.Error("handler was not called")

     

       801
       801
       +
       	}

     

       860
       802
        
       

     

       861
       861
       -
       	// Calling Stop again should also be safe (idempotent-ish)

     

       862
       862
       -
       	// Note: The underlying DPoPVerifier.Stop() closes a channel, so this might panic

     

       863
       863
       -
       	// if not handled properly. We test that at least one Stop works.

     

       803
       803
       +
       	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {

     

       804
       804
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)

     

       805
       805
       +
       	}

     

       864
       806
        
       }

     

       865
       807
        
       

     

       866
       866
       -
       // TestOptionalAuth_DPoPBoundToken_NoDPoPHeader tests that OptionalAuth treats

     

       867
       867
       -
       // tokens with cnf.jkt but no DPoP header as unauthenticated (potential token theft)

     

       868
       868
       -
       func TestOptionalAuth_DPoPBoundToken_NoDPoPHeader(t *testing.T) {

     

       869
       869
       -
       	// Generate a key pair for DPoP binding

     

       870
       870
       -
       	privateKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       871
       871
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       872
       872
       -
       	thumbprint, _ := auth.CalculateJWKThumbprint(jwk)

     

       873
       873
       -
       

     

       874
       874
       -
       	// Create a DPoP-bound token (has cnf.jkt)

     

       875
       875
       -
       	claims := auth.Claims{

     

       876
       876
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       877
       877
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:user123",

     

       878
       878
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       879
       879
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       880
       880
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       881
       881
       -
       		},

     

       882
       882
       -
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       883
       883
       -
       		Confirmation: map[string]interface{}{

     

       884
       884
       -
       			"jkt": thumbprint,

     

       885
       885
       -
       		},

     

       886
       886
       -
       	}

     

       808
       808
       +
       // TestOptionalAuth_InvalidCookie tests that OptionalAuth continues without auth on invalid cookie

     

       809
       809
       +
       func TestOptionalAuth_InvalidCookie(t *testing.T) {

     

       810
       810
       +
       	client := newMockOAuthClient()

     

       811
       811
       +
       	store := newMockOAuthStore()

     

       812
       812
       +
       	middleware := NewOAuthAuthMiddleware(client, store)

     

       887
       813
        
       

     

       888
       888
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       889
       889
       -
       	tokenString, _ := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       890
       890
       -
       

     

       891
       891
       -
       	// Use skipVerify=true to simulate a verified token

     

       892
       892
       -
       	// (In production, skipVerify would be false and VerifyJWT would be called)

     

       893
       893
       -
       	// However, for this test we need skipVerify=false to trigger DPoP checking

     

       894
       894
       -
       	// But the fetcher will fail, so let's use skipVerify=true and verify the logic

     

       895
       895
       -
       	// Actually, the DPoP check only happens when skipVerify=false

     

       896
       896
       -
       

     

       897
       897
       -
       	t.Run("with_skipVerify_false", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       898
       898
       -
       		// This will fail at JWT verification level, but that's expected

     

       899
       899
       -
       		// The important thing is the code path for DPoP checking

     

       900
       900
       -
       		fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{shouldFail: true}

     

       901
       901
       -
       		middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, false)

     

       902
       902
       -
       		defer middleware.Stop()

     

       903
       903
       -
       

     

       904
       904
       -
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       905
       905
       -
       		var capturedDID string

     

       906
       906
       -
       		handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       907
       907
       -
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       908
       908
       -
       			capturedDID = GetUserDID(r)

     

       909
       909
       -
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       910
       910
       -
       		}))

     

       911
       911
       -
       

     

       912
       912
       -
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       913
       913
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)

     

       914
       914
       -
       		// Deliberately NOT setting DPoP header

     

       915
       915
       -
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       916
       916
       -
       

     

       917
       917
       -
       		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       918
       918
       -
       

     

       919
       919
       -
       		// Handler should be called (optional auth doesn't block)

     

       920
       920
       -
       		if !handlerCalled {

     

       921
       921
       -
       			t.Error("handler should be called")

     

       922
       922
       -
       		}

     

       814
       814
       +
       	handlerCalled := false

     

       815
       815
       +
       	handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       816
       816
       +
       		handlerCalled = true

     

       923
       817
        
       

     

       924
       924
       -
       		// But since JWT verification fails, user should not be authenticated

     

       925
       925
       -
       		if capturedDID != "" {

     

       926
       926
       -
       			t.Errorf("expected empty DID when verification fails, got %s", capturedDID)

     

       818
       818
       +
       		// Verify no DID is set (invalid cookie ignored)

     

       819
       819
       +
       		did := GetUserDID(r)

     

       820
       820
       +
       		if did != "" {

     

       821
       821
       +
       			t.Errorf("expected empty DID for invalid cookie, got %s", did)

     

       927
       822
        
       		}

     

       928
       928
       -
       	})

     

       929
       823
        
       

     

       930
       930
       -
       	t.Run("with_skipVerify_true_dpop_not_checked", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       931
       931
       -
       		// When skipVerify=true, DPoP is not checked (Phase 1 mode)

     

       932
       932
       -
       		fetcher := &mockJWKSFetcher{}

     

       933
       933
       -
       		middleware := NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(fetcher, true)

     

       934
       934
       -
       		defer middleware.Stop()

     

       935
       935
       -
       

     

       936
       936
       -
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       937
       937
       -
       		var capturedDID string

     

       938
       938
       -
       		handler := middleware.OptionalAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       939
       939
       -
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       940
       940
       -
       			capturedDID = GetUserDID(r)

     

       941
       941
       -
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       942
       942
       -
       		}))

     

       943
       943
       -
       

     

       944
       944
       -
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       945
       945
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tokenString)

     

       946
       946
       -
       		// No DPoP header

     

       947
       947
       -
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       948
       948
       -
       

     

       949
       949
       -
       		handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       950
       950
       -
       

     

       951
       951
       -
       		if !handlerCalled {

     

       952
       952
       -
       			t.Error("handler should be called")

     

       953
       953
       -
       		}

     

       824
       824
       +
       		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       825
       825
       +
       	}))

     

       954
       826
        
       

     

       955
       955
       -
       		// With skipVerify=true, DPoP check is bypassed - token is trusted

     

       956
       956
       -
       		if capturedDID != "did:plc:user123" {

     

       957
       957
       -
       			t.Errorf("expected DID when skipVerify=true, got %s", capturedDID)

     

       958
       958
       -
       		}

     

       827
       827
       +
       	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       828
       828
       +
       	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       829
       829
       +
       		Name:  "coves_session",

     

       830
       830
       +
       		Value: "not-a-valid-sealed-token",

     

       959
       831
        
       	})

     

       960
       960
       -
       }

     

       961
       961
       -
       

     

       962
       962
       -
       // TestDPoPReplayProtection tests that the same DPoP proof cannot be used twice

     

       963
       963
       -
       func TestDPoPReplayProtection(t *testing.T) {

     

       964
       964
       -
       	// This tests the NonceCache functionality

     

       965
       965
       -
       	cache := auth.NewNonceCache(5 * time.Minute)

     

       966
       966
       -
       	defer cache.Stop()

     

       967
       967
       -
       

     

       968
       968
       -
       	jti := "unique-proof-id-123"

     

       969
       969
       -
       

     

       970
       970
       -
       	// First use should succeed

     

       971
       971
       -
       	if !cache.CheckAndStore(jti) {

     

       972
       972
       -
       		t.Error("First use of jti should succeed")

     

       973
       973
       -
       	}

     

       974
       974
       -
       

     

       975
       975
       -
       	// Second use should fail (replay detected)

     

       976
       976
       -
       	if cache.CheckAndStore(jti) {

     

       977
       977
       -
       		t.Error("SECURITY: Replay attack not detected - same jti accepted twice")

     

       978
       978
       -
       	}

     

       832
       832
       +
       	w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       979
       833
        
       

     

       980
       980
       -
       	// Different jti should succeed

     

       981
       981
       -
       	if !cache.CheckAndStore("different-jti-456") {

     

       982
       982
       -
       		t.Error("Different jti should succeed")

     

       983
       983
       -
       	}

     

       984
       984
       -
       }

     

       834
       834
       +
       	handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       985
       835
        
       

     

       986
       986
       -
       // Helper: createDPoPProof creates a DPoP proof JWT for testing

     

       987
       987
       -
       func createDPoPProof(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, method, uri string) string {

     

       988
       988
       -
       	// Create JWK from public key

     

       989
       989
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       990
       990
       -
       

     

       991
       991
       -
       	// Create DPoP claims with UUID for jti to ensure uniqueness across tests

     

       992
       992
       -
       	claims := auth.DPoPClaims{

     

       993
       993
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       994
       994
       -
       			IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       995
       995
       -
       			ID:       uuid.New().String(),

     

       996
       996
       -
       		},

     

       997
       997
       -
       		HTTPMethod: method,

     

       998
       998
       -
       		HTTPURI:    uri,

     

       836
       836
       +
       	if !handlerCalled {

     

       837
       837
       +
       		t.Error("handler was not called")

     

       999
       838
        
       	}

     

       1000
       839
        
       

     

       1001
       1001
       -
       	// Create token with custom header

     

       1002
       1002
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)

     

       1003
       1003
       -
       	token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"

     

       1004
       1004
       -
       	token.Header["jwk"] = jwk

     

       1005
       1005
       -
       

     

       1006
       1006
       -
       	// Sign with private key

     

       1007
       1007
       -
       	signedToken, err := token.SignedString(privateKey)

     

       1008
       1008
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       1009
       1009
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to sign DPoP proof: %v", err)

     

       840
       840
       +
       	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {

     

       841
       841
       +
       		t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)

     

       1010
       842
        
       	}

     

       1011
       1011
       -
       

     

       1012
       1012
       -
       	return signedToken

     

       1013
       843
        
       }

     

       1014
       844
        
       

     

       1015
       1015
       -
       // Helper: createDPoPProofWithAth creates a DPoP proof JWT with ath (access token hash) claim

     

       1016
       1016
       -
       func createDPoPProofWithAth(t *testing.T, privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey, method, uri, accessToken string) string {

     

       1017
       1017
       -
       	// Create JWK from public key

     

       1018
       1018
       -
       	jwk := ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(&privateKey.PublicKey)

     

       1019
       1019
       -
       

     

       1020
       1020
       -
       	// Calculate ath: base64url(SHA-256(access_token))

     

       1021
       1021
       -
       	hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(accessToken))

     

       1022
       1022
       -
       	ath := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:])

     

       1023
       1023
       -
       

     

       1024
       1024
       -
       	// Create DPoP claims with ath

     

       1025
       1025
       -
       	claims := auth.DPoPClaims{

     

       1026
       1026
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       1027
       1027
       -
       			IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       1028
       1028
       -
       			ID:       uuid.New().String(),

     

       1029
       1029
       -
       		},

     

       1030
       1030
       -
       		HTTPMethod:      method,

     

       1031
       1031
       -
       		HTTPURI:         uri,

     

       1032
       1032
       -
       		AccessTokenHash: ath,

     

       1033
       1033
       -
       	}

     

       1034
       1034
       -
       

     

       1035
       1035
       -
       	// Create token with custom header

     

       1036
       1036
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodES256, claims)

     

       1037
       1037
       -
       	token.Header["typ"] = "dpop+jwt"

     

       1038
       1038
       -
       	token.Header["jwk"] = jwk

     

       1039
       1039
       -
       

     

       1040
       1040
       -
       	// Sign with private key

     

       1041
       1041
       -
       	signedToken, err := token.SignedString(privateKey)

     

       1042
       1042
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       1043
       1043
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to sign DPoP proof: %v", err)

     

       845
       845
       +
       // TestWriteAuthError_JSONEscaping tests that writeAuthError properly escapes messages

     

       846
       846
       +
       func TestWriteAuthError_JSONEscaping(t *testing.T) {

     

       847
       847
       +
       	tests := []struct {

     

       848
       848
       +
       		name    string

     

       849
       849
       +
       		message string

     

       850
       850
       +
       	}{

     

       851
       851
       +
       		{"simple message", "Missing authentication"},

     

       852
       852
       +
       		{"message with quotes", `Invalid "token" format`},

     

       853
       853
       +
       		{"message with newlines", "Invalid\ntoken\nformat"},

     

       854
       854
       +
       		{"message with backslashes", `Invalid \ token`},

     

       855
       855
       +
       		{"message with special chars", `Invalid <script>alert("xss")</script> token`},

     

       856
       856
       +
       		{"message with unicode", "Invalid token: \u2028\u2029"},

     

       1044
       857
        
       	}

     

       1045
       858
        
       

     

       1046
       1046
       -
       	return signedToken

     

       1047
       1047
       -
       }

     

       859
       859
       +
       	for _, tt := range tests {

     

       860
       860
       +
       		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       861
       861
       +
       			w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       862
       862
       +
       			writeAuthError(w, tt.message)

     

       1048
       863
        
       

     

       1049
       1049
       -
       // Helper: ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK converts an ECDSA public key to JWK map

     

       1050
       1050
       -
       func ecdsaPublicKeyToJWK(pubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) map[string]interface{} {

     

       1051
       1051
       -
       	// Get curve name

     

       1052
       1052
       -
       	var crv string

     

       1053
       1053
       -
       	switch pubKey.Curve {

     

       1054
       1054
       -
       	case elliptic.P256():

     

       1055
       1055
       -
       		crv = "P-256"

     

       1056
       1056
       -
       	case elliptic.P384():

     

       1057
       1057
       -
       		crv = "P-384"

     

       1058
       1058
       -
       	case elliptic.P521():

     

       1059
       1059
       -
       		crv = "P-521"

     

       1060
       1060
       -
       	default:

     

       1061
       1061
       -
       		panic("unsupported curve")

     

       1062
       1062
       -
       	}

     

       864
       864
       +
       			// Verify status code

     

       865
       865
       +
       			if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       866
       866
       +
       				t.Errorf("expected status 401, got %d", w.Code)

     

       867
       867
       +
       			}

     

       1063
       868
        
       

     

       1064
       1064
       -
       	// Encode coordinates

     

       1065
       1065
       -
       	xBytes := pubKey.X.Bytes()

     

       1066
       1066
       -
       	yBytes := pubKey.Y.Bytes()

     

       1067
       1067
       -
       

     

       1068
       1068
       -
       	// Ensure proper byte length (pad if needed)

     

       1069
       1069
       -
       	keySize := (pubKey.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8

     

       1070
       1070
       -
       	xPadded := make([]byte, keySize)

     

       1071
       1071
       -
       	yPadded := make([]byte, keySize)

     

       1072
       1072
       -
       	copy(xPadded[keySize-len(xBytes):], xBytes)

     

       1073
       1073
       -
       	copy(yPadded[keySize-len(yBytes):], yBytes)

     

       1074
       1074
       -
       

     

       1075
       1075
       -
       	return map[string]interface{}{

     

       1076
       1076
       -
       		"kty": "EC",

     

       1077
       1077
       -
       		"crv": crv,

     

       1078
       1078
       -
       		"x":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(xPadded),

     

       1079
       1079
       -
       		"y":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(yPadded),

     

       1080
       1080
       -
       	}

     

       1081
       1081
       -
       }

     

       869
       869
       +
       			// Verify content type

     

       870
       870
       +
       			if ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/json" {

     

       871
       871
       +
       				t.Errorf("expected Content-Type 'application/json', got %s", ct)

     

       872
       872
       +
       			}

     

       1082
       873
        
       

     

       1083
       1083
       -
       // Helper: createValidJWT creates a valid unsigned JWT token for testing

     

       1084
       1084
       -
       // This is used with skipVerify=true middleware where signature verification is skipped

     

       1085
       1085
       -
       func createValidJWT(t *testing.T, subject string, expiry time.Duration) string {

     

       1086
       1086
       -
       	t.Helper()

     

       1087
       1087
       -
       

     

       1088
       1088
       -
       	claims := auth.Claims{

     

       1089
       1089
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       1090
       1090
       -
       			Subject:   subject,

     

       1091
       1091
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test.pds.local",

     

       1092
       1092
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(expiry)),

     

       1093
       1093
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       1094
       1094
       -
       		},

     

       1095
       1095
       -
       		Scope: "atproto",

     

       1096
       1096
       -
       	}

     

       874
       874
       +
       			// Verify response is valid JSON

     

       875
       875
       +
       			var response map[string]string

     

       876
       876
       +
       			if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &response); err != nil {

     

       877
       877
       +
       				t.Fatalf("response is not valid JSON: %v\nBody: %s", err, w.Body.String())

     

       878
       878
       +
       			}

     

       1097
       879
        
       

     

       1098
       1098
       -
       	// Create unsigned token (for skipVerify=true tests)

     

       1099
       1099
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodNone, claims)

     

       1100
       1100
       -
       	signedToken, err := token.SignedString(jwt.UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType)

     

       1101
       1101
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       1102
       1102
       -
       		t.Fatalf("failed to create test JWT: %v", err)

     

       880
       880
       +
       			// Verify fields

     

       881
       881
       +
       			if response["error"] != "AuthenticationRequired" {

     

       882
       882
       +
       				t.Errorf("expected error 'AuthenticationRequired', got %s", response["error"])

     

       883
       883
       +
       			}

     

       884
       884
       +
       			if response["message"] != tt.message {

     

       885
       885
       +
       				t.Errorf("expected message %q, got %q", tt.message, response["message"])

     

       886
       886
       +
       			}

     

       887
       887
       +
       		})

     

       1103
       888
        
       	}

     

       1104
       1104
       -
       

     

       1105
       1105
       -
       	return signedToken

     

       1106
       889
        
       }

+1 -1

internal/api/routes/community.go

···

       11
       11
        
       // RegisterCommunityRoutes registers community-related XRPC endpoints on the router

     

       12
       12
        
       // Implements social.coves.community.* lexicon endpoints

     

       13
       13
        
       // allowedCommunityCreators restricts who can create communities. If empty, anyone can create.

     

       14
       14
       -
       func RegisterCommunityRoutes(r chi.Router, service communities.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware, allowedCommunityCreators []string) {

     

       14
       14
       +
       func RegisterCommunityRoutes(r chi.Router, service communities.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware, allowedCommunityCreators []string) {

     

       15
       15
        
       	// Initialize handlers

     

       16
       16
        
       	createHandler := community.NewCreateHandler(service, allowedCommunityCreators)

     

       17
       17
        
       	getHandler := community.NewGetHandler(service)

+1 -1

internal/api/routes/post.go

···

       10
       10
        
       

     

       11
       11
        
       // RegisterPostRoutes registers post-related XRPC endpoints on the router

     

       12
       12
        
       // Implements social.coves.community.post.* lexicon endpoints

     

       13
       13
       -
       func RegisterPostRoutes(r chi.Router, service posts.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware) {

     

       13
       13
       +
       func RegisterPostRoutes(r chi.Router, service posts.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware) {

     

       14
       14
        
       	// Initialize handlers

     

       15
       15
        
       	createHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(service)

     

       16
       16

+1 -1

internal/api/routes/timeline.go

···

       12
       12
        
       func RegisterTimelineRoutes(

     

       13
       13
        
       	r chi.Router,

     

       14
       14
        
       	timelineService timelineCore.Service,

     

       15
       15
       -
       	authMiddleware *middleware.AtProtoAuthMiddleware,

     

       15
       15
       +
       	authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware,

     

       16
       16
        
       ) {

     

       17
       17
        
       	// Create handlers

     

       18
       18
        
       	getTimelineHandler := timeline.NewGetTimelineHandler(timelineService)

+291

tests/e2e/oauth_ratelimit_e2e_test.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package e2e

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"net/http/httptest"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"testing"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"time"

     

       9
       9
       +
       

     

       10
       10
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"

     

       11
       11
       +
       )

     

       12
       12
       +
       

     

       13
       13
       +
       // TestRateLimiting_E2E_OAuthEndpoints tests OAuth-specific rate limiting

     

       14
       14
       +
       // OAuth endpoints have stricter rate limits to prevent:

     

       15
       15
       +
       // - Credential stuffing attacks on login endpoints (10 req/min)

     

       16
       16
       +
       // - OAuth state exhaustion

     

       17
       17
       +
       // - Refresh token abuse (20 req/min)

     

       18
       18
       +
       func TestRateLimiting_E2E_OAuthEndpoints(t *testing.T) {

     

       19
       19
       +
       	t.Run("Login endpoints have 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       20
       20
       +
       		// Create rate limiter matching oauth.go config: 10 requests per minute

     

       21
       21
       +
       		loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)

     

       22
       22
       +
       

     

       23
       23
       +
       		// Mock OAuth login handler

     

       24
       24
       +
       		testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       25
       25
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       26
       26
       +
       			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("OK"))

     

       27
       27
       +
       		})

     

       28
       28
       +
       

     

       29
       29
       +
       		handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)

     

       30
       30
       +
       		clientIP := "192.168.1.200:12345"

     

       31
       31
       +
       

     

       32
       32
       +
       		// Make exactly 10 requests (at limit)

     

       33
       33
       +
       		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {

     

       34
       34
       +
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)

     

       35
       35
       +
       			req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       36
       36
       +
       			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       37
       37
       +
       

     

       38
       38
       +
       			handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       39
       39
       +
       

     

       40
       40
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Request %d should succeed", i+1)

     

       41
       41
       +
       		}

     

       42
       42
       +
       

     

       43
       43
       +
       		// 11th request should be rate limited

     

       44
       44
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)

     

       45
       45
       +
       		req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       46
       46
       +
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       47
       47
       +
       

     

       48
       48
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       49
       49
       +
       

     

       50
       50
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Request 11 should be rate limited")

     

       51
       51
       +
       		assert.Contains(t, rr.Body.String(), "Rate limit exceeded", "Should have rate limit error message")

     

       52
       52
       +
       	})

     

       53
       53
       +
       

     

       54
       54
       +
       	t.Run("Mobile login endpoints have 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       55
       55
       +
       		loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)

     

       56
       56
       +
       

     

       57
       57
       +
       		testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       58
       58
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       59
       59
       +
       		})

     

       60
       60
       +
       

     

       61
       61
       +
       		handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)

     

       62
       62
       +
       		clientIP := "192.168.1.201:12345"

     

       63
       63
       +
       

     

       64
       64
       +
       		// Make 10 requests

     

       65
       65
       +
       		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {

     

       66
       66
       +
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/mobile/login", nil)

     

       67
       67
       +
       			req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       68
       68
       +
       			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       69
       69
       +
       			handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       70
       70
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)

     

       71
       71
       +
       		}

     

       72
       72
       +
       

     

       73
       73
       +
       		// 11th request blocked

     

       74
       74
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/mobile/login", nil)

     

       75
       75
       +
       		req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       76
       76
       +
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       77
       77
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       78
       78
       +
       

     

       79
       79
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Mobile login should be rate limited at 10 req/min")

     

       80
       80
       +
       	})

     

       81
       81
       +
       

     

       82
       82
       +
       	t.Run("Refresh endpoint has 20 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       83
       83
       +
       		// Refresh has higher limit (20 req/min) for legitimate token refresh

     

       84
       84
       +
       		refreshLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(20, 1*time.Minute)

     

       85
       85
       +
       

     

       86
       86
       +
       		testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       87
       87
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       88
       88
       +
       		})

     

       89
       89
       +
       

     

       90
       90
       +
       		handler := refreshLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)

     

       91
       91
       +
       		clientIP := "192.168.1.202:12345"

     

       92
       92
       +
       

     

       93
       93
       +
       		// Make 20 requests

     

       94
       94
       +
       		for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {

     

       95
       95
       +
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)

     

       96
       96
       +
       			req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       97
       97
       +
       			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       98
       98
       +
       			handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       99
       99
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Request %d should succeed", i+1)

     

       100
       100
       +
       		}

     

       101
       101
       +
       

     

       102
       102
       +
       		// 21st request blocked

     

       103
       103
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)

     

       104
       104
       +
       		req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       105
       105
       +
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       106
       106
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       107
       107
       +
       

     

       108
       108
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Refresh should be rate limited at 20 req/min")

     

       109
       109
       +
       	})

     

       110
       110
       +
       

     

       111
       111
       +
       	t.Run("Logout endpoint has 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       112
       112
       +
       		logoutLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)

     

       113
       113
       +
       

     

       114
       114
       +
       		testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       115
       115
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       116
       116
       +
       		})

     

       117
       117
       +
       

     

       118
       118
       +
       		handler := logoutLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)

     

       119
       119
       +
       		clientIP := "192.168.1.203:12345"

     

       120
       120
       +
       

     

       121
       121
       +
       		// Make 10 requests

     

       122
       122
       +
       		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {

     

       123
       123
       +
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/logout", nil)

     

       124
       124
       +
       			req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       125
       125
       +
       			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       126
       126
       +
       			handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       127
       127
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)

     

       128
       128
       +
       		}

     

       129
       129
       +
       

     

       130
       130
       +
       		// 11th request blocked

     

       131
       131
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/logout", nil)

     

       132
       132
       +
       		req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       133
       133
       +
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       134
       134
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       135
       135
       +
       

     

       136
       136
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Logout should be rate limited at 10 req/min")

     

       137
       137
       +
       	})

     

       138
       138
       +
       

     

       139
       139
       +
       	t.Run("OAuth callback has 10 req/min limit", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       140
       140
       +
       		// Callback uses same limiter as login (part of auth flow)

     

       141
       141
       +
       		callbackLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)

     

       142
       142
       +
       

     

       143
       143
       +
       		testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       144
       144
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       145
       145
       +
       		})

     

       146
       146
       +
       

     

       147
       147
       +
       		handler := callbackLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)

     

       148
       148
       +
       		clientIP := "192.168.1.204:12345"

     

       149
       149
       +
       

     

       150
       150
       +
       		// Make 10 requests

     

       151
       151
       +
       		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {

     

       152
       152
       +
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback", nil)

     

       153
       153
       +
       			req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       154
       154
       +
       			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       155
       155
       +
       			handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       156
       156
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)

     

       157
       157
       +
       		}

     

       158
       158
       +
       

     

       159
       159
       +
       		// 11th request blocked

     

       160
       160
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback", nil)

     

       161
       161
       +
       		req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       162
       162
       +
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       163
       163
       +
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       164
       164
       +
       

     

       165
       165
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Callback should be rate limited at 10 req/min")

     

       166
       166
       +
       	})

     

       167
       167
       +
       

     

       168
       168
       +
       	t.Run("OAuth rate limits are stricter than global limit", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       169
       169
       +
       		// Verify OAuth limits are more restrictive than global 100 req/min

     

       170
       170
       +
       		const globalLimit = 100

     

       171
       171
       +
       		const oauthLoginLimit = 10

     

       172
       172
       +
       		const oauthRefreshLimit = 20

     

       173
       173
       +
       

     

       174
       174
       +
       		assert.Less(t, oauthLoginLimit, globalLimit, "OAuth login limit should be stricter than global")

     

       175
       175
       +
       		assert.Less(t, oauthRefreshLimit, globalLimit, "OAuth refresh limit should be stricter than global")

     

       176
       176
       +
       		assert.Greater(t, oauthRefreshLimit, oauthLoginLimit, "Refresh limit should be higher than login (legitimate use case)")

     

       177
       177
       +
       	})

     

       178
       178
       +
       

     

       179
       179
       +
       	t.Run("OAuth limits prevent credential stuffing", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       180
       180
       +
       		// Simulate credential stuffing attack

     

       181
       181
       +
       		loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)

     

       182
       182
       +
       

     

       183
       183
       +
       		testHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       184
       184
       +
       			// Simulate failed login attempts

     

       185
       185
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)

     

       186
       186
       +
       		})

     

       187
       187
       +
       

     

       188
       188
       +
       		handler := loginLimiter.Middleware(testHandler)

     

       189
       189
       +
       		attackerIP := "203.0.113.50:12345"

     

       190
       190
       +
       

     

       191
       191
       +
       		// Attacker tries 15 login attempts (credential stuffing)

     

       192
       192
       +
       		successfulAttempts := 0

     

       193
       193
       +
       		blockedAttempts := 0

     

       194
       194
       +
       

     

       195
       195
       +
       		for i := 0; i < 15; i++ {

     

       196
       196
       +
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)

     

       197
       197
       +
       			req.RemoteAddr = attackerIP

     

       198
       198
       +
       			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       199
       199
       +
       

     

       200
       200
       +
       			handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       201
       201
       +
       

     

       202
       202
       +
       			if rr.Code == http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       203
       203
       +
       				successfulAttempts++ // Reached handler (even if auth failed)

     

       204
       204
       +
       			} else if rr.Code == http.StatusTooManyRequests {

     

       205
       205
       +
       				blockedAttempts++

     

       206
       206
       +
       			}

     

       207
       207
       +
       		}

     

       208
       208
       +
       

     

       209
       209
       +
       		// Rate limiter should block 5 attempts after first 10

     

       210
       210
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, 10, successfulAttempts, "Should allow 10 login attempts")

     

       211
       211
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, 5, blockedAttempts, "Should block 5 attempts after limit reached")

     

       212
       212
       +
       	})

     

       213
       213
       +
       

     

       214
       214
       +
       	t.Run("OAuth limits are per-endpoint", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       215
       215
       +
       		// Each endpoint gets its own rate limiter

     

       216
       216
       +
       		// This test verifies that limits are independent per endpoint

     

       217
       217
       +
       		loginLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(10, 1*time.Minute)

     

       218
       218
       +
       		refreshLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(20, 1*time.Minute)

     

       219
       219
       +
       

     

       220
       220
       +
       		loginHandler := loginLimiter.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       221
       221
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       222
       222
       +
       		}))

     

       223
       223
       +
       

     

       224
       224
       +
       		refreshHandler := refreshLimiter.Middleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       225
       225
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       226
       226
       +
       		}))

     

       227
       227
       +
       

     

       228
       228
       +
       		clientIP := "192.168.1.205:12345"

     

       229
       229
       +
       

     

       230
       230
       +
       		// Exhaust login limit

     

       231
       231
       +
       		for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {

     

       232
       232
       +
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)

     

       233
       233
       +
       			req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       234
       234
       +
       			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       235
       235
       +
       			loginHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       236
       236
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code)

     

       237
       237
       +
       		}

     

       238
       238
       +
       

     

       239
       239
       +
       		// Login limit exhausted

     

       240
       240
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/login", nil)

     

       241
       241
       +
       		req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       242
       242
       +
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       243
       243
       +
       		loginHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       244
       244
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, rr.Code, "Login should be rate limited")

     

       245
       245
       +
       

     

       246
       246
       +
       		// Refresh endpoint should still work (independent limiter)

     

       247
       247
       +
       		req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/oauth/refresh", nil)

     

       248
       248
       +
       		req.RemoteAddr = clientIP

     

       249
       249
       +
       		rr = httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       250
       250
       +
       		refreshHandler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       251
       251
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Refresh should not be affected by login rate limit")

     

       252
       252
       +
       	})

     

       253
       253
       +
       }

     

       254
       254
       +
       

     

       255
       255
       +
       // OAuth Rate Limiting Configuration Documentation

     

       256
       256
       +
       // ================================================

     

       257
       257
       +
       // This test file validates OAuth-specific rate limits applied in oauth.go:

     

       258
       258
       +
       //

     

       259
       259
       +
       // 1. Login Endpoints (Credential Stuffing Protection)

     

       260
       260
       +
       //    - Endpoints: /oauth/login, /oauth/mobile/login, /oauth/callback

     

       261
       261
       +
       //    - Limit: 10 requests per minute per IP

     

       262
       262
       +
       //    - Reason: Prevent brute force and credential stuffing attacks

     

       263
       263
       +
       //    - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:21

     

       264
       264
       +
       //

     

       265
       265
       +
       // 2. Refresh Endpoint (Token Refresh)

     

       266
       266
       +
       //    - Endpoint: /oauth/refresh

     

       267
       267
       +
       //    - Limit: 20 requests per minute per IP

     

       268
       268
       +
       //    - Reason: Allow legitimate token refresh while preventing abuse

     

       269
       269
       +
       //    - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:24

     

       270
       270
       +
       //

     

       271
       271
       +
       // 3. Logout Endpoint

     

       272
       272
       +
       //    - Endpoint: /oauth/logout

     

       273
       273
       +
       //    - Limit: 10 requests per minute per IP

     

       274
       274
       +
       //    - Reason: Prevent session exhaustion attacks

     

       275
       275
       +
       //    - Implementation: internal/api/routes/oauth.go:27

     

       276
       276
       +
       //

     

       277
       277
       +
       // 4. Metadata Endpoints (No Extra Limit)

     

       278
       278
       +
       //    - Endpoints: /oauth/client-metadata.json, /oauth/jwks.json

     

       279
       279
       +
       //    - Limit: Global 100 requests per minute (from main.go)

     

       280
       280
       +
       //    - Reason: Public metadata, not sensitive to rate abuse

     

       281
       281
       +
       //

     

       282
       282
       +
       // Security Benefits:

     

       283
       283
       +
       //    - Credential Stuffing: Limits password guessing to 10 attempts/min

     

       284
       284
       +
       //    - State Exhaustion: Prevents OAuth state generation spam

     

       285
       285
       +
       //    - Token Abuse: Limits refresh token usage while allowing legitimate refresh

     

       286
       286
       +
       //

     

       287
       287
       +
       // Rate Limit Hierarchy:

     

       288
       288
       +
       //    - OAuth login: 10 req/min (most restrictive)

     

       289
       289
       +
       //    - OAuth refresh: 20 req/min (moderate)

     

       290
       290
       +
       //    - Comments: 20 req/min (expensive queries)

     

       291
       291
       +
       //    - Global: 100 req/min (baseline)

-208

tests/integration/jwt_verification_test.go

···

       1
       1
       -
       package integration

     

       2
       2
       -
       

     

       3
       3
       -
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       5
       5
       -
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/auth"

     

       6
       6
       -
       	"fmt"

     

       7
       7
       -
       	"net/http"

     

       8
       8
       -
       	"net/http/httptest"

     

       9
       9
       -
       	"os"

     

       10
       10
       -
       	"strings"

     

       11
       11
       -
       	"testing"

     

       12
       12
       -
       	"time"

     

       13
       13
       -
       )

     

       14
       14
       -
       

     

       15
       15
       -
       // TestJWTSignatureVerification tests end-to-end JWT signature verification

     

       16
       16
       -
       // with a real PDS-issued token. This verifies that AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false works.

     

       17
       17
       -
       //

     

       18
       18
       -
       // Flow:

     

       19
       19
       -
       // 1. Create account on local PDS (or use existing)

     

       20
       20
       -
       // 2. Authenticate to get a real signed JWT token

     

       21
       21
       -
       // 3. Verify our auth middleware can fetch JWKS and verify the signature

     

       22
       22
       -
       // 4. Test with AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false (production mode)

     

       23
       23
       -
       //

     

       24
       24
       -
       // NOTE: Local dev PDS (docker-compose.dev.yml) uses symmetric JWT_SECRET signing

     

       25
       25
       -
       // instead of asymmetric JWKS keys. This test verifies the code path works, but

     

       26
       26
       -
       // full JWKS verification requires a production PDS or setting up proper keys.

     

       27
       27
       -
       func TestJWTSignatureVerification(t *testing.T) {

     

       28
       28
       -
       	// Skip in short mode since this requires real PDS

     

       29
       29
       -
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       30
       30
       -
       		t.Skip("Skipping JWT verification test in short mode")

     

       31
       31
       -
       	}

     

       32
       32
       -
       

     

       33
       33
       -
       	pdsURL := os.Getenv("PDS_URL")

     

       34
       34
       -
       	if pdsURL == "" {

     

       35
       35
       -
       		pdsURL = "http://localhost:3001"

     

       36
       36
       -
       	}

     

       37
       37
       -
       

     

       38
       38
       -
       	// Check if PDS is running

     

       39
       39
       -
       	healthResp, err := http.Get(pdsURL + "/xrpc/_health")

     

       40
       40
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       41
       41
       -
       		t.Skipf("PDS not running at %s: %v", pdsURL, err)

     

       42
       42
       -
       	}

     

       43
       43
       -
       	_ = healthResp.Body.Close()

     

       44
       44
       -
       

     

       45
       45
       -
       	// Check if JWKS is available (production PDS) or symmetric secret (dev PDS)

     

       46
       46
       -
       	jwksResp, _ := http.Get(pdsURL + "/oauth/jwks")

     

       47
       47
       -
       	if jwksResp != nil {

     

       48
       48
       -
       		defer func() { _ = jwksResp.Body.Close() }()

     

       49
       49
       -
       	}

     

       50
       50
       -
       

     

       51
       51
       -
       	t.Run("JWT parsing and middleware integration", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       52
       52
       -
       		// Step 1: Create a test account on PDS

     

       53
       53
       -
       		// Keep handle short to avoid PDS validation errors

     

       54
       54
       -
       		timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000 // Last 5 digits

     

       55
       55
       -
       		handle := fmt.Sprintf("jwt%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)

     

       56
       56
       -
       		password := "testpass123"

     

       57
       57
       -
       		email := fmt.Sprintf("jwt%d@test.com", timestamp)

     

       58
       58
       -
       

     

       59
       59
       -
       		accessToken, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)

     

       60
       60
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       61
       61
       -
       			t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)

     

       62
       62
       -
       		}

     

       63
       63
       -
       		t.Logf("✓ Created test account: %s (DID: %s)", handle, did)

     

       64
       64
       -
       		t.Logf("✓ Received JWT token from PDS (length: %d)", len(accessToken))

     

       65
       65
       -
       

     

       66
       66
       -
       		// Step 3: Test JWT parsing (should work regardless of verification)

     

       67
       67
       -
       		claims, err := auth.ParseJWT(accessToken)

     

       68
       68
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       69
       69
       -
       			t.Fatalf("Failed to parse JWT: %v", err)

     

       70
       70
       -
       		}

     

       71
       71
       -
       		t.Logf("✓ JWT parsed successfully")

     

       72
       72
       -
       		t.Logf("  Subject (DID): %s", claims.Subject)

     

       73
       73
       -
       		t.Logf("  Issuer: %s", claims.Issuer)

     

       74
       74
       -
       		t.Logf("  Scope: %s", claims.Scope)

     

       75
       75
       -
       

     

       76
       76
       -
       		if claims.Subject != did {

     

       77
       77
       -
       			t.Errorf("Token DID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", did, claims.Subject)

     

       78
       78
       -
       		}

     

       79
       79
       -
       

     

       80
       80
       -
       		// Step 4: Test JWKS fetching and signature verification

     

       81
       81
       -
       		// NOTE: Local dev PDS uses symmetric secret, not JWKS

     

       82
       82
       -
       		// For production, we'd verify the full signature here

     

       83
       83
       -
       		t.Log("Checking JWKS availability...")

     

       84
       84
       -
       

     

       85
       85
       -
       		jwksFetcher := auth.NewCachedJWKSFetcher(1 * time.Hour)

     

       86
       86
       -
       		verifiedClaims, err := auth.VerifyJWT(httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil).Context(), accessToken, jwksFetcher)

     

       87
       87
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       88
       88
       -
       			// Expected for local dev PDS - log and continue

     

       89
       89
       -
       			t.Logf("ℹ️  JWKS verification skipped (expected for local dev PDS): %v", err)

     

       90
       90
       -
       			t.Logf("   Local PDS uses symmetric JWT_SECRET instead of JWKS")

     

       91
       91
       -
       			t.Logf("   In production, this would verify against proper JWKS keys")

     

       92
       92
       -
       		} else {

     

       93
       93
       -
       			// Unexpected success - means we're testing against a production PDS

     

       94
       94
       -
       			t.Logf("✓ JWT signature verified successfully!")

     

       95
       95
       -
       			t.Logf("  Verified DID: %s", verifiedClaims.Subject)

     

       96
       96
       -
       			t.Logf("  Verified Issuer: %s", verifiedClaims.Issuer)

     

       97
       97
       -
       

     

       98
       98
       -
       			if verifiedClaims.Subject != did {

     

       99
       99
       -
       				t.Errorf("Verified token DID mismatch: expected %s, got %s", did, verifiedClaims.Subject)

     

       100
       100
       -
       			}

     

       101
       101
       -
       		}

     

       102
       102
       -
       

     

       103
       103
       -
       		// Step 5: Test auth middleware with skipVerify=true (for dev PDS)

     

       104
       104
       -
       		t.Log("Testing auth middleware with skipVerify=true (dev mode)...")

     

       105
       105
       -
       

     

       106
       106
       -
       		authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher, true) // skipVerify=true for dev PDS

     

       107
       107
       -
       		defer authMiddleware.Stop()                                               // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine

     

       108
       108
       -
       

     

       109
       109
       -
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       110
       110
       -
       		var extractedDID string

     

       111
       111
       -
       

     

       112
       112
       -
       		testHandler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       113
       113
       -
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       114
       114
       -
       			extractedDID = middleware.GetUserDID(r)

     

       115
       115
       -
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       116
       116
       -
       			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success": true}`))

     

       117
       117
       -
       		}))

     

       118
       118
       -
       

     

       119
       119
       -
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       120
       120
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)

     

       121
       121
       -
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       122
       122
       -
       

     

       123
       123
       -
       		testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       124
       124
       -
       

     

       125
       125
       -
       		if !handlerCalled {

     

       126
       126
       -
       			t.Errorf("Handler was not called - auth middleware rejected valid token")

     

       127
       127
       -
       			t.Logf("Response status: %d", w.Code)

     

       128
       128
       -
       			t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())

     

       129
       129
       -
       		}

     

       130
       130
       -
       

     

       131
       131
       -
       		if w.Code != http.StatusOK {

     

       132
       132
       -
       			t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)

     

       133
       133
       -
       			t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())

     

       134
       134
       -
       		}

     

       135
       135
       -
       

     

       136
       136
       -
       		if extractedDID != did {

     

       137
       137
       -
       			t.Errorf("Middleware extracted wrong DID: expected %s, got %s", did, extractedDID)

     

       138
       138
       -
       		}

     

       139
       139
       -
       

     

       140
       140
       -
       		t.Logf("✅ Auth middleware with signature verification working correctly!")

     

       141
       141
       -
       		t.Logf("  Handler called: %v", handlerCalled)

     

       142
       142
       -
       		t.Logf("  Extracted DID: %s", extractedDID)

     

       143
       143
       -
       		t.Logf("  Response status: %d", w.Code)

     

       144
       144
       -
       	})

     

       145
       145
       -
       

     

       146
       146
       -
       	t.Run("Rejects tampered JWT", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       147
       147
       -
       		// Create valid token

     

       148
       148
       -
       		timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000

     

       149
       149
       -
       		handle := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)

     

       150
       150
       -
       		password := "testpass456"

     

       151
       151
       -
       		email := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d@test.com", timestamp)

     

       152
       152
       -
       

     

       153
       153
       -
       		accessToken, _, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)

     

       154
       154
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       155
       155
       -
       			t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)

     

       156
       156
       -
       		}

     

       157
       157
       -
       

     

       158
       158
       -
       		// Tamper with the token more aggressively to break JWT structure

     

       159
       159
       -
       		parts := splitToken(accessToken)

     

       160
       160
       -
       		if len(parts) != 3 {

     

       161
       161
       -
       			t.Fatalf("Invalid JWT structure: expected 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))

     

       162
       162
       -
       		}

     

       163
       163
       -
       		// Replace the payload with invalid base64 that will fail decoding

     

       164
       164
       -
       		tamperedToken := parts[0] + ".!!!invalid-base64!!!." + parts[2]

     

       165
       165
       -
       

     

       166
       166
       -
       		// Test with middleware (skipVerify=true since dev PDS doesn't use JWKS)

     

       167
       167
       -
       		// Tampered payload should fail JWT parsing even without signature check

     

       168
       168
       -
       		jwksFetcher := auth.NewCachedJWKSFetcher(1 * time.Hour)

     

       169
       169
       -
       		authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(jwksFetcher, true)

     

       170
       170
       -
       		defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine

     

       171
       171
       -
       

     

       172
       172
       -
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       173
       173
       -
       		testHandler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       174
       174
       -
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       175
       175
       -
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       176
       176
       -
       		}))

     

       177
       177
       -
       

     

       178
       178
       -
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       179
       179
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+tamperedToken)

     

       180
       180
       -
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       181
       181
       -
       

     

       182
       182
       -
       		testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       183
       183
       -
       

     

       184
       184
       -
       		if handlerCalled {

     

       185
       185
       -
       			t.Error("Handler was called for tampered token - should have been rejected")

     

       186
       186
       -
       		}

     

       187
       187
       -
       

     

       188
       188
       -
       		if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       189
       189
       -
       			t.Errorf("Expected status 401 for tampered token, got %d", w.Code)

     

       190
       190
       -
       		}

     

       191
       191
       -
       

     

       192
       192
       -
       		t.Logf("✅ Middleware correctly rejected tampered token with status %d", w.Code)

     

       193
       193
       -
       	})

     

       194
       194
       -
       

     

       195
       195
       -
       	t.Run("Rejects expired JWT with signature verification", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       196
       196
       -
       		// For this test, we'd need to create a token and wait for expiry,

     

       197
       197
       -
       		// or mock the time. For now, we'll just verify the validation logic exists.

     

       198
       198
       -
       		// In production, PDS tokens expire after a certain period.

     

       199
       199
       -
       		t.Log("ℹ️  Expiration test would require waiting for token expiry or time mocking")

     

       200
       200
       -
       		t.Log("   Token expiration validation is covered by unit tests in auth_test.go")

     

       201
       201
       -
       		t.Skip("Skipping expiration test - requires time manipulation")

     

       202
       202
       -
       	})

     

       203
       203
       -
       }

     

       204
       204
       -
       

     

       205
       205
       -
       // splitToken splits a JWT into its three parts (header.payload.signature)

     

       206
       206
       -
       func splitToken(token string) []string {

     

       207
       207
       -
       	return strings.Split(token, ".")

     

       208
       208
       -
       }

+910

tests/integration/oauth_e2e_test.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package integration

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"context"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"encoding/json"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"fmt"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       9
       9
       +
       	"net/http/httptest"

     

       10
       10
       +
       	"strings"

     

       11
       11
       +
       	"testing"

     

       12
       12
       +
       	"time"

     

       13
       13
       +
       

     

       14
       14
       +
       	oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"

     

       15
       15
       +
       	"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"

     

       16
       16
       +
       	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"

     

       17
       17
       +
       	_ "github.com/lib/pq"

     

       18
       18
       +
       	"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"

     

       19
       19
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"

     

       20
       20
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

     

       21
       21
       +
       )

     

       22
       22
       +
       

     

       23
       23
       +
       // TestOAuth_Components tests OAuth component functionality without requiring PDS.

     

       24
       24
       +
       // This validates all Coves OAuth code:

     

       25
       25
       +
       // - Session storage and retrieval (PostgreSQL)

     

       26
       26
       +
       // - Token sealing (AES-GCM encryption)

     

       27
       27
       +
       // - Token unsealing (decryption + validation)

     

       28
       28
       +
       // - Session cleanup

     

       29
       29
       +
       //

     

       30
       30
       +
       // NOTE: Full OAuth redirect flow testing requires both HTTPS PDS and HTTPS Coves deployment.

     

       31
       31
       +
       // The OAuth redirect flow is handled by indigo's library and enforces OAuth 2.0 spec

     

       32
       32
       +
       // (HTTPS required for authorization servers and redirect URIs).

     

       33
       33
       +
       func TestOAuth_Components(t *testing.T) {

     

       34
       34
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       35
       35
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth component test in short mode")

     

       36
       36
       +
       	}

     

       37
       37
       +
       

     

       38
       38
       +
       	// Setup test database

     

       39
       39
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       40
       40
       +
       	defer func() {

     

       41
       41
       +
       		if err := db.Close(); err != nil {

     

       42
       42
       +
       			t.Logf("Failed to close database: %v", err)

     

       43
       43
       +
       		}

     

       44
       44
       +
       	}()

     

       45
       45
       +
       

     

       46
       46
       +
       	// Run migrations to ensure OAuth tables exist

     

       47
       47
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       48
       48
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       49
       49
       +
       

     

       50
       50
       +
       	t.Log("🔧 Testing OAuth Components")

     

       51
       51
       +
       

     

       52
       52
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       53
       53
       +
       

     

       54
       54
       +
       	// Setup OAuth client and store

     

       55
       55
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       56
       56
       +
       	client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)

     

       57
       57
       +
       	require.NotNil(t, client, "OAuth client should be initialized")

     

       58
       58
       +
       

     

       59
       59
       +
       	// Use a test DID (doesn't need to exist on PDS for component tests)

     

       60
       60
       +
       	testDID := "did:plc:componenttest123"

     

       61
       61
       +
       

     

       62
       62
       +
       	// Run component tests

     

       63
       63
       +
       	testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession(t, ctx, nil, store, client, testDID, "")

     

       64
       64
       +
       

     

       65
       65
       +
       	t.Log("")

     

       66
       66
       +
       	t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))

     

       67
       67
       +
       	t.Log("✅ OAuth Component Tests Complete")

     

       68
       68
       +
       	t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))

     

       69
       69
       +
       	t.Log("Components validated:")

     

       70
       70
       +
       	t.Log("  ✓ Session storage (PostgreSQL)")

     

       71
       71
       +
       	t.Log("  ✓ Token sealing (AES-GCM encryption)")

     

       72
       72
       +
       	t.Log("  ✓ Token unsealing (decryption + validation)")

     

       73
       73
       +
       	t.Log("  ✓ Session cleanup")

     

       74
       74
       +
       	t.Log("")

     

       75
       75
       +
       	t.Log("NOTE: Full OAuth redirect flow requires HTTPS PDS + HTTPS Coves")

     

       76
       76
       +
       	t.Log(strings.Repeat("=", 60))

     

       77
       77
       +
       }

     

       78
       78
       +
       

     

       79
       79
       +
       // testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession tests OAuth components that work without PDS redirect flow.

     

       80
       80
       +
       // This is used when testing with localhost PDS, where the indigo library rejects http:// URLs.

     

       81
       81
       +
       func testOAuthComponentsWithMockedSession(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, _ interface{}, store oauthlib.ClientAuthStore, client *oauth.OAuthClient, userDID, _ string) {

     

       82
       82
       +
       	t.Helper()

     

       83
       83
       +
       

     

       84
       84
       +
       	t.Log("🔧 Testing OAuth components with mocked session...")

     

       85
       85
       +
       

     

       86
       86
       +
       	// Parse DID

     

       87
       87
       +
       	parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(userDID)

     

       88
       88
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should parse DID")

     

       89
       89
       +
       

     

       90
       90
       +
       	// Component 1: Session Storage

     

       91
       91
       +
       	t.Log("   📦 Component 1: Testing session storage...")

     

       92
       92
       +
       	testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       93
       93
       +
       		AccountDID:  parsedDID,

     

       94
       94
       +
       		SessionID:   fmt.Sprintf("localhost-test-%d", time.Now().UnixNano()),

     

       95
       95
       +
       		HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       96
       96
       +
       		AccessToken: "mocked-access-token",

     

       97
       97
       +
       		Scopes:      []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},

     

       98
       98
       +
       	}

     

       99
       99
       +
       

     

       100
       100
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)

     

       101
       101
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should save session")

     

       102
       102
       +
       

     

       103
       103
       +
       	retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)

     

       104
       104
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve session")

     

       105
       105
       +
       	require.Equal(t, testSession.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID)

     

       106
       106
       +
       	require.Equal(t, testSession.AccessToken, retrieved.AccessToken)

     

       107
       107
       +
       	t.Log("   ✅ Session storage working")

     

       108
       108
       +
       

     

       109
       109
       +
       	// Component 2: Token Sealing

     

       110
       110
       +
       	t.Log("   🔐 Component 2: Testing token sealing...")

     

       111
       111
       +
       	sealedToken, err := client.SealSession(parsedDID.String(), testSession.SessionID, time.Hour)

     

       112
       112
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should seal token")

     

       113
       113
       +
       	require.NotEmpty(t, sealedToken, "Sealed token should not be empty")

     

       114
       114
       +
       	tokenPreview := sealedToken

     

       115
       115
       +
       	if len(tokenPreview) > 50 {

     

       116
       116
       +
       		tokenPreview = tokenPreview[:50]

     

       117
       117
       +
       	}

     

       118
       118
       +
       	t.Logf("   ✅ Token sealed: %s...", tokenPreview)

     

       119
       119
       +
       

     

       120
       120
       +
       	// Component 3: Token Unsealing

     

       121
       121
       +
       	t.Log("   🔓 Component 3: Testing token unsealing...")

     

       122
       122
       +
       	unsealed, err := client.UnsealSession(sealedToken)

     

       123
       123
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should unseal token")

     

       124
       124
       +
       	require.Equal(t, userDID, unsealed.DID)

     

       125
       125
       +
       	require.Equal(t, testSession.SessionID, unsealed.SessionID)

     

       126
       126
       +
       	t.Log("   ✅ Token unsealing working")

     

       127
       127
       +
       

     

       128
       128
       +
       	// Component 4: Session Cleanup

     

       129
       129
       +
       	t.Log("   🧹 Component 4: Testing session cleanup...")

     

       130
       130
       +
       	err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)

     

       131
       131
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should delete session")

     

       132
       132
       +
       

     

       133
       133
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, parsedDID, testSession.SessionID)

     

       134
       134
       +
       	require.Error(t, err, "Session should not exist after deletion")

     

       135
       135
       +
       	t.Log("   ✅ Session cleanup working")

     

       136
       136
       +
       

     

       137
       137
       +
       	t.Log("✅ All OAuth components verified!")

     

       138
       138
       +
       	t.Log("")

     

       139
       139
       +
       	t.Log("📝 Summary: OAuth implementation validated with mocked session")

     

       140
       140
       +
       	t.Log("   - Session storage: ✓")

     

       141
       141
       +
       	t.Log("   - Token sealing: ✓")

     

       142
       142
       +
       	t.Log("   - Token unsealing: ✓")

     

       143
       143
       +
       	t.Log("   - Session cleanup: ✓")

     

       144
       144
       +
       	t.Log("")

     

       145
       145
       +
       	t.Log("⚠️  To test full OAuth redirect flow, use a production PDS with HTTPS")

     

       146
       146
       +
       }

     

       147
       147
       +
       

     

       148
       148
       +
       // TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration tests that expired sealed tokens are rejected

     

       149
       149
       +
       func TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration(t *testing.T) {

     

       150
       150
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       151
       151
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token expiration test in short mode")

     

       152
       152
       +
       	}

     

       153
       153
       +
       

     

       154
       154
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       155
       155
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       156
       156
       +
       

     

       157
       157
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       158
       158
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       159
       159
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       160
       160
       +
       

     

       161
       161
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       162
       162
       +
       

     

       163
       163
       +
       	t.Log("⏰ Testing OAuth token expiration...")

     

       164
       164
       +
       

     

       165
       165
       +
       	// Setup OAuth client and store

     

       166
       166
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       167
       167
       +
       	client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)

     

       168
       168
       +
       	_ = oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store) // Handler created for completeness

     

       169
       169
       +
       

     

       170
       170
       +
       	// Create test session with past expiration

     

       171
       171
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:expiredtest123")

     

       172
       172
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       173
       173
       +
       

     

       174
       174
       +
       	testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       175
       175
       +
       		AccountDID:  did,

     

       176
       176
       +
       		SessionID:   "expired-session",

     

       177
       177
       +
       		HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       178
       178
       +
       		AccessToken: "expired-token",

     

       179
       179
       +
       		Scopes:      []string{"atproto"},

     

       180
       180
       +
       	}

     

       181
       181
       +
       

     

       182
       182
       +
       	// Save session

     

       183
       183
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)

     

       184
       184
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       185
       185
       +
       

     

       186
       186
       +
       	// Manually update expiration to the past

     

       187
       187
       +
       	_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,

     

       188
       188
       +
       		"UPDATE oauth_sessions SET expires_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 day' WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2",

     

       189
       189
       +
       		did.String(), testSession.SessionID)

     

       190
       190
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       191
       191
       +
       

     

       192
       192
       +
       	// Try to retrieve expired session

     

       193
       193
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, testSession.SessionID)

     

       194
       194
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err, "Should not be able to retrieve expired session")

     

       195
       195
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound for expired session")

     

       196
       196
       +
       

     

       197
       197
       +
       	// Test cleanup of expired sessions

     

       198
       198
       +
       	cleaned, err := store.(*oauth.PostgresOAuthStore).CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx)

     

       199
       199
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Cleanup should succeed")

     

       200
       200
       +
       	assert.Greater(t, cleaned, int64(0), "Should have cleaned up at least one session")

     

       201
       201
       +
       

     

       202
       202
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Expired session handling verified (cleaned %d sessions)", cleaned)

     

       203
       203
       +
       }

     

       204
       204
       +
       

     

       205
       205
       +
       // TestOAuthE2E_InvalidToken tests that invalid/tampered tokens are rejected

     

       206
       206
       +
       func TestOAuthE2E_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {

     

       207
       207
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       208
       208
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth invalid token test in short mode")

     

       209
       209
       +
       	}

     

       210
       210
       +
       

     

       211
       211
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       212
       212
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       213
       213
       +
       

     

       214
       214
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       215
       215
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       216
       216
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       217
       217
       +
       

     

       218
       218
       +
       	t.Log("🔒 Testing OAuth invalid token rejection...")

     

       219
       219
       +
       

     

       220
       220
       +
       	// Setup OAuth client and store

     

       221
       221
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       222
       222
       +
       	client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)

     

       223
       223
       +
       	handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)

     

       224
       224
       +
       

     

       225
       225
       +
       	// Setup test server with protected endpoint

     

       226
       226
       +
       	r := chi.NewRouter()

     

       227
       227
       +
       	r.Get("/api/me", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       228
       228
       +
       		sessData, err := handler.GetSessionFromRequest(r)

     

       229
       229
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       230
       230
       +
       			http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)

     

       231
       231
       +
       			return

     

       232
       232
       +
       		}

     

       233
       233
       +
       		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       234
       234
       +
       		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"did": sessData.AccountDID.String()})

     

       235
       235
       +
       	})

     

       236
       236
       +
       

     

       237
       237
       +
       	server := httptest.NewServer(r)

     

       238
       238
       +
       	defer server.Close()

     

       239
       239
       +
       

     

       240
       240
       +
       	// Test with invalid token formats

     

       241
       241
       +
       	testCases := []struct {

     

       242
       242
       +
       		name  string

     

       243
       243
       +
       		token string

     

       244
       244
       +
       	}{

     

       245
       245
       +
       		{"Empty token", ""},

     

       246
       246
       +
       		{"Invalid base64", "not-valid-base64!!!"},

     

       247
       247
       +
       		{"Tampered token", "dGFtcGVyZWQtdG9rZW4tZGF0YQ=="}, // Valid base64 but invalid content

     

       248
       248
       +
       		{"Short token", "abc"},

     

       249
       249
       +
       	}

     

       250
       250
       +
       

     

       251
       251
       +
       	for _, tc := range testCases {

     

       252
       252
       +
       		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       253
       253
       +
       			req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", server.URL+"/api/me", nil)

     

       254
       254
       +
       			if tc.token != "" {

     

       255
       255
       +
       				req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tc.token)

     

       256
       256
       +
       			}

     

       257
       257
       +
       

     

       258
       258
       +
       			resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       259
       259
       +
       			require.NoError(t, err)

     

       260
       260
       +
       			defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

     

       261
       261
       +
       

     

       262
       262
       +
       			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,

     

       263
       263
       +
       				"Invalid token should be rejected with 401")

     

       264
       264
       +
       		})

     

       265
       265
       +
       	}

     

       266
       266
       +
       

     

       267
       267
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Invalid token rejection verified")

     

       268
       268
       +
       }

     

       269
       269
       +
       

     

       270
       270
       +
       // TestOAuthE2E_SessionNotFound tests behavior when session doesn't exist in DB

     

       271
       271
       +
       func TestOAuthE2E_SessionNotFound(t *testing.T) {

     

       272
       272
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       273
       273
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session not found test in short mode")

     

       274
       274
       +
       	}

     

       275
       275
       +
       

     

       276
       276
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       277
       277
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       278
       278
       +
       

     

       279
       279
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       280
       280
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       281
       281
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       282
       282
       +
       

     

       283
       283
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       284
       284
       +
       

     

       285
       285
       +
       	t.Log("🔍 Testing OAuth session not found behavior...")

     

       286
       286
       +
       

     

       287
       287
       +
       	// Setup OAuth store

     

       288
       288
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       289
       289
       +
       

     

       290
       290
       +
       	// Try to retrieve non-existent session

     

       291
       291
       +
       	nonExistentDID, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:nonexistent123")

     

       292
       292
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       293
       293
       +
       

     

       294
       294
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, nonExistentDID, "nonexistent-session")

     

       295
       295
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err, "Should return error for non-existent session")

     

       296
       296
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound")

     

       297
       297
       +
       

     

       298
       298
       +
       	// Try to delete non-existent session

     

       299
       299
       +
       	err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, nonExistentDID, "nonexistent-session")

     

       300
       300
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err, "Should return error when deleting non-existent session")

     

       301
       301
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "Should return ErrSessionNotFound")

     

       302
       302
       +
       

     

       303
       303
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Session not found handling verified")

     

       304
       304
       +
       }

     

       305
       305
       +
       

     

       306
       306
       +
       // TestOAuthE2E_MultipleSessionsPerUser tests that a user can have multiple active sessions

     

       307
       307
       +
       func TestOAuthE2E_MultipleSessionsPerUser(t *testing.T) {

     

       308
       308
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       309
       309
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth multiple sessions test in short mode")

     

       310
       310
       +
       	}

     

       311
       311
       +
       

     

       312
       312
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       313
       313
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       314
       314
       +
       

     

       315
       315
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       316
       316
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       317
       317
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       318
       318
       +
       

     

       319
       319
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       320
       320
       +
       

     

       321
       321
       +
       	t.Log("👥 Testing multiple OAuth sessions per user...")

     

       322
       322
       +
       

     

       323
       323
       +
       	// Setup OAuth store

     

       324
       324
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       325
       325
       +
       

     

       326
       326
       +
       	// Create a test DID

     

       327
       327
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:multisession123")

     

       328
       328
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       329
       329
       +
       

     

       330
       330
       +
       	// Create multiple sessions for the same user

     

       331
       331
       +
       	sessions := []oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       332
       332
       +
       		{

     

       333
       333
       +
       			AccountDID:  did,

     

       334
       334
       +
       			SessionID:   "session-1-web",

     

       335
       335
       +
       			HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       336
       336
       +
       			AccessToken: "token-1",

     

       337
       337
       +
       			Scopes:      []string{"atproto"},

     

       338
       338
       +
       		},

     

       339
       339
       +
       		{

     

       340
       340
       +
       			AccountDID:  did,

     

       341
       341
       +
       			SessionID:   "session-2-mobile",

     

       342
       342
       +
       			HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       343
       343
       +
       			AccessToken: "token-2",

     

       344
       344
       +
       			Scopes:      []string{"atproto"},

     

       345
       345
       +
       		},

     

       346
       346
       +
       		{

     

       347
       347
       +
       			AccountDID:  did,

     

       348
       348
       +
       			SessionID:   "session-3-tablet",

     

       349
       349
       +
       			HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       350
       350
       +
       			AccessToken: "token-3",

     

       351
       351
       +
       			Scopes:      []string{"atproto"},

     

       352
       352
       +
       		},

     

       353
       353
       +
       	}

     

       354
       354
       +
       

     

       355
       355
       +
       	// Save all sessions

     

       356
       356
       +
       	for i, session := range sessions {

     

       357
       357
       +
       		err := store.SaveSession(ctx, session)

     

       358
       358
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to save session %d", i+1)

     

       359
       359
       +
       	}

     

       360
       360
       +
       

     

       361
       361
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Created %d sessions for user", len(sessions))

     

       362
       362
       +
       

     

       363
       363
       +
       	// Verify all sessions can be retrieved independently

     

       364
       364
       +
       	for i, session := range sessions {

     

       365
       365
       +
       		retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, session.SessionID)

     

       366
       366
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to retrieve session %d", i+1)

     

       367
       367
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, session.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID, "Session ID should match")

     

       368
       368
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, session.AccessToken, retrieved.AccessToken, "Access token should match")

     

       369
       369
       +
       	}

     

       370
       370
       +
       

     

       371
       371
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ All sessions retrieved independently")

     

       372
       372
       +
       

     

       373
       373
       +
       	// Delete one session and verify others remain

     

       374
       374
       +
       	err = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, sessions[0].SessionID)

     

       375
       375
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to delete first session")

     

       376
       376
       +
       

     

       377
       377
       +
       	// Verify first session is deleted

     

       378
       378
       +
       	_, err = store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessions[0].SessionID)

     

       379
       379
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrSessionNotFound, err, "First session should be deleted")

     

       380
       380
       +
       

     

       381
       381
       +
       	// Verify other sessions still exist

     

       382
       382
       +
       	for i := 1; i < len(sessions); i++ {

     

       383
       383
       +
       		_, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessions[i].SessionID)

     

       384
       384
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err, "Session %d should still exist", i+1)

     

       385
       385
       +
       	}

     

       386
       386
       +
       

     

       387
       387
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Multiple sessions per user verified")

     

       388
       388
       +
       

     

       389
       389
       +
       	// Cleanup

     

       390
       390
       +
       	for i := 1; i < len(sessions); i++ {

     

       391
       391
       +
       		_ = store.DeleteSession(ctx, did, sessions[i].SessionID)

     

       392
       392
       +
       	}

     

       393
       393
       +
       }

     

       394
       394
       +
       

     

       395
       395
       +
       // TestOAuthE2E_AuthRequestStorage tests OAuth auth request storage and retrieval

     

       396
       396
       +
       func TestOAuthE2E_AuthRequestStorage(t *testing.T) {

     

       397
       397
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       398
       398
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth auth request storage test in short mode")

     

       399
       399
       +
       	}

     

       400
       400
       +
       

     

       401
       401
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       402
       402
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       403
       403
       +
       

     

       404
       404
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       405
       405
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       406
       406
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       407
       407
       +
       

     

       408
       408
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       409
       409
       +
       

     

       410
       410
       +
       	t.Log("📝 Testing OAuth auth request storage...")

     

       411
       411
       +
       

     

       412
       412
       +
       	// Setup OAuth store

     

       413
       413
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       414
       414
       +
       

     

       415
       415
       +
       	// Create test auth request data

     

       416
       416
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:authrequest123")

     

       417
       417
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       418
       418
       +
       

     

       419
       419
       +
       	authRequest := oauthlib.AuthRequestData{

     

       420
       420
       +
       		State:                        "test-state-12345",

     

       421
       421
       +
       		AccountDID:                   &did,

     

       422
       422
       +
       		PKCEVerifier:                 "test-pkce-verifier",

     

       423
       423
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase:      "test-dpop-key",

     

       424
       424
       +
       		DPoPAuthServerNonce:          "test-nonce",

     

       425
       425
       +
       		AuthServerURL:                "http://localhost:3001",

     

       426
       426
       +
       		RequestURI:                   "http://localhost:3001/authorize",

     

       427
       427
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint:      "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",

     

       428
       428
       +
       		AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/revoke",

     

       429
       429
       +
       		Scopes:                       []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},

     

       430
       430
       +
       	}

     

       431
       431
       +
       

     

       432
       432
       +
       	// Save auth request

     

       433
       433
       +
       	err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest)

     

       434
       434
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to save auth request")

     

       435
       435
       +
       

     

       436
       436
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Auth request saved")

     

       437
       437
       +
       

     

       438
       438
       +
       	// Retrieve auth request

     

       439
       439
       +
       	retrieved, err := store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)

     

       440
       440
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to retrieve auth request")

     

       441
       441
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, authRequest.State, retrieved.State, "State should match")

     

       442
       442
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, authRequest.PKCEVerifier, retrieved.PKCEVerifier, "PKCE verifier should match")

     

       443
       443
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, authRequest.AuthServerURL, retrieved.AuthServerURL, "Auth server URL should match")

     

       444
       444
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, len(authRequest.Scopes), len(retrieved.Scopes), "Scopes length should match")

     

       445
       445
       +
       

     

       446
       446
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Auth request retrieved and verified")

     

       447
       447
       +
       

     

       448
       448
       +
       	// Test duplicate state error

     

       449
       449
       +
       	err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest)

     

       450
       450
       +
       	assert.Error(t, err, "Should not allow duplicate state")

     

       451
       451
       +
       	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "already exists", "Error should indicate duplicate")

     

       452
       452
       +
       

     

       453
       453
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Duplicate state prevention verified")

     

       454
       454
       +
       

     

       455
       455
       +
       	// Delete auth request

     

       456
       456
       +
       	err = store.DeleteAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)

     

       457
       457
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should be able to delete auth request")

     

       458
       458
       +
       

     

       459
       459
       +
       	// Verify deletion

     

       460
       460
       +
       	_, err = store.GetAuthRequestInfo(ctx, authRequest.State)

     

       461
       461
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, oauth.ErrAuthRequestNotFound, err, "Auth request should be deleted")

     

       462
       462
       +
       

     

       463
       463
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Auth request deletion verified")

     

       464
       464
       +
       

     

       465
       465
       +
       	// Test cleanup of expired auth requests

     

       466
       466
       +
       	// Create an auth request and manually set created_at to the past

     

       467
       467
       +
       	oldAuthRequest := oauthlib.AuthRequestData{

     

       468
       468
       +
       		State:         "old-state-12345",

     

       469
       469
       +
       		PKCEVerifier:  "old-verifier",

     

       470
       470
       +
       		AuthServerURL: "http://localhost:3001",

     

       471
       471
       +
       		Scopes:        []string{"atproto"},

     

       472
       472
       +
       	}

     

       473
       473
       +
       

     

       474
       474
       +
       	err = store.SaveAuthRequestInfo(ctx, oldAuthRequest)

     

       475
       475
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       476
       476
       +
       

     

       477
       477
       +
       	// Update created_at to 1 hour ago

     

       478
       478
       +
       	_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,

     

       479
       479
       +
       		"UPDATE oauth_requests SET created_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour' WHERE state = $1",

     

       480
       480
       +
       		oldAuthRequest.State)

     

       481
       481
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       482
       482
       +
       

     

       483
       483
       +
       	// Cleanup expired requests

     

       484
       484
       +
       	cleaned, err := store.(*oauth.PostgresOAuthStore).CleanupExpiredAuthRequests(ctx)

     

       485
       485
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Cleanup should succeed")

     

       486
       486
       +
       	assert.Greater(t, cleaned, int64(0), "Should have cleaned up at least one auth request")

     

       487
       487
       +
       

     

       488
       488
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Expired auth request cleanup verified (cleaned %d requests)", cleaned)

     

       489
       489
       +
       }

     

       490
       490
       +
       

     

       491
       491
       +
       // TestOAuthE2E_TokenRefresh tests the refresh token flow

     

       492
       492
       +
       func TestOAuthE2E_TokenRefresh(t *testing.T) {

     

       493
       493
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       494
       494
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token refresh test in short mode")

     

       495
       495
       +
       	}

     

       496
       496
       +
       

     

       497
       497
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       498
       498
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       499
       499
       +
       

     

       500
       500
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       501
       501
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       502
       502
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       503
       503
       +
       

     

       504
       504
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       505
       505
       +
       

     

       506
       506
       +
       	t.Log("🔄 Testing OAuth token refresh flow...")

     

       507
       507
       +
       

     

       508
       508
       +
       	// Setup OAuth client and store

     

       509
       509
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       510
       510
       +
       	client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)

     

       511
       511
       +
       	handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)

     

       512
       512
       +
       

     

       513
       513
       +
       	// Create a test DID and session

     

       514
       514
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:refreshtest123")

     

       515
       515
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       516
       516
       +
       

     

       517
       517
       +
       	// Create initial session with refresh token

     

       518
       518
       +
       	initialSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       519
       519
       +
       		AccountDID:                   did,

     

       520
       520
       +
       		SessionID:                    "refresh-session-1",

     

       521
       521
       +
       		HostURL:                      "http://localhost:3001",

     

       522
       522
       +
       		AuthServerURL:                "http://localhost:3001",

     

       523
       523
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint:      "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",

     

       524
       524
       +
       		AuthServerRevocationEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/revoke",

     

       525
       525
       +
       		AccessToken:                  "initial-access-token",

     

       526
       526
       +
       		RefreshToken:                 "initial-refresh-token",

     

       527
       527
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase:      "test-dpop-key",

     

       528
       528
       +
       		DPoPAuthServerNonce:          "test-nonce",

     

       529
       529
       +
       		Scopes:                       []string{"atproto", "transition:generic"},

     

       530
       530
       +
       	}

     

       531
       531
       +
       

     

       532
       532
       +
       	// Save the session

     

       533
       533
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, initialSession)

     

       534
       534
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should save initial session")

     

       535
       535
       +
       

     

       536
       536
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Initial session created")

     

       537
       537
       +
       

     

       538
       538
       +
       	// Create a sealed token for this session

     

       539
       539
       +
       	sealedToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), initialSession.SessionID, time.Hour)

     

       540
       540
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should seal session token")

     

       541
       541
       +
       	require.NotEmpty(t, sealedToken, "Sealed token should not be empty")

     

       542
       542
       +
       

     

       543
       543
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Session token sealed")

     

       544
       544
       +
       

     

       545
       545
       +
       	// Setup test server with refresh endpoint

     

       546
       546
       +
       	r := chi.NewRouter()

     

       547
       547
       +
       	r.Post("/oauth/refresh", handler.HandleRefresh)

     

       548
       548
       +
       

     

       549
       549
       +
       	server := httptest.NewServer(r)

     

       550
       550
       +
       	defer server.Close()

     

       551
       551
       +
       

     

       552
       552
       +
       	t.Run("Valid refresh request", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       553
       553
       +
       		// NOTE: This test verifies that the refresh endpoint can be called

     

       554
       554
       +
       		// In a real scenario, the indigo client's RefreshTokens() would call the PDS

     

       555
       555
       +
       		// Since we're in a component test, we're testing the Coves handler logic

     

       556
       556
       +
       

     

       557
       557
       +
       		// Create refresh request

     

       558
       558
       +
       		refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{

     

       559
       559
       +
       			"did":          did.String(),

     

       560
       560
       +
       			"session_id":   initialSession.SessionID,

     

       561
       561
       +
       			"sealed_token": sealedToken,

     

       562
       562
       +
       		}

     

       563
       563
       +
       

     

       564
       564
       +
       		reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)

     

       565
       565
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       566
       566
       +
       

     

       567
       567
       +
       		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))

     

       568
       568
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       569
       569
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       570
       570
       +
       

     

       571
       571
       +
       		// NOTE: In component testing mode, the indigo client may not have

     

       572
       572
       +
       		// real PDS credentials, so RefreshTokens() might fail

     

       573
       573
       +
       		// We're testing that the handler correctly processes the request

     

       574
       574
       +
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       575
       575
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       576
       576
       +
       		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

     

       577
       577
       +
       

     

       578
       578
       +
       		// In component test mode without real PDS, we may get 401

     

       579
       579
       +
       		// In production with real PDS, this would return 200 with new tokens

     

       580
       580
       +
       		t.Logf("Refresh response status: %d", resp.StatusCode)

     

       581
       581
       +
       

     

       582
       582
       +
       		// The important thing is that the handler doesn't crash

     

       583
       583
       +
       		// and properly validates the request structure

     

       584
       584
       +
       		assert.True(t, resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized,

     

       585
       585
       +
       			"Refresh should return either success or auth failure, got %d", resp.StatusCode)

     

       586
       586
       +
       	})

     

       587
       587
       +
       

     

       588
       588
       +
       	t.Run("Invalid DID format (with valid token)", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       589
       589
       +
       		// Create a sealed token with an invalid DID format

     

       590
       590
       +
       		invalidDID := "invalid-did-format"

     

       591
       591
       +
       		// Create the token with a valid DID first, then we'll try to use it with invalid DID in request

     

       592
       592
       +
       		validToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), initialSession.SessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)

     

       593
       593
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       594
       594
       +
       

     

       595
       595
       +
       		refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{

     

       596
       596
       +
       			"did":          invalidDID, // Invalid DID format in request

     

       597
       597
       +
       			"session_id":   initialSession.SessionID,

     

       598
       598
       +
       			"sealed_token": validToken, // Valid token for different DID

     

       599
       599
       +
       		}

     

       600
       600
       +
       

     

       601
       601
       +
       		reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)

     

       602
       602
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       603
       603
       +
       

     

       604
       604
       +
       		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))

     

       605
       605
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       606
       606
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       607
       607
       +
       

     

       608
       608
       +
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       609
       609
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       610
       610
       +
       		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

     

       611
       611
       +
       

     

       612
       612
       +
       		// Should reject with 401 due to DID mismatch (not 400) since auth happens first

     

       613
       613
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,

     

       614
       614
       +
       			"DID mismatch should be rejected with 401 (auth check happens before format validation)")

     

       615
       615
       +
       	})

     

       616
       616
       +
       

     

       617
       617
       +
       	t.Run("Missing sealed_token (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       618
       618
       +
       		refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{

     

       619
       619
       +
       			"did":        did.String(),

     

       620
       620
       +
       			"session_id": initialSession.SessionID,

     

       621
       621
       +
       			// Missing sealed_token - should be rejected for security

     

       622
       622
       +
       		}

     

       623
       623
       +
       

     

       624
       624
       +
       		reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)

     

       625
       625
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       626
       626
       +
       

     

       627
       627
       +
       		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))

     

       628
       628
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       629
       629
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       630
       630
       +
       

     

       631
       631
       +
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       632
       632
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       633
       633
       +
       		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

     

       634
       634
       +
       

     

       635
       635
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,

     

       636
       636
       +
       			"Missing sealed_token should be rejected (proof of possession required)")

     

       637
       637
       +
       	})

     

       638
       638
       +
       

     

       639
       639
       +
       	t.Run("Invalid sealed_token", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       640
       640
       +
       		refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{

     

       641
       641
       +
       			"did":          did.String(),

     

       642
       642
       +
       			"session_id":   initialSession.SessionID,

     

       643
       643
       +
       			"sealed_token": "invalid-token-data",

     

       644
       644
       +
       		}

     

       645
       645
       +
       

     

       646
       646
       +
       		reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)

     

       647
       647
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       648
       648
       +
       

     

       649
       649
       +
       		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))

     

       650
       650
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       651
       651
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       652
       652
       +
       

     

       653
       653
       +
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       654
       654
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       655
       655
       +
       		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

     

       656
       656
       +
       

     

       657
       657
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,

     

       658
       658
       +
       			"Invalid sealed_token should be rejected")

     

       659
       659
       +
       	})

     

       660
       660
       +
       

     

       661
       661
       +
       	t.Run("DID mismatch (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       662
       662
       +
       		// Create a sealed token for a different DID

     

       663
       663
       +
       		wrongDID := "did:plc:wronguser123"

     

       664
       664
       +
       		wrongToken, err := client.SealSession(wrongDID, initialSession.SessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)

     

       665
       665
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       666
       666
       +
       

     

       667
       667
       +
       		// Try to use it to refresh the original session

     

       668
       668
       +
       		refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{

     

       669
       669
       +
       			"did":          did.String(), // Claiming original DID

     

       670
       670
       +
       			"session_id":   initialSession.SessionID,

     

       671
       671
       +
       			"sealed_token": wrongToken, // But token is for different DID

     

       672
       672
       +
       		}

     

       673
       673
       +
       

     

       674
       674
       +
       		reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)

     

       675
       675
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       676
       676
       +
       

     

       677
       677
       +
       		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))

     

       678
       678
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       679
       679
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       680
       680
       +
       

     

       681
       681
       +
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       682
       682
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       683
       683
       +
       		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

     

       684
       684
       +
       

     

       685
       685
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,

     

       686
       686
       +
       			"DID mismatch should be rejected (prevents session hijacking)")

     

       687
       687
       +
       	})

     

       688
       688
       +
       

     

       689
       689
       +
       	t.Run("Session ID mismatch (security test)", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       690
       690
       +
       		// Create a sealed token with wrong session ID

     

       691
       691
       +
       		wrongSessionID := "wrong-session-id"

     

       692
       692
       +
       		wrongToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), wrongSessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)

     

       693
       693
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       694
       694
       +
       

     

       695
       695
       +
       		// Try to use it to refresh the original session

     

       696
       696
       +
       		refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{

     

       697
       697
       +
       			"did":          did.String(),

     

       698
       698
       +
       			"session_id":   initialSession.SessionID, // Claiming original session

     

       699
       699
       +
       			"sealed_token": wrongToken,               // But token is for different session

     

       700
       700
       +
       		}

     

       701
       701
       +
       

     

       702
       702
       +
       		reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)

     

       703
       703
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       704
       704
       +
       

     

       705
       705
       +
       		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))

     

       706
       706
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       707
       707
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       708
       708
       +
       

     

       709
       709
       +
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       710
       710
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       711
       711
       +
       		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

     

       712
       712
       +
       

     

       713
       713
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,

     

       714
       714
       +
       			"Session ID mismatch should be rejected (prevents session hijacking)")

     

       715
       715
       +
       	})

     

       716
       716
       +
       

     

       717
       717
       +
       	t.Run("Non-existent session", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       718
       718
       +
       		// Create a valid sealed token for a non-existent session

     

       719
       719
       +
       		nonExistentSessionID := "nonexistent-session-id"

     

       720
       720
       +
       		validToken, err := client.SealSession(did.String(), nonExistentSessionID, 30*24*time.Hour)

     

       721
       721
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       722
       722
       +
       

     

       723
       723
       +
       		refreshReq := map[string]interface{}{

     

       724
       724
       +
       			"did":          did.String(),

     

       725
       725
       +
       			"session_id":   nonExistentSessionID,

     

       726
       726
       +
       			"sealed_token": validToken, // Valid token but session doesn't exist

     

       727
       727
       +
       		}

     

       728
       728
       +
       

     

       729
       729
       +
       		reqBody, err := json.Marshal(refreshReq)

     

       730
       730
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       731
       731
       +
       

     

       732
       732
       +
       		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", server.URL+"/oauth/refresh", strings.NewReader(string(reqBody)))

     

       733
       733
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       734
       734
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       735
       735
       +
       

     

       736
       736
       +
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       737
       737
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       738
       738
       +
       		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

     

       739
       739
       +
       

     

       740
       740
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, resp.StatusCode,

     

       741
       741
       +
       			"Non-existent session should be rejected with 401")

     

       742
       742
       +
       	})

     

       743
       743
       +
       

     

       744
       744
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Token refresh endpoint validation verified")

     

       745
       745
       +
       }

     

       746
       746
       +
       

     

       747
       747
       +
       // TestOAuthE2E_SessionUpdate tests that refresh updates the session in database

     

       748
       748
       +
       func TestOAuthE2E_SessionUpdate(t *testing.T) {

     

       749
       749
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       750
       750
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session update test in short mode")

     

       751
       751
       +
       	}

     

       752
       752
       +
       

     

       753
       753
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       754
       754
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       755
       755
       +
       

     

       756
       756
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       757
       757
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       758
       758
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       759
       759
       +
       

     

       760
       760
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       761
       761
       +
       

     

       762
       762
       +
       	t.Log("💾 Testing OAuth session update on refresh...")

     

       763
       763
       +
       

     

       764
       764
       +
       	// Setup OAuth store

     

       765
       765
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       766
       766
       +
       

     

       767
       767
       +
       	// Create a test session

     

       768
       768
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:sessionupdate123")

     

       769
       769
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       770
       770
       +
       

     

       771
       771
       +
       	originalSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       772
       772
       +
       		AccountDID:              did,

     

       773
       773
       +
       		SessionID:               "update-session-1",

     

       774
       774
       +
       		HostURL:                 "http://localhost:3001",

     

       775
       775
       +
       		AuthServerURL:           "http://localhost:3001",

     

       776
       776
       +
       		AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",

     

       777
       777
       +
       		AccessToken:             "original-access-token",

     

       778
       778
       +
       		RefreshToken:            "original-refresh-token",

     

       779
       779
       +
       		DPoPPrivateKeyMultibase: "original-dpop-key",

     

       780
       780
       +
       		Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       781
       781
       +
       	}

     

       782
       782
       +
       

     

       783
       783
       +
       	// Save original session

     

       784
       784
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, originalSession)

     

       785
       785
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       786
       786
       +
       

     

       787
       787
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Original session saved")

     

       788
       788
       +
       

     

       789
       789
       +
       	// Simulate a token refresh by updating the session with new tokens

     

       790
       790
       +
       	updatedSession := originalSession

     

       791
       791
       +
       	updatedSession.AccessToken = "new-access-token"

     

       792
       792
       +
       	updatedSession.RefreshToken = "new-refresh-token"

     

       793
       793
       +
       	updatedSession.DPoPAuthServerNonce = "new-nonce"

     

       794
       794
       +
       

     

       795
       795
       +
       	// Update the session (upsert)

     

       796
       796
       +
       	err = store.SaveSession(ctx, updatedSession)

     

       797
       797
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       798
       798
       +
       

     

       799
       799
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Session updated with new tokens")

     

       800
       800
       +
       

     

       801
       801
       +
       	// Retrieve the session and verify it was updated

     

       802
       802
       +
       	retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, originalSession.SessionID)

     

       803
       803
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve updated session")

     

       804
       804
       +
       

     

       805
       805
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "new-access-token", retrieved.AccessToken,

     

       806
       806
       +
       		"Access token should be updated")

     

       807
       807
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "new-refresh-token", retrieved.RefreshToken,

     

       808
       808
       +
       		"Refresh token should be updated")

     

       809
       809
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "new-nonce", retrieved.DPoPAuthServerNonce,

     

       810
       810
       +
       		"DPoP nonce should be updated")

     

       811
       811
       +
       

     

       812
       812
       +
       	// Verify session ID and DID remain the same

     

       813
       813
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, originalSession.SessionID, retrieved.SessionID,

     

       814
       814
       +
       		"Session ID should remain the same")

     

       815
       815
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, did, retrieved.AccountDID,

     

       816
       816
       +
       		"DID should remain the same")

     

       817
       817
       +
       

     

       818
       818
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Session update verified - tokens refreshed in database")

     

       819
       819
       +
       

     

       820
       820
       +
       	// Verify updated_at was changed

     

       821
       821
       +
       	var updatedAt time.Time

     

       822
       822
       +
       	err = db.QueryRowContext(ctx,

     

       823
       823
       +
       		"SELECT updated_at FROM oauth_sessions WHERE did = $1 AND session_id = $2",

     

       824
       824
       +
       		did.String(), originalSession.SessionID).Scan(&updatedAt)

     

       825
       825
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       826
       826
       +
       

     

       827
       827
       +
       	// Updated timestamp should be recent (within last minute)

     

       828
       828
       +
       	assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now(), updatedAt, time.Minute,

     

       829
       829
       +
       		"Session updated_at should be recent")

     

       830
       830
       +
       

     

       831
       831
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Session timestamp update verified")

     

       832
       832
       +
       }

     

       833
       833
       +
       

     

       834
       834
       +
       // TestOAuthE2E_RefreshTokenRotation tests refresh token rotation behavior

     

       835
       835
       +
       func TestOAuthE2E_RefreshTokenRotation(t *testing.T) {

     

       836
       836
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       837
       837
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth refresh token rotation test in short mode")

     

       838
       838
       +
       	}

     

       839
       839
       +
       

     

       840
       840
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       841
       841
       +
       	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()

     

       842
       842
       +
       

     

       843
       843
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       844
       844
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       845
       845
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       846
       846
       +
       

     

       847
       847
       +
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       848
       848
       +
       

     

       849
       849
       +
       	t.Log("🔄 Testing OAuth refresh token rotation...")

     

       850
       850
       +
       

     

       851
       851
       +
       	// Setup OAuth store

     

       852
       852
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       853
       853
       +
       

     

       854
       854
       +
       	// Create a test session

     

       855
       855
       +
       	did, err := syntax.ParseDID("did:plc:rotation123")

     

       856
       856
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       857
       857
       +
       

     

       858
       858
       +
       	// Simulate multiple refresh cycles

     

       859
       859
       +
       	sessionID := "rotation-session-1"

     

       860
       860
       +
       	tokens := []struct {

     

       861
       861
       +
       		access  string

     

       862
       862
       +
       		refresh string

     

       863
       863
       +
       	}{

     

       864
       864
       +
       		{"access-token-v1", "refresh-token-v1"},

     

       865
       865
       +
       		{"access-token-v2", "refresh-token-v2"},

     

       866
       866
       +
       		{"access-token-v3", "refresh-token-v3"},

     

       867
       867
       +
       	}

     

       868
       868
       +
       

     

       869
       869
       +
       	for i, tokenPair := range tokens {

     

       870
       870
       +
       		session := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       871
       871
       +
       			AccountDID:              did,

     

       872
       872
       +
       			SessionID:               sessionID,

     

       873
       873
       +
       			HostURL:                 "http://localhost:3001",

     

       874
       874
       +
       			AuthServerURL:           "http://localhost:3001",

     

       875
       875
       +
       			AuthServerTokenEndpoint: "http://localhost:3001/oauth/token",

     

       876
       876
       +
       			AccessToken:             tokenPair.access,

     

       877
       877
       +
       			RefreshToken:            tokenPair.refresh,

     

       878
       878
       +
       			Scopes:                  []string{"atproto"},

     

       879
       879
       +
       		}

     

       880
       880
       +
       

     

       881
       881
       +
       		// Save/update session

     

       882
       882
       +
       		err = store.SaveSession(ctx, session)

     

       883
       883
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err, "Should save session iteration %d", i+1)

     

       884
       884
       +
       

     

       885
       885
       +
       		// Retrieve and verify

     

       886
       886
       +
       		retrieved, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessionID)

     

       887
       887
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err, "Should retrieve session iteration %d", i+1)

     

       888
       888
       +
       

     

       889
       889
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, tokenPair.access, retrieved.AccessToken,

     

       890
       890
       +
       			"Access token should match iteration %d", i+1)

     

       891
       891
       +
       		assert.Equal(t, tokenPair.refresh, retrieved.RefreshToken,

     

       892
       892
       +
       			"Refresh token should match iteration %d", i+1)

     

       893
       893
       +
       

     

       894
       894
       +
       		// Small delay to ensure timestamp differences

     

       895
       895
       +
       		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)

     

       896
       896
       +
       	}

     

       897
       897
       +
       

     

       898
       898
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Refresh token rotation verified through %d cycles", len(tokens))

     

       899
       899
       +
       

     

       900
       900
       +
       	// Verify final state

     

       901
       901
       +
       	finalSession, err := store.GetSession(ctx, did, sessionID)

     

       902
       902
       +
       	require.NoError(t, err)

     

       903
       903
       +
       

     

       904
       904
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "access-token-v3", finalSession.AccessToken,

     

       905
       905
       +
       		"Final access token should be from last rotation")

     

       906
       906
       +
       	assert.Equal(t, "refresh-token-v3", finalSession.RefreshToken,

     

       907
       907
       +
       		"Final refresh token should be from last rotation")

     

       908
       908
       +
       

     

       909
       909
       +
       	t.Logf("✅ Token rotation state verified")

     

       910
       910
       +
       }

+312

tests/integration/oauth_session_fixation_test.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package integration

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/oauth"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"context"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"crypto/sha256"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"encoding/base64"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       9
       9
       +
       	"net/http/httptest"

     

       10
       10
       +
       	"net/url"

     

       11
       11
       +
       	"testing"

     

       12
       12
       +
       	"time"

     

       13
       13
       +
       

     

       14
       14
       +
       	oauthlib "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/auth/oauth"

     

       15
       15
       +
       	"github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/syntax"

     

       16
       16
       +
       	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"

     

       17
       17
       +
       	"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"

     

       18
       18
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"

     

       19
       19
       +
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

     

       20
       20
       +
       )

     

       21
       21
       +
       

     

       22
       22
       +
       // TestOAuth_SessionFixationAttackPrevention tests that the mobile redirect binding

     

       23
       23
       +
       // prevents session fixation attacks where an attacker plants a mobile_redirect_uri

     

       24
       24
       +
       // cookie, then the user does a web login, and credentials get sent to attacker's deep link.

     

       25
       25
       +
       //

     

       26
       26
       +
       // Attack scenario:

     

       27
       27
       +
       // 1. Attacker tricks user into visiting /oauth/mobile/login?redirect_uri=evil://steal

     

       28
       28
       +
       // 2. This plants a mobile_redirect_uri cookie (lives 10 minutes)

     

       29
       29
       +
       // 3. User later does normal web OAuth login via /oauth/login

     

       30
       30
       +
       // 4. HandleCallback sees the stale mobile_redirect_uri cookie

     

       31
       31
       +
       // 5. WITHOUT THE FIX: Callback sends sealed token, DID, session_id to attacker's deep link

     

       32
       32
       +
       // 6. WITH THE FIX: Binding mismatch is detected, mobile cookies cleared, user gets web session

     

       33
       33
       +
       func TestOAuth_SessionFixationAttackPrevention(t *testing.T) {

     

       34
       34
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       35
       35
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth session fixation test in short mode")

     

       36
       36
       +
       	}

     

       37
       37
       +
       

     

       38
       38
       +
       	// Setup test database

     

       39
       39
       +
       	db := setupTestDB(t)

     

       40
       40
       +
       	defer func() {

     

       41
       41
       +
       		if err := db.Close(); err != nil {

     

       42
       42
       +
       			t.Logf("Failed to close database: %v", err)

     

       43
       43
       +
       		}

     

       44
       44
       +
       	}()

     

       45
       45
       +
       

     

       46
       46
       +
       	// Run migrations

     

       47
       47
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.SetDialect("postgres"))

     

       48
       48
       +
       	require.NoError(t, goose.Up(db, "../../internal/db/migrations"))

     

       49
       49
       +
       

     

       50
       50
       +
       	// Setup OAuth client and store

     

       51
       51
       +
       	store := SetupOAuthTestStore(t, db)

     

       52
       52
       +
       	client := SetupOAuthTestClient(t, store)

     

       53
       53
       +
       	require.NotNil(t, client, "OAuth client should be initialized")

     

       54
       54
       +
       

     

       55
       55
       +
       	// Setup handler

     

       56
       56
       +
       	handler := oauth.NewOAuthHandler(client, store)

     

       57
       57
       +
       

     

       58
       58
       +
       	// Setup router

     

       59
       59
       +
       	r := chi.NewRouter()

     

       60
       60
       +
       	r.Get("/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)

     

       61
       61
       +
       

     

       62
       62
       +
       	t.Run("attack scenario - planted mobile cookie without binding", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       63
       63
       +
       		ctx := context.Background()

     

       64
       64
       +
       

     

       65
       65
       +
       		// Step 1: Simulate a successful OAuth callback (like a user did web login)

     

       66
       66
       +
       		// We'll create a mock session to simulate what ProcessCallback would return

     

       67
       67
       +
       		testDID := "did:plc:test123456"

     

       68
       68
       +
       		parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)

     

       69
       69
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       70
       70
       +
       

     

       71
       71
       +
       		sessionID := "test-session-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")

     

       72
       72
       +
       		testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       73
       73
       +
       			AccountDID:  parsedDID,

     

       74
       74
       +
       			SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       75
       75
       +
       			HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       76
       76
       +
       			AccessToken: "test-access-token",

     

       77
       77
       +
       			Scopes:      []string{"atproto"},

     

       78
       78
       +
       		}

     

       79
       79
       +
       

     

       80
       80
       +
       		// Save the session (simulating successful OAuth flow)

     

       81
       81
       +
       		err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)

     

       82
       82
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       83
       83
       +
       

     

       84
       84
       +
       		// Step 2: Attacker planted a mobile_redirect_uri cookie (without binding)

     

       85
       85
       +
       		// This simulates the cookie being planted earlier by attacker

     

       86
       86
       +
       		attackerRedirectURI := "evil://steal"

     

       87
       87
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)

     

       88
       88
       +
       

     

       89
       89
       +
       		// Plant the attacker's cookie (URL escaped as it would be in real scenario)

     

       90
       90
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       91
       91
       +
       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_uri",

     

       92
       92
       +
       			Value: url.QueryEscape(attackerRedirectURI),

     

       93
       93
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       94
       94
       +
       		})

     

       95
       95
       +
       		// NOTE: No mobile_redirect_binding cookie! This is the attack scenario.

     

       96
       96
       +
       

     

       97
       97
       +
       		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       98
       98
       +
       

     

       99
       99
       +
       		// Step 3: Try to process the callback

     

       100
       100
       +
       		// This would fail because ProcessCallback needs real OAuth code/state

     

       101
       101
       +
       		// For this test, we're verifying the handler's security checks work

     

       102
       102
       +
       		// even before ProcessCallback is called

     

       103
       103
       +
       

     

       104
       104
       +
       		// The handler will try to call ProcessCallback which will fail

     

       105
       105
       +
       		// But we're testing that even if it succeeded, the mobile redirect

     

       106
       106
       +
       		// validation would prevent the attack

     

       107
       107
       +
       		handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)

     

       108
       108
       +
       

     

       109
       109
       +
       		// Step 4: Verify the attack was prevented

     

       110
       110
       +
       		// The handler should reject the request due to missing binding

     

       111
       111
       +
       		// Since ProcessCallback will fail first (no real OAuth code), we expect

     

       112
       112
       +
       		// a 400 error, but the important thing is it doesn't redirect to evil://steal

     

       113
       113
       +
       

     

       114
       114
       +
       		assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,

     

       115
       115
       +
       			"Should not redirect when ProcessCallback fails")

     

       116
       116
       +
       		assert.NotContains(t, rec.Header().Get("Location"), "evil://",

     

       117
       117
       +
       			"Should never redirect to attacker's URI")

     

       118
       118
       +
       	})

     

       119
       119
       +
       

     

       120
       120
       +
       	t.Run("legitimate mobile flow - with valid binding", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       121
       121
       +
       		ctx := context.Background()

     

       122
       122
       +
       

     

       123
       123
       +
       		// Setup a legitimate mobile session

     

       124
       124
       +
       		testDID := "did:plc:mobile123"

     

       125
       125
       +
       		parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)

     

       126
       126
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       127
       127
       +
       

     

       128
       128
       +
       		sessionID := "mobile-session-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")

     

       129
       129
       +
       		testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       130
       130
       +
       			AccountDID:  parsedDID,

     

       131
       131
       +
       			SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       132
       132
       +
       			HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       133
       133
       +
       			AccessToken: "mobile-access-token",

     

       134
       134
       +
       			Scopes:      []string{"atproto"},

     

       135
       135
       +
       		}

     

       136
       136
       +
       

     

       137
       137
       +
       		// Save the session

     

       138
       138
       +
       		err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)

     

       139
       139
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       140
       140
       +
       

     

       141
       141
       +
       		// Create request with BOTH mobile_redirect_uri AND valid binding

     

       142
       142
       +
       		// Use Universal Link URI that's in the allowlist

     

       143
       143
       +
       		legitRedirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"

     

       144
       144
       +
       		csrfToken := "valid-csrf-token-for-mobile"

     

       145
       145
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)

     

       146
       146
       +
       

     

       147
       147
       +
       		// Add mobile redirect URI cookie

     

       148
       148
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       149
       149
       +
       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_uri",

     

       150
       150
       +
       			Value: url.QueryEscape(legitRedirectURI),

     

       151
       151
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       152
       152
       +
       		})

     

       153
       153
       +
       

     

       154
       154
       +
       		// Add CSRF token (required for mobile flow)

     

       155
       155
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       156
       156
       +
       			Name:  "oauth_csrf",

     

       157
       157
       +
       			Value: csrfToken,

     

       158
       158
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       159
       159
       +
       		})

     

       160
       160
       +
       

     

       161
       161
       +
       		// Add VALID binding cookie (this is what prevents the attack)

     

       162
       162
       +
       		// In real flow, this would be set by HandleMobileLogin

     

       163
       163
       +
       		// The binding now includes the CSRF token for double-submit validation

     

       164
       164
       +
       		mobileBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(csrfToken, legitRedirectURI)

     

       165
       165
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       166
       166
       +
       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_binding",

     

       167
       167
       +
       			Value: mobileBinding,

     

       168
       168
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       169
       169
       +
       		})

     

       170
       170
       +
       

     

       171
       171
       +
       		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       172
       172
       +
       		handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)

     

       173
       173
       +
       

     

       174
       174
       +
       		// This will also fail at ProcessCallback (no real OAuth code)

     

       175
       175
       +
       		// but we're verifying the binding validation logic is in place

     

       176
       176
       +
       		// In a real integration test with PDS, this would succeed

     

       177
       177
       +
       		assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,

     

       178
       178
       +
       			"Should not redirect when ProcessCallback fails (expected in mock test)")

     

       179
       179
       +
       	})

     

       180
       180
       +
       

     

       181
       181
       +
       	t.Run("binding mismatch - attacker tries wrong binding", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       182
       182
       +
       		ctx := context.Background()

     

       183
       183
       +
       

     

       184
       184
       +
       		// Setup session

     

       185
       185
       +
       		testDID := "did:plc:bindingtest"

     

       186
       186
       +
       		parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)

     

       187
       187
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       188
       188
       +
       

     

       189
       189
       +
       		sessionID := "binding-test-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")

     

       190
       190
       +
       		testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       191
       191
       +
       			AccountDID:  parsedDID,

     

       192
       192
       +
       			SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       193
       193
       +
       			HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       194
       194
       +
       			AccessToken: "binding-test-token",

     

       195
       195
       +
       			Scopes:      []string{"atproto"},

     

       196
       196
       +
       		}

     

       197
       197
       +
       

     

       198
       198
       +
       		err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)

     

       199
       199
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       200
       200
       +
       

     

       201
       201
       +
       		// Attacker tries to plant evil redirect with a binding from different URI

     

       202
       202
       +
       		attackerRedirectURI := "evil://steal"

     

       203
       203
       +
       		attackerCSRF := "attacker-csrf-token"

     

       204
       204
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)

     

       205
       205
       +
       

     

       206
       206
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       207
       207
       +
       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_uri",

     

       208
       208
       +
       			Value: url.QueryEscape(attackerRedirectURI),

     

       209
       209
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       210
       210
       +
       		})

     

       211
       211
       +
       

     

       212
       212
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       213
       213
       +
       			Name:  "oauth_csrf",

     

       214
       214
       +
       			Value: attackerCSRF,

     

       215
       215
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       216
       216
       +
       		})

     

       217
       217
       +
       

     

       218
       218
       +
       		// Use binding from a DIFFERENT CSRF token and URI (attacker's attempt to forge)

     

       219
       219
       +
       		// Even if attacker knows the redirect URI, they don't know the user's CSRF token

     

       220
       220
       +
       		wrongBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest("different-csrf", "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback")

     

       221
       221
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       222
       222
       +
       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_binding",

     

       223
       223
       +
       			Value: wrongBinding,

     

       224
       224
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       225
       225
       +
       		})

     

       226
       226
       +
       

     

       227
       227
       +
       		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       228
       228
       +
       		handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)

     

       229
       229
       +
       

     

       230
       230
       +
       		// Should fail due to binding mismatch (even before ProcessCallback)

     

       231
       231
       +
       		// The binding validation happens after ProcessCallback in the real code,

     

       232
       232
       +
       		// but the mismatch would be caught and cookies cleared

     

       233
       233
       +
       		assert.NotContains(t, rec.Header().Get("Location"), "evil://",

     

       234
       234
       +
       			"Should never redirect to attacker's URI on binding mismatch")

     

       235
       235
       +
       	})

     

       236
       236
       +
       

     

       237
       237
       +
       	t.Run("CSRF token value mismatch - attacker tries different CSRF", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       238
       238
       +
       		ctx := context.Background()

     

       239
       239
       +
       

     

       240
       240
       +
       		// Setup session

     

       241
       241
       +
       		testDID := "did:plc:csrftest"

     

       242
       242
       +
       		parsedDID, err := syntax.ParseDID(testDID)

     

       243
       243
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       244
       244
       +
       

     

       245
       245
       +
       		sessionID := "csrf-test-" + time.Now().Format("20060102150405")

     

       246
       246
       +
       		testSession := oauthlib.ClientSessionData{

     

       247
       247
       +
       			AccountDID:  parsedDID,

     

       248
       248
       +
       			SessionID:   sessionID,

     

       249
       249
       +
       			HostURL:     "http://localhost:3001",

     

       250
       250
       +
       			AccessToken: "csrf-test-token",

     

       251
       251
       +
       			Scopes:      []string{"atproto"},

     

       252
       252
       +
       		}

     

       253
       253
       +
       

     

       254
       254
       +
       		err = store.SaveSession(ctx, testSession)

     

       255
       255
       +
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       256
       256
       +
       

     

       257
       257
       +
       		// This tests the P1 security fix: CSRF token VALUE must be validated, not just presence

     

       258
       258
       +
       		// Attack scenario:

     

       259
       259
       +
       		// 1. User starts mobile login with CSRF token A and redirect URI X

     

       260
       260
       +
       		// 2. Binding = hash(A + X) is stored in cookie

     

       261
       261
       +
       		// 3. Attacker somehow gets user to have CSRF token B in cookie (different from A)

     

       262
       262
       +
       		// 4. Callback receives CSRF token B, redirect URI X, binding = hash(A + X)

     

       263
       263
       +
       		// 5. hash(B + X) != hash(A + X), so attack is detected

     

       264
       264
       +
       

     

       265
       265
       +
       		originalCSRF := "original-csrf-token-set-at-login"

     

       266
       266
       +
       		redirectURI := "https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback"

     

       267
       267
       +
       		// Binding was created with original CSRF token

     

       268
       268
       +
       		originalBinding := generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(originalCSRF, redirectURI)

     

       269
       269
       +
       

     

       270
       270
       +
       		// But attacker managed to change the CSRF cookie

     

       271
       271
       +
       		attackerCSRF := "attacker-replaced-csrf"

     

       272
       272
       +
       

     

       273
       273
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/oauth/callback?code=test&state=test&iss=http://localhost:3001", nil)

     

       274
       274
       +
       

     

       275
       275
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       276
       276
       +
       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_uri",

     

       277
       277
       +
       			Value: url.QueryEscape(redirectURI),

     

       278
       278
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       279
       279
       +
       		})

     

       280
       280
       +
       

     

       281
       281
       +
       		// Attacker's CSRF token (different from what created the binding)

     

       282
       282
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       283
       283
       +
       			Name:  "oauth_csrf",

     

       284
       284
       +
       			Value: attackerCSRF,

     

       285
       285
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       286
       286
       +
       		})

     

       287
       287
       +
       

     

       288
       288
       +
       		// Original binding (created with original CSRF token)

     

       289
       289
       +
       		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{

     

       290
       290
       +
       			Name:  "mobile_redirect_binding",

     

       291
       291
       +
       			Value: originalBinding,

     

       292
       292
       +
       			Path:  "/oauth",

     

       293
       293
       +
       		})

     

       294
       294
       +
       

     

       295
       295
       +
       		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       296
       296
       +
       		handler.HandleCallback(rec, req)

     

       297
       297
       +
       

     

       298
       298
       +
       		// Should fail because hash(attackerCSRF + redirectURI) != hash(originalCSRF + redirectURI)

     

       299
       299
       +
       		// This is the key security fix - CSRF token VALUE is now validated

     

       300
       300
       +
       		assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code,

     

       301
       301
       +
       			"Should not redirect when CSRF token doesn't match binding")

     

       302
       302
       +
       	})

     

       303
       303
       +
       }

     

       304
       304
       +
       

     

       305
       305
       +
       // generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest generates a binding for testing

     

       306
       306
       +
       // This mirrors the actual logic in handlers_security.go:

     

       307
       307
       +
       // binding = base64(sha256(csrfToken + "|" + redirectURI)[:16])

     

       308
       308
       +
       func generateMobileRedirectBindingForTest(csrfToken, mobileRedirectURI string) string {

     

       309
       309
       +
       	combined := csrfToken + "|" + mobileRedirectURI

     

       310
       310
       +
       	hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(combined))

     

       311
       311
       +
       	return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:16])

     

       312
       312
       +
       }

+169

tests/integration/oauth_token_verification_test.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package integration

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"fmt"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"net/http/httptest"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"os"

     

       9
       9
       +
       	"testing"

     

       10
       10
       +
       	"time"

     

       11
       11
       +
       )

     

       12
       12
       +
       

     

       13
       13
       +
       // TestOAuthTokenVerification tests end-to-end OAuth token verification

     

       14
       14
       +
       // with real PDS-issued OAuth tokens. This replaces the old JWT verification test

     

       15
       15
       +
       // since we now use OAuth sealed session tokens instead of raw JWTs.

     

       16
       16
       +
       //

     

       17
       17
       +
       // Flow:

     

       18
       18
       +
       // 1. Create account on local PDS (or use existing)

     

       19
       19
       +
       // 2. Authenticate to get OAuth tokens and create sealed session token

     

       20
       20
       +
       // 3. Verify our auth middleware can unseal and validate the token

     

       21
       21
       +
       // 4. Test token validation and session retrieval

     

       22
       22
       +
       //

     

       23
       23
       +
       // NOTE: This test uses the E2E OAuth middleware which mocks the session unsealing

     

       24
       24
       +
       // for testing purposes. Real OAuth tokens from PDS would be sealed using the

     

       25
       25
       +
       // OAuth client's seal secret.

     

       26
       26
       +
       func TestOAuthTokenVerification(t *testing.T) {

     

       27
       27
       +
       	// Skip in short mode since this requires real PDS

     

       28
       28
       +
       	if testing.Short() {

     

       29
       29
       +
       		t.Skip("Skipping OAuth token verification test in short mode")

     

       30
       30
       +
       	}

     

       31
       31
       +
       

     

       32
       32
       +
       	pdsURL := os.Getenv("PDS_URL")

     

       33
       33
       +
       	if pdsURL == "" {

     

       34
       34
       +
       		pdsURL = "http://localhost:3001"

     

       35
       35
       +
       	}

     

       36
       36
       +
       

     

       37
       37
       +
       	// Check if PDS is running

     

       38
       38
       +
       	healthResp, err := http.Get(pdsURL + "/xrpc/_health")

     

       39
       39
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       40
       40
       +
       		t.Skipf("PDS not running at %s: %v", pdsURL, err)

     

       41
       41
       +
       	}

     

       42
       42
       +
       	_ = healthResp.Body.Close()

     

       43
       43
       +
       

     

       44
       44
       +
       	t.Run("OAuth token validation and middleware integration", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       45
       45
       +
       		// Step 1: Create a test account on PDS

     

       46
       46
       +
       		// Keep handle short to avoid PDS validation errors

     

       47
       47
       +
       		timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000 // Last 5 digits

     

       48
       48
       +
       		handle := fmt.Sprintf("oauth%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)

     

       49
       49
       +
       		password := "testpass123"

     

       50
       50
       +
       		email := fmt.Sprintf("oauth%d@test.com", timestamp)

     

       51
       51
       +
       

     

       52
       52
       +
       		_, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)

     

       53
       53
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       54
       54
       +
       			t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)

     

       55
       55
       +
       		}

     

       56
       56
       +
       		t.Logf("✓ Created test account: %s (DID: %s)", handle, did)

     

       57
       57
       +
       

     

       58
       58
       +
       		// Step 2: Create OAuth middleware with mock unsealer for testing

     

       59
       59
       +
       		// In production, this would unseal real OAuth tokens from PDS

     

       60
       60
       +
       		t.Log("Testing OAuth middleware with sealed session tokens...")

     

       61
       61
       +
       

     

       62
       62
       +
       		e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()

     

       63
       63
       +
       		testToken := e2eAuth.AddUser(did)

     

       64
       64
       +
       

     

       65
       65
       +
       		handlerCalled := false

     

       66
       66
       +
       		var extractedDID string

     

       67
       67
       +
       

     

       68
       68
       +
       		testHandler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       69
       69
       +
       			handlerCalled = true

     

       70
       70
       +
       			extractedDID = middleware.GetUserDID(r)

     

       71
       71
       +
       			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       72
       72
       +
       			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success": true}`))

     

       73
       73
       +
       		}))

     

       74
       74
       +
       

     

       75
       75
       +
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       76
       76
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testToken)

     

       77
       77
       +
       		w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       78
       78
       +
       

     

       79
       79
       +
       		testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       80
       80
       +
       

     

       81
       81
       +
       		if !handlerCalled {

     

       82
       82
       +
       			t.Errorf("Handler was not called - auth middleware rejected valid token")

     

       83
       83
       +
       			t.Logf("Response status: %d", w.Code)

     

       84
       84
       +
       			t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())

     

       85
       85
       +
       		}

     

       86
       86
       +
       

     

       87
       87
       +
       		if w.Code != http.StatusOK {

     

       88
       88
       +
       			t.Errorf("Expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)

     

       89
       89
       +
       			t.Logf("Response body: %s", w.Body.String())

     

       90
       90
       +
       		}

     

       91
       91
       +
       

     

       92
       92
       +
       		if extractedDID != did {

     

       93
       93
       +
       			t.Errorf("Middleware extracted wrong DID: expected %s, got %s", did, extractedDID)

     

       94
       94
       +
       		}

     

       95
       95
       +
       

     

       96
       96
       +
       		t.Logf("✅ OAuth middleware with token validation working correctly!")

     

       97
       97
       +
       		t.Logf("  Handler called: %v", handlerCalled)

     

       98
       98
       +
       		t.Logf("  Extracted DID: %s", extractedDID)

     

       99
       99
       +
       		t.Logf("  Response status: %d", w.Code)

     

       100
       100
       +
       	})

     

       101
       101
       +
       

     

       102
       102
       +
       	t.Run("Rejects tampered/invalid sealed tokens", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       103
       103
       +
       		// Create valid user

     

       104
       104
       +
       		timestamp := time.Now().Unix() % 100000

     

       105
       105
       +
       		handle := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d.local.coves.dev", timestamp)

     

       106
       106
       +
       		password := "testpass456"

     

       107
       107
       +
       		email := fmt.Sprintf("tamp%d@test.com", timestamp)

     

       108
       108
       +
       

     

       109
       109
       +
       		_, did, err := createPDSAccount(pdsURL, handle, email, password)

     

       110
       110
       +
       		if err != nil {

     

       111
       111
       +
       			t.Fatalf("Failed to create PDS account: %v", err)

     

       112
       112
       +
       		}

     

       113
       113
       +
       

     

       114
       114
       +
       		// Create OAuth middleware

     

       115
       115
       +
       		e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()

     

       116
       116
       +
       		validToken := e2eAuth.AddUser(did)

     

       117
       117
       +
       

     

       118
       118
       +
       		// Create various invalid tokens to test

     

       119
       119
       +
       		testCases := []struct {

     

       120
       120
       +
       			name  string

     

       121
       121
       +
       			token string

     

       122
       122
       +
       		}{

     

       123
       123
       +
       			{"Empty token", ""},

     

       124
       124
       +
       			{"Invalid base64", "not-valid-base64!!!"},

     

       125
       125
       +
       			{"Tampered token", "dGFtcGVyZWQtdG9rZW4tZGF0YQ=="}, // Valid base64 but not a real sealed session

     

       126
       126
       +
       			{"Short token", "abc"},

     

       127
       127
       +
       			{"Modified valid token", validToken + "extra"},

     

       128
       128
       +
       		}

     

       129
       129
       +
       

     

       130
       130
       +
       		for _, tc := range testCases {

     

       131
       131
       +
       			t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       132
       132
       +
       				handlerCalled := false

     

       133
       133
       +
       				testHandler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       134
       134
       +
       					handlerCalled = true

     

       135
       135
       +
       					w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       136
       136
       +
       				}))

     

       137
       137
       +
       

     

       138
       138
       +
       				req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)

     

       139
       139
       +
       				if tc.token != "" {

     

       140
       140
       +
       					req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tc.token)

     

       141
       141
       +
       				}

     

       142
       142
       +
       				w := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       143
       143
       +
       

     

       144
       144
       +
       				testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)

     

       145
       145
       +
       

     

       146
       146
       +
       				if handlerCalled {

     

       147
       147
       +
       					t.Error("Handler was called for invalid token - should have been rejected")

     

       148
       148
       +
       				}

     

       149
       149
       +
       

     

       150
       150
       +
       				if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {

     

       151
       151
       +
       					t.Errorf("Expected status 401 for invalid token, got %d", w.Code)

     

       152
       152
       +
       				}

     

       153
       153
       +
       

     

       154
       154
       +
       				t.Logf("✓ Middleware correctly rejected %s with status %d", tc.name, w.Code)

     

       155
       155
       +
       			})

     

       156
       156
       +
       		}

     

       157
       157
       +
       

     

       158
       158
       +
       		t.Logf("✅ All invalid token types correctly rejected")

     

       159
       159
       +
       	})

     

       160
       160
       +
       

     

       161
       161
       +
       	t.Run("Session expiration handling", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       162
       162
       +
       		// OAuth session expiration is handled at the database level

     

       163
       163
       +
       		// See TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration in oauth_e2e_test.go for full expiration testing

     

       164
       164
       +
       		t.Log("ℹ️  Session expiration testing is covered in oauth_e2e_test.go")

     

       165
       165
       +
       		t.Log("   OAuth sessions expire based on database timestamps and are cleaned up periodically")

     

       166
       166
       +
       		t.Log("   This is different from JWT expiration which was timestamp-based in the token itself")

     

       167
       167
       +
       		t.Skip("Session expiration is tested in oauth_e2e_test.go - see TestOAuthE2E_TokenExpiration")

     

       168
       168
       +
       	})

     

       169
       169
       +
       }

+20 -19

tests/integration/aggregator_e2e_test.go

···

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
        
       	"Coves/internal/api/handlers/aggregator"

     

       5
       5
        
       	"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"

     

       6
       6
       -
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       7
       6
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"

     

       8
       7
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"

     

       9
       8
        
       	"Coves/internal/core/aggregators"

     
···

       82
       81
        
       	getAuthorizationsHandler := aggregator.NewGetAuthorizationsHandler(aggregatorService)

     

       83
       82
        
       	listForCommunityHandler := aggregator.NewListForCommunityHandler(aggregatorService)

     

       84
       83
        
       	createPostHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(postService)

     

       85
       85
       -
       	authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true) // Skip JWT verification for testing

     

       86
       86
       -
       	defer authMiddleware.Stop()                                      // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine

     

       84
       84
       +
       	e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()

     

       87
       85
        
       

     

       88
       86
        
       	ctx := context.Background()

     

       89
       87
        
       

     
···

       99
       97
        
       	// Part 1: Service Declaration via Real PDS

     

       100
       98
        
       	// ====================================================================================

     

       101
       99
        
       	// Store DIDs, tokens, and URIs for use across all test parts

     

       102
       102
       -
       	var aggregatorDID, aggregatorToken, aggregatorHandle, communityDID, communityToken, authorizationRkey string

     

       100
       100
       +
       	var aggregatorDID, aggregatorToken, aggregatorAPIToken, aggregatorHandle, communityDID, communityToken, authorizationRkey string

     

       103
       101
        
       

     

       104
       102
        
       	t.Run("1. Service Declaration - PDS Account → Write Record → Jetstream → AppView DB", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       105
       103
        
       		t.Log("\n📝 Part 1: Create aggregator account and publish service declaration to PDS...")

     
···

       119
       117
        
       

     

       120
       118
        
       		t.Logf("✓ Created aggregator account: %s (%s)", aggregatorHandle, aggregatorDID)

     

       121
       119
        
       

     

       120
       120
       +
       		// Register aggregator user with OAuth middleware for API requests

     

       121
       121
       +
       		aggregatorAPIToken = e2eAuth.AddUser(aggregatorDID)

     

       122
       122
       +
       

     

       122
       123
        
       		// STEP 2: Write service declaration to aggregator's repository on PDS

     

       123
       124
        
       		configSchema := map[string]interface{}{

     

       124
       125
        
       			"type": "object",

     
···

       335
       336
        
       

     

       336
       337
        
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))

     

       337
       338
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       338
       338
       -
       

     

       339
       339
       -
       		// Create JWT for aggregator (not a user)

     

       340
       340
       -
       		aggregatorJWT := createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID)

     

       341
       341
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+aggregatorJWT)

     

       339
       339
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)

     

       342
       340
        
       

     

       343
       341
        
       		// Execute request through auth middleware + handler

     

       344
       342
        
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       345
       345
       -
       		handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       343
       343
       +
       		handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       346
       344
        
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       347
       345
        
       

     

       348
       346
        
       		// STEP 2: Verify post creation succeeded

     
···

       425
       423
        
       

     

       426
       424
        
       			req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))

     

       427
       425
        
       			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       428
       428
       -
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID))

     

       426
       426
       +
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)

     

       429
       427
        
       

     

       430
       428
        
       			rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       431
       431
       -
       			handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       429
       429
       +
       			handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       432
       430
        
       			handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       433
       431
        
       

     

       434
       432
        
       			require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "Post %d should succeed", i)

     
···

       447
       445
        
       

     

       448
       446
        
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))

     

       449
       447
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       450
       450
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID))

     

       448
       448
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)

     

       451
       449
        
       

     

       452
       450
        
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       453
       453
       -
       		handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       451
       451
       +
       		handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       454
       452
        
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       455
       453
        
       

     

       456
       454
        
       		require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "10th post should succeed (at limit)")

     
···

       468
       466
        
       

     

       469
       467
        
       		req = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))

     

       470
       468
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       471
       471
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID))

     

       469
       469
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)

     

       472
       470
        
       

     

       473
       471
        
       		rr = httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       474
       474
       -
       		handler = authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       472
       472
       +
       		handler = e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       475
       473
        
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       476
       474
        
       

     

       477
       475
        
       		// Should be rate limited

     
···

       649
       647
        
       		err := aggregatorConsumer.HandleEvent(ctx, &unAuthAggEvent)

     

       650
       648
        
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     

       651
       649
        
       

     

       650
       650
       +
       		// Register unauthorized aggregator with OAuth middleware

     

       651
       651
       +
       		unauthorizedAPIToken := e2eAuth.AddUser(unauthorizedAggDID)

     

       652
       652
       +
       

     

       652
       653
        
       		// Try to create post without authorization

     

       653
       654
        
       		reqBody := map[string]interface{}{

     

       654
       655
        
       			"community": communityDID,

     
···

       660
       661
        
       

     

       661
       662
        
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))

     

       662
       663
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       663
       663
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(unauthorizedAggDID))

     

       664
       664
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+unauthorizedAPIToken)

     

       664
       665
        
       

     

       665
       666
        
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       666
       666
       -
       		handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       667
       667
       +
       		handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       667
       668
        
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       668
       669
        
       

     

       669
       670
        
       		// Should be forbidden

     
···

       784
       785
        
       

     

       785
       786
        
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))

     

       786
       787
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       787
       787
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+createSimpleTestJWT(aggregatorDID))

     

       788
       788
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+aggregatorAPIToken)

     

       788
       789
        
       

     

       789
       790
        
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       790
       790
       -
       		handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       791
       791
       +
       		handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createPostHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       791
       792
        
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       792
       793
        
       

     

       793
       794
        
       		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rr.Code, "Should reject post from disabled aggregator")

+16 -20

tests/integration/community_e2e_test.go

···

       1
       1
        
       package integration

     

       2
       2
        
       

     

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       5
       4
        
       	"Coves/internal/api/routes"

     

       6
       5
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"

     

       7
       6
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"

     
···

       108
       107
        
       

     

       109
       108
        
       	t.Logf("✅ Authenticated - Instance DID: %s", instanceDID)

     

       110
       109
        
       

     

       111
       111
       -
       	// Initialize auth middleware with skipVerify=true

     

       112
       112
       -
       	// IMPORTANT: PDS password authentication returns Bearer tokens (not DPoP-bound tokens).

     

       113
       113
       -
       	// E2E tests use these Bearer tokens with the DPoP scheme header, which only works

     

       114
       114
       -
       	// because skipVerify=true bypasses signature and DPoP binding verification.

     

       115
       115
       -
       	// In production, skipVerify=false requires proper DPoP-bound tokens from OAuth flow.

     

       116
       116
       -
       	authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true)

     

       117
       117
       -
       	defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine

     

       110
       110
       +
       	// Initialize OAuth auth middleware for E2E testing

     

       111
       111
       +
       	e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()

     

       112
       112
       +
       	// Register the instance user for OAuth authentication

     

       113
       113
       +
       	token := e2eAuth.AddUser(instanceDID)

     

       118
       114
        
       

     

       119
       115
        
       	// V2.0: Extract instance domain for community provisioning

     

       120
       116
        
       	var instanceDomain string

     
···

       152
       148
        
       

     

       153
       149
        
       	// Setup HTTP server with XRPC routes

     

       154
       150
        
       	r := chi.NewRouter()

     

       155
       155
       -
       	routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, authMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators

     

       151
       151
       +
       	routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators

     

       156
       152
        
       	httpServer := httptest.NewServer(r)

     

       157
       153
        
       	defer httpServer.Close()

     

       158
       154
        
       

     
···

       387
       383
        
       				t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)

     

       388
       384
        
       			}

     

       389
       385
        
       			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       390
       390
       -
       			// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication

     

       391
       391
       -
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)

     

       386
       386
       +
       			// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication

     

       387
       387
       +
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       392
       388
        
       

     

       393
       389
        
       			resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       394
       390
        
       			if err != nil {

     
···

       773
       769
        
       				t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)

     

       774
       770
        
       			}

     

       775
       771
        
       			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       776
       776
       -
       			// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication

     

       777
       777
       -
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)

     

       772
       772
       +
       			// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication

     

       773
       773
       +
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       778
       774
        
       

     

       779
       775
        
       			resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       780
       776
        
       			if err != nil {

     
···

       1008
       1004
        
       				t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)

     

       1009
       1005
        
       			}

     

       1010
       1006
        
       			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       1011
       1011
       -
       			// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication

     

       1012
       1012
       -
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)

     

       1007
       1007
       +
       			// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication

     

       1008
       1008
       +
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       1013
       1009
        
       

     

       1014
       1010
        
       			resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       1015
       1011
        
       			if err != nil {

     
···

       1141
       1137
        
       				t.Fatalf("Failed to create block request: %v", err)

     

       1142
       1138
        
       			}

     

       1143
       1139
        
       			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       1144
       1144
       -
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)

     

       1140
       1140
       +
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       1145
       1141
        
       

     

       1146
       1142
        
       			resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       1147
       1143
        
       			if err != nil {

     
···

       1261
       1257
        
       				t.Fatalf("Failed to create block request: %v", err)

     

       1262
       1258
        
       			}

     

       1263
       1259
        
       			blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       1264
       1264
       -
       			blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)

     

       1260
       1260
       +
       			blockHttpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       1265
       1261
        
       

     

       1266
       1262
        
       			blockResp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(blockHttpReq)

     

       1267
       1263
        
       			if err != nil {

     
···

       1321
       1317
        
       				t.Fatalf("Failed to create unblock request: %v", err)

     

       1322
       1318
        
       			}

     

       1323
       1319
        
       			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       1324
       1324
       -
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)

     

       1320
       1320
       +
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       1325
       1321
        
       

     

       1326
       1322
        
       			resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       1327
       1323
        
       			if err != nil {

     
···

       1477
       1473
        
       				t.Fatalf("Failed to create request: %v", err)

     

       1478
       1474
        
       			}

     

       1479
       1475
        
       			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       1480
       1480
       -
       			// Use real PDS access token for E2E authentication

     

       1481
       1481
       -
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+accessToken)

     

       1476
       1476
       +
       			// Use OAuth token for Coves API authentication

     

       1477
       1477
       +
       			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       1482
       1478
        
       

     

       1483
       1479
        
       			resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       1484
       1480
        
       			if err != nil {

+7 -9

tests/integration/post_e2e_test.go

···

       2
       2
        
       

     

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
        
       	"Coves/internal/api/handlers/post"

     

       5
       5
       -
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       6
       5
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"

     

       7
       6
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"

     

       8
       7
        
       	"Coves/internal/core/communities"

     
···

       405
       404
        
       

     

       406
       405
        
       	postService := posts.NewPostService(postRepo, communityService, nil, nil, nil, pdsURL) // nil aggregatorService, blobService, unfurlService for user-only tests

     

       407
       406
        
       

     

       408
       408
       -
       	// Setup auth middleware (skip JWT verification for testing)

     

       409
       409
       -
       	authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true)

     

       410
       410
       -
       	defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine

     

       407
       407
       +
       	// Setup OAuth auth middleware for E2E testing

     

       408
       408
       +
       	e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()

     

       411
       409
        
       

     

       412
       410
        
       	// Setup HTTP handler

     

       413
       411
        
       	createHandler := post.NewCreateHandler(postService)

     
···

       476
       474
        
       		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create", bytes.NewReader(reqJSON))

     

       477
       475
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       478
       476
        
       

     

       479
       479
       -
       		// Create a simple JWT for testing (Phase 1: no signature verification)

     

       480
       480
       -
       		// In production, this would be a real OAuth token from PDS

     

       481
       481
       -
       		testJWT := createSimpleTestJWT(author.DID)

     

       482
       482
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+testJWT)

     

       477
       477
       +
       		// Register the author user with OAuth middleware and get test token

     

       478
       478
       +
       		// For Coves API handlers, use Bearer scheme with OAuth middleware

     

       479
       479
       +
       		token := e2eAuth.AddUser(author.DID)

     

       480
       480
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)

     

       483
       481
        
       

     

       484
       482
        
       		// Execute request through auth middleware + handler

     

       485
       483
        
       		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()

     

       486
       486
       -
       		handler := authMiddleware.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       484
       484
       +
       		handler := e2eAuth.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(createHandler.HandleCreate))

     

       487
       485
        
       		handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)

     

       488
       486
        
       

     

       489
       487
        
       		// Check response

+22 -19

tests/integration/user_journey_e2e_test.go

···

       1
       1
        
       package integration

     

       2
       2
        
       

     

       3
       3
        
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       5
       4
        
       	"Coves/internal/api/routes"

     

       6
       5
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/identity"

     

       7
       6
        
       	"Coves/internal/atproto/jetstream"

     
···

       22
       21
        
       	"testing"

     

       23
       22
        
       	"time"

     

       24
       23
        
       

     

       25
       25
       -
       	timelineCore "Coves/internal/core/timeline"

     

       26
       26
       -
       

     

       27
       24
        
       	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"

     

       28
       25
        
       	"github.com/gorilla/websocket"

     

       29
       26
        
       	_ "github.com/lib/pq"

     

       30
       27
        
       	"github.com/pressly/goose/v3"

     

       31
       28
        
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"

     

       32
       29
        
       	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"

     

       30
       30
       +
       

     

       31
       31
       +
       	timelineCore "Coves/internal/core/timeline"

     

       33
       32
        
       )

     

       34
       33
        
       

     

       35
       34
        
       // TestFullUserJourney_E2E tests the complete user experience from signup to interaction:

     
···

       139
       138
        
       	commentConsumer := jetstream.NewCommentEventConsumer(commentRepo, db)

     

       140
       139
        
       	voteConsumer := jetstream.NewVoteEventConsumer(voteRepo, userService, db)

     

       141
       140
        
       

     

       142
       142
       -
       	// Setup HTTP server with all routes

     

       143
       143
       -
       	// IMPORTANT: skipVerify=true because PDS password auth returns Bearer tokens (not DPoP-bound).

     

       144
       144
       -
       	// E2E tests use Bearer tokens with DPoP scheme header, which only works with skipVerify=true.

     

       145
       145
       -
       	// In production, skipVerify=false requires proper DPoP-bound tokens from OAuth flow.

     

       146
       146
       -
       	authMiddleware := middleware.NewAtProtoAuthMiddleware(nil, true)

     

       147
       147
       -
       	defer authMiddleware.Stop() // Clean up DPoP replay cache goroutine

     

       141
       141
       +
       	// Setup HTTP server with all routes using OAuth middleware

     

       142
       142
       +
       	e2eAuth := NewE2EOAuthMiddleware()

     

       148
       143
        
       	r := chi.NewRouter()

     

       149
       149
       -
       	routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, authMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators

     

       150
       150
       -
       	routes.RegisterPostRoutes(r, postService, authMiddleware)

     

       151
       151
       -
       	routes.RegisterTimelineRoutes(r, timelineService, authMiddleware)

     

       144
       144
       +
       	routes.RegisterCommunityRoutes(r, communityService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware, nil) // nil = allow all community creators

     

       145
       145
       +
       	routes.RegisterPostRoutes(r, postService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware)

     

       146
       146
       +
       	routes.RegisterTimelineRoutes(r, timelineService, e2eAuth.OAuthAuthMiddleware)

     

       152
       147
        
       	httpServer := httptest.NewServer(r)

     

       153
       148
        
       	defer httpServer.Close()

     

       154
       149
        
       

     
···

       181
       176
        
       	var (

     

       182
       177
        
       		userAHandle     string

     

       183
       178
        
       		userADID        string

     

       184
       184
       -
       		userAToken      string

     

       179
       179
       +
       		userAToken      string // PDS access token for direct PDS requests

     

       180
       180
       +
       		userAAPIToken   string // Coves API token for Coves API requests

     

       185
       181
        
       		userBHandle     string

     

       186
       182
        
       		userBDID        string

     

       187
       187
       -
       		userBToken      string

     

       183
       183
       +
       		userBToken      string // PDS access token for direct PDS requests

     

       184
       184
       +
       		userBAPIToken   string // Coves API token for Coves API requests

     

       188
       185
        
       		communityDID    string

     

       189
       186
        
       		communityHandle string

     

       190
       187
        
       		postURI         string

     
···

       217
       214
        
       		userA := createTestUser(t, db, userAHandle, userADID)

     

       218
       215
        
       		require.NotNil(t, userA)

     

       219
       216
        
       

     

       217
       217
       +
       		// Register user with OAuth middleware for Coves API requests

     

       218
       218
       +
       		userAAPIToken = e2eAuth.AddUser(userADID)

     

       219
       219
       +
       

     

       220
       220
        
       		t.Logf("✅ User A indexed in AppView")

     

       221
       221
        
       	})

     

       222
       222
        
       

     
···

       244
       244
        
       			httpServer.URL+"/xrpc/social.coves.community.create",

     

       245
       245
        
       			bytes.NewBuffer(reqBody))

     

       246
       246
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       247
       247
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+userAToken)

     

       247
       247
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+userAAPIToken)

     

       248
       248
        
       

     

       249
       249
        
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       250
       250
        
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     
···

       328
       328
        
       			httpServer.URL+"/xrpc/social.coves.community.post.create",

     

       329
       329
        
       			bytes.NewBuffer(reqBody))

     

       330
       330
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       331
       331
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+userAToken)

     

       331
       331
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+userAAPIToken)

     

       332
       332
        
       

     

       333
       333
        
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       334
       334
        
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     
···

       413
       413
        
       		userB := createTestUser(t, db, userBHandle, userBDID)

     

       414
       414
        
       		require.NotNil(t, userB)

     

       415
       415
        
       

     

       416
       416
       +
       		// Register user with OAuth middleware for Coves API requests

     

       417
       417
       +
       		userBAPIToken = e2eAuth.AddUser(userBDID)

     

       418
       418
       +
       

     

       416
       419
        
       		t.Logf("✅ User B indexed in AppView")

     

       417
       420
        
       	})

     

       418
       421
        
       

     
···

       437
       440
        
       			httpServer.URL+"/xrpc/social.coves.community.subscribe",

     

       438
       441
        
       			bytes.NewBuffer(reqBody))

     

       439
       442
        
       		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       440
       440
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+userBToken)

     

       443
       443
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+userBAPIToken)

     

       441
       444
        
       

     

       442
       445
        
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       443
       446
        
       		require.NoError(t, err)

     
···

       669
       672
        
       	t.Run("9. User B - Verify Timeline Feed Shows Subscribed Community Posts", func(t *testing.T) {

     

       670
       673
        
       		t.Log("\n📰 Part 9: User B checks timeline feed...")

     

       671
       674
        
       

     

       672
       672
       -
       		// Use HTTP client to properly go through auth middleware with DPoP token

     

       675
       675
       +
       		// Use HTTP client to properly go through auth middleware with Bearer token

     

       673
       676
        
       		req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet,

     

       674
       677
        
       			httpServer.URL+"/xrpc/social.coves.feed.getTimeline?sort=new&limit=10", nil)

     

       675
       675
       -
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "DPoP "+userBToken)

     

       678
       678
       +
       		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+userBAPIToken)

     

       676
       679
        
       

     

       677
       680
        
       		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)

     

       678
       681
        
       		require.NoError(t, err)

go.mod

···

       27
       27
        
       	github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v4 v4.2.0 // indirect

     

       28
       28
        
       	github.com/earthboundkid/versioninfo/v2 v2.24.1 // indirect

     

       29
       29
        
       	github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4 // indirect

     

       30
       30
       +
       	github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2 // indirect

     

       30
       31
        
       	github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.1 // indirect

     

       31
       32
        
       	github.com/go-logr/stdr v1.2.2 // indirect

     

       32
       33
        
       	github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.2 // indirect

     

       33
       34
        
       	github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2 // indirect

     

       35
       35
       +
       	github.com/google/go-querystring v1.1.0 // indirect

     

       34
       36
        
       	github.com/hashicorp/go-cleanhttp v0.5.2 // indirect

     

       35
       37
        
       	github.com/hashicorp/go-retryablehttp v0.7.5 // indirect

     

       36
       38
        
       	github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru v1.0.2 // indirect

go.sum

···

       21
       21
        
       github.com/felixge/httpsnoop v1.0.4/go.mod h1:m8KPJKqk1gH5J9DgRY2ASl2lWCfGKXixSwevea8zH2U=

     

       22
       22
        
       github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.1 h1:KOIHODQj58PmL80G2Eak4WdvUzjSJSm0vG72crDCqb8=

     

       23
       23
        
       github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.1/go.mod h1:L2yAIGWB3H+phAw1NxKwWM+7eUH/lU8pOMm5hHcoops=

     

       24
       24
       +
       github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2 h1:Jmey33TE+b+rB7fT8MUy1u0I4L+NARQlK6LhzKPSyQE=

     

       25
       25
       +
       github.com/go-chi/cors v1.2.2/go.mod h1:sSbTewc+6wYHBBCW7ytsFSn836hqM7JxpglAy2Vzc58=

     

       24
       26
        
       github.com/go-logr/logr v1.2.2/go.mod h1:jdQByPbusPIv2/zmleS9BjJVeZ6kBagPoEUsqbVz/1A=

     

       25
       27
        
       github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.1 h1:pKouT5E8xu9zeFC39JXRDukb6JFQPXM5p5I91188VAQ=

     

       26
       28
        
       github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.1/go.mod h1:9T104GzyrTigFIr8wt5mBrctHMim0Nb2HLGrmQ40KvY=

     
···

       33
       35
        
       github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2/go.mod h1:P1XiOD3dCwIKUDQYPy72D8LYyHL2YPYrpS2s69NZV8Q=

     

       34
       36
        
       github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0 h1:pv4AsKCKKZuqlgs5sUmn4x8UlGa0kEVt/puTpKx9vvo=

     

       35
       37
        
       github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0/go.mod h1:fxCRLWMO43lRc8nhHWY6LGqRcf+1gQWArsqaEUEa5bE=

     

       38
       38
       +
       github.com/google/go-cmp v0.5.2/go.mod h1:v8dTdLbMG2kIc/vJvl+f65V22dbkXbowE6jgT/gNBxE=

     

       36
       39
        
       github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=

     

       37
       40
        
       github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0/go.mod h1:17dUlkBOakJ0+DkrSSNjCkIjxS6bF9zb3elmeNGIjoY=

     

       41
       41
       +
       github.com/google/go-querystring v1.1.0 h1:AnCroh3fv4ZBgVIf1Iwtovgjaw/GiKJo8M8yD/fhyJ8=

     

       42
       42
       +
       github.com/google/go-querystring v1.1.0/go.mod h1:Kcdr2DB4koayq7X8pmAG4sNG59So17icRSOU623lUBU=

     

       38
       43
        
       github.com/google/renameio v0.1.0/go.mod h1:KWCgfxg9yswjAJkECMjeO8J8rahYeXnNhOm40UhjYkI=

     

       39
       44
        
       github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=

     

       40
       45
        
       github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=

.env.dev

···

       115
       115
        
       # Also supports base64: prefix for consistency

     

       116
       116
        
       OAUTH_COOKIE_SECRET=f1132c01b1a625a865c6c455a75ee793572cedb059cebe0c4c1ae4c446598f7d

     

       117
       117
        
       

     

       118
       118
       +
       # Seal secret for OAuth session tokens (AES-256-GCM encryption)

     

       119
       119
       +
       # Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32

     

       120
       120
       +
       # This must be 32 bytes when base64-decoded for AES-256

     

       121
       121
       +
       # OAUTH_SEAL_SECRET=ryW6xNVxYhP6hCDA90NGCmK58Q2ONnkYXbHL0oZN2no=

     

       122
       122
       +
       

     

       118
       123
        
       # AppView public URL (used for OAuth callback and client metadata)

     

       119
       124
        
       # Dev: http://127.0.0.1:8081 (use 127.0.0.1 instead of localhost per RFC 8252)

     

       120
       125
        
       # Prod: https://coves.social

-73

cmd/genjwks/main.go

···

       1
       1
       -
       package main

     

       2
       2
       -
       

     

       3
       3
       -
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"crypto/ecdsa"

     

       5
       5
       -
       	"crypto/elliptic"

     

       6
       6
       -
       	"crypto/rand"

     

       7
       7
       -
       	"encoding/json"

     

       8
       8
       -
       	"fmt"

     

       9
       9
       -
       	"log"

     

       10
       10
       -
       	"os"

     

       11
       11
       -
       

     

       12
       12
       -
       	"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwk"

     

       13
       13
       -
       )

     

       14
       14
       -
       

     

       15
       15
       -
       // genjwks generates an ES256 keypair for OAuth client authentication

     

       16
       16
       -
       // The private key is stored in the config/env, public key is served at /oauth/jwks.json

     

       17
       17
       -
       //

     

       18
       18
       -
       // Usage:

     

       19
       19
       -
       //

     

       20
       20
       -
       //	go run cmd/genjwks/main.go

     

       21
       21
       -
       //

     

       22
       22
       -
       // This will output a JSON private key that should be stored in OAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK

     

       23
       23
       -
       func main() {

     

       24
       24
       -
       	fmt.Println("Generating ES256 keypair for OAuth client authentication...")

     

       25
       25
       -
       

     

       26
       26
       -
       	// Generate ES256 (NIST P-256) private key

     

       27
       27
       -
       	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)

     

       28
       28
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       29
       29
       -
       		log.Fatalf("Failed to generate private key: %v", err)

     

       30
       30
       -
       	}

     

       31
       31
       -
       

     

       32
       32
       -
       	// Convert to JWK

     

       33
       33
       -
       	jwkKey, err := jwk.FromRaw(privateKey)

     

       34
       34
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       35
       35
       -
       		log.Fatalf("Failed to create JWK from private key: %v", err)

     

       36
       36
       -
       	}

     

       37
       37
       -
       

     

       38
       38
       -
       	// Set key parameters

     

       39
       39
       -
       	if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.KeyIDKey, "oauth-client-key"); err != nil {

     

       40
       40
       -
       		log.Fatalf("Failed to set kid: %v", err)

     

       41
       41
       -
       	}

     

       42
       42
       -
       	if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.AlgorithmKey, "ES256"); err != nil {

     

       43
       43
       -
       		log.Fatalf("Failed to set alg: %v", err)

     

       44
       44
       -
       	}

     

       45
       45
       -
       	if err = jwkKey.Set(jwk.KeyUsageKey, "sig"); err != nil {

     

       46
       46
       -
       		log.Fatalf("Failed to set use: %v", err)

     

       47
       47
       -
       	}

     

       48
       48
       -
       

     

       49
       49
       -
       	// Marshal to JSON

     

       50
       50
       -
       	jsonData, err := json.MarshalIndent(jwkKey, "", "  ")

     

       51
       51
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       52
       52
       -
       		log.Fatalf("Failed to marshal JWK: %v", err)

     

       53
       53
       -
       	}

     

       54
       54
       -
       

     

       55
       55
       -
       	// Output instructions

     

       56
       56
       -
       	fmt.Println("\n✅ ES256 keypair generated successfully!")

     

       57
       57
       -
       	fmt.Println("\n📝 Add this to your .env.dev file:")

     

       58
       58
       -
       	fmt.Println("\nOAUTH_PRIVATE_JWK='" + string(jsonData) + "'")

     

       59
       59
       -
       	fmt.Println("\n⚠️  IMPORTANT:")

     

       60
       60
       -
       	fmt.Println("   - Keep this private key SECRET")

     

       61
       61
       -
       	fmt.Println("   - Never commit it to version control")

     

       62
       62
       -
       	fmt.Println("   - Generate a new key for production")

     

       63
       63
       -
       	fmt.Println("   - The public key will be automatically derived and served at /oauth/jwks.json")

     

       64
       64
       -
       

     

       65
       65
       -
       	// Optionally write to a file (not committed)

     

       66
       66
       -
       	if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "--save" {

     

       67
       67
       -
       		filename := "oauth-private-key.json"

     

       68
       68
       -
       		if err := os.WriteFile(filename, jsonData, 0o600); err != nil {

     

       69
       69
       -
       			log.Fatalf("Failed to write key file: %v", err)

     

       70
       70
       -
       		}

     

       71
       71
       -
       		fmt.Printf("\n💾 Private key saved to %s (remember to add to .gitignore!)\n", filename)

     

       72
       72
       -
       	}

     

       73
       73
       -
       }

-330

internal/atproto/auth/README.md

···

       1
       1
       -
       # atProto OAuth Authentication

     

       2
       2
       -
       

     

       3
       3
       -
       This package implements third-party OAuth authentication for Coves, validating DPoP-bound access tokens from mobile apps and other atProto clients.

     

       4
       4
       -
       

     

       5
       5
       -
       ## Architecture

     

       6
       6
       -
       

     

       7
       7
       -
       This is **third-party authentication** (validating incoming requests), not first-party authentication (logging users into Coves web frontend).

     

       8
       8
       -
       

     

       9
       9
       -
       ### Components

     

       10
       10
       -
       

     

       11
       11
       -
       1. **JWT Parser** (`jwt.go`) - Parses and validates JWT tokens

     

       12
       12
       -
       2. **JWKS Fetcher** (`jwks_fetcher.go`) - Fetches and caches public keys from PDS authorization servers

     

       13
       13
       -
       3. **Auth Middleware** (`internal/api/middleware/auth.go`) - HTTP middleware that protects endpoints

     

       14
       14
       -
       

     

       15
       15
       -
       ### Flow

     

       16
       16
       -
       

     

       17
       17
       -
       ```

     

       18
       18
       -
       Client Request

     

       19
       19
       -
           ↓

     

       20
       20
       -
       Authorization: DPoP <access_token>

     

       21
       21
       -
       DPoP: <proof-jwt>

     

       22
       22
       -
           ↓

     

       23
       23
       -
       Auth Middleware

     

       24
       24
       -
           ↓

     

       25
       25
       -
       Extract JWT → Parse Claims → Verify Signature (via JWKS) → Verify DPoP Proof

     

       26
       26
       -
           ↓

     

       27
       27
       -
       Inject DID into Context → Call Handler

     

       28
       28
       -
       ```

     

       29
       29
       -
       

     

       30
       30
       -
       ## Usage

     

       31
       31
       -
       

     

       32
       32
       -
       ### Phase 1: Parse-Only Mode (Testing)

     

       33
       33
       -
       

     

       34
       34
       -
       Set `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true` to only parse JWTs without signature verification:

     

       35
       35
       -
       

     

       36
       36
       -
       ```bash

     

       37
       37
       -
       export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true

     

       38
       38
       -
       ```

     

       39
       39
       -
       

     

       40
       40
       -
       This is useful for:

     

       41
       41
       -
       - Initial integration testing

     

       42
       42
       -
       - Testing with mock tokens

     

       43
       43
       -
       - Debugging JWT structure

     

       44
       44
       -
       

     

       45
       45
       -
       ### Phase 2: Full Verification (Production)

     

       46
       46
       -
       

     

       47
       47
       -
       Set `AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false` (or unset) to enable full JWT signature verification:

     

       48
       48
       -
       

     

       49
       49
       -
       ```bash

     

       50
       50
       -
       export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false

     

       51
       51
       -
       # or just unset it

     

       52
       52
       -
       ```

     

       53
       53
       -
       

     

       54
       54
       -
       This is **required for production** and validates:

     

       55
       55
       -
       - JWT signature using PDS public key

     

       56
       56
       -
       - Token expiration

     

       57
       57
       -
       - Required claims (sub, iss)

     

       58
       58
       -
       - DID format

     

       59
       59
       -
       

     

       60
       60
       -
       ## Protected Endpoints

     

       61
       61
       -
       

     

       62
       62
       -
       The following endpoints require authentication:

     

       63
       63
       -
       

     

       64
       64
       -
       - `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.create`

     

       65
       65
       -
       - `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.update`

     

       66
       66
       -
       - `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.subscribe`

     

       67
       67
       -
       - `POST /xrpc/social.coves.community.unsubscribe`

     

       68
       68
       -
       

     

       69
       69
       -
       ### Making Authenticated Requests

     

       70
       70
       -
       

     

       71
       71
       -
       Include the JWT in the `Authorization` header:

     

       72
       72
       -
       

     

       73
       73
       -
       ```bash

     

       74
       74
       -
       curl -X POST https://coves.social/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \

     

       75
       75
       -
         -H "Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGc..." \

     

       76
       76
       -
         -H "DPoP: eyJhbGc..." \

     

       77
       77
       -
         -H "Content-Type: application/json" \

     

       78
       78
       -
         -d '{"name":"Gaming","hostedByDid":"did:plc:..."}'

     

       79
       79
       -
       ```

     

       80
       80
       -
       

     

       81
       81
       -
       ### Getting User DID in Handlers

     

       82
       82
       -
       

     

       83
       83
       -
       The middleware injects the authenticated user's DID into the request context:

     

       84
       84
       -
       

     

       85
       85
       -
       ```go

     

       86
       86
       -
       import "Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       87
       87
       -
       

     

       88
       88
       -
       func (h *Handler) HandleCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       89
       89
       -
           // Extract authenticated user DID

     

       90
       90
       -
           userDID := middleware.GetUserDID(r)

     

       91
       91
       -
           if userDID == "" {

     

       92
       92
       -
               // Not authenticated (should never happen with RequireAuth middleware)

     

       93
       93
       -
               http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)

     

       94
       94
       -
               return

     

       95
       95
       -
           }

     

       96
       96
       -
       

     

       97
       97
       -
           // Use userDID for authorization checks

     

       98
       98
       -
           // ...

     

       99
       99
       -
       }

     

       100
       100
       -
       ```

     

       101
       101
       -
       

     

       102
       102
       -
       ## Key Caching

     

       103
       103
       -
       

     

       104
       104
       -
       Public keys are fetched from PDS authorization servers and cached for 1 hour. The cache is automatically cleaned up hourly to remove expired entries.

     

       105
       105
       -
       

     

       106
       106
       -
       ### JWKS Discovery Flow

     

       107
       107
       -
       

     

       108
       108
       -
       1. Extract `iss` claim from JWT (e.g., `https://pds.example.com`)

     

       109
       109
       -
       2. Fetch `https://pds.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`

     

       110
       110
       -
       3. Extract `jwks_uri` from metadata

     

       111
       111
       -
       4. Fetch JWKS from `jwks_uri`

     

       112
       112
       -
       5. Find matching key by `kid` from JWT header

     

       113
       113
       -
       6. Cache the JWKS for 1 hour

     

       114
       114
       -
       

     

       115
       115
       -
       ## DPoP Token Binding

     

       116
       116
       -
       

     

       117
       117
       -
       DPoP (Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession) binds access tokens to client-controlled cryptographic keys, preventing token theft and replay attacks.

     

       118
       118
       -
       

     

       119
       119
       -
       ### What is DPoP?

     

       120
       120
       -
       

     

       121
       121
       -
       DPoP is an OAuth extension (RFC 9449) that adds proof-of-possession semantics to bearer tokens. When a PDS issues a DPoP-bound access token:

     

       122
       122
       -
       

     

       123
       123
       -
       1. Access token contains `cnf.jkt` claim (JWK thumbprint of client's public key)

     

       124
       124
       -
       2. Client creates a DPoP proof JWT signed with their private key

     

       125
       125
       -
       3. Server verifies the proof signature and checks it matches the token's `cnf.jkt`

     

       126
       126
       -
       

     

       127
       127
       -
       ### CRITICAL: DPoP Security Model

     

       128
       128
       -
       

     

       129
       129
       -
       > ⚠️ **DPoP is an ADDITIONAL security layer, NOT a replacement for token signature verification.**

     

       130
       130
       -
       

     

       131
       131
       -
       The correct verification order is:

     

       132
       132
       -
       1. **ALWAYS verify the access token signature first** (via JWKS, HS256 shared secret, or DID resolution)

     

       133
       133
       -
       2. **If the verified token has `cnf.jkt`, REQUIRE valid DPoP proof**

     

       134
       134
       -
       3. **NEVER use DPoP as a fallback when signature verification fails**

     

       135
       135
       -
       

     

       136
       136
       -
       **Why This Matters**: An attacker could create a fake token with `sub: "did:plc:victim"` and their own `cnf.jkt`, then present a valid DPoP proof signed with their key. If we accept DPoP as a fallback, the attacker can impersonate any user.

     

       137
       137
       -
       

     

       138
       138
       -
       ### How DPoP Works

     

       139
       139
       -
       

     

       140
       140
       -
       ```

     

       141
       141
       -
       ┌─────────────┐                          ┌─────────────┐

     

       142
       142
       -
       │   Client    │                          │   Server    │

     

       143
       143
       -
       │             │                          │  (Coves)    │

     

       144
       144
       -
       └─────────────┘                          └─────────────┘

     

       145
       145
       -
              │                                        │

     

       146
       146
       -
              │ 1. Authorization: DPoP <token>         │

     

       147
       147
       -
              │    DPoP: <proof-jwt>                  │

     

       148
       148
       -
              │───────────────────────────────────────>│

     

       149
       149
       -
              │                                        │

     

       150
       150
       -
              │                                        │ 2. VERIFY token signature

     

       151
       151
       -
              │                                        │    (REQUIRED - no fallback!)

     

       152
       152
       -
              │                                        │

     

       153
       153
       -
              │                                        │ 3. If token has cnf.jkt:

     

       154
       154
       -
              │                                        │    - Verify DPoP proof

     

       155
       155
       -
              │                                        │    - Check thumbprint match

     

       156
       156
       -
              │                                        │

     

       157
       157
       -
              │                              200 OK    │

     

       158
       158
       -
              │<───────────────────────────────────────│

     

       159
       159
       -
       ```

     

       160
       160
       -
       

     

       161
       161
       -
       ### When DPoP is Required

     

       162
       162
       -
       

     

       163
       163
       -
       DPoP verification is **REQUIRED** when:

     

       164
       164
       -
       - Access token signature has been verified AND

     

       165
       165
       -
       - Access token contains `cnf.jkt` claim (DPoP-bound)

     

       166
       166
       -
       

     

       167
       167
       -
       If the token has `cnf.jkt` but no DPoP header is present, the request is **REJECTED**.

     

       168
       168
       -
       

     

       169
       169
       -
       ### Replay Protection

     

       170
       170
       -
       

     

       171
       171
       -
       DPoP proofs include a unique `jti` (JWT ID) claim. The server tracks seen `jti` values to prevent replay attacks:

     

       172
       172
       -
       

     

       173
       173
       -
       ```go

     

       174
       174
       -
       // Create a verifier with replay protection (default)

     

       175
       175
       -
       verifier := auth.NewDPoPVerifier()

     

       176
       176
       -
       defer verifier.Stop() // Stop cleanup goroutine on shutdown

     

       177
       177
       -
       

     

       178
       178
       -
       // The verifier automatically rejects reused jti values within the proof validity window (5 minutes)

     

       179
       179
       -
       ```

     

       180
       180
       -
       

     

       181
       181
       -
       ### DPoP Implementation

     

       182
       182
       -
       

     

       183
       183
       -
       The `dpop.go` module provides:

     

       184
       184
       -
       

     

       185
       185
       -
       ```go

     

       186
       186
       -
       // Create a verifier with replay protection

     

       187
       187
       -
       verifier := auth.NewDPoPVerifier()

     

       188
       188
       -
       defer verifier.Stop()

     

       189
       189
       -
       

     

       190
       190
       -
       // Verify the DPoP proof

     

       191
       191
       -
       proof, err := verifier.VerifyDPoPProof(dpopHeader, "POST", "https://coves.social/xrpc/...")

     

       192
       192
       -
       if err != nil {

     

       193
       193
       -
           // Invalid proof (includes replay detection)

     

       194
       194
       -
       }

     

       195
       195
       -
       

     

       196
       196
       -
       // Verify it binds to the VERIFIED access token

     

       197
       197
       -
       expectedThumbprint, err := auth.ExtractCnfJkt(claims)

     

       198
       198
       -
       if err != nil {

     

       199
       199
       -
           // Token not DPoP-bound

     

       200
       200
       -
       }

     

       201
       201
       -
       

     

       202
       202
       -
       if err := verifier.VerifyTokenBinding(proof, expectedThumbprint); err != nil {

     

       203
       203
       -
           // Proof doesn't match token

     

       204
       204
       -
       }

     

       205
       205
       -
       ```

     

       206
       206
       -
       

     

       207
       207
       -
       ### DPoP Proof Format

     

       208
       208
       -
       

     

       209
       209
       -
       The DPoP header contains a JWT with:

     

       210
       210
       -
       

     

       211
       211
       -
       **Header**:

     

       212
       212
       -
       - `typ`: `"dpop+jwt"` (required)

     

       213
       213
       -
       - `alg`: `"ES256"` (or other supported algorithm)

     

       214
       214
       -
       - `jwk`: Client's public key (JWK format)

     

       215
       215
       -
       

     

       216
       216
       -
       **Claims**:

     

       217
       217
       -
       - `jti`: Unique proof identifier (tracked for replay protection)

     

       218
       218
       -
       - `htm`: HTTP method (e.g., `"POST"`)

     

       219
       219
       -
       - `htu`: HTTP URI (without query/fragment)

     

       220
       220
       -
       - `iat`: Timestamp (must be recent, within 5 minutes)

     

       221
       221
       -
       

     

       222
       222
       -
       **Example**:

     

       223
       223
       -
       ```json

     

       224
       224
       -
       {

     

       225
       225
       -
         "typ": "dpop+jwt",

     

       226
       226
       -
         "alg": "ES256",

     

       227
       227
       -
         "jwk": {

     

       228
       228
       -
           "kty": "EC",

     

       229
       229
       -
           "crv": "P-256",

     

       230
       230
       -
           "x": "...",

     

       231
       231
       -
           "y": "..."

     

       232
       232
       -
         }

     

       233
       233
       -
       }

     

       234
       234
       -
       {

     

       235
       235
       -
         "jti": "unique-id-123",

     

       236
       236
       -
         "htm": "POST",

     

       237
       237
       -
         "htu": "https://coves.social/xrpc/social.coves.community.create",

     

       238
       238
       -
         "iat": 1700000000

     

       239
       239
       -
       }

     

       240
       240
       -
       ```

     

       241
       241
       -
       

     

       242
       242
       -
       ## Security Considerations

     

       243
       243
       -
       

     

       244
       244
       -
       ### ✅ Implemented

     

       245
       245
       -
       

     

       246
       246
       -
       - JWT signature verification with PDS public keys

     

       247
       247
       -
       - Token expiration validation

     

       248
       248
       -
       - DID format validation

     

       249
       249
       -
       - Required claims validation (sub, iss)

     

       250
       250
       -
       - Key caching with TTL

     

       251
       251
       -
       - Secure error messages (no internal details leaked)

     

       252
       252
       -
       - **DPoP proof verification** (proof-of-possession for token binding)

     

       253
       253
       -
       - **DPoP thumbprint validation** (prevents token theft attacks)

     

       254
       254
       -
       - **DPoP freshness checks** (5-minute proof validity window)

     

       255
       255
       -
       - **DPoP replay protection** (jti tracking with in-memory cache)

     

       256
       256
       -
       - **Secure DPoP model** (DPoP required AFTER signature verification, never as fallback)

     

       257
       257
       -
       

     

       258
       258
       -
       ### ⚠️ Not Yet Implemented

     

       259
       259
       -
       

     

       260
       260
       -
       - Server-issued DPoP nonces (additional replay protection)

     

       261
       261
       -
       - Scope validation (checking `scope` claim)

     

       262
       262
       -
       - Audience validation (checking `aud` claim)

     

       263
       263
       -
       - Rate limiting per DID

     

       264
       264
       -
       - Token revocation checking

     

       265
       265
       -
       

     

       266
       266
       -
       ## Testing

     

       267
       267
       -
       

     

       268
       268
       -
       Run the test suite:

     

       269
       269
       -
       

     

       270
       270
       -
       ```bash

     

       271
       271
       -
       go test ./internal/atproto/auth/... -v

     

       272
       272
       -
       ```

     

       273
       273
       -
       

     

       274
       274
       -
       ### Manual Testing

     

       275
       275
       -
       

     

       276
       276
       -
       1. **Phase 1 (Parse Only)**:

     

       277
       277
       -
          ```bash

     

       278
       278
       -
          # Create a test JWT (use jwt.io or a tool)

     

       279
       279
       -
          export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=true

     

       280
       280
       -
          curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \

     

       281
       281
       -
            -H "Authorization: DPoP <test-jwt>" \

     

       282
       282
       -
            -H "DPoP: <test-dpop-proof>" \

     

       283
       283
       -
            -d '{"name":"Test","hostedByDid":"did:plc:test"}'

     

       284
       284
       -
          ```

     

       285
       285
       -
       

     

       286
       286
       -
       2. **Phase 2 (Full Verification)**:

     

       287
       287
       -
          ```bash

     

       288
       288
       -
          # Use a real JWT from a PDS

     

       289
       289
       -
          export AUTH_SKIP_VERIFY=false

     

       290
       290
       -
          curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/xrpc/social.coves.community.create \

     

       291
       291
       -
            -H "Authorization: DPoP <real-jwt>" \

     

       292
       292
       -
            -H "DPoP: <real-dpop-proof>" \

     

       293
       293
       -
            -d '{"name":"Test","hostedByDid":"did:plc:test"}'

     

       294
       294
       -
          ```

     

       295
       295
       -
       

     

       296
       296
       -
       ## Error Responses

     

       297
       297
       -
       

     

       298
       298
       -
       ### 401 Unauthorized

     

       299
       299
       -
       

     

       300
       300
       -
       Missing or invalid token:

     

       301
       301
       -
       

     

       302
       302
       -
       ```json

     

       303
       303
       -
       {

     

       304
       304
       -
         "error": "AuthenticationRequired",

     

       305
       305
       -
         "message": "Missing Authorization header"

     

       306
       306
       -
       }

     

       307
       307
       -
       ```

     

       308
       308
       -
       

     

       309
       309
       -
       ```json

     

       310
       310
       -
       {

     

       311
       311
       -
         "error": "AuthenticationRequired",

     

       312
       312
       -
         "message": "Invalid or expired token"

     

       313
       313
       -
       }

     

       314
       314
       -
       ```

     

       315
       315
       -
       

     

       316
       316
       -
       ### Common Issues

     

       317
       317
       -
       

     

       318
       318
       -
       1. **Missing Authorization header** → Add `Authorization: DPoP <token>` and `DPoP: <proof>`

     

       319
       319
       -
       2. **Token expired** → Get a new token from PDS

     

       320
       320
       -
       3. **Invalid signature** → Ensure token is from a valid PDS

     

       321
       321
       -
       4. **JWKS fetch fails** → Check PDS availability and network connectivity

     

       322
       322
       -
       

     

       323
       323
       -
       ## Future Enhancements

     

       324
       324
       -
       

     

       325
       325
       -
       - [ ] DPoP nonce validation (server-managed nonce for additional replay protection)

     

       326
       326
       -
       - [ ] Scope-based authorization

     

       327
       327
       -
       - [ ] Audience claim validation

     

       328
       328
       -
       - [ ] Token revocation support

     

       329
       329
       -
       - [ ] Rate limiting per DID

     

       330
       330
       -
       - [ ] Metrics and monitoring

-52

internal/atproto/auth/combined_key_fetcher.go

···

       1
       1
       -
       package auth

     

       2
       2
       -
       

     

       3
       3
       -
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"context"

     

       5
       5
       -
       	"fmt"

     

       6
       6
       -
       	"strings"

     

       7
       7
       -
       

     

       8
       8
       -
       	indigoIdentity "github.com/bluesky-social/indigo/atproto/identity"

     

       9
       9
       -
       )

     

       10
       10
       -
       

     

       11
       11
       -
       // CombinedKeyFetcher handles JWT public key fetching for both:

     

       12
       12
       -
       // - DID issuers (did:plc:, did:web:) → resolves via DID document

     

       13
       13
       -
       // - URL issuers (https://) → fetches via JWKS endpoint (legacy/fallback)

     

       14
       14
       -
       //

     

       15
       15
       -
       // For atproto service authentication, the issuer is typically the user's DID,

     

       16
       16
       -
       // and the signing key is published in their DID document.

     

       17
       17
       -
       type CombinedKeyFetcher struct {

     

       18
       18
       -
       	didFetcher  *DIDKeyFetcher

     

       19
       19
       -
       	jwksFetcher JWKSFetcher

     

       20
       20
       -
       }

     

       21
       21
       -
       

     

       22
       22
       -
       // NewCombinedKeyFetcher creates a key fetcher that supports both DID and URL issuers.

     

       23
       23
       -
       // Parameters:

     

       24
       24
       -
       //   - directory: Indigo's identity directory for DID resolution

     

       25
       25
       -
       //   - jwksFetcher: fallback JWKS fetcher for URL issuers (can be nil if not needed)

     

       26
       26
       -
       func NewCombinedKeyFetcher(directory indigoIdentity.Directory, jwksFetcher JWKSFetcher) *CombinedKeyFetcher {

     

       27
       27
       -
       	return &CombinedKeyFetcher{

     

       28
       28
       -
       		didFetcher:  NewDIDKeyFetcher(directory),

     

       29
       29
       -
       		jwksFetcher: jwksFetcher,

     

       30
       30
       -
       	}

     

       31
       31
       -
       }

     

       32
       32
       -
       

     

       33
       33
       -
       // FetchPublicKey fetches the public key for verifying a JWT.

     

       34
       34
       -
       // Routes to the appropriate fetcher based on issuer format:

     

       35
       35
       -
       // - DID (did:plc:, did:web:) → DIDKeyFetcher

     

       36
       36
       -
       // - URL (https://) → JWKSFetcher

     

       37
       37
       -
       func (f *CombinedKeyFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {

     

       38
       38
       -
       	// Check if issuer is a DID

     

       39
       39
       -
       	if strings.HasPrefix(issuer, "did:") {

     

       40
       40
       -
       		return f.didFetcher.FetchPublicKey(ctx, issuer, token)

     

       41
       41
       -
       	}

     

       42
       42
       -
       

     

       43
       43
       -
       	// Check if issuer is a URL (https:// or http:// in dev)

     

       44
       44
       -
       	if strings.HasPrefix(issuer, "https://") || strings.HasPrefix(issuer, "http://") {

     

       45
       45
       -
       		if f.jwksFetcher == nil {

     

       46
       46
       -
       			return nil, fmt.Errorf("URL issuer %s requires JWKS fetcher, but none configured", issuer)

     

       47
       47
       -
       		}

     

       48
       48
       -
       		return f.jwksFetcher.FetchPublicKey(ctx, issuer, token)

     

       49
       49
       -
       	}

     

       50
       50
       -
       

     

       51
       51
       -
       	return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported issuer format: %s (expected DID or URL)", issuer)

     

       52
       52
       -
       }

-189

internal/atproto/auth/jwks_fetcher.go

···

       1
       1
       -
       package auth

     

       2
       2
       -
       

     

       3
       3
       -
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"context"

     

       5
       5
       -
       	"encoding/json"

     

       6
       6
       -
       	"fmt"

     

       7
       7
       -
       	"net/http"

     

       8
       8
       -
       	"strings"

     

       9
       9
       -
       	"sync"

     

       10
       10
       -
       	"time"

     

       11
       11
       -
       )

     

       12
       12
       -
       

     

       13
       13
       -
       // CachedJWKSFetcher fetches and caches JWKS from authorization servers

     

       14
       14
       -
       type CachedJWKSFetcher struct {

     

       15
       15
       -
       	cache      map[string]*cachedJWKS

     

       16
       16
       -
       	httpClient *http.Client

     

       17
       17
       -
       	cacheMutex sync.RWMutex

     

       18
       18
       -
       	cacheTTL   time.Duration

     

       19
       19
       -
       }

     

       20
       20
       -
       

     

       21
       21
       -
       type cachedJWKS struct {

     

       22
       22
       -
       	jwks      *JWKS

     

       23
       23
       -
       	expiresAt time.Time

     

       24
       24
       -
       }

     

       25
       25
       -
       

     

       26
       26
       -
       // NewCachedJWKSFetcher creates a new JWKS fetcher with caching

     

       27
       27
       -
       func NewCachedJWKSFetcher(cacheTTL time.Duration) *CachedJWKSFetcher {

     

       28
       28
       -
       	return &CachedJWKSFetcher{

     

       29
       29
       -
       		cache: make(map[string]*cachedJWKS),

     

       30
       30
       -
       		httpClient: &http.Client{

     

       31
       31
       -
       			Timeout: 10 * time.Second,

     

       32
       32
       -
       		},

     

       33
       33
       -
       		cacheTTL: cacheTTL,

     

       34
       34
       -
       	}

     

       35
       35
       -
       }

     

       36
       36
       -
       

     

       37
       37
       -
       // FetchPublicKey fetches the public key for verifying a JWT from the issuer

     

       38
       38
       -
       // Implements JWKSFetcher interface

     

       39
       39
       -
       // Returns interface{} to support both RSA and ECDSA keys

     

       40
       40
       -
       func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {

     

       41
       41
       -
       	// Extract key ID from token

     

       42
       42
       -
       	kid, err := ExtractKeyID(token)

     

       43
       43
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       44
       44
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to extract key ID: %w", err)

     

       45
       45
       -
       	}

     

       46
       46
       -
       

     

       47
       47
       -
       	// Get JWKS from cache or fetch

     

       48
       48
       -
       	jwks, err := f.getJWKS(ctx, issuer)

     

       49
       49
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       50
       50
       -
       		return nil, err

     

       51
       51
       -
       	}

     

       52
       52
       -
       

     

       53
       53
       -
       	// Find the key by ID

     

       54
       54
       -
       	jwk, err := jwks.FindKeyByID(kid)

     

       55
       55
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       56
       56
       -
       		// Key not found in cache - try refreshing

     

       57
       57
       -
       		jwks, err = f.fetchJWKS(ctx, issuer)

     

       58
       58
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       59
       59
       -
       			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to refresh JWKS: %w", err)

     

       60
       60
       -
       		}

     

       61
       61
       -
       		f.cacheJWKS(issuer, jwks)

     

       62
       62
       -
       

     

       63
       63
       -
       		// Try again with fresh JWKS

     

       64
       64
       -
       		jwk, err = jwks.FindKeyByID(kid)

     

       65
       65
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       66
       66
       -
       			return nil, err

     

       67
       67
       -
       		}

     

       68
       68
       -
       	}

     

       69
       69
       -
       

     

       70
       70
       -
       	// Convert JWK to public key (RSA or ECDSA)

     

       71
       71
       -
       	return jwk.ToPublicKey()

     

       72
       72
       -
       }

     

       73
       73
       -
       

     

       74
       74
       -
       // getJWKS gets JWKS from cache or fetches if not cached/expired

     

       75
       75
       -
       func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) getJWKS(ctx context.Context, issuer string) (*JWKS, error) {

     

       76
       76
       -
       	// Check cache first

     

       77
       77
       -
       	f.cacheMutex.RLock()

     

       78
       78
       -
       	cached, exists := f.cache[issuer]

     

       79
       79
       -
       	f.cacheMutex.RUnlock()

     

       80
       80
       -
       

     

       81
       81
       -
       	if exists && time.Now().Before(cached.expiresAt) {

     

       82
       82
       -
       		return cached.jwks, nil

     

       83
       83
       -
       	}

     

       84
       84
       -
       

     

       85
       85
       -
       	// Not in cache or expired - fetch from issuer

     

       86
       86
       -
       	jwks, err := f.fetchJWKS(ctx, issuer)

     

       87
       87
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       88
       88
       -
       		return nil, err

     

       89
       89
       -
       	}

     

       90
       90
       -
       

     

       91
       91
       -
       	// Cache it

     

       92
       92
       -
       	f.cacheJWKS(issuer, jwks)

     

       93
       93
       -
       

     

       94
       94
       -
       	return jwks, nil

     

       95
       95
       -
       }

     

       96
       96
       -
       

     

       97
       97
       -
       // fetchJWKS fetches JWKS from the authorization server

     

       98
       98
       -
       func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) fetchJWKS(ctx context.Context, issuer string) (*JWKS, error) {

     

       99
       99
       -
       	// Step 1: Fetch OAuth server metadata to get JWKS URI

     

       100
       100
       -
       	metadataURL := strings.TrimSuffix(issuer, "/") + "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"

     

       101
       101
       -
       

     

       102
       102
       -
       	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", metadataURL, nil)

     

       103
       103
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       104
       104
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create metadata request: %w", err)

     

       105
       105
       -
       	}

     

       106
       106
       -
       

     

       107
       107
       -
       	resp, err := f.httpClient.Do(req)

     

       108
       108
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       109
       109
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch metadata: %w", err)

     

       110
       110
       -
       	}

     

       111
       111
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       112
       112
       -
       		_ = resp.Body.Close()

     

       113
       113
       -
       	}()

     

       114
       114
       -
       

     

       115
       115
       -
       	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {

     

       116
       116
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("metadata endpoint returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)

     

       117
       117
       -
       	}

     

       118
       118
       -
       

     

       119
       119
       -
       	var metadata struct {

     

       120
       120
       -
       		JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri"`

     

       121
       121
       -
       	}

     

       122
       122
       -
       	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&metadata); err != nil {

     

       123
       123
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode metadata: %w", err)

     

       124
       124
       -
       	}

     

       125
       125
       -
       

     

       126
       126
       -
       	if metadata.JWKSURI == "" {

     

       127
       127
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("jwks_uri not found in metadata")

     

       128
       128
       -
       	}

     

       129
       129
       -
       

     

       130
       130
       -
       	// Step 2: Fetch JWKS from the JWKS URI

     

       131
       131
       -
       	jwksReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", metadata.JWKSURI, nil)

     

       132
       132
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       133
       133
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create JWKS request: %w", err)

     

       134
       134
       -
       	}

     

       135
       135
       -
       

     

       136
       136
       -
       	jwksResp, err := f.httpClient.Do(jwksReq)

     

       137
       137
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       138
       138
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch JWKS: %w", err)

     

       139
       139
       -
       	}

     

       140
       140
       -
       	defer func() {

     

       141
       141
       -
       		_ = jwksResp.Body.Close()

     

       142
       142
       -
       	}()

     

       143
       143
       -
       

     

       144
       144
       -
       	if jwksResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {

     

       145
       145
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("JWKS endpoint returned status %d", jwksResp.StatusCode)

     

       146
       146
       -
       	}

     

       147
       147
       -
       

     

       148
       148
       -
       	var jwks JWKS

     

       149
       149
       -
       	if err := json.NewDecoder(jwksResp.Body).Decode(&jwks); err != nil {

     

       150
       150
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode JWKS: %w", err)

     

       151
       151
       -
       	}

     

       152
       152
       -
       

     

       153
       153
       -
       	if len(jwks.Keys) == 0 {

     

       154
       154
       -
       		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no keys found in JWKS")

     

       155
       155
       -
       	}

     

       156
       156
       -
       

     

       157
       157
       -
       	return &jwks, nil

     

       158
       158
       -
       }

     

       159
       159
       -
       

     

       160
       160
       -
       // cacheJWKS stores JWKS in the cache

     

       161
       161
       -
       func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) cacheJWKS(issuer string, jwks *JWKS) {

     

       162
       162
       -
       	f.cacheMutex.Lock()

     

       163
       163
       -
       	defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()

     

       164
       164
       -
       

     

       165
       165
       -
       	f.cache[issuer] = &cachedJWKS{

     

       166
       166
       -
       		jwks:      jwks,

     

       167
       167
       -
       		expiresAt: time.Now().Add(f.cacheTTL),

     

       168
       168
       -
       	}

     

       169
       169
       -
       }

     

       170
       170
       -
       

     

       171
       171
       -
       // ClearCache clears the entire JWKS cache

     

       172
       172
       -
       func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) ClearCache() {

     

       173
       173
       -
       	f.cacheMutex.Lock()

     

       174
       174
       -
       	defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()

     

       175
       175
       -
       	f.cache = make(map[string]*cachedJWKS)

     

       176
       176
       -
       }

     

       177
       177
       -
       

     

       178
       178
       -
       // CleanupExpiredCache removes expired entries from the cache

     

       179
       179
       -
       func (f *CachedJWKSFetcher) CleanupExpiredCache() {

     

       180
       180
       -
       	f.cacheMutex.Lock()

     

       181
       181
       -
       	defer f.cacheMutex.Unlock()

     

       182
       182
       -
       

     

       183
       183
       -
       	now := time.Now()

     

       184
       184
       -
       	for issuer, cached := range f.cache {

     

       185
       185
       -
       		if now.After(cached.expiresAt) {

     

       186
       186
       -
       			delete(f.cache, issuer)

     

       187
       187
       -
       		}

     

       188
       188
       -
       	}

     

       189
       189
       -
       }

-496

internal/atproto/auth/jwt_test.go

···

       1
       1
       -
       package auth

     

       2
       2
       -
       

     

       3
       3
       -
       import (

     

       4
       4
       -
       	"context"

     

       5
       5
       -
       	"testing"

     

       6
       6
       -
       	"time"

     

       7
       7
       -
       

     

       8
       8
       -
       	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"

     

       9
       9
       -
       )

     

       10
       10
       -
       

     

       11
       11
       -
       func TestParseJWT(t *testing.T) {

     

       12
       12
       -
       	// Create a test JWT token

     

       13
       13
       -
       	claims := &Claims{

     

       14
       14
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       15
       15
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       16
       16
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test-pds.example.com",

     

       17
       17
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       18
       18
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       19
       19
       -
       		},

     

       20
       20
       -
       		Scope: "atproto transition:generic",

     

       21
       21
       -
       	}

     

       22
       22
       -
       

     

       23
       23
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)

     

       24
       24
       -
       	tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))

     

       25
       25
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       26
       26
       -
       		t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)

     

       27
       27
       -
       	}

     

       28
       28
       -
       

     

       29
       29
       -
       	// Test parsing

     

       30
       30
       -
       	parsedClaims, err := ParseJWT(tokenString)

     

       31
       31
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       32
       32
       -
       		t.Fatalf("ParseJWT failed: %v", err)

     

       33
       33
       -
       	}

     

       34
       34
       -
       

     

       35
       35
       -
       	if parsedClaims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       36
       36
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Subject)

     

       37
       37
       -
       	}

     

       38
       38
       -
       

     

       39
       39
       -
       	if parsedClaims.Issuer != "https://test-pds.example.com" {

     

       40
       40
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected issuer 'https://test-pds.example.com', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Issuer)

     

       41
       41
       -
       	}

     

       42
       42
       -
       

     

       43
       43
       -
       	if parsedClaims.Scope != "atproto transition:generic" {

     

       44
       44
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected scope 'atproto transition:generic', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Scope)

     

       45
       45
       -
       	}

     

       46
       46
       -
       }

     

       47
       47
       -
       

     

       48
       48
       -
       func TestParseJWT_MissingSubject(t *testing.T) {

     

       49
       49
       -
       	// Create a token without subject

     

       50
       50
       -
       	claims := &Claims{

     

       51
       51
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       52
       52
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test-pds.example.com",

     

       53
       53
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       54
       54
       -
       		},

     

       55
       55
       -
       	}

     

       56
       56
       -
       

     

       57
       57
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)

     

       58
       58
       -
       	tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))

     

       59
       59
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       60
       60
       -
       		t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)

     

       61
       61
       -
       	}

     

       62
       62
       -
       

     

       63
       63
       -
       	// Test parsing - should fail

     

       64
       64
       -
       	_, err = ParseJWT(tokenString)

     

       65
       65
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       66
       66
       -
       		t.Error("Expected error for missing subject, got nil")

     

       67
       67
       -
       	}

     

       68
       68
       -
       }

     

       69
       69
       -
       

     

       70
       70
       -
       func TestParseJWT_MissingIssuer(t *testing.T) {

     

       71
       71
       -
       	// Create a token without issuer

     

       72
       72
       -
       	claims := &Claims{

     

       73
       73
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       74
       74
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       75
       75
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       76
       76
       -
       		},

     

       77
       77
       -
       	}

     

       78
       78
       -
       

     

       79
       79
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)

     

       80
       80
       -
       	tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))

     

       81
       81
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       82
       82
       -
       		t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)

     

       83
       83
       -
       	}

     

       84
       84
       -
       

     

       85
       85
       -
       	// Test parsing - should fail

     

       86
       86
       -
       	_, err = ParseJWT(tokenString)

     

       87
       87
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       88
       88
       -
       		t.Error("Expected error for missing issuer, got nil")

     

       89
       89
       -
       	}

     

       90
       90
       -
       }

     

       91
       91
       -
       

     

       92
       92
       -
       func TestParseJWT_WithBearerPrefix(t *testing.T) {

     

       93
       93
       -
       	// Create a test JWT token

     

       94
       94
       -
       	claims := &Claims{

     

       95
       95
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       96
       96
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       97
       97
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test-pds.example.com",

     

       98
       98
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       99
       99
       -
       		},

     

       100
       100
       -
       	}

     

       101
       101
       -
       

     

       102
       102
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)

     

       103
       103
       -
       	tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("test-secret"))

     

       104
       104
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       105
       105
       -
       		t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)

     

       106
       106
       -
       	}

     

       107
       107
       -
       

     

       108
       108
       -
       	// Test parsing with Bearer prefix

     

       109
       109
       -
       	parsedClaims, err := ParseJWT("Bearer " + tokenString)

     

       110
       110
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       111
       111
       -
       		t.Fatalf("ParseJWT failed with Bearer prefix: %v", err)

     

       112
       112
       -
       	}

     

       113
       113
       -
       

     

       114
       114
       -
       	if parsedClaims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       115
       115
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", parsedClaims.Subject)

     

       116
       116
       -
       	}

     

       117
       117
       -
       }

     

       118
       118
       -
       

     

       119
       119
       -
       func TestValidateClaims_Expired(t *testing.T) {

     

       120
       120
       -
       	claims := &Claims{

     

       121
       121
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       122
       122
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       123
       123
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test-pds.example.com",

     

       124
       124
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)), // Expired

     

       125
       125
       -
       		},

     

       126
       126
       -
       	}

     

       127
       127
       -
       

     

       128
       128
       -
       	err := validateClaims(claims)

     

       129
       129
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       130
       130
       -
       		t.Error("Expected error for expired token, got nil")

     

       131
       131
       -
       	}

     

       132
       132
       -
       }

     

       133
       133
       -
       

     

       134
       134
       -
       func TestValidateClaims_InvalidDID(t *testing.T) {

     

       135
       135
       -
       	claims := &Claims{

     

       136
       136
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       137
       137
       -
       			Subject:   "invalid-did-format",

     

       138
       138
       -
       			Issuer:    "https://test-pds.example.com",

     

       139
       139
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       140
       140
       -
       		},

     

       141
       141
       -
       	}

     

       142
       142
       -
       

     

       143
       143
       -
       	err := validateClaims(claims)

     

       144
       144
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       145
       145
       -
       		t.Error("Expected error for invalid DID format, got nil")

     

       146
       146
       -
       	}

     

       147
       147
       -
       }

     

       148
       148
       -
       

     

       149
       149
       -
       func TestExtractKeyID(t *testing.T) {

     

       150
       150
       -
       	// Create a test JWT token with kid in header

     

       151
       151
       -
       	token := jwt.New(jwt.SigningMethodRS256)

     

       152
       152
       -
       	token.Header["kid"] = "test-key-id"

     

       153
       153
       -
       	token.Claims = &Claims{

     

       154
       154
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       155
       155
       -
       			Subject: "did:plc:test123",

     

       156
       156
       -
       			Issuer:  "https://test-pds.example.com",

     

       157
       157
       -
       		},

     

       158
       158
       -
       	}

     

       159
       159
       -
       

     

       160
       160
       -
       	// Sign with a dummy RSA key (we just need a valid token structure)

     

       161
       161
       -
       	tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte("dummy"))

     

       162
       162
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       163
       163
       -
       		// If it succeeds (shouldn't with wrong key type, but let's handle it)

     

       164
       164
       -
       		kid, err := ExtractKeyID(tokenString)

     

       165
       165
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       166
       166
       -
       			t.Logf("ExtractKeyID failed (expected if signing fails): %v", err)

     

       167
       167
       -
       		} else if kid != "test-key-id" {

     

       168
       168
       -
       			t.Errorf("Expected kid 'test-key-id', got '%s'", kid)

     

       169
       169
       -
       		}

     

       170
       170
       -
       	}

     

       171
       171
       -
       }

     

       172
       172
       -
       

     

       173
       173
       -
       // === HS256 Verification Tests ===

     

       174
       174
       -
       

     

       175
       175
       -
       // mockJWKSFetcher is a mock implementation of JWKSFetcher for testing

     

       176
       176
       -
       type mockJWKSFetcher struct {

     

       177
       177
       -
       	publicKey interface{}

     

       178
       178
       -
       	err       error

     

       179
       179
       -
       }

     

       180
       180
       -
       

     

       181
       181
       -
       func (m *mockJWKSFetcher) FetchPublicKey(ctx context.Context, issuer, token string) (interface{}, error) {

     

       182
       182
       -
       	return m.publicKey, m.err

     

       183
       183
       -
       }

     

       184
       184
       -
       

     

       185
       185
       -
       func createHS256Token(t *testing.T, subject, issuer, secret string, expiry time.Duration) string {

     

       186
       186
       -
       	t.Helper()

     

       187
       187
       -
       	claims := &Claims{

     

       188
       188
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       189
       189
       -
       			Subject:   subject,

     

       190
       190
       -
       			Issuer:    issuer,

     

       191
       191
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(expiry)),

     

       192
       192
       -
       			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),

     

       193
       193
       -
       		},

     

       194
       194
       -
       		Scope: "atproto transition:generic",

     

       195
       195
       -
       	}

     

       196
       196
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)

     

       197
       197
       -
       	tokenString, err := token.SignedString([]byte(secret))

     

       198
       198
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       199
       199
       -
       		t.Fatalf("Failed to create test token: %v", err)

     

       200
       200
       -
       	}

     

       201
       201
       -
       	return tokenString

     

       202
       202
       -
       }

     

       203
       203
       -
       

     

       204
       204
       -
       func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_Valid(t *testing.T) {

     

       205
       205
       -
       	// Setup: Configure environment for HS256 verification

     

       206
       206
       -
       	secret := "test-jwt-secret-key-12345"

     

       207
       207
       -
       	issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"

     

       208
       208
       -
       

     

       209
       209
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       210
       210
       -
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", secret)

     

       211
       211
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       212
       212
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       213
       213
       -
       

     

       214
       214
       -
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, secret, 1*time.Hour)

     

       215
       215
       -
       

     

       216
       216
       -
       	// Verify token

     

       217
       217
       -
       	claims, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})

     

       218
       218
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       219
       219
       -
       		t.Fatalf("VerifyJWT failed for valid HS256 token: %v", err)

     

       220
       220
       -
       	}

     

       221
       221
       -
       

     

       222
       222
       -
       	if claims.Subject != "did:plc:test123" {

     

       223
       223
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected subject 'did:plc:test123', got '%s'", claims.Subject)

     

       224
       224
       -
       	}

     

       225
       225
       -
       	if claims.Issuer != issuer {

     

       226
       226
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected issuer '%s', got '%s'", issuer, claims.Issuer)

     

       227
       227
       -
       	}

     

       228
       228
       -
       }

     

       229
       229
       -
       

     

       230
       230
       -
       func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_WrongSecret(t *testing.T) {

     

       231
       231
       -
       	// Setup: Configure environment with one secret, sign with another

     

       232
       232
       -
       	issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"

     

       233
       233
       -
       

     

       234
       234
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       235
       235
       -
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "correct-secret")

     

       236
       236
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       237
       237
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       238
       238
       -
       

     

       239
       239
       -
       	// Create token with wrong secret

     

       240
       240
       -
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, "wrong-secret", 1*time.Hour)

     

       241
       241
       -
       

     

       242
       242
       -
       	// Verify should fail

     

       243
       243
       -
       	_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})

     

       244
       244
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       245
       245
       -
       		t.Error("Expected error for HS256 token with wrong secret, got nil")

     

       246
       246
       -
       	}

     

       247
       247
       -
       }

     

       248
       248
       -
       

     

       249
       249
       -
       func TestVerifyJWT_HS256_SecretNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {

     

       250
       250
       -
       	// Setup: Whitelist issuer but don't configure secret

     

       251
       251
       -
       	issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"

     

       252
       252
       -
       

     

       253
       253
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       254
       254
       -
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "") // Ensure secret is not set (empty = not configured)

     

       255
       255
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       256
       256
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       257
       257
       -
       

     

       258
       258
       -
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", issuer, "any-secret", 1*time.Hour)

     

       259
       259
       -
       

     

       260
       260
       -
       	// Verify should fail with descriptive error

     

       261
       261
       -
       	_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})

     

       262
       262
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       263
       263
       -
       		t.Error("Expected error when PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured, got nil")

     

       264
       264
       -
       	}

     

       265
       265
       -
       	if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured") {

     

       266
       266
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected error about PDS_JWT_SECRET not configured, got: %v", err)

     

       267
       267
       -
       	}

     

       268
       268
       -
       }

     

       269
       269
       -
       

     

       270
       270
       -
       // === Algorithm Confusion Attack Prevention Tests ===

     

       271
       271
       -
       

     

       272
       272
       -
       func TestVerifyJWT_AlgorithmConfusionAttack_HS256WithNonWhitelistedIssuer(t *testing.T) {

     

       273
       273
       -
       	// SECURITY TEST: This tests the algorithm confusion attack prevention

     

       274
       274
       -
       	// An attacker tries to use HS256 with an issuer that should use RS256/ES256

     

       275
       275
       -
       

     

       276
       276
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       277
       277
       -
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")

     

       278
       278
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://trusted.example.com") // Different from token issuer

     

       279
       279
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       280
       280
       -
       

     

       281
       281
       -
       	// Create HS256 token with non-whitelisted issuer (simulating attack)

     

       282
       282
       -
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:attacker", "https://victim-pds.example.com", "some-secret", 1*time.Hour)

     

       283
       283
       -
       

     

       284
       284
       -
       	// Verify should fail because issuer is not in HS256 whitelist

     

       285
       285
       -
       	_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})

     

       286
       286
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       287
       287
       -
       		t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: HS256 token accepted for non-whitelisted issuer")

     

       288
       288
       -
       	}

     

       289
       289
       -
       	if err != nil && !contains(err.Error(), "not in HS256_ISSUERS whitelist") {

     

       290
       290
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected error about HS256 not allowed for issuer, got: %v", err)

     

       291
       291
       -
       	}

     

       292
       292
       -
       }

     

       293
       293
       -
       

     

       294
       294
       -
       func TestVerifyJWT_AlgorithmConfusionAttack_EmptyWhitelist(t *testing.T) {

     

       295
       295
       -
       	// SECURITY TEST: When no issuers are whitelisted for HS256, all HS256 tokens should be rejected

     

       296
       296
       -
       

     

       297
       297
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       298
       298
       -
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "some-secret")

     

       299
       299
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "") // Empty whitelist

     

       300
       300
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       301
       301
       -
       

     

       302
       302
       -
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://any-pds.example.com", "some-secret", 1*time.Hour)

     

       303
       303
       -
       

     

       304
       304
       -
       	// Verify should fail because no issuers are whitelisted for HS256

     

       305
       305
       -
       	_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})

     

       306
       306
       -
       	if err == nil {

     

       307
       307
       -
       		t.Error("SECURITY VULNERABILITY: HS256 token accepted with empty issuer whitelist")

     

       308
       308
       -
       	}

     

       309
       309
       -
       }

     

       310
       310
       -
       

     

       311
       311
       -
       func TestVerifyJWT_IssuerRequiresHS256ButTokenUsesRS256(t *testing.T) {

     

       312
       312
       -
       	// Test that issuer whitelisted for HS256 rejects tokens claiming to use RS256

     

       313
       313
       -
       	issuer := "https://pds.coves.social"

     

       314
       314
       -
       

     

       315
       315
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       316
       316
       -
       	t.Setenv("PDS_JWT_SECRET", "test-secret")

     

       317
       317
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", issuer)

     

       318
       318
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       319
       319
       -
       

     

       320
       320
       -
       	// Create RS256-signed token (can't actually sign without RSA key, but we can test the header check)

     

       321
       321
       -
       	claims := &Claims{

     

       322
       322
       -
       		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{

     

       323
       323
       -
       			Subject:   "did:plc:test123",

     

       324
       324
       -
       			Issuer:    issuer,

     

       325
       325
       -
       			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour)),

     

       326
       326
       -
       		},

     

       327
       327
       -
       	}

     

       328
       328
       -
       	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)

     

       329
       329
       -
       	// This will create an invalid signature but valid header structure

     

       330
       330
       -
       	// The test should fail at algorithm check, not signature verification

     

       331
       331
       -
       	tokenString, _ := token.SignedString([]byte("dummy-key"))

     

       332
       332
       -
       

     

       333
       333
       -
       	if tokenString != "" {

     

       334
       334
       -
       		_, err := VerifyJWT(context.Background(), tokenString, &mockJWKSFetcher{})

     

       335
       335
       -
       		if err == nil {

     

       336
       336
       -
       			t.Error("Expected error when HS256 issuer receives non-HS256 token")

     

       337
       337
       -
       		}

     

       338
       338
       -
       	}

     

       339
       339
       -
       }

     

       340
       340
       -
       

     

       341
       341
       -
       // === ParseJWTHeader Tests ===

     

       342
       342
       -
       

     

       343
       343
       -
       func TestParseJWTHeader_Valid(t *testing.T) {

     

       344
       344
       -
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://test.example.com", "secret", 1*time.Hour)

     

       345
       345
       -
       

     

       346
       346
       -
       	header, err := ParseJWTHeader(tokenString)

     

       347
       347
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       348
       348
       -
       		t.Fatalf("ParseJWTHeader failed: %v", err)

     

       349
       349
       -
       	}

     

       350
       350
       -
       

     

       351
       351
       -
       	if header.Alg != AlgorithmHS256 {

     

       352
       352
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected alg '%s', got '%s'", AlgorithmHS256, header.Alg)

     

       353
       353
       -
       	}

     

       354
       354
       -
       }

     

       355
       355
       -
       

     

       356
       356
       -
       func TestParseJWTHeader_WithBearerPrefix(t *testing.T) {

     

       357
       357
       -
       	tokenString := createHS256Token(t, "did:plc:test123", "https://test.example.com", "secret", 1*time.Hour)

     

       358
       358
       -
       

     

       359
       359
       -
       	header, err := ParseJWTHeader("Bearer " + tokenString)

     

       360
       360
       -
       	if err != nil {

     

       361
       361
       -
       		t.Fatalf("ParseJWTHeader failed with Bearer prefix: %v", err)

     

       362
       362
       -
       	}

     

       363
       363
       -
       

     

       364
       364
       -
       	if header.Alg != AlgorithmHS256 {

     

       365
       365
       -
       		t.Errorf("Expected alg '%s', got '%s'", AlgorithmHS256, header.Alg)

     

       366
       366
       -
       	}

     

       367
       367
       -
       }

     

       368
       368
       -
       

     

       369
       369
       -
       func TestParseJWTHeader_InvalidFormat(t *testing.T) {

     

       370
       370
       -
       	testCases := []struct {

     

       371
       371
       -
       		name  string

     

       372
       372
       -
       		input string

     

       373
       373
       -
       	}{

     

       374
       374
       -
       		{"empty string", ""},

     

       375
       375
       -
       		{"single part", "abc"},

     

       376
       376
       -
       		{"two parts", "abc.def"},

     

       377
       377
       -
       		{"too many parts", "a.b.c.d"},

     

       378
       378
       -
       	}

     

       379
       379
       -
       

     

       380
       380
       -
       	for _, tc := range testCases {

     

       381
       381
       -
       		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {

     

       382
       382
       -
       			_, err := ParseJWTHeader(tc.input)

     

       383
       383
       -
       			if err == nil {

     

       384
       384
       -
       				t.Errorf("Expected error for invalid JWT format '%s', got nil", tc.input)

     

       385
       385
       -
       			}

     

       386
       386
       -
       		})

     

       387
       387
       -
       	}

     

       388
       388
       -
       }

     

       389
       389
       -
       

     

       390
       390
       -
       // === shouldUseHS256 and isHS256IssuerWhitelisted Tests ===

     

       391
       391
       -
       

     

       392
       392
       -
       func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_Whitelisted(t *testing.T) {

     

       393
       393
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       394
       394
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com,https://pds2.example.com")

     

       395
       395
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       396
       396
       -
       

     

       397
       397
       -
       	if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds1.example.com") {

     

       398
       398
       -
       		t.Error("Expected pds1 to be whitelisted")

     

       399
       399
       -
       	}

     

       400
       400
       -
       	if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds2.example.com") {

     

       401
       401
       -
       		t.Error("Expected pds2 to be whitelisted")

     

       402
       402
       -
       	}

     

       403
       403
       -
       }

     

       404
       404
       -
       

     

       405
       405
       -
       func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_NotWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {

     

       406
       406
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       407
       407
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://pds1.example.com")

     

       408
       408
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       409
       409
       -
       

     

       410
       410
       -
       	if isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://attacker.example.com") {

     

       411
       411
       -
       		t.Error("Expected non-whitelisted issuer to return false")

     

       412
       412
       -
       	}

     

       413
       413
       -
       }

     

       414
       414
       -
       

     

       415
       415
       -
       func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_EmptyWhitelist(t *testing.T) {

     

       416
       416
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       417
       417
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "") // Empty whitelist

     

       418
       418
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       419
       419
       -
       

     

       420
       420
       -
       	if isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://any.example.com") {

     

       421
       421
       -
       		t.Error("Expected false when whitelist is empty (safe default)")

     

       422
       422
       -
       	}

     

       423
       423
       -
       }

     

       424
       424
       -
       

     

       425
       425
       -
       func TestIsHS256IssuerWhitelisted_WhitespaceHandling(t *testing.T) {

     

       426
       426
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       427
       427
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "  https://pds1.example.com  ,  https://pds2.example.com  ")

     

       428
       428
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       429
       429
       -
       

     

       430
       430
       -
       	if !isHS256IssuerWhitelisted("https://pds1.example.com") {

     

       431
       431
       -
       		t.Error("Expected whitespace-trimmed issuer to be whitelisted")

     

       432
       432
       -
       	}

     

       433
       433
       -
       }

     

       434
       434
       -
       

     

       435
       435
       -
       // === shouldUseHS256 Tests (kid-based logic) ===

     

       436
       436
       -
       

     

       437
       437
       -
       func TestShouldUseHS256_WithKid_AlwaysFalse(t *testing.T) {

     

       438
       438
       -
       	// Tokens with kid should NEVER use HS256, regardless of issuer whitelist

     

       439
       439
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       440
       440
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://whitelisted.example.com")

     

       441
       441
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       442
       442
       -
       

     

       443
       443
       -
       	header := &JWTHeader{

     

       444
       444
       -
       		Alg: AlgorithmHS256,

     

       445
       445
       -
       		Kid: "some-key-id", // Has kid

     

       446
       446
       -
       	}

     

       447
       447
       -
       

     

       448
       448
       -
       	// Even whitelisted issuer should not use HS256 if token has kid

     

       449
       449
       -
       	if shouldUseHS256(header, "https://whitelisted.example.com") {

     

       450
       450
       -
       		t.Error("Tokens with kid should never use HS256 (supports federation)")

     

       451
       451
       -
       	}

     

       452
       452
       -
       }

     

       453
       453
       -
       

     

       454
       454
       -
       func TestShouldUseHS256_WithoutKid_WhitelistedIssuer(t *testing.T) {

     

       455
       455
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       456
       456
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")

     

       457
       457
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       458
       458
       -
       

     

       459
       459
       -
       	header := &JWTHeader{

     

       460
       460
       -
       		Alg: AlgorithmHS256,

     

       461
       461
       -
       		Kid: "", // No kid

     

       462
       462
       -
       	}

     

       463
       463
       -
       

     

       464
       464
       -
       	if !shouldUseHS256(header, "https://my-pds.example.com") {

     

       465
       465
       -
       		t.Error("Token without kid from whitelisted issuer should use HS256")

     

       466
       466
       -
       	}

     

       467
       467
       -
       }

     

       468
       468
       -
       

     

       469
       469
       -
       func TestShouldUseHS256_WithoutKid_NotWhitelisted(t *testing.T) {

     

       470
       470
       -
       	ResetJWTConfigForTesting()

     

       471
       471
       -
       	t.Setenv("HS256_ISSUERS", "https://my-pds.example.com")

     

       472
       472
       -
       	t.Cleanup(ResetJWTConfigForTesting)

     

       473
       473
       -
       

     

       474
       474
       -
       	header := &JWTHeader{

     

       475
       475
       -
       		Alg: AlgorithmHS256,

     

       476
       476
       -
       		Kid: "", // No kid

     

       477
       477
       -
       	}

     

       478
       478
       -
       

     

       479
       479
       -
       	if shouldUseHS256(header, "https://external-pds.example.com") {

     

       480
       480
       -
       		t.Error("Token without kid from non-whitelisted issuer should NOT use HS256")

     

       481
       481
       -
       	}

     

       482
       482
       -
       }

     

       483
       483
       -
       

     

       484
       484
       -
       // Helper function

     

       485
       485
       -
       func contains(s, substr string) bool {

     

       486
       486
       -
       	return len(s) >= len(substr) && (s == substr || len(s) > 0 && containsHelper(s, substr))

     

       487
       487
       -
       }

     

       488
       488
       -
       

     

       489
       489
       -
       func containsHelper(s, substr string) bool {

     

       490
       490
       -
       	for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ {

     

       491
       491
       -
       		if s[i:i+len(substr)] == substr {

     

       492
       492
       -
       			return true

     

       493
       493
       -
       		}

     

       494
       494
       -
       	}

     

       495
       495
       -
       	return false

     

       496
       496
       -
       }

docker-compose.prod.yml

···

       62
       62
        
             # Instance identity

     

       63
       63
        
             INSTANCE_DID: did:web:coves.social

     

       64
       64
        
             INSTANCE_DOMAIN: coves.social

     

       65
       65
       +
             APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL: https://coves.social

     

       65
       66
        
       

     

       66
       67
        
             # PDS connection (separate domain!)

     

       67
       68
        
             PDS_URL: https://coves.me

+3 -1

internal/atproto/oauth/client.go

···

       82
       82
        
       		clientConfig = oauth.NewLocalhostConfig(callbackURL, config.Scopes)

     

       83
       83
        
       	} else {

     

       84
       84
        
       		// Production mode: public OAuth client with HTTPS

     

       85
       85
       +
       		// client_id must be the URL of the client metadata document per atproto OAuth spec

     

       86
       86
       +
       		clientID := config.PublicURL + "/oauth/client-metadata.json"

     

       85
       87
        
       		callbackURL := config.PublicURL + "/oauth/callback"

     

       86
       86
       -
       		clientConfig = oauth.NewPublicConfig(config.PublicURL, callbackURL, config.Scopes)

     

       88
       88
       +
       		clientConfig = oauth.NewPublicConfig(clientID, callbackURL, config.Scopes)

     

       87
       89
        
       	}

     

       88
       90
        
       

     

       89
       91
        
       	// Set user agent

-97

static/oauth/callback.html

···

       1
       1
       -
       <!DOCTYPE html>

     

       2
       2
       -
       <html>

     

       3
       3
       -
       <head>

     

       4
       4
       -
         <meta charset="utf-8">

     

       5
       5
       -
         <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">

     

       6
       6
       -
         <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'">

     

       7
       7
       -
         <title>Authorization Successful - Coves</title>

     

       8
       8
       -
         <style>

     

       9
       9
       -
           body {

     

       10
       10
       -
             font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;

     

       11
       11
       -
             display: flex;

     

       12
       12
       -
             align-items: center;

     

       13
       13
       -
             justify-content: center;

     

       14
       14
       -
             min-height: 100vh;

     

       15
       15
       -
             margin: 0;

     

       16
       16
       -
             background: #f5f5f5;

     

       17
       17
       -
           }

     

       18
       18
       -
           .container {

     

       19
       19
       -
             text-align: center;

     

       20
       20
       -
             padding: 2rem;

     

       21
       21
       -
             background: white;

     

       22
       22
       -
             border-radius: 8px;

     

       23
       23
       -
             box-shadow: 0 2px 8px rgba(0,0,0,0.1);

     

       24
       24
       -
             max-width: 400px;

     

       25
       25
       -
           }

     

       26
       26
       -
           .success { color: #22c55e; font-size: 3rem; margin-bottom: 1rem; }

     

       27
       27
       -
           h1 { margin: 0 0 0.5rem; color: #1f2937; font-size: 1.5rem; }

     

       28
       28
       -
           p { color: #6b7280; margin: 0.5rem 0; }

     

       29
       29
       -
           a {

     

       30
       30
       -
             display: inline-block;

     

       31
       31
       -
             margin-top: 1rem;

     

       32
       32
       -
             padding: 0.75rem 1.5rem;

     

       33
       33
       -
             background: #3b82f6;

     

       34
       34
       -
             color: white;

     

       35
       35
       -
             text-decoration: none;

     

       36
       36
       -
             border-radius: 6px;

     

       37
       37
       -
             font-weight: 500;

     

       38
       38
       -
           }

     

       39
       39
       -
           a:hover { background: #2563eb; }

     

       40
       40
       -
         </style>

     

       41
       41
       -
       </head>

     

       42
       42
       -
       <body>

     

       43
       43
       -
         <div class="container">

     

       44
       44
       -
           <div class="success">✓</div>

     

       45
       45
       -
           <h1>Authorization Successful!</h1>

     

       46
       46
       -
           <p id="status">Returning to Coves...</p>

     

       47
       47
       -
           <a href="#" id="manualLink">Open Coves</a>

     

       48
       48
       -
         </div>

     

       49
       49
       -
         <script>

     

       50
       50
       -
           (function() {

     

       51
       51
       -
             // Parse and sanitize query params - only allow expected OAuth parameters

     

       52
       52
       -
             const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);

     

       53
       53
       -
             const safeParams = new URLSearchParams();

     

       54
       54
       -
       

     

       55
       55
       -
             // Whitelist only expected OAuth callback parameters

     

       56
       56
       -
             const code = urlParams.get('code');

     

       57
       57
       -
             const state = urlParams.get('state');

     

       58
       58
       -
             const error = urlParams.get('error');

     

       59
       59
       -
             const errorDescription = urlParams.get('error_description');

     

       60
       60
       -
             const iss = urlParams.get('iss');

     

       61
       61
       -
       

     

       62
       62
       -
             if (code) safeParams.set('code', code);

     

       63
       63
       -
             if (state) safeParams.set('state', state);

     

       64
       64
       -
             if (error) safeParams.set('error', error);

     

       65
       65
       -
             if (errorDescription) safeParams.set('error_description', errorDescription);

     

       66
       66
       -
             if (iss) safeParams.set('iss', iss);

     

       67
       67
       -
       

     

       68
       68
       -
             const sanitizedQuery = safeParams.toString() ? '?' + safeParams.toString() : '';

     

       69
       69
       -
       

     

       70
       70
       -
             const userAgent = navigator.userAgent || '';

     

       71
       71
       -
             const isAndroid = /Android/i.test(userAgent);

     

       72
       72
       -
       

     

       73
       73
       -
             // Build deep link based on platform

     

       74
       74
       -
             let deepLink;

     

       75
       75
       -
             if (isAndroid) {

     

       76
       76
       -
               // Android: Intent URL format

     

       77
       77
       -
               const pathAndQuery = '/oauth/callback' + sanitizedQuery;

     

       78
       78
       -
               deepLink = 'intent:/' + pathAndQuery + '#Intent;scheme=social.coves;package=social.coves;end';

     

       79
       79
       -
             } else {

     

       80
       80
       -
               // iOS: Custom scheme

     

       81
       81
       -
               deepLink = 'social.coves:/oauth/callback' + sanitizedQuery;

     

       82
       82
       -
             }

     

       83
       83
       -
       

     

       84
       84
       -
             // Update manual link

     

       85
       85
       -
             document.getElementById('manualLink').href = deepLink;

     

       86
       86
       -
       

     

       87
       87
       -
             // Attempt automatic redirect

     

       88
       88
       -
             window.location.href = deepLink;

     

       89
       89
       -
       

     

       90
       90
       -
             // Update status after 2 seconds if redirect didn't work

     

       91
       91
       -
             setTimeout(function() {

     

       92
       92
       -
               document.getElementById('status').textContent = 'Click the button above to continue';

     

       93
       93
       -
             }, 2000);

     

       94
       94
       -
           })();

     

       95
       95
       -
         </script>

     

       96
       96
       -
       </body>

     

       97
       97
       -
       </html>

+6 -5

internal/api/routes/oauth.go

···

       38
       38
        
       	// Use login limiter since callback completes the authentication flow

     

       39
       39
        
       	r.With(corsMiddleware(allowedOrigins), loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)

     

       40
       40
        
       

     

       41
       41
       -
       	// Mobile Universal Link callback route

     

       42
       42
       -
       	// This route is used for iOS Universal Links and Android App Links

     

       43
       43
       -
       	// Path must match the path in .well-known/apple-app-site-association

     

       44
       44
       -
       	// Uses the same handler as web callback - the system routes it to the mobile app

     

       45
       45
       -
       	r.With(loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/app/oauth/callback", handler.HandleCallback)

     

       41
       41
       +
       	// Mobile Universal Link callback route (fallback when app doesn't intercept)

     

       42
       42
       +
       	// This route exists for iOS Universal Links and Android App Links.

     

       43
       43
       +
       	// When properly configured, the mobile OS intercepts this URL and opens the app

     

       44
       44
       +
       	// BEFORE the request reaches the server. If this handler is reached, it means

     

       45
       45
       +
       	// Universal Links failed to intercept.

     

       46
       46
       +
       	r.With(loginLimiter.Middleware).Get("/app/oauth/callback", handler.HandleMobileDeepLinkFallback)

     

       46
       47
        
       

     

       47
       48
        
       	// Session management - dedicated rate limits

     

       48
       49
        
       	r.With(logoutLimiter.Middleware).Post("/oauth/logout", handler.HandleLogout)

+11

static/.well-known/apple-app-site-association

···

       1
       1
       +
       {

     

       2
       2
       +
         "applinks": {

     

       3
       3
       +
           "apps": [],

     

       4
       4
       +
           "details": [

     

       5
       5
       +
             {

     

       6
       6
       +
               "appID": "TEAM_ID.social.coves",

     

       7
       7
       +
               "paths": ["/app/oauth/callback"]

     

       8
       8
       +
             }

     

       9
       9
       +
           ]

     

       10
       10
       +
         }

     

       11
       11
       +
       }

+10

static/.well-known/assetlinks.json

···

       1
       1
       +
       [{

     

       2
       2
       +
         "relation": ["delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"],

     

       3
       3
       +
         "target": {

     

       4
       4
       +
           "namespace": "android_app",

     

       5
       5
       +
           "package_name": "social.coves",

     

       6
       6
       +
           "sha256_cert_fingerprints": [

     

       7
       7
       +
             "0B:D8:8C:99:66:25:E5:CD:06:54:80:88:01:6F:B7:38:B9:F4:5B:41:71:F7:95:C8:68:94:87:AD:EA:9F:D9:ED"

     

       8
       8
       +
           ]

     

       9
       9
       +
         }

     

       10
       10
       +
       }]

+16 -9

internal/atproto/oauth/handlers_test.go

···

       171
       171
        
       }

     

       172
       172
        
       

     

       173
       173
        
       // TestIsMobileRedirectURI tests mobile redirect URI validation with EXACT URI matching

     

       174
       174
       -
       // Only Universal Links (HTTPS) are allowed - custom schemes are blocked for security

     

       174
       174
       +
       // Per atproto spec, custom schemes must match client_id hostname in reverse-domain order

     

       175
       175
        
       func TestIsMobileRedirectURI(t *testing.T) {

     

       176
       176
        
       	tests := []struct {

     

       177
       177
        
       		uri      string

     

       178
       178
        
       		expected bool

     

       179
       179
        
       	}{

     

       180
       180
       -
       		{"https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback", true}, // Universal Link - allowed

     

       181
       181
       -
       		{"coves-app://oauth/callback", false},             // Custom scheme - blocked (insecure)

     

       182
       182
       -
       		{"coves://oauth/callback", false},                 // Custom scheme - blocked (insecure)

     

       183
       183
       -
       		{"coves-app://callback", false},                   // Custom scheme - blocked

     

       184
       184
       -
       		{"coves://oauth", false},                          // Custom scheme - blocked

     

       185
       185
       -
       		{"myapp://oauth", false},                          // Not in allowlist

     

       186
       186
       -
       		{"https://example.com", false},                    // Wrong domain

     

       187
       187
       -
       		{"http://localhost", false},                       // HTTP not allowed

     

       180
       180
       +
       		// Custom scheme per atproto spec (reverse domain of coves.social)

     

       181
       181
       +
       		{"social.coves:/callback", true},

     

       182
       182
       +
       		{"social.coves://callback", true},

     

       183
       183
       +
       		{"social.coves:/oauth/callback", true},

     

       184
       184
       +
       		{"social.coves://oauth/callback", true},

     

       185
       185
       +
       		// Universal Link - allowed (strongest security)

     

       186
       186
       +
       		{"https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback", true},

     

       187
       187
       +
       		// Wrong custom schemes - not reverse-domain of coves.social

     

       188
       188
       +
       		{"coves-app://oauth/callback", false},

     

       189
       189
       +
       		{"coves://oauth/callback", false},

     

       190
       190
       +
       		{"coves.social://callback", false}, // Not reversed

     

       191
       191
       +
       		{"myapp://oauth", false},

     

       192
       192
       +
       		// Wrong domain/scheme

     

       193
       193
       +
       		{"https://example.com", false},

     

       194
       194
       +
       		{"http://localhost", false},

     

       188
       195
        
       		{"", false},

     

       189
       196
        
       		{"not-a-uri", false},

     

       190
       197
        
       	}

+115

internal/api/handlers/vote/create_vote.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package vote

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"Coves/internal/core/votes"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"encoding/json"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"log"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       9
       9
       +
       )

     

       10
       10
       +
       

     

       11
       11
       +
       // CreateVoteHandler handles vote creation

     

       12
       12
       +
       type CreateVoteHandler struct {

     

       13
       13
       +
       	service votes.Service

     

       14
       14
       +
       }

     

       15
       15
       +
       

     

       16
       16
       +
       // NewCreateVoteHandler creates a new create vote handler

     

       17
       17
       +
       func NewCreateVoteHandler(service votes.Service) *CreateVoteHandler {

     

       18
       18
       +
       	return &CreateVoteHandler{

     

       19
       19
       +
       		service: service,

     

       20
       20
       +
       	}

     

       21
       21
       +
       }

     

       22
       22
       +
       

     

       23
       23
       +
       // CreateVoteInput represents the request body for creating a vote

     

       24
       24
       +
       type CreateVoteInput struct {

     

       25
       25
       +
       	Subject struct {

     

       26
       26
       +
       		URI string `json:"uri"`

     

       27
       27
       +
       		CID string `json:"cid"`

     

       28
       28
       +
       	} `json:"subject"`

     

       29
       29
       +
       	Direction string `json:"direction"`

     

       30
       30
       +
       }

     

       31
       31
       +
       

     

       32
       32
       +
       // CreateVoteOutput represents the response body for creating a vote

     

       33
       33
       +
       type CreateVoteOutput struct {

     

       34
       34
       +
       	URI string `json:"uri"`

     

       35
       35
       +
       	CID string `json:"cid"`

     

       36
       36
       +
       }

     

       37
       37
       +
       

     

       38
       38
       +
       // HandleCreateVote creates a vote on a post or comment

     

       39
       39
       +
       // POST /xrpc/social.coves.vote.create

     

       40
       40
       +
       //

     

       41
       41
       +
       // Request body: { "subject": { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." }, "direction": "up" }

     

       42
       42
       +
       // Response: { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." }

     

       43
       43
       +
       //

     

       44
       44
       +
       // Behavior:

     

       45
       45
       +
       // - If no vote exists: creates new vote with given direction

     

       46
       46
       +
       // - If vote exists with same direction: deletes vote (toggle off)

     

       47
       47
       +
       // - If vote exists with different direction: updates to new direction

     

       48
       48
       +
       func (h *CreateVoteHandler) HandleCreateVote(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       49
       49
       +
       	if r.Method != http.MethodPost {

     

       50
       50
       +
       		http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)

     

       51
       51
       +
       		return

     

       52
       52
       +
       	}

     

       53
       53
       +
       

     

       54
       54
       +
       	// Parse request body

     

       55
       55
       +
       	var input CreateVoteInput

     

       56
       56
       +
       	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {

     

       57
       57
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")

     

       58
       58
       +
       		return

     

       59
       59
       +
       	}

     

       60
       60
       +
       

     

       61
       61
       +
       	// Validate required fields

     

       62
       62
       +
       	if input.Subject.URI == "" {

     

       63
       63
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.uri is required")

     

       64
       64
       +
       		return

     

       65
       65
       +
       	}

     

       66
       66
       +
       	if input.Subject.CID == "" {

     

       67
       67
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.cid is required")

     

       68
       68
       +
       		return

     

       69
       69
       +
       	}

     

       70
       70
       +
       	if input.Direction == "" {

     

       71
       71
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "direction is required")

     

       72
       72
       +
       		return

     

       73
       73
       +
       	}

     

       74
       74
       +
       

     

       75
       75
       +
       	// Validate direction

     

       76
       76
       +
       	if input.Direction != "up" && input.Direction != "down" {

     

       77
       77
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "direction must be 'up' or 'down'")

     

       78
       78
       +
       		return

     

       79
       79
       +
       	}

     

       80
       80
       +
       

     

       81
       81
       +
       	// Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)

     

       82
       82
       +
       	session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)

     

       83
       83
       +
       	if session == nil {

     

       84
       84
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")

     

       85
       85
       +
       		return

     

       86
       86
       +
       	}

     

       87
       87
       +
       

     

       88
       88
       +
       	// Create vote request

     

       89
       89
       +
       	req := votes.CreateVoteRequest{

     

       90
       90
       +
       		Subject: votes.StrongRef{

     

       91
       91
       +
       			URI: input.Subject.URI,

     

       92
       92
       +
       			CID: input.Subject.CID,

     

       93
       93
       +
       		},

     

       94
       94
       +
       		Direction: input.Direction,

     

       95
       95
       +
       	}

     

       96
       96
       +
       

     

       97
       97
       +
       	// Call service to create vote

     

       98
       98
       +
       	response, err := h.service.CreateVote(r.Context(), session, req)

     

       99
       99
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       100
       100
       +
       		handleServiceError(w, err)

     

       101
       101
       +
       		return

     

       102
       102
       +
       	}

     

       103
       103
       +
       

     

       104
       104
       +
       	// Return success response

     

       105
       105
       +
       	output := CreateVoteOutput{

     

       106
       106
       +
       		URI: response.URI,

     

       107
       107
       +
       		CID: response.CID,

     

       108
       108
       +
       	}

     

       109
       109
       +
       

     

       110
       110
       +
       	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       111
       111
       +
       	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       112
       112
       +
       	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {

     

       113
       113
       +
       		log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)

     

       114
       114
       +
       	}

     

       115
       115
       +
       }

+93

internal/api/handlers/vote/delete_vote.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package vote

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"Coves/internal/core/votes"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"encoding/json"

     

       7
       7
       +
       	"log"

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"net/http"

     

       9
       9
       +
       )

     

       10
       10
       +
       

     

       11
       11
       +
       // DeleteVoteHandler handles vote deletion

     

       12
       12
       +
       type DeleteVoteHandler struct {

     

       13
       13
       +
       	service votes.Service

     

       14
       14
       +
       }

     

       15
       15
       +
       

     

       16
       16
       +
       // NewDeleteVoteHandler creates a new delete vote handler

     

       17
       17
       +
       func NewDeleteVoteHandler(service votes.Service) *DeleteVoteHandler {

     

       18
       18
       +
       	return &DeleteVoteHandler{

     

       19
       19
       +
       		service: service,

     

       20
       20
       +
       	}

     

       21
       21
       +
       }

     

       22
       22
       +
       

     

       23
       23
       +
       // DeleteVoteInput represents the request body for deleting a vote

     

       24
       24
       +
       type DeleteVoteInput struct {

     

       25
       25
       +
       	Subject struct {

     

       26
       26
       +
       		URI string `json:"uri"`

     

       27
       27
       +
       		CID string `json:"cid"`

     

       28
       28
       +
       	} `json:"subject"`

     

       29
       29
       +
       }

     

       30
       30
       +
       

     

       31
       31
       +
       // DeleteVoteOutput represents the response body for deleting a vote

     

       32
       32
       +
       // Per lexicon: output is an empty object

     

       33
       33
       +
       type DeleteVoteOutput struct{}

     

       34
       34
       +
       

     

       35
       35
       +
       // HandleDeleteVote removes a vote from a post or comment

     

       36
       36
       +
       // POST /xrpc/social.coves.vote.delete

     

       37
       37
       +
       //

     

       38
       38
       +
       // Request body: { "subject": { "uri": "at://...", "cid": "..." } }

     

       39
       39
       +
       // Response: { "success": true }

     

       40
       40
       +
       func (h *DeleteVoteHandler) HandleDeleteVote(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

     

       41
       41
       +
       	if r.Method != http.MethodPost {

     

       42
       42
       +
       		http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)

     

       43
       43
       +
       		return

     

       44
       44
       +
       	}

     

       45
       45
       +
       

     

       46
       46
       +
       	// Parse request body

     

       47
       47
       +
       	var input DeleteVoteInput

     

       48
       48
       +
       	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {

     

       49
       49
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Invalid request body")

     

       50
       50
       +
       		return

     

       51
       51
       +
       	}

     

       52
       52
       +
       

     

       53
       53
       +
       	// Validate required fields

     

       54
       54
       +
       	if input.Subject.URI == "" {

     

       55
       55
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.uri is required")

     

       56
       56
       +
       		return

     

       57
       57
       +
       	}

     

       58
       58
       +
       	if input.Subject.CID == "" {

     

       59
       59
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "subject.cid is required")

     

       60
       60
       +
       		return

     

       61
       61
       +
       	}

     

       62
       62
       +
       

     

       63
       63
       +
       	// Get OAuth session from context (injected by auth middleware)

     

       64
       64
       +
       	session := middleware.GetOAuthSession(r)

     

       65
       65
       +
       	if session == nil {

     

       66
       66
       +
       		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "AuthRequired", "Authentication required")

     

       67
       67
       +
       		return

     

       68
       68
       +
       	}

     

       69
       69
       +
       

     

       70
       70
       +
       	// Create delete vote request

     

       71
       71
       +
       	req := votes.DeleteVoteRequest{

     

       72
       72
       +
       		Subject: votes.StrongRef{

     

       73
       73
       +
       			URI: input.Subject.URI,

     

       74
       74
       +
       			CID: input.Subject.CID,

     

       75
       75
       +
       		},

     

       76
       76
       +
       	}

     

       77
       77
       +
       

     

       78
       78
       +
       	// Call service to delete vote

     

       79
       79
       +
       	err := h.service.DeleteVote(r.Context(), session, req)

     

       80
       80
       +
       	if err != nil {

     

       81
       81
       +
       		handleServiceError(w, err)

     

       82
       82
       +
       		return

     

       83
       83
       +
       	}

     

       84
       84
       +
       

     

       85
       85
       +
       	// Return success response (empty object per lexicon)

     

       86
       86
       +
       	output := DeleteVoteOutput{}

     

       87
       87
       +
       

     

       88
       88
       +
       	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")

     

       89
       89
       +
       	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)

     

       90
       90
       +
       	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(output); err != nil {

     

       91
       91
       +
       		log.Printf("Failed to encode response: %v", err)

     

       92
       92
       +
       	}

     

       93
       93
       +
       }

+24

internal/api/routes/vote.go

···

       1
       1
       +
       package routes

     

       2
       2
       +
       

     

       3
       3
       +
       import (

     

       4
       4
       +
       	"Coves/internal/api/handlers/vote"

     

       5
       5
       +
       	"Coves/internal/api/middleware"

     

       6
       6
       +
       	"Coves/internal/core/votes"

     

       7
       7
       +
       

     

       8
       8
       +
       	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"

     

       9
       9
       +
       )

     

       10
       10
       +
       

     

       11
       11
       +
       // RegisterVoteRoutes registers vote-related XRPC endpoints on the router

     

       12
       12
       +
       // Implements social.coves.feed.vote.* lexicon endpoints

     

       13
       13
       +
       func RegisterVoteRoutes(r chi.Router, voteService votes.Service, authMiddleware *middleware.OAuthAuthMiddleware) {

     

       14
       14
       +
       	// Initialize handlers

     

       15
       15
       +
       	createHandler := vote.NewCreateVoteHandler(voteService)

     

       16
       16
       +
       	deleteHandler := vote.NewDeleteVoteHandler(voteService)

     

       17
       17
       +
       

     

       18
       18
       +
       	// Procedure endpoints (POST) - require authentication

     

       19
       19
       +
       	// social.coves.feed.vote.create - create or update a vote on a post/comment

     

       20
       20
       +
       	r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post("/xrpc/social.coves.feed.vote.create", createHandler.HandleCreateVote)

     

       21
       21
       +
       

     

       22
       22
       +
       	// social.coves.feed.vote.delete - delete a vote from a post/comment

     

       23
       23
       +
       	r.With(authMiddleware.RequireAuth).Post("/xrpc/social.coves.feed.vote.delete", deleteHandler.HandleDeleteVote)

     

       24
       24
       +
       }

.beads/beads.left.jsonl

···

       1
       1
       +
       {"id":"Coves-95q","content_hash":"8ec99d598f067780436b985f9ad57f0fa19632026981038df4f65f192186620b","title":"Add comprehensive API documentation","description":"","status":"open","priority":2,"issue_type":"task","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:34.835721854-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:34.835721854-08:00","source_repo":".","dependencies":[{"issue_id":"Coves-95q","depends_on_id":"Coves-e16","type":"blocks","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:46.273899399-08:00","created_by":"daemon"}]}

     

       2
       2
       +
       {"id":"Coves-e16","content_hash":"7c5d0fc8f0e7f626be3dad62af0e8412467330bad01a244e5a7e52ac5afff1c1","title":"Complete post creation and moderation features","description":"","status":"open","priority":1,"issue_type":"feature","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:12.885991306-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:12.885991306-08:00","source_repo":"."}

     

       3
       3
       +
       {"id":"Coves-fce","content_hash":"26b3e16b99f827316ee0d741cc959464bd0c813446c95aef8105c7fd1e6b09ff","title":"Implement aggregator feed federation","description":"","status":"open","priority":1,"issue_type":"feature","created_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:21.453326012-08:00","updated_at":"2025-11-17T20:30:21.453326012-08:00","source_repo":"."}

.beads/beads.left.meta.json

···

       1
       1
       +
       {"version":"0.23.1","timestamp":"2025-12-02T18:25:24.009187871-08:00","commit":"00d7d8d"}

+5 -28

cmd/server/main.go

···

       393
       393
        
       	commentRepo := postgresRepo.NewCommentRepository(db)

     

       394
       394
        
       	log.Println("✅ Comment repository initialized (Jetstream indexing only)")

     

       395
       395
        
       

     

       396
       396
       -
       	// Initialize subject validator for votes (checks posts and comments exist)

     

       397
       397
       -
       	subjectValidator := votes.NewCompositeSubjectValidator(

     

       398
       398
       -
       		// Post existence checker

     

       399
       399
       -
       		func(ctx context.Context, uri string) (bool, error) {

     

       400
       400
       -
       			_, err := postRepo.GetByURI(ctx, uri)

     

       401
       401
       -
       			if err != nil {

     

       402
       402
       -
       				if err == posts.ErrNotFound {

     

       403
       403
       -
       					return false, nil

     

       404
       404
       -
       				}

     

       405
       405
       -
       				return false, err

     

       406
       406
       -
       			}

     

       407
       407
       -
       			return true, nil

     

       408
       408
       -
       		},

     

       409
       409
       -
       		// Comment existence checker

     

       410
       410
       -
       		func(ctx context.Context, uri string) (bool, error) {

     

       411
       411
       -
       			_, err := commentRepo.GetByURI(ctx, uri)

     

       412
       412
       -
       			if err != nil {

     

       413
       413
       -
       				if err == comments.ErrCommentNotFound {

     

       414
       414
       -
       					return false, nil

     

       415
       415
       -
       				}

     

       416
       416
       -
       				return false, err

     

       417
       417
       -
       			}

     

       418
       418
       -
       			return true, nil

     

       419
       419
       -
       		},

     

       420
       420
       -
       	)

     

       421
       421
       -
       

     

       422
       396
        
       	// Initialize vote service (for XRPC API endpoints)

     

       423
       423
       -
       	voteService := votes.NewService(voteRepo, subjectValidator, oauthClient, oauthStore, nil)

     

       424
       424
       -
       	log.Println("✅ Vote service initialized (with OAuth authentication and subject validation)")

     

       397
       397
       +
       	// Note: We don't validate subject existence - the vote goes to the user's PDS regardless.

     

       398
       398
       +
       	// The Jetstream consumer handles orphaned votes correctly by only updating counts for

     

       399
       399
       +
       	// non-deleted subjects. This avoids race conditions and eventual consistency issues.

     

       400
       400
       +
       	voteService := votes.NewService(voteRepo, oauthClient, oauthStore, nil)

     

       401
       401
       +
       	log.Println("✅ Vote service initialized (with OAuth authentication)")

     

       425
       402
        
       

     

       426
       403
        
       	// Initialize comment service (for query API)

     

       427
       404
        
       	// Requires user and community repos for proper author/community hydration per lexicon

-3

internal/api/handlers/vote/errors.go

···

       34
       34
        
       	case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrVoteNotFound):

     

       35
       35
        
       		// Matches: social.coves.feed.vote.delete#VoteNotFound

     

       36
       36
        
       		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "VoteNotFound", "No vote found for this subject")

     

       37
       37
       -
       	case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrSubjectNotFound):

     

       38
       38
       -
       		// Matches: social.coves.feed.vote.create#SubjectNotFound

     

       39
       39
       -
       		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "SubjectNotFound", "The subject post or comment was not found")

     

       40
       37
        
       	case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrInvalidDirection):

     

       41
       38
        
       		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "InvalidRequest", "Vote direction must be 'up' or 'down'")

     

       42
       39
        
       	case errors.Is(err, votes.ErrInvalidSubject):

+4 -4

internal/atproto/oauth/handlers_security.go

···

       25
       25
        
       // - Android: Verified via /.well-known/assetlinks.json

     

       26
       26
        
       var allowedMobileRedirectURIs = map[string]bool{

     

       27
       27
        
       	// Custom scheme per atproto spec (reverse-domain of coves.social)

     

       28
       28
       -
       	"social.coves:/callback":                  true,

     

       29
       29
       -
       	"social.coves://callback":                 true, // Some platforms add double slash

     

       30
       30
       -
       	"social.coves:/oauth/callback":            true, // Alternative path

     

       31
       31
       -
       	"social.coves://oauth/callback":           true,

     

       28
       28
       +
       	"social.coves:/callback":        true,

     

       29
       29
       +
       	"social.coves://callback":       true, // Some platforms add double slash

     

       30
       30
       +
       	"social.coves:/oauth/callback":  true, // Alternative path

     

       31
       31
       +
       	"social.coves://oauth/callback": true,

     

       32
       32
        
       	// Universal Links - cryptographically bound to app (preferred for security)

     

       33
       33
        
       	"https://coves.social/app/oauth/callback": true,

     

       34
       34
        
       }

-3

internal/core/votes/errors.go

···

       6
       6
        
       	// ErrVoteNotFound indicates the requested vote doesn't exist

     

       7
       7
        
       	ErrVoteNotFound = errors.New("vote not found")

     

       8
       8
        
       

     

       9
       9
       -
       	// ErrSubjectNotFound indicates the post/comment being voted on doesn't exist

     

       10
       10
       -
       	ErrSubjectNotFound = errors.New("subject not found")

     

       11
       11
       -
       

     

       12
       9
        
       	// ErrInvalidDirection indicates the vote direction is not "up" or "down"

     

       13
       10
        
       	ErrInvalidDirection = errors.New("invalid vote direction: must be 'up' or 'down'")

     

       14
       11

+14 -27

internal/core/votes/service_impl.go

···

       19
       19
        
       

     

       20
       20
        
       // voteService implements the Service interface for vote operations

     

       21
       21
        
       type voteService struct {

     

       22
       22
       -
       	repo             Repository

     

       23
       23
       -
       	subjectValidator SubjectValidator

     

       24
       24
       -
       	oauthClient      *oauthclient.OAuthClient

     

       25
       25
       -
       	oauthStore       oauth.ClientAuthStore

     

       26
       26
       -
       	logger           *slog.Logger

     

       22
       22
       +
       	repo        Repository

     

       23
       23
       +
       	oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient

     

       24
       24
       +
       	oauthStore  oauth.ClientAuthStore

     

       25
       25
       +
       	logger      *slog.Logger

     

       27
       26
        
       }

     

       28
       27
        
       

     

       29
       28
        
       // NewService creates a new vote service instance

     

       30
       30
       -
       // subjectValidator can be nil to skip subject existence checks (not recommended for production)

     

       31
       31
       -
       func NewService(repo Repository, subjectValidator SubjectValidator, oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient, oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore, logger *slog.Logger) Service {

     

       29
       29
       +
       func NewService(repo Repository, oauthClient *oauthclient.OAuthClient, oauthStore oauth.ClientAuthStore, logger *slog.Logger) Service {

     

       32
       30
        
       	if logger == nil {

     

       33
       31
        
       		logger = slog.Default()

     

       34
       32
        
       	}

     

       35
       33
        
       	return &voteService{

     

       36
       36
       -
       		repo:             repo,

     

       37
       37
       -
       		subjectValidator: subjectValidator,

     

       38
       38
       -
       		oauthClient:      oauthClient,

     

       39
       39
       -
       		oauthStore:       oauthStore,

     

       40
       40
       -
       		logger:           logger,

     

       34
       34
       +
       		repo:        repo,

     

       35
       35
       +
       		oauthClient: oauthClient,

     

       36
       36
       +
       		oauthStore:  oauthStore,

     

       37
       37
       +
       		logger:      logger,

     

       41
       38
        
       	}

     

       42
       39
        
       }

     

       43
       40
        
       

     
···

       65
       62
        
       		return nil, ErrInvalidSubject

     

       66
       63
        
       	}

     

       67
       64
        
       

     

       68
       68
       -
       	// Validate subject exists in AppView (post or comment)

     

       69
       69
       -
       	// This prevents creating votes on non-existent content

     

       70
       70
       -
       	if s.subjectValidator != nil {

     

       71
       71
       -
       		exists, err := s.subjectValidator.SubjectExists(ctx, req.Subject.URI)

     

       72
       72
       -
       		if err != nil {

     

       73
       73
       -
       			s.logger.Error("failed to validate subject existence",

     

       74
       74
       -
       				"error", err,

     

       75
       75
       -
       				"subject", req.Subject.URI)

     

       76
       76
       -
       			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to validate subject: %w", err)

     

       77
       77
       -
       		}

     

       78
       78
       -
       		if !exists {

     

       79
       79
       -
       			return nil, ErrSubjectNotFound

     

       80
       80
       -
       		}

     

       81
       81
       -
       	}

     

       65
       65
       +
       	// Note: We intentionally don't validate subject existence here.

     

       66
       66
       +
       	// The vote record goes to the user's PDS regardless. The Jetstream consumer

     

       67
       67
       +
       	// handles orphaned votes correctly by only updating counts for non-deleted subjects.

     

       68
       68
       +
       	// This avoids race conditions and eventual consistency issues.

     

       82
       69
        
       

     

       83
       70
        
       	// Check for existing vote by querying PDS directly (source of truth)

     

       84
       71
        
       	// This avoids eventual consistency issues with the AppView database

     
···

       284
       271
        
       

     

       285
       272
        
       		// Parse the listRecords response

     

       286
       273
        
       		var result struct {

     

       274
       274
       +
       			Cursor  string `json:"cursor"`

     

       287
       275
        
       			Records []struct {

     

       288
       276
        
       				URI   string `json:"uri"`

     

       289
       277
        
       				CID   string `json:"cid"`

     
···

       297
       285
        
       					CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt"`

     

       298
       286
        
       				} `json:"value"`

     

       299
       287
        
       			} `json:"records"`

     

       300
       300
       -
       			Cursor string `json:"cursor"`

     

       301
       288
        
       		}

     

       302
       289
        
       

     

       303
       290
        
       		if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &result); err != nil {

+3 -2

internal/db/postgres/vote_repo.go

···

       64
       64
        
       	return nil

     

       65
       65
        
       }

     

       66
       66
        
       

     

       67
       67
       -
       // GetByURI retrieves a vote by its AT-URI

     

       67
       67
       +
       // GetByURI retrieves an active vote by its AT-URI

     

       68
       68
        
       // Used by Jetstream consumer for DELETE operations

     

       69
       69
       +
       // Returns ErrVoteNotFound for soft-deleted votes

     

       69
       70
        
       func (r *postgresVoteRepo) GetByURI(ctx context.Context, uri string) (*votes.Vote, error) {

     

       70
       71
        
       	query := `

     

       71
       72
        
       		SELECT

     
···

       73
       74
        
       			subject_uri, subject_cid, direction,

     

       74
       75
        
       			created_at, indexed_at, deleted_at

     

       75
       76
        
       		FROM votes

     

       76
       76
       -
       		WHERE uri = $1

     

       77
       77
       +
       		WHERE uri = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL

     

       77
       78
        
       	`

     

       78
       79
        
       

     

       79
       80
        
       	var vote votes.Vote

Compare changes