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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <sys/capability.h>
// Make sure assertions are not compiled out, we use them to codify
// invariants about this program and we want it to fail fast and
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// The WRAPPER_DIR macro is supplied at compile time so that it cannot
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static char * wrapperDir = WRAPPER_DIR;
// Wrapper debug variable name
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static char * wrapperDebug = "WRAPPER_DEBUG";
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// Update the capabilities of the running process to include the given
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// capability in the Ambient set.
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static void set_ambient_cap(cap_value_t cap)
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capng_get_caps_process();
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if (capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, (unsigned long) cap))
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perror("cannot raise the capability into the Inheritable set\n");
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capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
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if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, (unsigned long) cap, 0, 0))
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perror("cannot raise the capability into the Ambient set\n");
// Given the path to this program, fetch its configured capability set
// (as set by `setcap ... /path/to/file`) and raise those capabilities
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static int make_caps_ambient(const char *selfPath)
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cap_t caps = cap_get_file(selfPath);
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if(getenv(wrapperDebug))
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fprintf(stderr, "no caps set or could not retrieve the caps for this file, not doing anything...");
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// We use `cap_to_text` and iteration over the tokenized result
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// string because, as of libcap's current release, there is no
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// facility for retrieving an array of `cap_value_t`'s that can be
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// given to `prctl` in order to lift that capability into the
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// Some discussion was had around shot-gunning all of the
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// capabilities we know about into the Ambient set but that has a
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// security smell and I deemed the risk of the current
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// implementation crashing the program to be lower than the risk
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// of a privilege escalation security hole being introduced by
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// raising all capabilities, even ones we didn't intend for the
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// program, into the Ambient set.
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// `cap_t` which is returned by `cap_get_*` is an opaque type and
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// even if we could retrieve the bitmasks (which, as far as I can
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// tell we cannot) in order to get the `cap_value_t`
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// representation for each capability we would have to take the
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// total number of capabilities supported and iterate over the
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// sequence of integers up-to that maximum total, testing each one
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// against the bitmask ((bitmask >> n) & 1) to see if it's set and
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// aggregating each "capability integer n" that is set in the
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// That, combined with the fact that we can't easily get the
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// bitmask anyway seemed much more brittle than fetching the
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// `cap_t`, transforming it into a textual representation,
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// tokenizing the string, and using `cap_from_name` on the token
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// to get the `cap_value_t` that we need for `prctl`. There is
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// indeed risk involved if the output string format of
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// `cap_to_text` ever changes but at this time the combination of
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// factors involving the below list have led me to the conclusion
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// that the best implementation at this time is reading then
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// parsing with *lots of documentation* about why we're doing it
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// 1. No explicit API for fetching an array of `cap_value_t`'s or
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// for transforming a `cap_t` into such a representation
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// 2. The risk of a crash is lower than lifting all capabilities
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// into the Ambient set
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// 3. libcap is depended on heavily in the Linux ecosystem so
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// there is a high chance that the output representation of
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// `cap_to_text` will not change which reduces our risk that
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// this parsing step will cause a crash
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// The preferred method, should it ever be available in the
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// future, would be to use libcap API's to transform the result
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// from a `cap_get_*` into an array of `cap_value_t`'s that can
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// then be given to prctl.
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char* capstr = cap_to_text(caps, &capLen);
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// TODO: For now, we assume that cap_to_text always starts its
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// result string with " =" and that the first capability is listed
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// immediately after that. We should verify this.
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for(char* tok = strtok_r(capstr, ",", &saveptr); tok; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ",", &saveptr))
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if (cap_from_name(tok, &capnum))
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if(getenv(wrapperDebug))
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fprintf(stderr, "cap_from_name failed, skipping: %s", tok);
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else if (capnum == CAP_SETPCAP)
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// Check for the cap_setpcap capability, we set this on the
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// wrapper so it can elevate the capabilities to the Ambient
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// set but we do not want to propagate it down into the
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// TODO: what happens if that's the behavior you want
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// though???? I'm preferring a strict vs. loose policy here.
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if(getenv(wrapperDebug))
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fprintf(stderr, "cap_setpcap in set, skipping it\n");
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set_ambient_cap(capnum);
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if(getenv(wrapperDebug))
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fprintf(stderr, "raised %s into the Ambient capability set\n", tok);
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int main(int argc, char * * argv)
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// I *think* it's safe to assume that a path from a symbolic link
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// should safely fit within the PATH_MAX system limit. Though I'm
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// not positive it's safe...
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char selfPath[PATH_MAX];
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int selfPathSize = readlink("/proc/self/exe", selfPath, sizeof(selfPath));
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assert(selfPathSize > 0);
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// Assert we have room for the zero byte, this ensures the path
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// isn't being truncated because it's too big for the buffer.
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// A better way to handle this might be to use something like the
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// whereami library (https://github.com/gpakosz/whereami) or a
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// loop that resizes the buffer and re-reads the link if the
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// contents are being truncated.
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assert(selfPathSize < sizeof(selfPath));
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// Set the zero byte since readlink doesn't do that for us.
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selfPath[selfPathSize] = '\0';
// Make sure that we are being executed from the right location,
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// i.e., `safeWrapperDir'. This is to prevent someone from creating
// hard link `X' from some other location, along with a false
// `X.real' file, to allow arbitrary programs from being executed
// with elevated capabilities.
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int len = strlen(wrapperDir);
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if (len > 0 && '/' == wrapperDir[len - 1])
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assert(!strncmp(selfPath, wrapperDir, len));
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assert('/' == wrapperDir[0]);
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assert('/' == selfPath[len]);
// Make *really* *really* sure that we were executed as
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// `selfPath', and not, say, as some other setuid program. That
// is, our effective uid/gid should match the uid/gid of
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assert(lstat(selfPath, &st) != -1);
assert(!(st.st_mode & S_ISUID) || (st.st_uid == geteuid()));
assert(!(st.st_mode & S_ISGID) || (st.st_gid == getegid()));
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assert(!(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)));
// Read the path of the real (wrapped) program from <self>.real.
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char realFN[PATH_MAX + 10];
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int realFNSize = snprintf (realFN, sizeof(realFN), "%s.real", selfPath);
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assert (realFNSize < sizeof(realFN));
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int fdSelf = open(realFN, O_RDONLY);
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char sourceProg[PATH_MAX];
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len = read(fdSelf, sourceProg, PATH_MAX);
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assert (len < sizeof(sourceProg));
// Read the capabilities set on the wrapper and raise them in to
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// the Ambient set so the program we're wrapping receives the
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make_caps_ambient(selfPath);
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execve(sourceProg, argv, environ);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot run `%s': %s\n",
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argv[0], sourceProg, strerror(errno));
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